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SUMMARY  
This thesis examines how regional level network governance and structure influence 
the effectiveness of technology policy to improve local firms’ innovativeness in a 
developing country context. It examines whether network governance and structure 
have a consistent influence on the innovative performance of firms located in 
developing country regions that show different levels of socio-economic 
development. The empirical evidence is based on a multiple case study of two 
regional software networks in Brazil – Campinas and Recife – in the period 2006 to 
2009. 
 
Studies show that regional networks and industry growth in developed countries 
involve some degree of co-evolution. Networks are supposed to foster firm-level 
innovation, since government policies tend to assume that firms learn by interacting 
and that new knowledge is essential for innovation. Inspired by these findings, 
governments in developing countries often seek to address industry and regional 
development by encouraging the formation of regional networks. Policies aimed at 
supporting development of networks have become an important instrument to 
support interaction among firms, and between firms and other network actors. 
However, the investigation of networks, and especially the formation of dyadic ties 
and network consistency, is rarely the subject of empirical work on developing 
countries’ innovation systems. Existing studies of networks tend to provide little 
empirical evidence on multi-organisational interaction and often do not investigate 
the related controlling mechanisms, which are crucial for a better understanding and 
more effective policies. This thesis, using a single analytical framework, provides a 
study of technology policy, multi-organisational network governance and structure, 
and firm level innovative performance. 
 
The research examines two Brazilian software industry networks established in the 
early 1990s, promoted by a national government programme to support the 
formation of regional networks. The histories of the information and communication 
technology (ICT) industries in the two regions are very different. The ICT industry 
in Campinas benefited from long-term national support, while the ICT industry in 
Recife received little direct support through national policies. The history of each 
network (i.e. infancy and evolution) is described until 2009. National government 
programmes to support these networks were complemented by local and state level 
policies aimed at developing the respective regional software industries. We observe 
the innovative performance of local firms participating in these regional networks in 
the period 2006-2009. The finding from this doctoral research is that network 
governance and structure had a mixed influence on the effectiveness of government 
technology policy to promote firm-level innovation in the networks investigated; the 
thesis sets out some of the reasons for the differences in firm level innovative 
performance in the two networks.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Issues Addressed 
The thesis examines public policies aimed at: i) fostering the initiation and 
development of regional network for high-technology activities; ii) supporting 
effective network governance and structure; and iii) encouraging of firm-level 
innovation in a developing country context. The empirical evidence is derived from 
the experience of two Brazilian regional software networks. In this thesis, we use the 
term ‘network’ to refer to a structure of formal and informal collaborations and 
common interest relationships among (for profit and non-profit) organisations. The 
primary focus of the thesis is formally recognised collaborations within the networks 
examined. 
The relevance of network arrangements to support firm-level innovation has been 
addressed extensively, and especially in the systems of innovation literature, which 
claims that firms learn through interaction, and that this learning includes new 
knowledge that is essential for innovation (Cimoli, 2002; Freeman, 1987, 1991; 
Lundvall, 1992b; Nelson, 1993; Powell and Grodal, 2005). Evidence on the 
significance of network arrangements (especially for developed countries), including 
networks of individuals and informal networks, for innovation is often interpreted as 
meaning that firms that are embedded in network arrangements are likely to be more 
innovative (Castilla et al., 2000; Grasenick et al., 2008; Herrigel, 1993; Lazerson, 
1993; Saxenian, 1990; Uzzi, 1997). Network studies take account of the fact that 
firms are not isolated actors and will be influenced by dyadic ties formed with other 
network actors. In addition, and significantly, it is not necessarily the strength of a tie 
that determines its value because ties can play different roles (Granovetter, 1973) and 
the structure in which they are embedded is also critical (Storper, 1996).  
Networks can be seen as emerging entirely from a process of dyadic tie formation, 
arising through happenstance or chance, and that the strength of inter-organisational 
ties is the result of personal interactions that reflect personalities and various 
experience. Alternatively, the processes of network tie formation and the evolving 
strength of ties can be seen as reflecting the purposive aims of organisations that take 
account of some parts or all of the structure of the network. This latter view suggests 
the presence of agency in the formation and evolution of networks.  
  
2 
An understanding of both paths to the formation of networks is relevant to an 
investigation of network development, which includes governance issues (where 
governance meaning coordination), and calls for a definition of network governance 
and structure. We would define network governance and structure as inter-
organisational coordination exerted in a particular institutional setting
1
 and 
understand coordination as occurring when two (or more) network actors pursue a 
common outcome and establish a tie in order to pursue it (Bevir, 2009: 57). In this 
thesis we investigate firm-level innovation, where the innovation is an outcome 
pursued by network actors, and examine dyadic ties taking account of the possible 
influence of these ties and their coordination (see Chapter 5 for a more in depth 
discussion). The institutional setting influences the agency exercised in the formation 
of ties and the exertion of control in the effort to shape the overall structure of the 
network. The institutional setting also may involve different levels of investigation, 
such as local, regional, national or global, which aligns with the systems of 
innovation approach introduced by Freeman (1987). 
The possibility of governance, and the corollary that some acts of governance may 
be superior to others, suggests that governments might want to implement 
technology policies to support the creation of networks, the expected by-product 
being networks effective governance as a means to improve firm-level innovation. 
For instance, US federal government expenditure on technological development 
activities in the Route 128 and Silicon Valley regions (Saxenian, 1994), shows that 
geographically concentrated government investment can promote the formation of a 
self-organising network involving firm specialisation. Although the contexts are 
different, the experiences of industrial districts such as Modena in the Emilia-
Romagna district of Italy (Lazerson, 1993) and Baden-Württemberg in Germany 
(Herrigel, 1993), illustrate successful government intervention to support regional 
network development.  
The confluence of successful experience in developed economies and growing 
awareness of the systems of innovation approach since the late 1980s (Freeman, 
1987; Lundvall, 1992b; Nelson, 1993) has inspired developing country governments 
to make network formation an element of their technology policies and to invest in 
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 Jones et al. (1997: 913) define network governance as inter-firm coordination. Here we extend their 
conception to include all organisations (profit and non-profit) that are part of the network.  
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the creation of local and regional networks. However, it is still debateable whether 
and to what extent government policies to induce network formation and 
development are effective. Based on perceptions of experience such as that 
mentioned above, governments in developing countries have assumed that regional 
networks can be engineered or arranged to become efficient mechanisms to support 
both economic catch-up with the developed countries and laggard regions in the 
national economy catching up more generally. This was the aim of policies 
formulated for the Brazilian software industry (see Chapter 3). Identification and 
replication of policies implemented in developed countries has been common 
practice in Brazil since the early stages of its industrialisation (Pacheco and Corder, 
2009). 
There are three aspects of government intervention related to individual and 
collective gain. Firstly, from the social welfare perspective, government intervention 
should be social welfare improving. Since any intervention will involve a re-
allocation of resources (government’s or those of other actors’) and possible negative 
effects on social welfare, it is important to establish whether government intervention 
is necessary. That is, whether the absence of government intervention lead to inferior 
social welfare outcomes. For example, if networks would be beneficial, but their 
formation unlikely, would government intervention catalyse or stimulate the 
engagement of actors sufficient to lead to the development or exchange of relevant 
knowledge? A positive answer to this question is needed to support government 
intervention. For instance, allocating resources to only a small number of (perhaps 
minor) actors might result in these resources being wasted, which would be welfare 
reducing compared to some more productive use of these same resources. There 
might be alternative and more effective support than networking. The lack of 
consensus about the level of gain to be expected from intervention and the level of 
risk that the government bears in undertaking such intervention suggests the need for 
research to better assess these issues. 
Secondly, we need some clarification about whether network actors and agents are 
likely to respond to government policy intervention. This requires some assessment 
of the ‘feasibility’ of intervention. Since the desirable features of networks flow from 
the voluntary actions of their participants it is possible that little or nothing might 
result from government incentivised or directed efforts to create ‘networks’. Network 
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actors may act opportunistically to fulfil the requirements of the intervention in order 
to receive the incentive, or comply with the formalities without expending the 
additional effort required to derive value from network membership. The history of 
the actors matters here since it may influence their responsiveness to government 
intervention or their willingness to explore with their new ‘partners’ whether there 
are any gains to be derived from a relationship that has been foisted upon them. 
Thirdly, there is a need to investigate whether the governance process established by 
the government intervention will be more effective than would have followed from 
autonomous governance by network participants. This implies that governments 
intervene not just in network formation, but also in the governance of ongoing 
networks, not least to establish some accountability for their investment. How this 
accountability should be demonstrated then becomes an important regulatory issue – 
can governments distinguish networks that have ‘gone wrong’, for example collusive 
and anti-competitive networks (including those dominated by single actors), which 
will be more likely to suppress than to foster innovation, and to engage in other 
actions that may be social welfare reducing (e.g. collusive pricing). In the following 
paragraphs, we investigate these three issues in more detail to lay the foundations for 
the investigation in this thesis. 
The study of whether government intervention is necessary is related to the debate on 
the role of state, whose participants include advocates of markets as efficient 
economic controlling mechanisms (Friedman, 2002). This group would argue that 
government intervention is superfluous (markets achieve the desired outcome 
without intervention) or undesirable (government failure could lead to social welfare 
diminishing outcomes).
2
 Advocates of government intervention identify market 
shortcomings that could lead to market failure, some of which might be overcome or 
mitigated through government intervention. 
Advocates of market control argue that market price and profit incentives are 
sufficient for an efficient resolution of the problems of resource allocation. They 
often assume that there is no persistent information asymmetry among economic 
                                                 
2
 Krueger (1991) provides a detailed discussion of government failure in developing countries, 
relating it to problems of failure of commission (e.g. the high-cost public sector enterprises engaged in 
economic sectors traditionally not associated with the public sector (Krueger, 1991:4) and failure of 
omission (e.g. the deterioration of transport and communication facilities as well as failure to maintain 
infrastructure facilities (Krueger, 1991: 5).   
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agents and that market power in transactions is ephemeral because of the competitive 
response that such market power elicits. A further view of markets is their flexibility; 
economic agents can freely access or leave markets according to their perceptions of 
the profit making opportunity. This group claims that there is no need for 
governments to intervene in the economy; markets will achieve the most efficient 
allocation of resources in production and consumption, given the prior endowments 
of participants. There are variants of this view. One is that government intervention 
might be able to achieve welfare improving outcomes by prioritising subsidy of 
specific industries (sometimes called ‘picking winners’) instead of indiscriminate 
and uniform tariff protection (Baldwin, 1969:304).  Another, more pessimistic view, 
is that governments will inevitably create more distortions and inefficiency through 
intervention and that ‘picking winners’ is beyond the competence of governments. 
However, the assumptions made by the advocates of markets are being questioned 
increasingly by their critics who ague that market failures are frequent, and that 
markets need to be monitored; they argue also that pure market mechanisms raise as 
many problems as they solve (Boyer, 1997). Examples include: i) provision of public 
goods, related to ‘non-rivalry’ and ‘non-excludability’ issues;3 ii) the existence of 
imperfect competition resulting from collusion or imperfect information, and iii) the 
presence of externalities, which by definition are not subject to market exchange, and 
whose socially optimal resolution requires state intervention (e.g., taxing negative 
externalities - such as pollution, and subsidising positive externalities - such as 
education). Those who point to the frequency of market failure argue that 
governments need to intervene in the economy to adjust or correct market 
imperfections, and that doing so will increase social welfare.   
On the other hand, market advocates, particularly those pessimistic concerning 
government intervention, claim that government intervention suffers from the 
following four types of failure: i) information problems; ii) agency problems; iii) 
rent-seeking behaviour; and iv) bureaucratic capture. For instance, Krueger (1997) 
discusses government intervention in developing countries where infant industries 
were protected following an inner-oriented industrial policy (for example, based on 
an import substitution model), where the problem of rent-seeking behaviour by the 
                                                 
3
 Goods are non-rivalrous if their use or consumption does not interfere with the use or consumption 
of someone else (e.g. software applications); a non-excludable good is a good for which there are no 
practical means for excluding common use (e.g. national defence).  
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private sector was commonly found. Although supporters of government 
intervention recognise that government failures occur, developmental state scholars 
maintain that the state should intervene in the economy in order to avoid, minimise 
or correct market failure mechanisms (Evans, 1995). The market imperfections 
related to technology require government intervention by means of technology 
policy. 
Technology can be defined in terms of the knowledge embodied in machines and in 
terms of the person-embodied knowledge of those who use codified and tacit 
knowledge to develop, operate and improve these machines (Pavitt, 1987). These 
features of technology raise issues related to technological spillovers in the economy, 
when “knowing how to do one thing is consequent on knowing how to do closely 
linked things” (Storper, 1995:895), which endows technology with some non-rival 
and non-excludable goods characteristics. These characteristics may push actors to 
take actions to remedy the possible negative effects of economic externalities (such 
as free-riding on others’ investment in innovation) that have the potential to 
undermine market competition (e.g. by creating market power through intellectual 
property rights protection). In addition, technology involves asymmetric knowledge 
between its developers and users, which is additional market power that affects 
market competition and the efficient supply of goods and services. Technology 
developers are not driven out by competition because those with better knowledge 
restrict their output (or the equivalent, demand higher prices) in pursuit of higher 
profits, which creates a higher cost ceiling making it possible for less profitable 
companies to afford (inefficient) higher costs (Steinmueller, 2010). While the less 
profitable companies eventually will be abandoned by investors seeking higher 
returns, this process is not likely to occur instantaneously. 
Developmental state scholars (for instance, Chang, 1994; Evans, 1995) argue in 
favour of government policy intervention, and government intervention through 
technology policy is necessary for economic development (Pavitt, 1987). Therefore, 
examining their arguments is appropriate in light of the policy aims of the Brazilian 
government. In addition, considering that the technology characteristics mentioned 
above may be exacerbated in the case of developing countries where insufficient 
scale, inefficient markets and infant industries may reduce innovative performance 
  
7 
and economic growth, some further investigation is required into how government 
policy can influence networks in developing countries.  
The above discussion leads to the second issue that requires clarification, which is 
whether network actors and agents are likely to respond to government policy 
intervention. The original formation and evolution of a network can influence the 
responsiveness to government intervention of its actors and agents. Networks can be 
emergent (i.e. based on incidental interactions) or purpose-built (i.e. strategically 
created), and technology policy formulation and implementation must take account 
of the history (if any) of the relations between the actors that might be involved in 
the network.  
Emergent regional networks arise from the voluntary searches of actors seeking 
mutual gain, and are generally localized in a bounded territory, although some 
network nodes may be located outside the region (investigated using the concept of 
inter-network collaborations). In emergent networks the key actors are already 
accessible and interacting with one other; government needs to promote and foster 
the continuity of these interactions if the network was established to achieve a short 
term goal. Government may be able to anticipate changes that would enhance 
network development (this relates to the third issue discussed further below). In this 
case, policy intervention may be linked to promoting the inclusion of new actors in 
the network, recreating existing network actors, or institutional changes (e.g. in the 
rules governing public research centres or business organisations). Then, one would 
expect ex-ante, that the network would emerge bottom-up from the arrangements 
among network actors searching solutions to their problems or promoting projects 
related to future network development. In this case, the influence of government 
policies on network actors is likely to be lower than in the case of purpose-built 
networks. 
Purpose-built regional networks may emerge as a result of government policy 
intervention following selection of a region to host public and private investment 
directed towards a particular industry. The organisation of private investment is most 
often orchestrated by government. The selection of a region may be related to its 
attributes, for example natural resources, expertise developed by local suppliers 
including (among others) knowledge (especially universities) and technology (most 
often technology centres). The creation of regional networks occurs in two stages: i) 
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first government assures accessibility to the key actors to support the regional 
network through their physical presence or easy distance accessibility; and ii) second 
government establishes mechanisms to foster and support interaction among the 
actors in the network. Intervention should be based on the assumption that the actors 
may have asymmetric information, may be misinformed about or may have 
inadequate access to other actors. In this case, one would expect ex-ante, a top-down 
arrangement in which technology policy is more likely to influence actors’ 
interactions (at least in the early stage of network development). In this case, 
network actors and agents will be more dependent on policy incentives and, 
therefore, more responsive to policy implementation than in emergent networks 
where the actors follow their own agendas.  
In addition to network creation issues (emergent or purpose-built networks), there 
are the issues of actors’ responsiveness to government policy implementation, such 
as the motivation for actor-to-actor tie formation. The motivations will likely differ 
in every case, but will include past personal relationships (friendships or 
acquaintanceships which commonly involve trust), common professional 
background (former class mates or university tutors-tutees, which imply common 
interests and visions about the nature of the available opportunities), cost savings, 
and geographic or social proximity. 
Although the motivations for actor-to-actor tie formation may vary, their formation 
is likely to be related to the stage of network emergence or the response of the actor 
to government intervention. In emergent networks, ties are likely to be motivated 
more by ‘trust’, where ‘trust’ is understood as contingent on the context and quality 
of relationships formation, than by other factors (e.g. opportunities). Here the 
expectation ex-ante of policy implementation is that once government incentives are 
put in place, actor-to-actor ties will be more likely to be maintained or to increase 
over time. 
Government capability to foresee the changes required to spontaneously formed 
networks on the one hand, and extreme government intervention directed at creating 
networks on the other hand, are related to the third issue we investigate, that is, 
whether the governance process established as the result of government intervention 
will be more effective than the process that would emerge from autonomous 
governance by network participants. This issue has two aspects. Firstly, governments 
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must possess the resources or powers of enforcement and also the capabilities to 
assess network operation and existing or potential barriers to the achievement of 
desired goals, for example innovation. Secondly, interventions that potentially are 
social welfare enhancing may fail or have deleterious effects at the network level.  
This thesis aims to explain to what extent government technology policy is able to 
influence network formation and growth and to assess whether these processes, 
including the resulting network structure, have an effect on firm-level innovations. 
We take account especially of the fact that firms are embedded in particular settings, 
which also may exert an influence on the returns to investment for firms involved in 
innovation and other activities. 
The above discussion, combined with reflections on the literature in Chapter 2, 
suggest the following two groups of research questions: 
Research Questions Group A: 
Question A1 
In considering government technology policy to promote firm innovation through 
networks in a developing country context, do regional level network governance and 
structure influence policy effectiveness? If they do, what features of governance and 
structure should be taken into account in policymaking?  
Question A2 
What, if any, is the responsiveness of network governance and structure to 
technology policy aimed at the promotion of networks in a developing country 
context? Does government policy promotion of networks and efforts to control 
network structure increase the effectiveness of technology policy aimed at improving 
innovative performance in a developing country context? 
Research Questions Group B: 
Question B1 
Do network governance and structure have a consistent influence upon the 
innovative performance of developing country firms set up in regions with different 
socio-economic development indicators?  
Question B2 
  
10 
In assessing the effectiveness of technology policy in developing countries, are there 
differences in policy effects when comparing advanced and relatively backward 
regions within a country? 
The research for this thesis was aimed at answering these questions in the specific 
context of an intermediate developing country, Brazil, where there is disparity 
among regions in terms of economic, social and industrial development.  
1.2 Scope and Broad Approach of the Thesis 
It is assumed that firms are at the core of the innovation system, because 
technological accumulation is localized mainly in firms and they are supposedly the 
network actors that most benefit from innovation (Bell and Pavitt, 1992; Malerba, 
2004: 24). This assumption leads to a focus on network governance and structure 
related to firm-level innovations in developing country contexts and especially 
Brazil.  
Since the end of the 1990s, studies of innovation in Brazil have adopted the Local 
Productive Arrangement (LPA) approach, in which different regions are investigated 
in relation to: i) market penetration of the local arrangement; ii) use and development 
of local competencies in the activities performed under the arrangement; and iii) the 
mode of governance within the LPA, with the aim of elucidating the decision making 
power among actors, that is, whether the LPA follows a hierarchy or network type 
(Cassiolato and Lastres, 2003).  
We focus on network governance and structure to investigate the dyadic ties formed 
by firms with regard to their innovation activities; we differ from the LPA approach 
mainly with regard to the level of analysis and methodology applied. The level of 
analysis investigated here refers to the nature of and motivation for each tie in order 
to achieve a better representation of the network, which allows an interpretation of 
the network structure (including the institutional setting) and how government policy 
effectiveness relates to network governance and structure. The methodology for this 
analysis draws partially on social network analysis methods, especially with regard 
to visual representation of the network, which provides insights into bridges within 
networks and the structure of the network. This methodology supports discussion of 
the engagement or disengagement of key actors in the main cluster of nodes and how 
information is spread within the network.  
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The thesis is based on original qualitative data on firm level innovations, collected 
mainly through face-to-face interviews. This method of data collection was chosen 
because: i) quantitative data, such as patents, are not considered an appropriate proxy 
for innovation in the software industry; ii) innovation surveys in Brazil are a recent 
phenomenon, and so far, few of the questions relate to the information technology 
(IT) (although this is being remedied); and iii) quantitative data, such as required for 
social network analysis, capture neither historical trends nor regulatory and 
institutional issues (Grasenick et al., 2008 :309-310), both of which may prove 
extremely relevant for explaining collaboration among network actors and network 
structure.  
Firm-level innovations were identified for the period 2006-2009, according to Oslo 
Manual (OECD, 2005) recommendations. Thus, innovations were measured as the 
commercialisation of new product or services and classified by their degree of 
novelty: i) new to the firm, ii) new to the regional market; iii) new to the national 
market; or iv) new to the international market.  
Network governance studies tend to analyse either the dyadic ties within networks or 
the structure of the networks. In this thesis we integrate the elements of dyadic ties 
and network structure as well as government technology policy, within a single 
analytical framework (Chapter 5, Figure 5.2). The analytical framework is applied to 
the investigation of each separate network.  
Network governance is examined through the dyadic ties among firms, and between 
firms and other network actors. The examination of dyadic ties provides evidence on 
the following: i) the features of and motivations behind the network ties created 
between firms and other network actors; ii) the number of ties created by each firm; 
iii) the frequency of collaboration related to each tied actor; and iv) the location of 
the collaborating partner. The classification of the features of tie creation are based 
on the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) and supported the identification of consistency 
between four sub-networks (business, skills, technology and financial) within the 
main network.
4
 The motivations behind each tie provide evidence on firms’ 
connectivity, classified as tightly-connected or loosely-connected ties. Network 
                                                 
4
 The rationale for grouping the actors into four sub-networks is based on the argument that 
innovation networks are a sub-set of a system of innovation. Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.1 discusses this 
in more detail. 
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structure is examined from emergence to 2009 and provides evidence on how the 
network was formed (e.g. emergent or purpose-built) and its evolution and maturity.  
A multiple case study methodology is employed (Yin, 2003). The choice of case 
studies was based on regions exemplifying different contexts that change over time 
and warrant in-depth analysis. The two case studies of software industry regional 
networks, Campinas and Recife in Brazil, were selected based on the following 
criteria: i) they were targeted by government technology policy aimed at industrial 
regional network creation; ii) they were affected by the same national government 
programme; iii) the networks are based in regions at different stages of industrial 
development; and iv) the networks are in regions with different levels of socio-
economic development. The two networks were formally created in the early 1990s 
as a result of the national Brazilian government Softex Programme (see selection 
criteria (i) and (ii) above, and Chapter 3). Also the two networks are located in 
regions at different stages of industrial and socio-economic development (selection 
criteria (iii) and (iv) and Chapter 4).  
The thesis is positioned within the literature on sectoral systems of innovation in 
developing countries, government policy intervention and local firm-level 
innovation, and the investigation of regional networks. Section 1.3 describes the 
approach adopted to these issues. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the systems of innovation, 
network governance, technology policy and firm-level innovation literature to 
address the research questions set out above. The systems of innovation literature 
examines the importance of local, regional and national institutions and organisations 
required to support innovation performance at firm level. The network governance 
approach includes a discussion on the relevance of network arrangements for inter- 
and intra-firm collaboration with regard to firm-level innovation activities, and 
introduces concepts relevant to the discussion on dyadic tie formation (Granovetter, 
1973), network structural holes (Burt, 1992) and network openness. As already 
mentioned, technology policy may be crucial for network creation and development. 
We discuss the issues addressed by technology policy and the implications of its 
implementation. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of why firm-level innovation 
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is relevant and the approaches that can be used to explain firm-level innovation 
performance. Chapter 2 identifies some issues not covered in the literature and 
situates the research questions in a theoretical context which is re-considered in light 
of the experience presented in the succeeding chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of industrial development in Brazil, and introduces 
the mechanisms enabling industrial development, highlighting the most relevant 
organisations created by national government to support local science and 
technology activities and to foster technological progress and economic 
development. This is followed by a section devoted to the software sectoral system 
of innovation, which provides the basis for a discussion of the Brazilian software 
industry’s emergence and evolution. 
Chapter 4 provides background information on the structure of the two regional 
networks we examine, Campinas and Recife. We investigate their early stages and 
evolution, discussing their main characteristics such as age, maturity, information 
and communication technology (ICT) related history and government technology 
policies implemented in the regions that could be related to software firms’ 
innovation performance in each region (examined in more detail in Chapters 6 and 
7). 
Chapter 5 describes the methodology used in this thesis and explains the choice of 
research methods. The bounded focus of the empirical research is discussed along 
with the core concepts supporting the design of the analytical framework and the 
research strategy. The chapter concludes with a description of the data collection and 
analysis.  
Chapter 6 is the first of two empirical chapters. It investigates the network 
governance and structure of the Campinas software network and the innovation 
activities of local firms during the period 2006-2009. It provides evidence related to 
the research questions in Group A and Group B, although the chapter addresses the 
Research Questions Group A. Chapter 7 is the second empirical chapter and 
investigates the Recife network governance and structure and local firms’ innovation 
activities in the period 2006-2009. It also provides evidence related to both groups of 
research questions, although it only addresses the Research Questions Group A.  
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Chapter 8 addresses the Research Questions Group B and discusses the findings 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7 and derives some conclusions. We describe the 
contributions of this thesis, and highlight some implications for theory. We discuss 
some of the limitations of this research and also its level of generalisability. Finally 
we suggest some policy implications and avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The topic of this thesis research is public policies aimed at the creation and 
development of regional network for high-technology activities, network governance 
and structure, and firm-level innovation in the context of developing countries. This 
chapter identifies and discusses the related literature in order to identify areas that 
need further investigation.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the relevance of networks 
within systems of innovation, addressing especially issues related to the role of 
networks and technology policy in creating and supporting networks in a dynamic 
economic context. Section 2.3 discusses the importance of networks for regional 
development, highlighting the issues of regional networks for economic catching-up, 
path-rigidity and interactions between new technology-based firms (NTBF) and 
network actors. Section 2.4 investigates network governance and firm-level 
innovation and considers issues related to the structure and types of networks and the 
characteristics of the dyadic ties formed by innovative firms in developing country 
contexts. Section 2.5 summarises the main findings from this review.  
2.2 Networks within systems of innovation  
Research on innovation has addressed several issues including: what innovation 
means (Freeman, 1974), why it is relevant (Freeman, 1987), how it can be fostered 
and supported (Freeman, 1987; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Pavitt, 1987), who are its 
performers (NSF, 2010) and how and where it is performed (Edquist, 2004). In this 
thesis we focus on innovations at firm level, within particular regions. We 
investigate whether innovations at firm level employ only internal knowledge and 
information, or also exploit knowledge and information developed externally and 
accessed by the firm. Our concern is with how this knowledge is used. In discussing 
how firms access outside knowledge it is useful to introduce the concept of 
‘networks’, which refer to the structure of formal and informal collaborations and 
common interest relationships among organisations. Section 2.2.1 introduces the 
relevant concepts and discussions related to networks within systems of innovation. 
Section 2.2.2 discusses issues related to government intervention in the form of 
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technology policy to support the formation of networks aimed at increasing and 
improving firm-level innovation (Freeman, 1987).  
2.2.1 The role of networks within systems of innovation  
It is commonly agreed that the system of innovation consists of interaction among 
institutions and organisations directly or indirectly involved with technological 
activities (Freeman, 1987).
5
 The system of innovation concept introduced by 
Freeman has been incorporated into other studies on systems of innovation, such as 
Lundvall (1992b), Nelson (1993), Edquist (2004), and Lundvall et al. (2009a). These 
authors consider that the components of a system of innovation include: firms, 
universities, financial organisations, research and development (R&D) organisations, 
agencies supporting innovation, and government departments (Lundvall, 1992a). 
There is an assumption of coherence in the relationships among these components 
aimed at a well functioning system (Edquist, 2004: 187; Nelson and Rosenberg, 
1993). Thus, networks and their functioning are core features of a system of 
innovation.  
There is a frequent assumption that developed countries have well developed and 
extensively inter-connected networks, and that where this is the case, their 
performance and governance can be assessed. However, in developing country 
contexts there may be important ‘missing links’. Cimoli (2002: 2) notes that 
networks ‘can be considered as a proxy and as an observation unit to understand if 
systematic linkages and interactions are really diffused or not in the innovation 
systems’. Firms are the main economic agents benefiting from new knowledge and 
innovation and are at the core of networks. The system of innovation concept 
assumes that firms are embedded in a dynamic environment where technological 
changes are endogenous and, to a certain extent, unpredictable. Therefore, their 
results cannot be fully foreseen (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This is crucial for 
understanding how and why networks may emerge and evolve within systems. Their 
dynamic environment prompts firms constantly to reassess and possibly change their 
strategies with regard to searching and exploring for new knowledge and information 
in order to maintain or improve their competitive positions. Search and exploration 
mechanisms related to innovation performance may be internal or externally 
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 Freeman’s concept of system of innovation was strongly inspired by the work of List (1841; quoted 
by Freeman 1987).   
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oriented, intra-firm or inter-organisation (Lundvall, 1992a; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). 
A system of innovation can be defined in different ways that have implications for 
the investigation of networks. The broad definition of a system of innovation, 
proposed by Lundvall (1992a: 12) includes ‘all parts and aspects of the economic 
structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and 
exploring’ and supports the examination of elements that influence the performance 
of technological activities such as the social, scientific, political, cultural and 
economic elements within each system. An investigation of systems of innovation 
based on this broad definition is appropriate to provide the macro-level background 
in which firms are embedded. However, its capacity to explain firm-level differences 
in technological and innovative performance is limited since firms are part of the 
larger system of innovation.  
Lundvall (1992a: 12) also proposes a narrower definition of systems of innovation 
which focuses on organisations that are engaged in knowledge creation and 
diffusion, that is, organisations involved in searching for and exploring new 
knowledge, such as innovative firms, R&D organisations, technology institutes and 
universities. This narrower definition may be more appropriate to investigate systems 
of innovation at the micro level, and to study organisations and their interactions. It 
is likely that interactions will differ across firms in clearly observable ways, 
meaning, effectively, that the value of different elements external to the firm will 
also vary in ways that can be clearly observed. Empirical investigations of networks 
of innovators (Freeman, 1991) as a sub-set within systems (Cantner and Graf, 2010), 
are commonly based on this narrow definition. 
In addition to these two definitions of systems of innovation, the literature also 
emphasises distinct global, national, regional and local perspectives (Edquist, 2004; 
Freeman, 2002). These approaches are useful to the extent that the relevant 
institutional interactions take place at the level at which the analysis is conducted. 
Thus, the national systems of innovation approach has been criticised for failing to 
consider trans-national structures, such as the scientific research community.   
In addition to the types of organisations included and the level of the analysis, the 
period of analysis is also important. Here, the principal issue is whether the history 
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of institutional development has a persistent influence on the evolution of innovation 
systems.
6
   
There is ongoing debate on whether and how globalisation affects national systems 
of innovation and on the networks embedded in these systems. Some support the 
argument that globalisation is leading to increasing codification of previously tacit 
knowledge and, therefore, that national contexts are becoming less relevant for face-
to-face learning interactions (Friedman, 2005). This argument is based on evidence 
from industries where the codification of knowledge has facilitated technology 
transfer, such as relatively mature industries (e.g. electronics) where standardisation 
and codification of the knowledge required for the production process has permitted 
the relocation of manufacturing. It may apply also to industries whose core 
components are imported and integrated locally (e.g. integrated circuits prototyped 
and tested abroad that are used in modular systems) or to the location of call centres 
for customer support. These examples demonstrate the opportunities for software 
development in developing countries, where local firms are able to access 
components critical for software development (e.g. an ERP platform), leading to the 
‘localisation’ of software associated with local value-added activities.7  
Asheim and Gertler (2004: 310), however, argue that although globalisation is 
becoming increasingly widespread, national contexts are relevant for examination of 
national innovation systems.
8
 They claim that face-to-face interactions affect trust 
building and the creation and exchange of knowledge (cognitive proximity), and that 
smaller scale territories can be more conducive to learning by interacting (Lundvall, 
1992b). Asheim and Gertler go further, claiming that regional contexts are especially 
relevant for the examination of particular systems, and argue for studies of regional 
systems of innovation; defined by them as ‘the institutional infrastructure supporting 
innovation within the production structure of a region’ (Asheim and Gertler, 2004: 
299).
9
 As already indicated, this claim is valid to the extent that different, smaller 
regions have heterogeneous institutions and access to institutions. 
                                                 
6
 This issue relates to path-rigidity, which is discussed in Section 2.3. 
7
 E.g., see Duarte (2003) for empirical evidence of the ‘localisation’ of globalised software 
development in a study of 5 Brazilian software firms. 
8
 Patel and Pavitt’s (1994) analysis confirms these findings, claiming that the local scientific system 
still plays a major role in the R&D activities performed in each country. 
9
 Region has a different meaning in different contexts and different implications in empirical 
examinations studies. Region can be defined broadly or narrowly. A broad definition of a region is of 
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The regional systems of innovation approach allows examination of the components 
of the innovation system (and their interactions) at the meso level, and supersedes 
the somewhat unrealistic assumption of spatial homogeneity implied by the national 
systems of innovation perspective (Howells, 1999: 69). Regional systems studies 
investigate: i) which components of the system are present in the region; ii) whether 
these components interact, that is, what are the systemic features of the concept, 
either within the region or with components located outside the region; and iii) 
whether components present in regional systems are operating appropriately in their 
self-defined roles. Studies of regional systems of innovation are particularly relevant 
for the investigation of innovation systems in large countries where economic (as 
well as social, political and scientific) progress is likely to show disparities among 
regions (Cassiolato and Lastres, 2003; Cassiolato et al., 2003). Also, different 
regions often show heterogeneous innovation performance within the same industry. 
We can compare the performance of the same industry across different regions in the 
same country and between countries, as well as the performance of different 
industries in different regions within the same country.  
Research on different types of regional systems of innovation (Asheim and Gertler, 
2004) shows different levels of importance of networks: i) networks can play a 
marginal role; ii) networks can be circumscribed within a region and a country; iii) 
regions may be part of international networks, particularly if the objective is more 
radical ‘global product’ innovations.10 Asheim and Gertler offer two conclusions. 
First, regions may differ, but the national system of innovation in which they are 
embedded presents its own specific features, such as institutional set-up, government 
                                                                                                                                          
a sub-continental area such as the European Community, Latin America or East Asia. Freeman (2002) 
draws on this definition to discuss why East Asian economies were more successful than Latin 
American economies during the second half of the 20
th
 Century. According to Freeman, East Asian 
national systems were able to remedy some crucial dysfunctions, which explains their greater success 
compared the Latin American economies that were unable to tackle the same problems. The narrow 
definition of region is of a geographical area within a country, state, county or metropolitan area. For 
instance, Dohse (2000) studies the context of German biotechnology regions in the bidding process 
for public funding. Some regions comprise a single city, others include the city and its surroundings, 
which, in turn, may include other cities in the confines of a specific geographical area. 
10
 The authors identify 3 types of regional system: i) the territorially embedded regional innovation 
system, where firms ‘base their innovation activity mainly on localized learning processes stimulated 
by geographical, social and cultural proximity, without much direct interaction with knowledge 
organizations’ (Asheim and Gertler, 2004: 300); ii) the regionally networked innovation system, 
where ‘firms and organizations are still embedded in a specific region and characterized by localized, 
interactive learning’ (Asheim and Gertler, 2004: 301); and iii) the regionalised national innovation 
system, where parts of its industry and institutional infrastructure are ‘more functionally integrated 
into national or international innovation systems’ (Asheim and Gertler, 2004: 302). 
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intervention and autonomy, economic model (liberal vs coordinated market), labour 
mobility and education infrastructure, which will influence the region’s autonomy, 
development and performance. Thus, studies of regional systems must consider this 
national embedding in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the 
performance of the regional system.  
Second, timing is very important when comparing regions’ innovative and 
development performance. The different phases of the regions in the industry life 
cycle must be considered when making regional comparisons because learning, 
capability building, and the development of new knowledge are long-term, gradual 
processes. Hence, empirical evidence from an isolated ‘snapshot’ might lead to the - 
possibly wrong - conclusion that newer (younger) regions are failing in comparison 
to more mature (longer established) regions. Timing is especially important when 
investigating laggard regions, when a macro (national embedding) and meso level 
(regional systems) analysis combined with the level of regional maturity could 
explain why some regions are failing to achieve developmental aspirations. In effect, 
this is a variant of the ‘infant industry’ argument proposed by List (1841) in the 19th 
century. 
That timing related to the industry life cycle influences firms, networks and 
innovation systems leads to the concept of sectoral systems of innovation, where the 
focus is on both innovation performance in different sectors and innovation patterns 
within and across sectors in which the central actors are private firms (Malerba, 
2002).
11
 In this perspective, sectors are defined as the ‘set of activities that are 
unified by some related product group for a given or emerging demand and that 
share some basic knowledge’ (Malerba, 2004: 9-10). Each sector presents its own 
division of labour and knowledge specialisation, involving different creation, use, 
diffusion and appropriation of knowledge, and learning processes.  
The boundaries to the sectoral system of innovation are endogenous, which is an 
important difference with the regional system of innovation approach where 
boundaries are most often geographically determined (although particular regions 
                                                 
11
 Breschi and Malerba (1997: 131) state that ‘the concept of SIS [sectoral systems of innovation] 
bears some relationships with taxonomies and categories proposed in the technical change literature 
…[and] shares many aspects with Pavitt’s [1984] well-known taxonomy. In addition, by stressing the 
role played by sector and technology specific factors, it also has some antecedents in the notions of 
technological trajectories and paradigms’. 
  
21 
can be central or peripheral at any moment in time). The definition of region can be 
arbitrary and may follow conventional criteria (Edquist, 2004).
12
 In terms of both 
timing and definition, the flexibility implied by adopting region as the unit of 
analysis in turn implies the existence of some level of endogeneity in its definition. 
The concepts of sectoral and regional systems of innovation overlap in their 
understanding that learning, cooperation, competition and geographical areas are 
relevant, since, in some sectors, firms are concentrated in particular regions, which 
determines the different levels of geographical concentration of innovators (Breschi 
and Malerba, 1997: 139). The geographical distribution of innovators is related to the 
sector’s opportunities, appropriability and cumulative knowledge conditions, which, 
in some industries, are associated also with the geographical localisation of 
specialised knowledge and technology suppliers.  
One of the most successful cases of a sectoral and regional system is the 
semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley in the USA, where close geographical 
interactions among knowledge suppliers, technology organisations, firms, the labour 
force, customers and product suppliers benefited from industrial knowledge 
cumulativeness in the region, which attracted innovators that contributed to the 
accumulation of specialist knowledge and the continuous virtuous cycle set up in the 
region (Castilla et al., 2000; Kenney, 2000; Saxenian, 1994).
13
 The Italian industrial 
district of Modena, which specialises in knitwear, is another success story (Lazerson, 
1993).  
The type of knowledge required for the development of each sector determines 
firms’ needs for external knowledge or information, which can be addressed through 
creation of a new or participation in an existing network.
14
 Networks may emerge in 
uncertain and changing environments as a result of differences (not similarities) 
among agents that are seeking complementary knowledge, capabilities and 
specializations (Malerba, 2004: 26). For example, high-technology sectors are more 
likely to perform in-house R&D and use scientific knowledge, which may demand 
close interaction between the firms and knowledge producers (e.g. universities). 
                                                 
12
 Edquist (2004) provides the example of Germany, where the ‘Länder’ is an appropriate unit of 
analysis, and claims that ‘the choice of approach may not only be a question of size of the country, but 
also whether it is federally organized or not’ (Edquist, 2004: 200). 
13
 These authors point out that one of the most important reasons for the success of the region is the 
loyalty of its labour to the region rather than to firms and find that the rate of labour mobility among 
firms is extremely high, allowing the transfer of both codified and tacit knowledge. 
14
 Malerba (2004) defines a network as interaction among different actors. 
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Conversely, firms performing in low-technology sectors may rely more on external 
sources of innovation than on in-house R&D and be less likely to engage with 
science or knowledge supplier organisations. The former would be categorised as 
science-based and the latter as supplier-dominated in Pavitt’s (Pavitt, 1984) 
taxonomy. 
Von Tunzelmann and Acha (2006), however, argue that low-technology sectors may 
be close to and sometimes integrated with recently developed technologies which 
may be science intensive, blurring the division between high-technology and low-
technology sectors.
15
 Similarly, Pérez (2008) proposes a new strategy to support the 
economic catching-up of developing countries in Latin America, claiming that a new 
and complementary exploitation of these countries’ natural resources is required to 
achieve dynamic and sustainable economic growth. She claims that the exploitation 
of natural resources should relate to the processing industry in high added-value, 
low-volume niches (which differs from the view that natural resources are merely 
commodities). Since resource-intensive sectors rely heavily on supplier-dominated 
innovations based on the employment of capital equipment (Pavitt, 1984), the 
exploitation of the natural resources in developing countries as proposed by Pérez, 
may be limited by the innovations introduced by capital equipment suppliers.  
The arguments put forward by von Tunzelmann and Acha, and Pérez highlights the 
role of networks in developing countries, suggesting that they combine new types of 
complementary knowledge which may play crucial roles in industrial development 
and technological catch-up. However, there is insufficient evidence about what 
drives innovating firms in developing countries to network, and on the roles that 
networks perform within their systems of innovation. The above issue raise questions 
about the role of government intervention through technology policy to support the 
creation of networks; this is discussed in the next section.     
2.2.2 Technology policy and networks  
Technology policy addresses two intertwined issues: i) the role of the state and 
government intervention in the economy to promote social welfare (Block, 1994; 
                                                 
15
 E.g., margarine production, from the perspective of its general formulation, is a low-technology 
activity of the food industry; however, the leading firms have incorporated ingredients based on 
frontier scientific knowledge to differentiate their products (e.g. Unilever and plant sterols; de 
Campos, 2006). As discussed in Section 2.3.1 this type of development could be important for 
developing countries. 
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Steinmueller, 2010; Stiglitz, 2002); and ii) technology defined as a partly public 
good, whose role in economic activities related to creation, development and 
diffusion of technology requires government intervention (Dasgupta, 1987; Ergas, 
1987; Mowery, 1995; Storper, 1995). The first relates mainly to the question of 
whether government intervention is necessary; advocates of markets argue that 
market equilibrium and profit incentives are sufficient to solve most problems of 
resource allocation efficiently, with the exception of the provision of public-goods 
(i.e. non-rival and non-excludable goods such as defence, utilities, education and 
health services) where government intervention is justified. This intervention is 
based on the assumption that the public sector is an important, primary public-good 
customer (Steinmueller, 2010) and the positive externalities from mixed (i.e. partly-
public and partly private) goods are constrained by the distribution of income among 
consumers rendering the level of private consumption below optimal, which does not 
provide sufficient incentive for for-profit organisations to invest (Block, 1994: 
692).
16
 The second aspect relates to the fact that technology involves both the 
knowledge embodied in machines and person-embodied codified and tacit 
knowledge about the development, operation of and improvement to machines 
(Pavitt, 1987). Although technological knowledge is different from information,
17
 its 
informational content may allow technological knowledge spillovers within the 
economy, making technology a partly public good (Mowery, 1995: 519; Storper, 
1995).
18
 
Advocates of government intervention, however, argue that market failures are 
frequent and should be monitored (Boyer, 1997) and that the state has the capability 
to adjust or correct market imperfections through interventions. The role of the state 
and government intervention to improve social welfare is influenced by whether 
economic actors are likely to respond to policy interventions, especially if they have 
a history and experience of the economic setting which might affect their response to 
government attempts to intervene, and the capability of the state to assess whether 
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 E.g., Block (1994: 693) points out that this argument justifies state provision of public education. 
17
 If technology equated with information, innovation would be expensive, but not its imitation; 
however, they have been shown not to be equivalent (Pavitt, 1987); firms need to develop a minimum 
level of absorptive capacity in order to de-codify and replicate external knowledge developed by 
competitors (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
18
 The informational content also shows the feature of the technological knowledge it embodies (and 
possibly transfers) through labour mobility, which reinforces the important role of networks for 
innovation activities.  
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strategic alliances among economic actors should be fostered or left to emerge as a 
consequence of self-interest. This capability relates to governance mechanisms (such 
as regulation) implemented by the state to foster or prevent formal collaboration 
among the economic actors.
19
  
Among the sources of market failure, technological knowledge spillovers can lead to 
negative externalities such as free-riding by rivals on investments made for 
innovation, which results in incomplete appropriability of the profit generated by the 
private production of new technological knowledge (Dasgupta, 1987) and, hence, 
under-compensation of the cost of investment (Steinmueller, 2010). Also, 
technological knowledge spillovers potentially can undermine market competition 
through the imposition of intellectual property rights (e.g. patents), and investments 
in technological knowledge are inherently risky; a high proportion of technological 
development is not diffused because of the risk of social or economic rejection 
(Pavitt, 1987: 182). Thus, to address the issues of appropriability and risk, 
government intervention related to technological activities may be necessary, and 
may be justified from a social welfare perspective.  
The market failure and partly-public good characteristic of technology supports the 
implementation of government technology policy, however it overlooks issues 
related to the areas/sectors where government intervention would be legitimate and 
effective, that is, should the government intervene only in sectors related to national 
social interests (such as military defence) or should it intervene for commercial 
reasons (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005: 608-609).
20
 The systems of innovation 
argument would be that support for technological activities is crucial for socio-
economic development (Freeman, 1987) and, therefore, that technology policy and 
government intervention play major roles in the economy, to further national social 
interests and also commercial sectors (Ergas, 1987), especially those involving 
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 E.g., Jorde and Teece (1989) claim that anti-trust regulations imposed by the US government 
prevented the emergence of strategic alliances in US high-technology industries at the end of the 
1980s. According to the authors, US over regulated antitrust laws prevented the formation of strategic 
alliances among small firms to invest in cooperative research and development that would benefit the 
allied firms. Shapiro and Willig (1990) contest Jorde and Teece’s argument, especially in the case of 
antitrust laws governing horizontal joint ventures in the USA. In contrast to Jorde and Teece, Shapiro 
and Willig argue that there is no consistent evidence that antitrust policies prevented cooperation 
among American firms or stifled their innovation and international competitiveness. See also Brodley 
(1990) for a more detailed discussion on this issue. 
20
 Nelson (1977) analyses public policies in more general terms, claiming that science and technology 
policies should address social priorities as well as national interests. 
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increasing economic returns and positive spillover effects. For instance, the 
importance of state investment in high-technology industries (e.g. ICT related 
industries) justifies government intervention because of the pervasiveness of these 
industries and their high potential for economic outcomes that will benefit a large 
share of society. State regulation and support are particularly relevant in industries 
that exploit inputs produced by subsidised sectors, for example the downstream 
application of ‘green’ technologies. Larger development objectives might justify 
temporary subsidies (especially in the case of ‘infant industries’ capable of maturing 
to become independent). Where market failures are seen as persistent (e.g. the case 
of very long-term investment in ‘transition’ as in the case of reducing carbon 
dependence), subsidies may need to apply for several decades.   
The discussion above calls for a definition of technology policy and some 
clarifications about how it is channelled, especially with regard to the formation of 
networks. Mowery (1995: 514 - emphasis added) defines technology policy ‘as 
policies that are intended to influence the decisions of firms to develop, 
commercialize or adopt new technologies’.21 Technology policy is applied using 
different mechanisms, to improve the institutional and economic settings such that 
firms, the main drivers of technical change and economic development (Freeman, 
1987), are encouraged to invest in innovation and technological activities. 
Technology policy is related to networks through their roles within government and 
within the economy.  
Networks within government are related to several issues. They are involved in the 
creation of public bureaux and the bureaucratic infrastructures that are designed to 
support the decisions of policy makers. Bureaucracy is justified by the argument that 
policy makers are not able to access all the information available about their 
operations and also do not have the capacity to filter out which information is more 
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 There is no consensus in the literature on a definition of technology policy, however, there is some 
agreement that science and technology policy addresses different economic resources. Lundvall and 
Borrás (2005) differentiate between technology policy, science policy and innovation policy. 
According to them:  i) technology policy ‘refers to policies that focus on technologies and sectors’ 
Lundvall and Borrás, 2005: 607); ii) science policy concerns the sufficient allocation of resources ‘to 
science, to distribute them wisely between activities, to make sure that resources are used efficiently 
and contribute to social welfare’ (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005: 605); and iii) that ‘innovation policy lies 
between initiatives aiming at promoting innovation within the institutional context and those aiming at 
changing in the institutional context in order to promote innovation’ (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005: 612-
613).  
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important and more reliable for their decisions (Downs, 1964).
22
 Therefore, it is 
necessary to create support agencies and bureaux that can develop expertise and 
knowledge in particular fields and can be consulted by policy makers in their 
decision making processes. These agencies and bureaux, in practice, are often 
organised as networks rather than hierarchies – that is, their remits overlap and their 
‘chains of command’ flow only nominally from some higher authority. Networks 
within government also relate to the interaction between government officers and 
third-party actors that are a part of their professional (formal and informal) networks. 
For instance, government officers may be able to consult and bring together actors 
from academia and industry with different knowledge about a specific subject. 
Working together allows the combination of this fragmented knowledge to further 
technological developments in a particular industry. Fuchs (2010), for example, 
examines the case of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in the 
period 1992-2008 and shows that the role played by its programme managers’ 
networks were crucial for supporting the identification and development of new 
technologies for the US defence industry. Fuchs (2010: 1145-1146) highlights also 
the role of government officers’ networks as a new form of technology policy, 
claiming that: 
embedded government agents re-architect social networks among 
researchers so as to identify and influence new technology directions (…) 
these agents do not give way to the invisible hand of markets nor do they 
step in with top-down bureaucracy to ‘pick technology winners’. Instead, 
they are in constant contact with the research community, understanding 
emerging themes, matching these emerging themes to military needs, betting 
on the right people, connecting disconnected communities, standing up 
competing technologies against each other, and maintaining that birds-eye 
perspective critical to integrating disparate activities across our national 
innovation ecosystem. 
Finally, networks within government may be an emergent property of particular 
policies. This is observable as a co-evolutionary development stemming from the 
greater role of autonomous and semi-autonomous private entities that deliver public 
services on behalf of government. For instance, Rhodes (2007) explains that the 
more market-oriented approach of the British government since the 1980s was aimed 
at increasing competition among autonomous public service providers. In practice, 
however, it resulted in the fragmentation of public service delivery systems, forced 
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 See Downs (1964) for an elucidation of the benefits and possible shortcoming of bureaucracy.  
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autonomous organisations to cooperate and multiplied the number of networks  
(Rhodes, 2007: 1245).
23
 More in depth discussion of the role of networks within 
government is beyond the scope of this thesis; here, we concentrate on the role of 
networks in the economy, and especially why technology policy aims, amongst 
others things, to support and foster the creation and development of networks.  
Networks within the economy more generally, play an important role because they 
provide the possibility to investigate interactions among economic actors that are not 
‘completely’ based on formal contracts or obligations (networks are an intermediate 
form between market and hierarchy; Powell, 1990). Networks ‘breed trustworthy 
relations’ among economic actors (Giuliani, 2010: 264; Granovetter, 1973, 1985), 
potentially reducing transaction costs and favouring the creation and diffusion of 
knowledge.
24
 Therefore, networks are often seen as a positive source of spillovers. 
However, the costs of networking can outweigh the benefits when relationships are 
poorly coordinated, the costs of forming and finishing alliances can be difficult or 
expensive, ‘thus once established, there may be reluctance to disband them’ (Powell 
and Grodal, 2005: 78), and networks also may trigger collusion among a small 
number of actors, which can lead to the formation of cartels and exclude competitive 
entry.
25
  
Since the 1990s, the relevance of networks has increased due to the emergence of 
successful clusters or districts associated with the presence of networks (Giuliani, 
2010: 261). The way that networks are structured, especially in developing countries, 
has been tackled by a few scholars including Dantas and Bell (2009) who investigate 
the Brazilian oil industry, Dodgson et al. (2008) who investigate the Taiwanese 
biotechnology industry, Giuliani (2010) who investigates the wine industry in Chile 
and Italy, Kim and von Tunzelmann (1998) who investigated the Taiwanese ICT 
industry, Ramirez and Dickenson (2010) who investigated the ICT industry in China, 
and Perini (2009) who investigates knowledge networks in the Brazilian ICT sector. 
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 It is assumed that any discussion of government action, in the main, would address political 
hierarchy as a mode of governance. For an elaboration of this issue and how the role of networks has 
increased in relation to delivery of government services since the 1980s, see Bevir and Rhodes (2001) 
and Rhodes (2007). 
24
 See Callon (1999) for a more general claim that actors do not interact based on arm’s length 
relationships, an argument that is central to Walrasian and other neo-classical approaches to 
understanding markets as auctions. 
25
 E.g., Shapiro and Willig (1990) and Brodley (1990) discuss the benefits and problems related to 
inter-firm cooperation through joint ventures, mainly addressing the antitrust regulatory regime in the 
US. 
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However, most studies of networks concentrate on developed economies, for 
example (among others), Ahuja (2000), who investigate the chemical industry in 
Japan, Western Europe and the US, Cantner and Graf (2010), who investigate the 
network of innovators in Jena, Germany, Cooke and de Laurentis (2010), who 
investigate the UK ICT industry, Fuchs (2010), who investigates the US defence 
industry, Grasenick et al. (2008), who investigate knowledge intensive networks in 
the Styria region in Austria, Herrigel (1993), who investigates the Baden-
Württemberg region in Germany, Lazerson (1993), who investigates the Modena 
region in Italy; Nohria (1992), who investigates Route 128 in the US East region; 
Saxenian (1994), Castilla et al. (2000) and Kenney (2000), who investigate the US 
semiconductor industry and Uzzi (1997), who investigates the apparel industry in the 
New York region of the US.  
Following the assumption of the system of innovation that local contexts play an 
important role in the creation and diffusion of knowledge, technology and 
innovation, we find that networks can be contextualised in particular socio-economic 
and geographical settings and may differ with regard to, among other things, their 
emergence, evolution and structure.
26
 Although networks differ, Grabher and Powell 
(2004) claim that it is possible to recognise the types of networks that may emerge 
through the performance of economic actors operating under similar conditions. 
They group networks into four types: i) informal networks (based on inter-personal 
ties); ii) project networks (to fulfil specific tasks, limited in time and involving 
formal and informal ties); iii) regional networks (trust and reputation are key assets 
and division of labour is common); and iv) business networks (which are more 
‘strategic and orchestrated’, in which power plays an important role in inter and 
intra-organisational ties).
27
 Although this typology may be useful for empirical 
investigation of networks, there is no reason to believe that they do not intermingle 
(Granovetter, 1994).
28
 In addition, networks can be the result of a purpose (i.e. be 
strategically created) or may be emergent (i.e. based on incidental interactions). 
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 The Social Network Analysis methodology investigates the structure of networks. See Scott (1991) 
for a comprehensive explanation of this. 
27
 E.g, Granovetter (1973) examines the role of informal network in labour mobility in the US, 
Castilla et al. (2000) examine the regional network in the Silicon Valley region in the US, and 
Granovetter (1994) examines business intra-networks. 
28
 Section 2.4 develops the issues of networks as a mode of governance. 
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In many cases it appears that government actions play an incidental facilitating role 
in the formation and maintenance of networks. For example, one of the main 
technology policy channels supports the formation of networks by defining and 
funding institutions that develop new scientific or technological activities, and may 
also support the training of skilled labour (Mowery, 1995). This may foster the 
formation of informal networks among actors with a common professional 
background, affording individuals and organisations the opportunity to engage in 
scientific and technological development communities (Salter and Martin, 2001). 
This type of policy has proved an important mechanism to support public-private 
sector collaboration (Faulkner and Senker, 1995) and the establishment of ongoing 
networks of participants. For instance, recipients of government funding for 
scientific training (university-trained scientists and engineers) may engage with the 
private sector (through employment or entrepreneurship) and create ties with former 
students or professors, based in their common understandings of particular problems 
(Pavitt, 1987: 184). Ties among entrepreneurs will be formed and probably 
maintained over time, especially if the entrepreneurs engage in active acquisition of 
new knowledge to maintain their competitive positions and if training institutions are 
open to collaborations with the private sector.
29
   
A second, more direct way to influence the formation and maintenance of networks 
is to impose new regulations to improve relations among the actors and agents 
involved in technological activities and innovation. An example here is the European 
Commission Sixth Framework Programme ‘Network of Excellence’ which provided 
funding for networks as infrastructures to which more specific project funding would 
be directed on a preferential basis (David and Keely, 2003). Apart from the relatively 
rare instances of policies explicitly directed to network formation, such as the 
Networks of Excellence funding as part of the European Commission Framework 
Programme and the Softex programme examined in this thesis, the formation of 
networks can be related to government funding programmes requiring certain forms 
of collaboration to promote coordination among actors. For instance, Steinmueller 
(2010: 1192) refers to the ‘thematic funding’ design and as describing ‘a wide range 
of programs that involve the predefinition of themes under which eligible candidates 
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 The case of the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley investigated by Saxenian (1994) is a clear 
example of the formation of both types of networks (formal and informal) in the region; Stanford 
University was shown to play a crucial role in supporting entrepreneurship. 
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are invited to propose specific programs of research’. Requirements often include 
project teams including members from industry and academia. Thus, thematic 
funding may support the formation of networks in two ways. Firstly, the thematic 
funding call may require the participation of several actors in the application 
processes and the creation of formal collaborations (e.g., between firms and 
universities). Secondly, the themes per se may involve sophisticated scientific 
knowledge that requires firms to engage (at least informally) with scientific or 
technological organisations to produce sufficiently detailed grant proposals and to 
increase the chances of funding being awarded.  
More fundamental science and technology policies also promote the formation of 
networks, and include, among other things, actions related to basic research, higher 
education, public procurement, subsidies and tax reductions (Lundvall and Borrás, 
2005; Mowery, 1995). These types of policies support network formation more 
indirectly. For example, large scale education policies that include scientific and 
technical training aimed at the development of a specific technology, may foster the 
formation of informal or regional networks. The former are based on the assumption 
that informal networks among actors with similar professional backgrounds are 
common (following the rationale described above). Regional networks may emerge 
when government strategy is directed to a particular region or confined to scientific 
and technical training institutions in a specific geographical area (e.g. to promote the 
establishment and growth of technology parks). The assumption is that the presence 
of crucial actors with a developed capability to advance the technological 
development of a particular industry or to handle changes to the technological 
paradigm, may benefit from spillovers of knowledge from other actors in the region 
(not least through labour mobility within a delimited geographical area). 
Other indirect technology policies may support the formation of networks, including 
actions to improve basic education and training standards,
30
 and promote competition 
policy and public investment.
31
 Such policies support the aims and roles of public 
organisations. Both the assignment of new missions to existing public organisations 
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 For instance, Ergas (1987) discussed the importance of basic education and training for the 
technological development of countries that followed a ‘diffusion-oriented’ technology policy, such 
as Germany, Switzerland and Sweden (as opposed to ‘mission-oriented’ technology policy countries, 
such as the UK, USA and France).  
31
 Mowery (1995: 539) stated that technology policy does not conventionally include competition 
amongst it instruments. However, competition has proved to be relevant to assure the enhancement of 
national innovation performances, and therefore may be included as a technology policy instrument. 
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or the creation of new organisations to correct dysfunctions within innovation 
systems (Steinmueller, 2010), may support network formation by establishing or 
increasing the interactions between the public and private sectors. These may 
include: i) exemptions on private sector involvement; ii) support for academic 
engagement with the private sector; and iii) sharing of intellectual property revenues 
among organisations, departments and individuals to recognise the contributions of 
each party. In this context, there will be a higher probability of formal network 
formation through consortia or engagement in the co-development of scientific or 
technological activities. Also, the assignment of new missions to existing public 
organisations might indirectly support the formation of interactions among private 
actors. 
In addition to government-led interventions, technology policy may also involve 
bottom-up arrangements to improve coordination among economic actors by: i) 
supporting the emergence of or improvement to institutions that develop any kinds of 
scientific or technological activities; ii) negotiating new regulations in order to 
improve the relations among the actors involved in technological activities and 
innovation; iii) negotiating new import and export laws; and iv) encouraging the 
establishment of institutions that contribute to the innovation process. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, bottom-up arrangements increase the likelihood of the 
engagement of emergent networks. This is not to say that such networks are based on 
balanced relationships among actors, bottom-up arrangements may call for 
coordination under hierarchical as opposed to heterarchical arrangements in which 
the power among actors tends to be more balanced. Hierarchies can be expected to 
emerge when particular actors have higher reputations in their milieux (compared to 
their peers) and better access to government representatives resulting in a higher 
probability of individual and collective requests being considered and granted.
32
 
A discussion of technology policy supporting the formation of networks requires 
examination of the following issues: i) what technologies and sectors should be 
prioritised (Freeman and Soete, 1997: 385), that is, should government support or 
invest in industries that are entirely new - to both the country and the world, or only 
those that are new to the country; in either case, there is likely to be a need for long-
term capability building to create scientific and technological knowledge consistent 
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 Industry associations are one example of the actors that may perform these roles. 
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with the more general infant industry argument; ii) should government prioritise 
high-technology or low-technology industries for investment bearing in mind that the 
boundaries between these industries is sometimes blurred; iii) which technological 
stage(s) should be supported, that is, there is a need to assess the trade-off between 
investing in industries during their early or their more mature stages and the various 
risks and different appropriation of profits (Pérez, 2001); iv) whether industries 
should be supported in terms of competition, promotion or a combination of the two; 
and v) whether the government agenda should include regional industry 
developments since, historically, industrial activities tend to be concentrated in 
geographical areas and geographic proximity can support formal and informal 
interactions among actors pursuing the development of similar or complementary 
technological knowledge (Boschma, 2005; Boschma and Martin, 2010b; Cooke, 
2001; Cooke and de Laurentis, 2010; Storper, 1995; Storper and Harrison, 1991).
33
 
The above discussion provides a theoretical view of how networks may be fostered 
and supported by government technology policy. However, the implementation of 
policy is not straightforward, and, as argued in the systems of innovation approach, 
differences in the economic and social settings may influence its implementation and 
results (Dasgupta, 1987). In addition, differences in the characteristics of sectors and 
regions may influence the success of technology policies. The particularities of the 
technologies (sector related) and local contexts (region related) may explain why 
successful experience cannot easily be replicated. Section 2.3 addresses some of 
these issues with a particular focus on the importance of networks for regional 
development and economic catching-up.  
2.3 Regional development and networks  
The importance of networks for regional development and economic catching-up is 
discussed in the context of path rigidity and institutional history which are crucial for 
understanding how regions evolve (Section 2.3.1). We discuss the relevance of 
networking activities involving NTBF, especially in the software industry (Section 
2.3.2). 
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 The identification of these issues is based on the discussion in Lundvall and Borrás (2005) related 
to economic catching-up, which is examined in more detail in Section 2.3. 
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2.3.1 Regional networks and economic catching-up  
Regional development and regional networks are informed by the understanding that 
technical progress is an endogenous process that develops in the course of economic 
growth (Freeman and Soete, 1997).
34
 This assumption has implications for 
examination of the emergence and development of industrial regions, and for the 
catching-up process in different regions. The issues involved relate directly to the 
concept of path dependence at whose core is the argument that past economic and 
technological choices influence present results, and that ‘history matters’ in the 
evolution of organisations and institutions (David, 1994: 208).
35
 The concept of path 
dependence is particularly relevant for the understanding of how networks and 
regions evolve. It is necessary to consider the process by which regional networks 
can become locked into certain paths through a process of self-reinforcement or 
released from a previous institutional, economic or technological path. The concept 
of path dependence and the knowledge that history matters are crucial for an 
investigation of networks in developing country economies, where networks 
commonly are embedded in rather negative social, economic, institutional and 
technological contexts that are associated with social inequalities, economic 
vulnerability to external economic shocks, lack of skilled human resources and 
obsolete technologies. This raises questions about how laggard regions can break 
free of their lock-in to negative paths, which might be a requirement for socio, 
economic and technological catching-up.  
According to the path dependence theory, a change of paths is triggered by an 
external shock and the costs involved in disturbing the equilibrium associated with 
lock-in may produce a worsening of the economic position. In some cases, these 
costs may be so substantial that they prevent the transition to other paths. The costs 
of switching to a new path can be a major constraint on developing country regions. 
Although managerial decision-making process tend to maintain paths (i.e., path 
rigidity), internal or external intervention may enable path switching. The use of a 
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 Freeman and Soete (1997, Ch. 13) provide a detailed historical discussion of the assumptions about 
and shortcomings of old and new growth models. In the former technical progress is treated as an 
exogenous variable and in the latter it is an endogenous variable. Further exploration of this topic is 
beyond the scope of the literature review in this chapter.  
35
 It is important to point out that path dependence and history are not equivalents. History matters 
because of the cumulativeness and directionality of the choices made in past events; path dependence 
occurs when it is impossible to achieve a particular position due to the accumulation of experience 
along a particular ‘path’ or direction. 
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framework that combines exogenous and endogenous incentives for a change in 
direction increases the scope of technology policy formulation and implementation. 
Regions set on a particular path, may offer scope for government intervention in the 
form of technology policy and the potential for a change in direction through 
changes to supply or demand policy (Steinmueller, 2010). However, there are no 
guarantees that these interventions will be effective. 
Contributions to the path dependence literature from such authors as Martin and 
Sunley (2006; and 2010) and Boschma and Martin (2010b), who are not economists, 
use the term path dependence to refer to situations characterised by path rigidities. 
This could apply to some Brazilian regional and industrial development experience 
because government technology policy for some Brazilian regions has been aimed at 
the creation or re-creation of new paths.
36
  
However, these studies tend to skim over investigation of the role of nodes in 
networks (i.e. how dyadic ties are formed).
37
 Empirical evidence could provide 
explanatory variables for understanding whether and how self-reinforcing, negative 
paths may be changed through endogenous or exogenous processes.   
Path rigidity is directly related to technological catching-up at regional and country 
level, because changes to paths may support the emergence of new opportunities for 
laggard economies to improve their technological activities and catch-up to the 
leading economies. At country level, development paths are associated also with 
changes in technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982),
38
 such as the ICT revolution 
(Pérez, 2001). ICT has accelerated economic globalisation and influenced the 
development of networks within innovation systems, and economic actors that are 
more knowledgeable about their own and other networks and systems, which in 
theory increases their potential to access other actors. This applies to networks in 
developing countries and potentially increases the access to and engagement of 
developing country actors with new knowledge in new technologies. However, 
access to new knowledge does not necessarily include the ‘know-how’ required to 
use it.  
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 Chs 4, 6 and 7 examine some of these experiences in some depth. 
37
 E.g., recent studies on Brazilian innovative regions, such as those in Cassiolato et al. (2008a), are 
not included in the in-depth investigation of dyadic ties within networks. 
38
 Dosi (1982:152) defines a ‘technological paradigm’ as a ‘model’ and a ‘pattern of solution of 
selected technological problems based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on 
selected material technologies’ (emphasis in original). 
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An examination of regional path rigidity and technological catching-up is 
particularly relevant in the case of large countries. First, because there are likely to 
be more regional disparities (as discussed above), and different regions are likely to 
have developed along different paths. Second, because industries are often 
concentrated in geographical regions (Asheim and Gertler, 2004; Boschma and 
Martin, 2010b; Cooke, 2001; Dohse, 2000; Giuliani, 2010; Markusen, 1996; 
Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1995), and use different mechanisms to develop their 
technological activities (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2002, 2004; Pavitt, 
1984; Steinmueller, 2004).  
So how can networks embedded in regions support technological catching-up within 
a particular path? Since networks involve collaboration (as discussed above), we 
need to investigate whether and how support for collaboration among regional firms 
might improve their technological activities; such improvement is expected ex-ante 
to increase firm competitiveness and the process of catch-up with competitors.  
The case of Japan’s technological catching-up process, especially after World War 
II, highlights the importance given to networks by Japan’s Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI). The formulation of industrial policy involved frequent 
discussion between MITI members and industry scientists and technologists, aimed 
at supporting and improving policy and its implementation (Evans, 1995: 49; 
Freeman, 1987: 36). Also, MITI and Japanese industry associations pursued 
systematic efforts to ‘upgrade’ local capabilities through the formation of learning 
networks, with a specific focus on  developing technology domestically, with the aim 
of reducing dependence on foreign technologies (Okimoto, 1989).  
The cases of the Taiwan’s IT and biotechnology industries investigated in Dodgson 
et al. (2008) demonstrate the importance given by national governments to 
supporting the creation of local (purposive) networks and the creation of science 
parks to nurture IT and biotechnology developments. These efforts were aimed at 
changing the ‘imitation’ path to an ‘innovation’ path. The interactions between firms 
and knowledge suppliers (such as universities and technology centres), and local 
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venture capitalists were very important for the local development of these industries, 
and the eventual catching-up by Taiwan’s IT industry.39  
The networks described above were facilitated by government through institutional 
changes addressing the needs of the two industries, in the form of adapted rather than 
horizontally implemented institutional support. In the case of the Taiwanese IT 
industry, government supported interaction involving local firms and MNCs, aimed 
at diffusing existing knowledge. In the case of the biotechnology firms, government 
fostered interactions between firms and local knowledge suppliers to create new 
local knowledge. Adaptation of policies to fit different industry developments shows 
that the Taiwanese government recognised that industries differ and no ‘one model 
fits all’; it was a recognition that different paths (in this case technological paths) 
require different monitoring and support. The lessons from experience in Japan and 
Taiwan are that networks can lead to technological development, but that policy 
makers need to consider the technological and institutional paths within industries so 
that more appropriate networks emerge, the costs of changes to rigid paths can be 
more accurately assessed and technological catch-up is achieved. Both these cases 
seem to be exceptions rather than the rules, which implies further investigation is 
needed into whether this process can be replicated in other developing countries and 
with what results. 
Another aspect of networks and catching-up is how successful experience can be 
replicated, and especially in developing countries which often try to replicate 
developed economy examples with the expectation of similarly successful results. 
The systems of innovation approach states that systems differ and, therefore, that 
national governments need to be cautious about their choice of supporting 
mechanisms aimed at technological development, especially in developing countries 
where systems may not be complete (i.e. may be missing some components), or may 
be dysfunctional (i.e. their components do not perform as expected) (Bell and Pavitt, 
1993; Cassiolato et al., 2003; Lastres and Cassiolato, 2001). Whilst, the replication 
of experience is associated with uncertain results, this does not mean that regions and 
countries cannot learn from the experience of others. Understanding how firms 
combine different knowledge, and their ability to engage in networks is required for 
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 Although the share of venture capital investment is larger in the IT industry than in the 
biotechnology industry.  
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the successful replication of experience in other contexts. Section 2.3.2 discusses this 
in relation to software firms.    
2.3.2 NTBF and networks  
This section aims to discuss how NTBF combine different knowledge for the 
development and commercialisation of their products or services, that is, whether 
NTBF employ knowledge that is developed internally or externally, or a combination 
of both (when they assemble and integrate knowledge from various sources). We 
discuss the motivations for NTBF network activity focusing on the case of software 
firms. 
The development of software products and services is part of a wide range of 
development activities that include systems, packaged applications and customised 
applications (Steinmueller, 2004). The software industry is highly creative, as noted 
by Brooks Jr (1995: 7), and software programming relates to ‘the joy of always 
learning, which springs from the non-repeating nature of the task. In one way or 
another, the problem is ever new, and its solver learns something: sometimes 
practical, sometimes theoretical and sometimes both’. Software development 
involves the systematic planning of the division of labour (Brooks Jr., 1995), 
systematic documentation and training (Cusumano and Selby, 1995),
40
 and well 
established communication and coordination among software programmers (Heeks 
et al., 2001). Each activity of software systems and packaged and customised 
applications, varies in its complexity and may demand different types of scientific, 
technological and commercial knowledge, requiring ‘firms to mix internal 
competencies, knowledge and experience with external sources of knowledge’ 
(Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001: 1428) through the creation of external ties with other 
organisations such as universities, suppliers, competitors and users. Although there 
may be patterns of relationships among software firms or between software firms 
and network actors, the role of networks may differ for the individual firms in the 
software industry. 
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 Cusumano and Selby (1995) provide a detailed investigation of how Microsoft improved its 
software development processes adjusting and adopting internal procedures, over the years, aimed at 
supporting its accelerated growth, which coincided with a dynamic technological evolution within the 
software industry. 
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The international software industry is highly concentrated, especially in the 
development of packaged and platform applications, which are mainly dominated by 
US software suppliers (Steinmueller, 2004). Most software firms innovate by 
differentiating and customising their products to particular application contexts, 
which often involves close relationships with customers (users). Software 
developments also frequently require knowledge that is accessed through networking 
activities, for instance, with supplier firms, complementary firms, university 
researchers and competitors. 
Grimaldi and Torrisi (2001) in an investigation of formal external ties among Italian 
software firms, find that ties can be classified as research-oriented or market-
oriented. Research-oriented ties may involve formal links with competitors (e.g. 
through joint R&D agreements) or software firms that develop complementary 
technologies. Market-oriented ties usually involve firms that perform in different 
stages of a technological process (e.g. systems suppliers) or in different regional 
markets and are designed to gain access to specialised commercial assets, service 
expertise and new markets (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001: 1431). Market-oriented ties 
can include the use of well-established systems or platforms that benefit from the 
network externalities related to the use of well-diffused technologies developed by 
platform providers and which can be customised (often as a value-added computer 
service activity) to particular users (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  
The discussion above suggests that although software development is strongly 
related to the employment by trained developers of internal knowledge gained 
through study and experience, networking activities are also required. In this thesis 
we are particularly interested in the relations between firms and supporting 
organisations that are part of a network that also includes customers, and 
investigating networks created by firms that develop software as a business. Section 
2.3.1 suggested that micro level investigation of networks, that is, of the dyadic ties 
between the nodes in a network, is relevant to explain the structure and evolution of 
networks that might explain how paths change or are changed. We investigate this in 
Section 2.4.  
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2.4 Network governance and structure, and firm-level innovation in 
a developing country context  
Section 2.4.1 reviews the literature on network governance and structure and 
discusses the importance of dyadic ties and control mechanisms within networks. 
Section 2.4.2 addresses the main concepts related to firm-level innovation and 
especially networks embedded in developing countries. 
2.4.1 Network governance and structure 
The issue of network governance concerns the relation between the structure and the 
functions of networks. Governance can be seen as purpose-related in the deliberate 
effort to establish and manage a network, for example aimed at achieving market 
leadership for its members. Governance can emerge in a self-organising fashion, for 
example through the emergence of ‘anchor’ actors within the network whose 
influence is based on long-term trust relationships with other network actors. 
Network governance is mostly confined to organisation studies where the main units 
of analysis are i) coordination mechanisms within networks and ii) the existence, 
nature and extent of dyadic ties among network nodes (Provan and Kenis, 2008). The 
definition of ‘network governance’ varies; it often includes a bias towards 
investigation of one or other of the units of analysis described above (i.e. purpose as 
a constituting rationale for establishment or management, or purpose as an emergent 
property of the network) rather than considering both within a single framework. The 
definition of network governance related to intra or inter-network structure and 
functions is somewhat arbitrary (as noted by Jones et al., 1997).
41
 However, all the 
definitions proposed assume that the actors are neither isolated from one another nor 
take decisions based on arm’s length relationships (Callon, 1999). Networks are 
considered to be embedded in social and economic settings that are likely to 
influence the actors economic decisions and formation of ties (Granovetter, 1985, 
1992).
42
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 Jones et al. (1997: 915) provide a table showing that inter-organisation networks, alliance 
capitalism, business groups and social networks are terms used by different authors who examine 
network governance issues.  
42
 According to Granovetter (1992: 33; emphasis in original) ‘embeddedness refers to the fact that 
economic action and outcomes, like all social action and outcomes, are affected by actors’ dyadic 
(pairwise) relations and by the structure of the overall network of relations’. 
  
40 
As mentioned above, the role of networks in fostering development is increasingly 
acknowledged, in part because networks are an important complement to markets by 
facilitating exchanges of information on current and future opportunities and 
developments governing the planning and operational decisions of upstream firms in 
current production processes. Firms’ engagement in networks brings benefits in the 
form of externalities resulting from knowledge about the plans of other firms. This 
knowledge is relevant for development, because the effects of coordination 
externalities help to overcome information asymmetries.   
In this thesis, network governance and structure is related to the inter-organisational 
coordination exerted in a particular institutional setting. Jones et al. (1997: 913) 
define network governance as inter-firm coordination. We extend this to include all 
organisations (for profit and non-profit) in the network. We understand coordination 
as occurring when two (or more) network actors have a common goal and establish a 
tie in order to pursue it (Bevir, 2009: 57). This definition encompasses a more 
comprehensive understanding of network governance compared to studies that 
investigate only dyadic ties and consider governance as an emergent or collateral 
property of a network. It also encompasses the micro and the macro dimensions of 
networks,
43
 which are overlooked by most network governance studies (Provan and 
Kenis, 2008).
44
  
Micro level investigation of networks examines the creation, nature and strength of 
dyadic ties. The work developed by Granovetter (1973: 1361) on the strength of ties, 
defined by him as ‘a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services 
which characterize the tie’, is a major contribution to the investigation of networks 
that has been applied frequently.
45
 Granovetter (1973) defines a strong tie as a direct 
connection between two actors that is based on trust, reputation and a long-term 
relationship, and is difficult to break and likely to continue through time. He defines 
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 Studies of dyadic ties provide a micro analysis of the network, referred to by Jones et al. (1997) as 
relational embeddedness and by Provan and Kenis (2008) as the analytical approach. Studies of 
network control mechanisms provide a macro analysis of networks, termed by Jones et al. structural 
embeddedness and by Provan and Kenis (2008) network governance. 
44
 Network governance scholars focus less on the structural features of the network. However, this 
does not mean that structural issues have been ignored. For instance, economic geography studies 
contribute to the understanding of regional industrial clusters by incorporating structural issues in 
their analysis (Boschma and Martin, 2010a).   
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 E.g., Uzzi (1997) investigates 23 New York apparel manufacturers and confirms Granovetter’s 
argument that trust and long-term relationships are crucial for inter-firm interactions.  
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a weak tie as an indirect connection between two actors, which is based on a short-
term and more opportunistic relationship.  
Granovetter does not consider whether ties are created purposely or incidentally. He 
disregards the origins of networks and the forces that subsequently govern their 
growth and further articulation. This allows him to separate strong from weak ties 
without considering the relation between the strength of the tie in relation to its 
prospective purpose. In this thesis, networks are seen as purposive and, hence, the 
strength of the ties among network actors is relevant to their exploitation in 
prospective relationships. The strength of a tie does not necessarily determine its 
value. Ties play different roles, and the structure in which they are embedded is 
important (Storper, 1996).
46
 For instance, weak ties can act as bridges between nodes 
(i.e., network actors) that are unknown to each other and may be important for 
spreading non-overlapping information across the network.
47
 The assumption is that 
directly connected actors are likely to have access to similar if not identical 
information, because they share the same sources, but actors that are not directly 
connected may be more likely to bring new information into the network because 
they access different sources. Thus, the argument is that the larger the number of an 
actor’s weak ties, the higher will be the chances of this actor accessing new (but not 
necessarily relevant) information. Bridges are important for the diffusion of 
information.  
Similarly, the structural holes concept proposed by Burt (1992) contributes to the 
investigation of dyadic ties, the diffusion of information within networks and 
network efficiency. Burt (1992: 18) defines a structural hole as a relationship where 
there is non-redundancy between two contacts involved in a transaction. Redundant 
contacts lead the target node to the same people and spread information in a circular 
fashion with high probabilities of overlapping information.
48
 The concept of 
structural holes developed by Burt contributes to the debate on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of networks, which is relevant for investigation and understanding of 
network structure and evolution discussed below.  
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 Grabher (1993) claims that the presence of strong ties in the Ruhr area in Germany trapped the 
region into negative lock-in, which was damaging to regional development.  
47
 All bridges are weak ties, but not all weak ties are necessarily bridges. For a comprehensive 
discussion on the features of bridges see Granovetter (1973: 1364). 
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 Burt, unlike Granovetter, considers that both strong and weak ties can be bridges. 
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The efficiency of a network stems from the likelihood that it is more advantageous 
(less costly) for a central node to have a few trusted direct links (which are costly to 
maintain) that are connected to other clusters of nodes (Figure 2.1a below), than to 
have direct ties with all the nodes in every cluster (Figure 2.1b below). If the direct 
links are based on trust, the central node is likely to have access to reliable 
information from various sources, which is an advantage (Burt, 1992: 20-21). 
Figure 2.1 Network efficiency  
(a)   (b) 
 
Source: Burt (1992: 17 and 20). 
The effectiveness of a network is determined by the access to new information at 
network level. Since a given actor (the central node) has a fixed number of ties it is 
more effective to have direct ties to actors with connections to other networks (‘after’ 
position in Figure 2.2) than to have direct ties with actors in the same network(s) 
(‘before’ position in Figure 2.2). The higher possibility of connections with 
additional networks allows the central node greater access to non-redundant 
information. This is advantageous because:   
non-redundant contacts are only linked through the central player, you are 
assured of being the first to see new opportunities created by needs in one 
group that could be served by skills in another group. You become the 
person who first brings people together, which gives you the opportunity of 
coordinate their activities. These benefits are compounded by the fact that 
having a network that yields such benefits makes you even more attractive 
as a network contact to other people, thus easing your task of expanding the 
network to best serve your interests. (Burt, 1992: 23)
49
 
                                                 
49 This quote indicates that, unlike Granovetter, Burt anticipates the formation of ties based on 
‘ulterior motives’, and supports the above argument that networks are purposive and, hence, that the 
strength of ties among network actors is relevant to the purposes for which they might be exploited in 
prospective relationships. 
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Figure 2.2 Network effectiveness 
 
Source: Burt (1992:22). 
The investigation of dyadic ties provides empirical information at the individual 
level and, combined with evidence on the institutional arrangements in which ties are 
embedded, may contribute to our understanding of the structure of networks. This 
raises the question of whether there are optimal strong and weak ties (to use 
Granovetter’s terms) or structural holes (in Burt’s terms) combinations that would 
render networks more efficient and more effective. At one extreme, optimal 
combinations of strong and weak ties could be considered in the investment planning 
sense, which would cast network formation as a maximisation problem of the sort 
favoured by neoclassical economists. However, successful anticipation of optimal 
combinations is unlikely because: a) the costs of maintaining ties are difficult to 
predict, and b) the value of what would be gained is similarly uncertain. In the 
context of this thesis, firms are not isolated actors; they are embedded in dynamic 
settings which, when understood in combination with ties within networks, may 
provide evidence to support government action aimed at improving industrial 
development. 
Provan and Kenis (2008) note that although networks have been extensively 
investigated, organisational studies of network governance pay scant attention to the 
governance of multi-organisational networks, perhaps because: 
organizational scholars are used to studying organizations, not 
multiorganizational arrangements [and] (…) there seems to be some 
reluctance among many who study networks to discuss formal mechanisms 
of control. A common assumption is that since networks are collaborative 
arrangements, governance, which implies hierarchy and control, is 
inappropriate. (Provan and Kenis, 2008: 230) 
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Also, organisational studies that address multi-organisational network governance 
and structure in general do not specifically consider the infancy and evolution of 
these networks, but rather refer to these aspects implicitly under the heading of 
network controlling mechanisms (Provan and Kenis, 2008). However, the study of 
network infancy and evolution is relevant for an examination of inter-organisational 
networks. The following elements may be conditions for the further development 
and articulation of the network: i) networks might be purposive or emergent with 
different consequences for their growth and articulation; ii) government efforts to 
promote networks may influence which type of network is more likely to emerge in a 
particular industry; iii) the level of openness of the network, often established at an 
early point in its history, influences its evolution; and iv) the existence in the network 
of a network broker may involve controlling mechanisms that deserve examination. 
An investigation of inter-organisational networks that addresses these issues could 
provide important insights for a more comprehensive understanding of networks and 
the proper role of policy to support network formation and maintenance.  
Each of the four issues outlined above requires further examination. First, we find 
that purposive networks follow as the result of strategic actions implemented by 
government and that emergent networks follow as the result of spontaneous 
interactions among actors. The reasons why a network is formed may be significant 
for its governance. In purposive networks compared to emergent networks, ties may 
be more vulnerable to being broken, because the actors in purposive networks may 
have responded to a specific initiating event (such as a government incentive to 
engage in a network). However, over time, these motivations may be superseded by 
other incentives and developments and when put under pressure actors may reassess 
their ties and whether the initial reasons for engaging in the network remain valid. 
Emergent networks result from the creation of spontaneous ties based on an ex-ante 
assessment by the network actors that the costs of engaging in the network will be 
worthwhile in the short-term. Over time, these ex-ante expectations may or may not 
be fulfilled. However, the variety of motives and expectations related to emergent 
networks is likely to be greater and the ties will be less vulnerable to pressures from 
changing events.  
The second issue, relating to the response of industry to the implementation of 
government policy, concerns the likelihood that firms will respond to government 
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actions, which will depend on the following. Industry’s response to government 
policy will be related to the dynamics in specific sectors. As already discussed, 
sectoral characteristics determine in part whether firms need to combine different 
sources of knowledge and engage with different types of actors; however, these 
needs may change over time. In addition, the power arrangement within a network 
(i.e. hierarchical or heterarchical) is likely to influence the network actors’ responses 
to government intervention and power relationships are likely also to evolve over 
time, which will influence the controlling mechanisms within networks discussed 
further below. 
The issue of the level of openness of regional networks is important for 
understanding network governance and how networks evolve over time. A proxy for 
the level of network openness is the number of actors in the network that are external 
to the region. This is an important measure because it is an indication of the level of 
risk that the region will become locked in ‘functional’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘political’ 
ways (Grabher, 1993).
50
 The absence of inter-network ties in the regional network 
suggests that there is a higher risk of lock in occurring, as a result of what Grabher 
(1993) refers to as the ‘weakness of strong ties’, that is, the ties among network 
actors are so strong as to prevent changes that would allow the network to evolve in 
new and positive directions. When a network becomes dominated by one or more of 
the lock-in mechanisms described above, ‘sclerosis’ develops which jeopardises 
further network evolution. The level of openness of the network is a proxy for the 
absorptive capacity of the network actors (here we are concerned specifically with 
firms) and the regional network.
51
 The ability of firms to access inter-network actors 
will be based on their level of absorptive capacity, and the inter-network ties they 
establish may prevent network lock in and indicate greater absorptive capacity. 
The issue of controlling mechanisms within networks is important for understanding 
network governance. The empirical evidence on this issue is scant; most studies 
investigate dyadic ties and ignore the wider control mechanisms. Similarly, the 
foundational assumption that networks are collective arrangements precludes the 
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 ‘Functional lock-in’ occurs when the region is trapped into a rigid specialisation, ‘cognitive lock-in’ 
describes a situation of ‘groupthink’ that leads to regional development, and ‘political lock-in’ 
happens when there are symbiotic ties between the politico-administrative systems and industry 
representatives (Grabher, 1993). 
51
 Absorptive capacity is the ability to de-codify and re-deploy knowledge developed externally 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Rousseva (2008) uses this proxy to investigate the absorptive capacity 
and technological capabilities of Bulgarian software firms. 
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observation of unbalanced power within network arrangements and represents a gap 
in organisation studies (Provan and Kenis, 2008: 230).
52
 Although empirical 
evidence from social network analysis identifies network nodes that are more 
powerful, the focus is on analysing network representation (degree centrality), rather 
than investigating in depth the nature and motivations for tie creation or how these 
issues are linked to more or less powerful actors within the network. Institutional 
arrangements (rules and conventions) that are strongly related to the controlling 
mechanism are not captured by social network analysis (Cantner and Graf, 2010; 
Grasenick et al., 2008). These studies do not capture institutional arrangements often 
because of data restrictions; if patents are employed as a proxy for innovation, it is 
possible to identify dyadic relationships (e.g. co-invention) which are not specific to 
the features or motivations determining tie creation. Also, the use of patents as a 
proxy for innovation excludes innovation activities that are not appropriated by 
patenting. Social network analysis combined with in depth investigation of network 
nodes and dyadic ties would explain how networks function and evolve, and suggest 
government interventions aimed at making networks more efficient and effective.  
Investigation of the controlling mechanisms enables differentiation among brokered 
networks, shared-governance networks and mixed governance networks.
53
 An 
examination of how controlling mechanisms are exercised within a network adds to 
our understanding of whether the network is dependent on one or a few particular 
actors and, therefore, the removal of these actors from the network may cause major 
disruption to its arrangement and result in its degeneration. Also, the identification of 
a heterarchical (shared-governance) or hierarchical (brokered) network arrangement 
may support the formulation and implementation of technology policy to create or 
support networks.
54
  
In addition to network governance and structures with controlling mechanisms and 
dyadic ties, von Tunzelmann (2003) introduces the concept of network alignment, 
which is also relevant for understanding how networks evolve. Von Tunzelmann 
(2003: 46) takes a systemic approach and assumes that multiple networks are 
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 See the contribution by Cantner and Graf (2010). 
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 Brokers govern the network and can be internal or external to the networks; shared-governance 
networks occur when all the network participants govern the network collectively; mixed governance 
networks are where a single entity which is responsible for coordinating certain network issues and 
others are coordinated collectively. 
54
 The use of social network analysis methods for visualising the representation of networks is useful 
in allowing a more accurate identification of the actors. 
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different elements ‘pulling in similar directions to one another, even when their 
purposes differ’. Network alignment refers to the consistency of heterogeneous 
networks and their ability to ‘orient their effectiveness towards attaining certain 
goals for the relevant systems’ (von Tunzelmann, 2010: 4). Von Tunzelmann’s 
contribution is especially useful for a consideration of whether the role of 
government in creating networks should include the issue of network alignment. This 
would mean that government support for the creation of networks may not by itself 
be a sufficient mechanism to foster knowledge exchange among the actors or to 
promote learning by firms; some level of alignment may also be required.  
In the context of developing countries this could be important to challenge the view 
that the replication of support for networks is sufficient to foster firm innovation; in 
these contexts, the institutional setting required to achieve alignment is neglected. 
For instance, Pacheco and Corder (2009) note that, historically, Brazilian public 
organisations have been rigid, against change and, therefore, unlikely to be able to 
adapt to new demands. In their view, this problem has delayed the evolution of the 
country’s system of innovation. Dodgson et al. (2008) find evidence of a quite 
different phenomenon in Taiwan, where local institutions adapt to the needs of 
specific industries, which in part explains the country’s catch-up in the IT industry. 
In this case, network alignment was evidence at the national level (Kim and Von 
Tunzelmann, 1998). 
This section has discussed the issue of network governance, which relates to the 
structure and functions of networks in which governance can be seen as a purposive 
or emergent feature. Although network governance has been differently defined by 
organisational scholars, all definitions are based on the premise that network actors 
are embedded in economic and social settings that influence their economic 
decisions and the formation of ties. Network coordination may benefit firms, 
particularly in development contexts, by helping to overcome information 
asymmetries. This thesis examines purposive networks, and hypothesises that the 
strength of ties among network actors may be advantageous for prospective 
relationships. Studies on the strength of dyadic ties may support an understanding of 
the structure and performance of networks, including their efficiency and 
effectiveness, especially if combined with evidence that relates to the institutional 
settings (and investigation of the infancy and evolution of networks) wherein dyadic 
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ties are embedded. The evidence from such studies can be used to inform 
government actions to improve industrial development. Investigation of inter-
organisational networks provides some clarification of the key elements that may 
influence the development and articulation of networks, providing important insights 
that should lead to a more comprehensive understanding of networks and the proper 
role of policy in supporting network formation and maintenance. This section 
demonstrates that the concept of network alignment may be relevant for an 
understanding of network evolution and the role of networks as sufficient 
mechanisms for knowledge exchange among actors, and learning-by-interacting 
among firms.  
The next section discusses the systemic linkages within and among networks from 
the perspective of the firm. 
2.4.2 Firm-level innovation and networks in developing countries  
An understanding of firm-level innovation is relevant for firms’ economic 
performance and development, since most economic activity is channelled through 
firms (Penrose, 1959: 9). Firms are the main recipients of the benefits from 
innovation and technological accumulation is localized mainly in firms (Bell and 
Pavitt, 1992; Malerba, 2004: 24). Innovation can be defined from different 
viewpoints. Some would claim that only radical inventions should be described as 
innovations and do not consider incremental innovation. The definition of innovation 
in the OECD (2005) Oslo Manual provides some resolution between these 
conflicting stances, and broadens the scope of investigation. It defines innovation as: 
the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or 
service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations 
(…) The minimum requirement for an innovation is that the product, 
process, marketing method or organisational method must be new (or 
significantly improved) to the firm. (OECD, 2005: 46) 
The Oslo Manual provides a comprehensive perspective on the measurement of 
innovation, especially in developing country economies where firm level innovations 
(i.e. practices or outputs new to the firm but not the market) are more frequent than 
market level (i.e. practices or outputs new to all the firms in the country) or 
international market level (i.e. practices or outputs new to the world) innovations 
(OECD, 2005: Annex 1).  
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Firm level innovations are often related to innovative firms’ specialisation in 
knowledge production, and in the technologies employed, the products produced and 
the processes employed (Pavitt, 1998). This specialisation in knowledge production 
differs considerably between large and small firms (based on their different 
availability of the resources required to pursue innovation and operate under 
organisational arrangements),
55
 and between sectors and industries (Freeman and 
Soete, 1997). Hence, a firm’s innovation strategy will be influenced by firm size, 
sector and industry
56
 as well as by issues related to technological, social and 
scientific path-rigidity (as discussed in Section 2.3.1). Innovation ability depends on 
experience at the micro level; over time, firms accumulate capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997), which influence their capacity to access and apply externally developed 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and to change or re-think their strategies. 
Firms’ knowledge specialisation, knowledge creation, innovation strategies, dynamic 
capabilities, absorptive capacity and the systems in which they are embedded are 
determinants of the search for external and complementary knowledge, that is, 
through their network ties.  
Bell and Pavitt (1992) stress the need to know more about the specific conditions 
favouring technological accumulation by firms in developing countries, which may 
involve participation in networks. The network concept assumes the presence of 
collective arrangements. It is useful for understanding innovation since it enables us 
‘to supersede the methodological individualism of Schumpeter’s “heroic” 
entrepreneur’  (DeBreson and Amese, 1991: 364). Both networks of innovators and 
collective actions are related to collective learning and the mutual benefits that each 
actor secures. They are a sub-set of systems of innovation (Cantner and Graf, 2010). 
A precondition for the existence of a network of innovators is synergy among agents, 
without which the network can fail. Cooperative relationships among agents are a 
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 E.g., Pavitt (1998) examines the case of knowledge specialisation in large firms, addressing the 
issues of internal control and coordination within the firm (i.e. governance) and linkages of interfaces 
within and outside the firm (i.e. network). He claims that these features are increasingly essential for 
the successful deployment by large firms of technological knowledge and for their commercial 
success. Small firms, on the other hand, can usually not afford investment in R&D on a similar scale 
to that found in large firms. The development of technological knowledge by small firms requires a 
different organisational structure. For a comprehensive study of micro and small firms see Rothwell 
and Zegveld (1982). 
56
 Freeman and Soete (1997; Ch. 11) propose a range of innovation strategies including: offensive, 
defensive, imitative, dependent, traditional and opportunistic strategies. Each includes different 
combinations of in-house scientific and technical activities, which may provide useful insights for the 
empirical examination of firm-level innovations in specific industries. 
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‘key linking mechanism in network configurations’ (Freeman, 1991: 502). However, 
as already stated, it cannot be assumed that relationships are balanced, and 
hierarchical networks often emerge during network development.
57
 Innovation in a 
developing country context often depends on whether and why firms engage with 
networks of innovators, in which types of networks they participate and how they are 
able to benefit from these arrangements. For instance, Bresnaham et al. (2001), used 
an industrial cluster approach and found that Ireland, Israel, India and Taiwan have 
benefited in different ways from engagement with leading US ICT networks to 
develop their own ICT industry; thus, they stress that contextual settings should be 
considered for policy making. 
Research on innovation in developing countries aims, among other things, to explain 
how interactions among firms, and between firms and other organisations, support 
regions’ or countries’ economic development.58 For example, Sagasti (2003) claims 
that networks are relevant for building strong endogenous scientific and 
technological systems in developing countries and that interactions among local 
actors, and with global counterparts are important for economic development. 
Innovation studies do not always refer to these interactions using the language of 
networks; however, there is a level of consensus that technological and social 
capabilities require a long and gradual building process and that inter-organisation 
interactions may support the process of capabilities acquisition by firms and lead to 
economic development (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). We review some of these 
studies below. 
Bell and Albu (1999) contribute to our understanding of how firms in developing 
countries can improve their capabilities through interactions. They consider the 
‘cluster’ as their unit of analysis (clusters are defined as co-located and industry 
specialised groups of firms). They find that industry clusters in developing countries 
are comprised of firms with intra- and inter-cluster relationships, where inter-cluster 
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 E.g., value chain networks may use different kinds of governance related to the level of 
technological capabilities of suppliers and contractors. Value-chain suppliers may be more or less 
engaged with contractors’ technological developments and, depending on their technological 
capabilities, may be able to benefit from knowledge spillovers (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2009: 222-
226). Developing country firms belonging to global value chains are usually involved in the lowest 
added-value activities (Chaminade and Vang, 2008). 
58
 Another frequent issue in research on innovation in developing countries is the contribution of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the development of indigenous technological capabilities (Costa 
and Queiroz, 2002). 
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relationships improve their ability to accumulate ‘knowledge using’ capabilities to 
build ‘knowledge changing’ capabilities.59 Although the authors use an industrial 
cluster rather than a network approach, they stress the relevance of inter-organisation 
interactions for innovative firms involved in knowledge diffusion and open to 
external cooperation to acquire new knowledge (Bell and Albu, 1999: 1729). From a 
rather different perspective, but also using a cluster approach to address networks, 
Håkanson (2005) stresses the relevance of epistemic communities for the creation of 
trustworthy interactions, rather than the mostly found policy prescription of co-
location of firms in specific regions aimed at the creation of collaborations. 
Chaminade and Vang (2008) examine the role of inter-organisation interactions in 
capability building through an investigation of how regional systems of innovations 
in developing countries support firms in global value-chains in upgrading their 
activities. Their use of the value chain as a unit of analysis is another variant 
terminology to refer to a group of firms; in network terminology, value chains are 
purposive networks organised around a collection of goods or services produced by 
network participants and organised usually hierarchically among downstream (closer 
to final user) firms. According to Chaminade and Vang, firms that want to upgrade 
to higher added-value activities in the value-chain will be more successful if they are 
embedded in a region that supports interactive learning and innovation. This is 
because the development of higher added-value activities requires interactions 
among customers, firms and organisations (Chaminade and Vang, 2008: 1686). 
Chaminade and Vang claim also that regional systems of innovation in developing 
countries are often in an emergent stage and show the following features: i) 
interactions among systems components likely to be dominated by market 
transactions; ii) weak inter-sectoral ties; iii) absence of supporting organisations; iv) 
transfer of knowledge from universities, mainly through human resources training; 
and v) low level of interactive learning involving firms and other components in the 
system with competences related to new knowledge creation (Chaminade and Vang, 
2008: 1689).  
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 According to Bell and Albu (1999: 1729), ‘knowledge-using’ capabilities involve maintenance of or 
expansion to production capacity or imitation of neighbouring firms’ techniques while ‘knowledge-
changing’ capabilities involve managerial skill in innovation, or ‘the search for, selection, adaptation 
and assimilation of new product or process technology’. 
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Chaminade and Vang employ the ‘cluster’ approach (defined above). They argue 
that inter-organisation interactions are relevant for capability building, and that the 
development stages in the economic and institutional settings in which firms are 
embedded are crucial. They note also that systems of innovation in developing 
countries (in their analysis, regional systems) historically lack features that are 
important to support fruitful interactions between the components of the innovation 
system.  
Viotti (2000) contributes indirectly to the examination of ‘lacking systemic features’  
in developing countries, as discussed by Chaminade and Vang (2008). This is 
because Viotti questions the value of systems of innovation as an approach 
appropriate for explaining technical change in developing countries. His critique is 
based on the claim that the systems of innovation approach implicitly defines an 
innovation as something new, a breakthrough technology, and that developing 
countries are engaged in learning activities related to already existing techniques 
rather than of fundamental innovations. According to Viotti (2000: 4), learning:  
is the process of technical change achieved by diffusion (in the perspective 
of technology absorption) and incremental innovation. In other words, 
learning is the absorption of already existing techniques, i.e., the absorption 
of innovations produced elsewhere, and the generation of improvements in 
the vicinity of acquired techniques. By contrast, innovation is the process of 
technical change achieved by the production of (the first commercial 
transaction involving) a new product, process, system or organization. 
(emphasis in original)   
He investigates the learning systems in Korea and Brazil and although his analysis is 
not aimed at the interactions in learning systems, he demonstrates that Korea’s 
efforts to construct an active learning system required active (as opposed to passive) 
interactions among local firms, and FDI companies in Korea. Despite some 
scepticism about the ‘systems’ approach, we find that inter-organisation interactions 
play a relevant role in capability building. 
The lack of systemic interactions in developing countries’ systems of innovation is 
identified in empirical studies of innovation in Brazil (Cassiolato and Lastres, 1999, 
2003), and has lead Brazilian scholars to develop an approach that is appropriate to 
investigate innovation in Brazil. This approach originally was described as the Local 
Productive Arrangement (LPA) approach, but has been renamed the Local 
Productive Arrangements and Innovation Systems (LPAIS) in order to include 
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systemic as well as productive arrangements of firms (Lastres, 2007). The LPAIS 
approach uses empirical evidence gathered at the local and regional level in Brazil, 
to account for the presence of strong socio-economic and cultural differences. The 
approach has been applied to investigate innovation in Brazilian regions (for instance 
by Britto and Stallivieri, 2010; Campos et al., 1998; Cassiolato et al., 2008a; da 
Silva, 2008; Garcia and Souza, 1999; IPARDES, 2006; Machado, 2003; Teixeira, 
2008).
60
 Examples of successful cases of systemic interactions that could lead to 
technological and economic development are the exception rather the rule (as 
observed by Dantas, 2006).  
Although the LPAIS approach deals with governance issues related to the presence 
of networks in clusters or industrial regions (particular investigating if there is a 
heterarchical or hierarchical type of decision making process, Redesist, 2005),
61
 it 
does not examine the extensions to, features of or motivations for tie creation by 
firms within the investigated ‘local arrangements’. Further research on the formation 
of regional networks of innovators in Brazil that investigates the creation of inter-
organisational dyadic ties by firms is needed. The specific contribution of such 
research might be the examination of whether there is any consistency in these 
networks that explains the conditions under which networks will be effective for 
fostering and supporting firms’ innovative activities, technological capability 
upgrading and industrial regional development.  
Although, as the above examples illustrate, some studies of firm-level innovation and 
networks in developing countries follow a systemic approach, Fagerberg and Srholec 
(2008) note that the use of the systems of innovation approach in developing 
countries is relatively new,
62
 as is the investigation of networks of innovators as a 
sub-set of the systems approach. Lundvall et al. (2009b) claim that investigations of 
developing countries systems do not comprehensively address two important issues: 
the relationships between organisations, often neglected in investigations of single 
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 E.g., a collection of studies edited by Cassiolato et al. (2008) provides empirical evidence of LPAIS 
and arrangements in eight Brazilian states. 
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 According to Redesist (2005: 3), ‘in the specific cases of LPAIS governance refers to different 
coordination mechanisms among actors and activities involving the production and distributions of 
goods and services, as well as the processes of generation, employment and diffusion of knowledge 
and innovation. There are different modes of governance and hierarchies in productive systems, which 
represent different power mechanisms in decision making processes (centralised and decentralised; 
more or less formalised)’. (my translation)  
62
 Cassiolate and Lastres (1999) and Cassiolato et al. (2003) provide extensive evidence on Mercosur 
(i.e. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay). 
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organisations;
63
 and the need for indicators ‘that reflect the quality of relationships 
such as trust’ (Lundvall et al., 2009b: 19).64 Lundvall et al. consider that empirical 
investigations would be more useful if they used methods that grouped systems into 
‘families’ based on commonalities, which would increase comparability. With regard 
to comparisons between regional systems in developing countries, Padilla-Pérez et 
al. (2009) claim that research on regional systems of innovation in developing 
countries tends to be generic and does not provide sufficient evidence that is specific 
to the firms located in these systems or information on the specific stage of evolution 
of the system. The authors call for more systematic comparison among regions 
(Padilla-Pérez et al., 2009: 141). 
It has been argued that interactions among the components of developing country 
systems are often weak, dysfunctional or misaligned, and it is plausible that 
innovation networks, which are a part of the larger system of innovation, will show 
similar patterns. However, there is no systematic empirical evidence to test this 
conjecture,
65
 which demonstrates the need for more detailed investigation of regional 
networks of innovators in developing countries. An investigation of regional 
networks would provide evidence related to regional systems as discussed by 
Padilla-Pérez et al. (2009).  
There is some evidence from studies of networks in developing countries on the 
existence of systemic links in developing country regions. Recall the case of 
Taiwan’s IT industry which shows that networks are relevant for firms’ capability 
upgrading, and that systemic linkages were present and partly explain IT industry 
development in Taiwan. Giuliani (2010) investigates business and knowledge 
networks in the Chilean and Italian wine industries and finds that knowledge related 
(but not business related) ties among firms are positively correlated to firm 
performances. Giuliani’s findings show that different types of links (in her study 
business and knowledge links) are not necessarily homogeneous within a region. She 
notes also the need to investigate further the type of (firm-level) conditions required 
to foster the formation of links that positively affect firm performances. 
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 As discussed above, organisational studies tend to favour investigation of intra-organisational 
interactions over inter-organisational interactions. 
64
 The issue of trust is addressed in Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) which examines social capital 
across countries, claiming that it is an important aspect that needs to be considered in an examination 
of innovation in developing countries. 
65
 For example, Cimoli (2002) discussed the role of networks within innovations systems in Latin 
America from the conceptual perspective. 
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Dantas and Bell (2009) contributed to the debate on networks in developing 
countries by examining the knowledge network of the state-owned Brazilian firm, 
Petrobrás, and showed that its knowledge network has become more complex over 
time and is positively correlated to the firm’s capabilities for technological 
upgrading. Although their empirical evidence does not provide information on the 
broader inter-organisational interactions, it is consistent with claims that the building 
of systemic links is a long term and gradual process and is relevant to technological 
development.  
2.5 Summary 
This chapter discussed the role of networks in the economy, claiming that they are at 
the core of systems of innovations, are related to technological and institutional 
dynamic paths, and show different structures across regions and industries. Particular 
attention was paid to networks of innovators, in which firms are core actors. A better 
understanding of how networks of innovators emerge and evolve, through an 
examination of their structure defined by the existence and nature of dyadic ties 
among actors, may enable a better explanation of whether and why innovative firms 
participate in networks.  
It has been argued that networks of innovators in developed economies can forge 
systemic linkages that position their economies at the technological frontier of global 
knowledge specialisation. Some works, such as Pérez (2008) and von Tunzelmann 
and Acha (2006), conclude that networks combine new types of complementary 
knowledge which may play a crucial role in industrial development and 
technological catch-up. A few examples of successful networks of innovators in 
developing countries, such as the cases of Japan and Taiwan, suggest that such an 
approach might be relevant for technological catching-up.  
The literature review highlights the lack of empirical evidence on networks of 
innovators in developing countries. More work is needed on what drives innovating 
firms in developing countries to create dyadic ties and engage in networks. There is a 
lack of evidence on the roles played by networks in developing country systems of 
innovation, and especially on how the governance of networks is related to firm level 
innovation performance.  
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We argued that studies of multi-organisational network governance and structure 
tend to ignore the infancy and evolution of networks, both of which are relevant for 
an examination of inter-organisational networks because of the following elements: 
i) networks might be purposive or emergent; ii) government efforts to promote 
networks may influence which type of network is more likely to emerge in a 
particular industry; iii) the openness level of the network influences its evolution; 
and iv) the existence of a network broker within the network may involve controlling 
mechanisms which deserve examination. Hence, investigation of inter-organisational 
networks that addresses these issues would provide important insights for a more 
comprehensive understanding of networks of innovators.  
The examination of purposive networks of innovators, that is, networks formed as a 
result of technology policies and government intervention, may be explanatory 
variables for understanding whether and how regions locked into negative path 
rigidity can change direction through endogenous or exogenous processes.   
We showed also that the adoption of the systems of innovation approach to 
developing countries is relatively new (Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008), as is 
investigation of the networks of innovators as a sub-set of systems. Investigation of 
developing country systems should focus on two issues: i) the relationships among 
organisations as opposed to investigation of single organisations; and ii) indicators 
‘that reflect the quality of relationships such as trust’ (Lundvall et al., 2009b: 19). 
Empirical investigations in developing country contexts would be more useful if they 
employed methods that grouped systems into ‘families’ based on their 
commonalities, thus providing a basis for comparability. Studies comparing regional 
systems in developing countries provide little evidence on the specificities of firms 
located in these systems or the specific stage of evolution of the system. There is also 
a methodological need for systematic comparisons among regions (Padilla-Pérez et 
al., 2009). 
Finally, this chapter demonstrates that studies on Brazilian regional experience 
related to innovation and governance have been influenced by the LPAIS approach, 
which relates governance to hierarchical or participatory decision making processes 
within regions (Lastres, 2007; Redesist, 2005). Although studies using the LPAIS 
approach cover a wide array of Brazilian regions, they do not consistently investigate 
the extension to, nature of and motivation for tie creation among firms in Brazilian 
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arrangements or systems. Further research is needed on the formation of regional 
networks of innovators in Brazil, and particularly the creation of inter-organisational 
dyadic ties by firms and whether there is consistency in these networks. This would 
highlight the role of networks to foster and support Brazilian firms’ innovative 
activities, technological capability upgrading and industrial regional development.  
A more comprehensive understanding of the above issues is crucial if government 
intervention in developing countries is to result in technological development and 
economic catch-up, especially when policy is related to the formation of networks.  
Chapter 3 investigates the formation of the Brazilian software industry, which 
followed the implementation of a government programme. It provides the context for 
the research questions formulated in Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM OF 
INNOVATION AND THE LOCAL SOFTWARE 
INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the emergence and development of the Brazilian software 
industry, in particular, the motives and mechanisms that supported the creation of 
regional networks within the country to foster the local software industry. Following 
the system of innovation approach discussed in Chapter 2, we argue that the 
emergence and development of the local software industry was contextualised in the 
country’s industrial development and the institutional set up created to support a 
network oriented approach to development. The Brazilian industrialisation process 
was influenced not only by the internal economic context, but also by the 
institutional set up in which firms were embedded. Section 3.2 provides an overview 
of the Brazilian industrialisation process, highlighting the creation of organisations 
by the government to support industry development generally and network formation 
in particular. Section 3.3 examines the software industry, following a sectoral 
systems of innovation approach, aimed at contextualising the emergence and 
development of the Brazilian software industry. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Industrial development in Brazil - towards a system of 
innovation: an overview  
This section introduces the mechanisms of industrial development in Brazil, focusing 
mainly on the creation by national government of relevant organisations to support 
local science and technology (S&T) activities and to foster technological progress 
and economic development.
66
 Section 3.2.1 discusses the history of the organisations 
related to S&T activities. Section 3.2.2 examines the period when national 
government took an active role in supporting industrialisation and the creation of 
S&T organisations. Section 3.2.3 examines the country’s more recent industrial 
development, again highlighting the creation and restructuring of S&T organisations. 
Section 3.2.4 summarises the section. 
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 It is important to highlight that this section is not intended to cover all the initiatives related to 
industry and technology policies in Brazil throughout the country’s industrialisation process; such a 
task is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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3.2.1 From the early days to the mid-1960s 
The Brazilian system of innovation, as we currently understand the concept (Edquist, 
2004; Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1993), dates from the 1950s when national 
government deliberately created S&T organisations to support economic 
development. At that time, it was common practice among catching up countries to 
adopt developed economy initiatives to support economic development and growth, 
which included the creation of S&T organisations to support technological progress 
(Pacheco and Corder, 2009).  
However, before the 1950s the Brazilian national government had created some S&T 
related organisations, although not deliberately following the argument that technical 
progress was crucial for economic development. Some of these organisations date 
back to the 19
th
 century (created under the regime of monarchy) and were created to 
build local knowledge in specific areas related to the country’s main economic 
activities at the time, such as mining, public health, and coffee growing.
67
  
World War I made it difficult to import goods and triggered further industrialisation 
via import substitution (Tavares, 1972; Versiani and Versiani, 1977).
68
 Local 
production of many goods did not require local sophisticated research capabilities or 
engineering manpower; purchasing and sometimes copying technology developed 
abroad were common practice (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993: 417; Suzigan, 2000). 
By the 1930s, industrial development was underway in Brazil, although in the form 
of more meagre and less competitive industries compared to the developed 
economies (Suzigan, 2000).  
Local industrialisation became critical for the country’s economic growth during 
World War II when the import of key inputs (steel and capital goods) became almost 
impossible (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993: 417). The resulting shortages led to the 
national government investing in industries that could provide independence 
(although partial) in certain inputs. Hence, by the early 1940s the national 
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 According to Dahlman and Frischtak (1993: 416) the move of the Portuguese Royal family to 
Brazil triggered the creation of S&T organisations such as the Medical School of Bahia, the Medical 
School of Rio de Janeiro, the National Library, the Royal Farm, and the National Museum. Along the 
same lines, Pacheco and Corder (2009: 10) point to the creation of: the National Observatory (1827), 
Ouro Preto Mining School (1876), Agronomic Institute (1887), the São Paulo Institute of 
Technological Research (1899), and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (1900). 
68
 E.g., Versiani and Versiani (1977) provide a discussion of the effects of the variation in 
international exchange rates for investment in the Brazilian textile industry, the most important 
industrial sector in the early stages of the Brazil’s industrialisation. 
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government was investing in capital intensive industries, such as steel and pulp and 
paper. Brazil entered World War II in 1942, which promoted the creation of 
university funding for research in national defence related industries (Pacheco and 
Corder, 2009: 11). By the end of the World War II, national government had 
extended its investment to heavy engineering, iron ore and chemicals (alkali). 
National government also created the Technology Department in the Ministry of 
Aeronautics. This Ministry supported the later creation of the Technology Centre in 
Aeronautics-CTA, and the Aeronautics Technology Institute-ITA, two crucial 
organisations that supported the development of a local aircraft industry in 
subsequent decades (Oliveira, 2004). From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s 
government invested in heavy chemicals, heavy mechanical and electrical 
machinery, railway equipment, motor vehicles and shipbuilding (Suzigan and 
Villella, 1997). 
After the 1950s, Brazil’s industrialisation process intensified and government 
implemented deliberate S&T policies to support economic growth through the 
creation of S&T organisations. These policies were in tune with the view of national 
government that the country had to catch-up with other developed countries (such as 
USA, the UK, Canada and France) in the development of nuclear energy, considered 
a crucial pre-requisite for national security at the time (Morel, 1979: 45). In line with 
this mission, national government aimed to support the training of the local labour 
force, as well as coordination and support for local scientific knowledge 
development. The latter occurred through the creation of the National Council for 
Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and the former was supported by 
the creation of the Agency for the Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education 
(CAPES), both in 1951. CAPES and CNPq were part of a strategy aimed at the 
results from national security investments spilling over to other economic sectors 
which were expected to support national economic growth. Economic development 
depended on two essential institutional systems: the network of local universities 
(undergraduate and postgraduate degrees) and public research organisations (Morel, 
1979: 52). Within this strategy, national government created S&T related 
organisations, such as: i) the R&D Institute (IPD) in 1953, to study and solve social 
and technical problems related to the airspace industry; ii) the National Council in 
Nuclear Energy (CNEN) created in 1956, to develop applied research in nuclear 
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energy, and iii) the National Institute of Metrology (INPM, now INMETRO) to 
support industry product standardisation (Pacheco and Corder, 2009).
69
  
Industry policies were implemented to create organisations devoted specifically to 
industrial development, including the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDE, in 2011 
BNDES) in 1952.
70
  
In 1956, national government implemented a programme to foster and support 
economic growth and development, explicitly choosing industrialisation via import 
substitution (IIS) as an economic development model for catching-up with developed 
economies. This was a common trend in Latin American countries (Pérez, 2001). 
The Brazilian IIS model was very specific with regard to the roles attributed to the 
private and public sectors and multinational corporations (MNCs).
71
 According to 
the Brazilian government, it was necessary to achieve high levels of industrialisation 
in the short-term and MNCs offered mature technologies that were less risky for 
investment; hence, MNCs benefited from special regulations for the import of capital 
goods (Pacheco and Corder, 2009; Ritz, 2008).
72
 Government argued also that the 
national industry was not sufficiently technologically developed to provide the 
quality or quantity of the products offered by MNCs. This suited MNCs, which were 
seeking new markets for investment due to market saturation in the developed 
economies (Pérez, 2008), hence their interest in investing in Brazilian subsidiaries.  
However, MNCs incorporated technology and knowledge developed in their parent 
firms and performed only low level R&D activities in Brazil.
73
 These firms updated 
and adapted products developed abroad to local market needs, which represented 
weak modernisation for Brazil. The goods produced locally by MNCs were lower 
quality than those produced in their home countries. In addition, it was argued that 
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 Although national government created the infrastructure for the local development of S&T 
activities, according to Bielschowsky (1978) this infrastructure was not effective at decreasing 
Brazil’s current technological dependence. According to him, this was because of lack of coordination 
between the S&T and economic policies. 
70
 The role of BNDES in supporting local industry and the country’s infra-structure has changed 
throughout its history. For a detailed discussion on which public organisations were created by 
national government to support industrial policy, see Suzigan (1978). 
71
 These roles were part of industrialisation triad (‘Tripé da Industrialização’). 
72
 Pérez (2001) claims that technological catching-up based on mature technologies is unlikely to 
occur because they show decreasing profits and productivity at this stage in the product life cycle, 
which partly explained the failure of Latin American countries to catch up with developed economies. 
See Pérez (2001) for an extensive discussion on this issue. 
73
 This corroborates the argument that firms give preference to their original scientific systems for 
performing R&D activities, put forward by systems of innovations studies (see Chapter 2). 
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MNCs did not support significant levels of knowledge and technology transfer into 
the local innovation system in most Latin American countries (Cimoli, 2002).  
To support the role of MNCs in the Brazilian industrialisation processes, government 
provided fiscal and financial incentives to attract and assure their investments. 
MNCs were mostly involved in the production of capital intensive and durable 
consumer goods, they had the knowledge and financial requirements necessaries for 
the installation of these types of industries. Brazilian firms were neither financially 
nor technological competitive compared to the MNCs, and were involved mainly in 
investments in non-durable and intermediate consumer goods (Tigre et al., 2002). 
Alongside industrialisation via import substitution, government implemented 
policies to protect the internal market against imports and, therefore, international 
competition.  
Moreover, the Brazilian government became increasingly more involved in 
economic development. This occurred basically through two mechanisms: i) high 
investment in key inputs and infra-structure, such as energy, transport, automobiles, 
and petroleum refining; and ii) the implementation of regulations that initially 
supported machinery import by multinationals in more intensive technology sectors 
(the local capital goods industry was not fully developed) (Pacheco and Corder, 
2009).  
Hence, in the 1950s there was a continuity of the investments that had started in the 
1930s, demonstrating the active and developmental role of national government, 
aimed at assuring economic growth and development based on coordinated action. 
At that time, there was a clear understanding in the developed economies that 
technical progress was crucial for economic development and also that market 
mechanisms would not assure the necessary investment in S&T activities, which 
called for strong state intervention to guarantee positive outcomes from economic 
investment. The Brazilian government followed this international trend. 
3.2.2 Mid-1960s to early 1990s 
At the beginning of the 1960s the Brazilian economy faced an economic downturn 
and high inflation rates, followed by political instability, which contributed to the 20 
years of Military Dictatorship that began in 1964 (Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993). 
The military governments continued high investment in the institutional set up to 
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support S&T activities. The BNDE Fund for Techno-scientific Development 
(FUNTEC) was created in 1964 to provide human resources training through 
technical post-graduate programmes in local universities, following the argument 
that the shortage in science and human resources (especially those related to the 
productive sector) represented a bottleneck to the country’s economic growth 
(Morel, 1979). In the same year, BNDE created the Fund for Acquisition of 
Machinery and Industrial Equipment (FINAME), to develop the capital goods 
industry. The Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP) was created in 1965 to manage 
state funding of special projects and programmes, and later FUNTEC funds. 
According to Pacheco and Corder (2009: 18), FINEP was the embryo of a system for 
financing Brazil’s technological development.  
In the early 1970s, national government implemented the first National Development 
Plan (PND) aimed at economic and social development, which was related explicitly 
to S&T activities. In this period there was an important shift towards the creation of 
public organisations and public support for industries that later would foster the 
development of the Brazilian software industry; for example, the Research Centre for 
Telecommunications (CPqD) in 1974, which was part of Telebrás, the Brazilian 
state-owned telecommunications firm, and the Renato Archer Information 
Technology Centre (CTI/CenPRA) in 1982, a public organisation devoted to R&D in 
information technology. Other important public organisation were created, including: 
i) the National Institute for Intellectual Property Rights (INPI) created in 1970 to 
assure the transfer of technologies created in the country; ii) the National Institute for 
Space Research (INPE) in 1971; iii) the Brazilian Centre for Management Support to 
Micro and Small Firms (in 2011 SEBRAE) in 1972; and iv) the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) in 1973 (Pacheco and Corder, 
2009).
74
 Dahlman and Frischtak (1993: 419) summarise the state’s role during the 
military period as follows:  
Overall, the military period can be characterized as a time when a planning 
system was established for S&T and strong emphasis placed on institutional 
development. Science and technology were perceived as important elements 
for enhancing national power. (…) these tendencies found expression in a 
strong emphasis on strengthening national technological capability in 
military and strategic areas such as informatics, telecommunications, the 
defence industry, aviation, and nuclear energy. 
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 Table A1 in the appendix presents a summary of the main organisations created to support the 
development of the Brazilian innovation system during this period. 
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Military governments financed economic development using internal and external 
debts mechanisms. The latter created a high level of vulnerability in the Brazilian 
economy to international economic downturns, such as those resulting from the 
international oil crisis in the 1970s. These downturns led to decreased Brazilian 
exports and a decline in the internal rate of economic growth resulting from over 
capacity in installed production (compared to real internal market demand). Local 
macro-economic instability and high inflation rates, influenced the low rates of 
economic growth throughout the 1980s, which has been described as a ‘lost decade’ 
in terms of economic development (Carneiro, 2002). The internal market declined 
and private and public investment was low compared to previous decades. Several 
economic plans were implemented during the second half of the 1980s to control this 
macroeconomic instability and high inflation.
75
 These plans were successful only in 
the short term and did not resolve the country’s economic instability.  
During the 1980s, an important institutional change was the creation of the Ministry 
of S&T (MCT) in 1985, which aimed to coordinate the national S&T system. The 
S&T organisations created under previous governments, including CNPq, came 
under MCT (Pacheco and Corder, 2009).  
At the end of this period, Brazilian firms were characterised by poor competitiveness 
and low technological development compared to MNCs and most products 
developed by local private firms were adapted from foreign technology absorbed via 
the mechanisms of import substitution; technology transfer from multinationals to 
local firms was rarely at the knowledge frontier in many industries. The R&D 
activities of local private firms were low-level compared to the leading economies. 
For instance, in 1990-1992 Brazil’s expenditure on S&T represented 1.23% of its 
GDP and 75.5% of this expenditure was by the Brazilian government; whereas 
developed countries’ expenditure on S&T activities represented 3% of their GDP, of 
which 40%-60% was private sector investment (Velho and Saenz, 2002). In addition, 
local R&D activities related more to (incremental) improvements than to radical 
innovation (Tigre et al., 2002). The liberalization process started in Brazil at the end 
of the 1980s and was strongly associated with the failure of internal market 
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 Such as ‘Plano Cruzado’, ‘Plano Cruzado II’, ‘Plano Bresser’, ‘Política do Feijão com Arroz’, and 
‘Plano Verão’. 
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protection and a model of industrialisation via import substitution for economic 
growth. Section 3.2.3 addresses this issue. 
3.2.3 Early 1990s to late 2000s 
A new government came to power in Brazil in the early 1990s; the first 
democratically elected president since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985, 
assumed control of the national government. This represented a major shift in the 
role of the Brazilian state and had implications for how the institutional settings 
supporting local S&T activities evolved in that decade. The new government 
assessed the IIS model adopted mainly from the mid 1950s and concluded that its 
positive outcomes had been exhausted. It claimed also that the IIS model created a 
protected internal market with low internal and external competitiveness, which was 
hampering national industrial modernisation. The new government implemented a 
liberalisation of the Brazilian economy following the arguments that:  
economic liberalization reduces static inefficiencies arising from resource 
misallocation and waste; (ii) economic liberalization enhances learning, 
technological change, and economic growth; (iii) outward-oriented 
economies are better able to cope with adverse external shocks; (iv) market-
based economic systems are less prone to wasteful rent-seeking activities. 
(Rodrik, 1993: 7) 
The new government argued that the shift from the old internal market protection to 
free competition market mechanisms would trigger a restructuring of the local 
industry, would push local firms to up-date their products (Baumann, 2000; 
Markwald, 2001; Tigre, 1993; Tigre et al., 2002). In later years, the non-tariff 
barriers related to import quantity restrictions (firms were allowed to increase the 
number of products in their imports portfolio) were eliminated, and temporary laws 
were introduced that suspended or eliminated most of the fiscal incentives and 
government subsidies (Carneiro, 2002: Chapter 10). Government claimed that local 
firms, facing international competition in the internal market, should make 
modernisation efforts to produce better and cheaper products compared to those 
produced under the internal market protection mechanism (Arbix, 1997). 
It is argued by some, such as Evans (1995) and Chang and Rowthorn (1995), that the 
main consequence of the implementation of liberal government policies, such as 
occurred in Brazil, is an increasing absence of the state as coordinator, and erasure of 
its institutional builder characteristic, which according to these authors is essential 
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for driving economic agents to take concerted action. The liberalisation process 
continued throughout the 1990s and, as a consequence, the internal market was 
exposed to more vigorous foreign competition. According to some authors, for 
instance, Pacheco and Corder (2009: 24), and Lastres (2007), the consequences for 
national industrial development were: i) depreciation in the country’s industrial 
infra-structure; ii) reduced employment; iii) outsourcing and higher imports of inputs 
and components; iv) more attention to organisational innovation; v) lower industrial 
investment; and vi) take over by multinational firms of sectors once supported by 
government investment, for example the telecommunications industry (the results of 
the privatization of telecommunications partly explain the initial development of 
Brazil’s software industry, see Section 3.3.2).  
Villaschi (1993) claimed that the liberalisation process would weaken the Brazilian 
national system of innovation, for example, public investment in S&T, and reinforce 
the institutional constraints identified in the 1980s. His claims are confirmed by 
studies that analysed the liberalisation process in different industries.
76
 For example, 
Tigre et al., (2002: 7) show that from 1993 to 1996 there was a significant increase 
the country’s expenditure on trademarks, patents supply of industrial technical 
cooperation and supply of industrial technology, with no proportional increase in 
private R&D expenditure. However, liberalisation spurred the modernisation of some 
industries that benefited from imports of equipment, such as ceramics and steel. In 
the case of ceramics, local producers had access to improved materials and 
technologies (Tigre et al., 2002).
77
 This leads to the conclusion that deregulation of 
technology imports had a partially negative effect on local technological efforts, 
since the capital goods and technology-based durable industries were the most 
affected (Tigre et al., 2002).
78
 Also, university-industry links in Brazil became less 
intense (Dagnino and Velho, 1998).  
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 E.g., the following studies discuss the negative effects of the liberalisation process for Brazil’s 
technological development: Tigre and Junqueira (1999) for the IT sector, Mani (2001) for several 
industries, Velho and Saenz (2002) more generally, Tigre et al. (2002) for the automobile, and 
telecommunications industries, Szapiro et al. (2002) for the telecommunications sector, and Salerno et 
al. (2002) for the automobile industry. 
77
 The Brazilian aeronautics industry is another example of a local industry that benefited from 
liberalisation of the Brazilian economy. Its modernisation resulted in increased exports from this 
industry throughout the 2000s (Bonelli and Pinheiro, 2007).  
78
 A classic example is the Brazilian auto-parts industry (Costa, 1998). 
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In 1992, in the context of a liberalised economy, national political turmoil, high 
levels of macro-economic instability, inflation and public debt, a new national 
government came into power.
79
 The new government inherited a partial de-
structuring of the public institutional arrangements built by the Brazilian state since 
the 1950s. However, sorting out the macro-economic instability (i.e. high inflation 
and low economic growth) had to be prioritised over issues of discontinuity in the 
implementation of S&T related government programmes. Government concluded 
that once the macro-economic instability was solved, new political reforms aiming at 
a new institutional arrangement could be put in place to support economic 
development (Pacheco and Corder, 2009).  
Macro-economic stability was achieved in the mid-1990s, which, combined with 
liberalisation of the Brazilian economy, resulted in a steep increase in imports and 
low growth in exports in the second half of the 1990s. After 1999, the level of 
imports reduced considerably as a result of devaluation of the Brazilian currency –
the Real; this created expectations about increased Brazilian exports, which were 
disappointed due to low levels of growth in other economies and the crises related to 
provision of energy in Brazil. Exports began to increase again from 2002 and even 
more so in 2004 since when the Brazilian economy has shown considerable growth 
(Castilho and Luporini, 2010: 10).
80
 Regarding the technological content of Brazilian 
exports, Castilho and Luporini (2010) find that low added value traded products, 
often related to commodities (e.g. minerals, oil, coal) increased considerably during 
the first decade of the 2000s. At the same time, there were significant increases in 
exports from specific industrial sectors, such as machinery, tractors and transport 
equipment (this refers especially, but not only, to trading with neighbouring 
countries in Latin America). Castilho and Luporini (2010) finds that the relative 
increase in the value of exports in commodities over the exports in industrialised 
products is associated with the increase in the international price of commodities 
and, hence, claim that there was no shift in Brazilian export trade towards low added 
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 The president elected in 1990, who was responsible for the higher liberalization process, was 
impeached at the end of 1992 and a new government was established.  
80
 Brazil GDP in 2003 was 1.1% , 5.7% in 2004, 3.2% in 2005, 4% in 2006, 5.7% in 2007 and 5.1% in 
2008 (IBGE, 2009). 
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value products (often associated with commodities) in the first ten years of 2000s 
(Castilho and Luporini, 2010: 20).
81
   
The substantial economic growth experienced during the 2000s was corresponded 
with public investments in S&T, some of the following indicators show the results of 
these investments: i) the combined investment in scholarships by CAPES and CNPq 
increased from R$813M in 2001 to R$2.635M in 2010 (MCT, 2011); ii)  the 
combined number of scholarships offered by CAPES and CNPq increased specially 
from 98.684 in 2007 to 149.579 in 2009 (MCT, 2011); iii) the total number of 
graduated masters and PhDs increased from about 26 thousand in 2001 to 50.2 
thousand in 2009 (MCT, 2011); and iv) the number of scientific articles published in 
indexed journal from the Institute for Scientific Information basis increased from 
about 12 thousand in 2001 to 32 thousand in 2009 (MCT, 2011). The new S&T 
institutional framework implemented during the 2000 decade contributed to these 
performances. Section 3.2.3.1 discusses the new S&T institutional framework 
created in Brazil from the late 1990s throughout the 2000 decade. 
3.2.3.1 The New S&T Institutional Framework in the 2000s 
The discussion above showed that by the late 1990s the Brazilian S&T systems 
experienced the following: i) disarticulation between the scientific knowledge 
produced in the country and demand from the productive sector (as discussed by 
Villaschi, 1993); ii) the private sector was still showing low R&D investments 
compared to the developed economies;
82
 iii) the old financing mechanisms to support 
S&T activities were ineffective and new mechanisms had to be created; iv) the S&T 
system largely lacked solutions to the major socio-economic problems, such as 
poverty, education, violence, unemployment and regional differences (Pacheco, 
2007; Pacheco and Corder, 2009). At the end of the 1990s, national government 
implemented a new policy to restructure the financing of S&T activities, and aimed 
at guaranteed long-term financing, which was different from past policies that had 
been implemented in a context of economic instability (Pacheco, 2007).
83
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 See Castilho and Luporini (2010) for a detailed discussion on the Brazilian trade balance in 2000-
2010. 
82
 For instance, at the beginning of the 2000 decade, Brazil’s expenditure in R&D was of 1.4% of its 
GDP, and 36.7% invested by the private sector (Pacheco, 2007: Table 1). 
83
 Lastres (2007) also discussed the short termism of  government policies due to macro economic 
instability, which according to her was an implicit policy influencing the country’s performance on 
S&T activities.  
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In 1999 national government created Sectoral Funds to support R&D activities in 
specific sectors, to be administered mostly through the National Fund for Scientific 
and Technologic Development (FNDCT/FINEP).
84
 The arrangement of Sectoral 
Funds involved: 13 funds created between 1997 and 2001, of which 2 had a 
horizontal approach and financed more than one sector – the infra-structural and 
university-industry links Sectoral Funds, the other 11 were vertical funding for 
petroleum, energy, transport, hydro-resources, aerospace related activities, 
telecommunications, biotechnology, agribusiness, health, aeronautics and 
information technology (including the software and other industries). The sources of 
funding for each Sectoral Fund differed and was a percentage of the income 
generated by each sector (Pacheco, 2007: 13).
85
  
Government also implemented an initiative that aimed to solve institutional 
dysfunctions in the Brazilian system of innovation through the approval of a new 
legislation that allowed the creation of social organisations, which are non-profit 
organisations that act on behalf of public interest (associations, foundations, civil 
society organisations). This initiative followed government assessments that there 
were excessive levels of bureaucracy in the public administration, which led to 
inefficiencies in government programme implementation and also discontinuity of 
funding (Pacheco and Corder, 2009). Social organisations operate under 
management contracts, which allow them to request and manage public funding to 
invest in human resources, equipment and facilities on behalf of public authorities. 
They are also allowed to receive funding from other sources than government.
86
 For 
instance, some organisations, originally under the supervision of the MCT 
administration, became Social Organisations, with the aim of improving the 
administration of public funding.  
The creation of the Center for Strategic Studies and Management in Science, 
Technology and Innovation (CGEE) in 2001, under the Social Organisation 
arrangement, aimed to support the frail networking between universities, research 
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 With the exception of the fund for telecommunications - FUNTELL, this was managed by the 
Ministry of Telecommunications. 
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 Originally allocation of the Sectoral Funds was negotiated by committees with representation from: 
the MCT and its agencies, sectoral ministries, regulation agencies, scientific communities and the 
private sector. According to Pacheco and Corder (2009), arrangements changed in 2004 when the new 
national government came into power and the decision process became less democratic and more 
centralised in government. 
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 http://pgpe.planejamento.gov.br/os.htm, accessed 15 August 2010. 
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centres and the private sector. The CGEE was originally the Technical Secretariat for 
the Sectoral Funds but this role was taken over in 2003 by the MCT.
87
  
In the early 2000s, national government formulated the Programme to Support 
Innovation in Local Productive Arrangements, which followed an approach 
developed by Brazilian academics to investigate industries geographically confined 
in Brazil, the LPA approach (discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2). The programme 
was financed by the university-industry links horizontal sectoral fund (the ‘Green 
and Yellow Fund’) and CNPq scholarships (Lastres, 2007). This programme was 
implemented in the 2000s (Teixeira, 2008) and its administration shifted among 
different government representatives over this period. 
Lastres (2007: 13-15) assesses the LPA programme implemented during the 2000s 
and does not refer explicitly to the programme’s aims as technology policy oriented. 
However, her discussion points to elements of technology policy in the programme, 
namely that the aims: i) contribute to the cooperation among agents within the 
‘arrangement’; ii) foster, at the global level, partnerships between firms, and among 
firms and government bodies, R&D organisations, and universities; iii) support 
actions to foster higher levels of synergy among the actors within the ‘arrangement’, 
possibly leading to a systemic production chain; iv) support actions to improve the 
coordination and management of LPA; and finally, v) support actions aimed at 
personnel training and technological capabilities in the relevant industries. The LPA 
programme followed different stages. The first identified arrangements within the 
country, following regional and local, public and private sector efforts aimed at: i) 
solving or minimizing the effects of economic liberalisation; and ii) coordinating the 
agents involved in the productive process to increase innovation and industrial 
competitiveness.
88
 In a second stage local arrangements were selected for financial 
support. In both stages priority was given to coordination among local agents, in the 
first identification stage to measure the level of coordination and in the second stage 
to improve coordination. This highlights the relevance of governance within these 
‘arrangements’.   
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 The Sectoral Funds are under the control of the Brazilian MCT. CGEE is a think tank that manages 
public funding to produce technical studies and workshops that support the discussion of national 
strategy for the country’s S&T development. 
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 Some examples of the regional industries targeted by local initiatives are: household ceramics, 
aerospace, IT and furniture industries in the São Paulo State, and the leather shoes in the Rio Grande 
do Sul State. For a more comprehensive study see Cassiolato and Lastres (1999) and Cassiolato et al. 
(2008). 
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Lastres, in the same report, discusses some of the limitations to programme 
implementation. She claims that there was conflict between policies aimed at local 
development and social inclusion, and those to promote innovation. This is explained 
in part by agents in some local arrangements perceiving new knowledge as 
knowledge incorporated in new machinery, and innovation as being related only to 
process improvements. Therefore, the strong cultural characteristics of these ‘local 
arrangements’ contributed to the neglect of important issues related to development. 
These findings reinforce the argument that although regions differ, they have social 
and cultural commonalities that need to be addressed (see discussion in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.1). This is relevant to the study of regional systems of innovations, or 
‘arrangements’ (in Lastres’s terminology), proposed by Asheim and Gertler (2004), 
who claimed that although regions differ, they are circumscribed within a national 
context that cannot be ignored in the examination of regions.
89
  
At the end of 2003, the new national government approved and implemented the 
Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE), which prioritised four 
industries for public investment: capital goods, software, semiconductors, and 
pharmaceuticals. According to Pacheco and Corder (2009), PITCE’s results were 
disappointing compared to its original aims, but are important to highlight the 
relevance of industrial policy in the new government’s agenda. Among the reasons 
for these poor results it is argued that issues related to network governance and 
misalignment are central (Pacheco and Corder, (2009: 34):  
[PITCE’s] difficulties related to the macroeconomic context include lack of 
articulation between the government instruments and firms’ demands, the 
precarious economic infra-structure, insufficiencies in the national S&T 
system and poor coordination of the industrial policy process. (my 
translation)  
Throughout the 2000s, the Brazilian national government increased its role in the 
Brazilian economy through the introduction of government programmes to support 
economic and social development, and approval of new laws aimed at supporting the 
country’s industrial activities. These changes represented a shift in the role played by 
the Brazilian state compared to the 1990s.  
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Consistent with this, in 2004 a change in the national regulations was aimed at 
alleviating some of the dysfunctions in the local S&T systems, such as those 
identified by Corder (2004: 93), 
Brazil has the appropriate actors and a supporting infrastructure. However, 
cooperation among the actors and coordination by the state, and the capacity 
of firms to innovate are very restricted. There are also several factors that 
constrain the evolution of technical change towards consolidation of the 
Innovation System: low innovative performance of firms, relative isolation 
of universities, lack of definition of several research institutes and research 
centres, lack of an information system, lack of technology foresight, and 
lack of human resources capacities in building and management that would 
provide the state with the conditions to coordinate. (my translation) 
The most important regulatory change was the ‘Innovation Law’ (Law nº 10.973/04) 
approved by national government in 2004. It represented an important effort to 
change the country’s institutional setting with regards to local S&T activities.90 It 
aimed to support, among others; i) improvements in public-private partnerships; ii) 
formation of strategic partnership between firms, and S&T institutes; and iii) 
engagement of researchers employed by public organisations in research projects 
with the private sector. Previously, researchers from public research organisations 
had to ask for permission from their employers to participate in collaborative 
research, and were not paid for collaboration with the private sector. Under the new 
Innovation Law permission was no longer required and researchers were 
remunerated (Pacheco, 2007; Pacheco and Corder, 2009). This law promoted 
technology policy design as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2,
91
 and especially 
engagement of the private and public sectors in the innovation network. 
Also in 2004, government approved the creation of a new institute, the Brazilian 
Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI), which operates under the Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Commerce (MDIC) administration under a management 
contract. Its main aim is to provide support to MDIC in the formulation and 
implementation of industrial policies. ABDI also mediates between government 
divisions involved in policy formulation, such as MCT, FINEP and BNDES.
92
 In 
2005 government approved the creation of the National Council for Industrial 
                                                 
90
 Although the law was approved in 2004, it was formulated during the previous presidential 
administration (Pacheco, 2007). 
91
 As discussed above, one technology policy channel is the imposition of new regulations that aim to 
improve the relations among actors and agents involved in technological activities and innovation.  
92
 Fieldwork organisational interview. 
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Development (CNDI), to support the Brazilian President in formulating industry 
policy.  
The creation of new public institutions throughout the 2000s suggests that the 
problem of institutional rigidity identified by studies of the Brazilian system of 
innovation, that is, the unwillingness of public organisations to adapt to the new 
needs promoted by changes in the innovation system, has persisted. It suggests also 
that these public organisations are likely to have overlapping aims, which may not 
contribute to improving the system. This is not to deny the efforts of central 
government to create an infrastructure that was intended to be better articulated, and 
with greater competence to set effective policies (addressing, for instance, the 
argument in Downs (1964) that public bureaux need to develop expertise and 
knowledge in particular fields to inform government policy makers during decision 
making). As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1, changing path rigidities is costly 
and is a long term process that demands high levels of commitment from those 
involved. 
With regard to national government intervention in the Brazilian economy, we find 
that the scope of some of the main public organisations increased through the decade 
of the 2000s. For instance, BNDES at the end of the 2000s was offering 30 special 
programmes, directed mostly towards industrial development, with 2 directed to 
industries that were identified as government priorities: i) the Programme to Support 
the Development of the Health Industrial Complex - Profarma, and ii) the 
Programme for the Development of the Software and Services in Information 
Technology Industries - Prosoft. Prosoft is of particular relevance for this thesis and 
is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.3, where we address the Brazilian software 
industry.93 The BNDES also created a special programme to provide seed funding 
for start-up firms in partnership with the private sector. The Criatec Fund is managed 
by a private organisation and has supported 25 firms with an investment of some 
US$1M each.
94
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www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/Apoio_Financeiro/Programas_e_Fundo
s/, accessed 05 January 2011. 
94
 Fieldwork organisational interview. For a list of the firms that received Criatec support see 
http://fundocriatec.com.br/investidas.php, accessed 08 July 2011. 
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FINEP increased its public funding for the development of local innovation and at 
the end of the 2000s was offering more than 20 funding programmes, 7 of which 
were to encourage innovation in firms, such as: i) the FINEP Subvention programme 
which offers full or partial non-reimbursable funding; ii) the Zero Interest 
Programme which provides loans to small and medium firms at lower interest rates 
than the private banking system; and iii) Prime (Primeira Empresa Inovadora - the 
First Innovative Firm) which aims to create favourable financing conditions for start-
up firms operating in high added-value sectors, to enable successful consolidation in 
the initial development stage of their investment.
95
 Both the Zero Interest and Prime 
programmes are implemented in collaboration with regional organisations in the 
regions that benefit from the programmes.  
The positive results of the efforts of national government to support the development 
of S&T activities in Brazil increased total investment in S&T activities from 1.3% 
GDP in 2000 to 1.57% GDP in 2010 (MCT, 2011: 3). Another indicator that shows 
positive results is increase in total investment in R&D which rose from 1.02% GDP 
in 2000 to 1.25% GDP in 2010, public investment in R&D which increased from 
0.55% GDP in 2000 to 0.66% GDP in 2010, and private investment in R&D which 
rose from 0.47% GDP in 2000 to 0.59% GDP in 2010 (MCT, 2011). However, as 
already observed, the large share of public investment in R&D (compared to private 
investment), has been identified as one of the main fragilities of the Brazilian system 
that remains to be overcome. 
Some efforts have been made to assess changes in innovation performance. The 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in 2008 implemented the 
fourth innovation survey in Brazil, the Technological Innovation Research (Pesquisa 
da Inovação Tecnológica - Pintec). The survey follows the Oslo Manual (OECD, 
2005) recommendations and the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
2008 format (Pintec, 2010a). Pintec 2008 shows that investment by the Brazilian 
government to create an institutional infrastructure to support R&D and innovation 
in Brazil, resulted in 38.6% of the firms included in the sample innovating in the 
period 2005-2008, including radical and incremental improvements (Pintec, 2010b: 
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 http://www.finep.gov.br/programas/prime.asp, accessed 29 June 2011. 
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37).
96
 The survey differentiates between product and process innovations, and the 
degree of novelty. The survey shows that: i) 22.9% of industrial sector firms 
innovated in products and 4.1% were innovations that were incremental or radical in 
the national market (i.e. new or partially new practices or outputs for firms in 
Brazil); ii) 37.4% of services sector firms innovated in products and 9.1% of this 
innovation was radical or incremental in the national market; iii) 32.1% of industrial 
sector firms innovated in processes, and 2.3% of this innovation was radical or 
incremental improvements in the national market (i.e. new or partially new practices 
or outputs for firms in Brazil); and iv) 30.9% of services sector firms innovated in 
processes and 2.8% of these innovations were radical or incremental improvements 
in the national market.  
The results for cooperation for the development of innovations (Pintec, 2010b: 49, 
Figure 6) show that the actors that showed the highest levels of cooperation for 
innovation were: i) digital information networks (78.7% for firms in the services 
sectors and 68.8% in the industrial sector); ii) customers (69.3% for firms in the 
services sectors and 68.2% in the industrial sector);  iii) other areas within the firm 
(73.5% for firms in the services sectors and 61.5% in the industrial sector); and 
suppliers (55% for firms in the services sectors and 65.7% in the industrial sector). 
The lowest levels of cooperation with firms innovation activities were recorded for: 
i) research institutes and technological centres (16.1% with firms in the services 
sectors and 12% in the industrial sector); ii) universities and other higher education 
organisations (22.4% with firms in the services sectors and 13.4% in the industrial 
sector).      
These results suggest that the dysfunctions in the Brazilian system of innovation, 
such as the low coordination between the supply and demand of knowledge 
produced in the country (as discussed by Corder, 2004), and low performance of 
innovative firms with regard to the degree of novelty of their innovations, are 
persistent problems that need to be overcome in order to establish a stronger system 
of innovation in Brazil. 
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 The CIS implemented in the UK in 2008 shows that 58.2% of British firms innovated during the 
period 2005-2008 (BIS, 2010), which demonstrates that the share of Brazilian innovative firms is 
considerably lower than advanced country firms.  
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3.2.4 Summary 
The above shows that the Brazilian government tried to build an institutional set up 
to support and foster local S&T related activities from the 1950s. However, recurrent 
macroeconomic instability seems to have disrupted these institutional framework; 
policies aimed at economic stability have been prioritised over technological and 
industrial policies as if they were incompatible (Lastres, 2007). Two conclusions can 
be drawn from this observation. Firstly, there is a major problem at government level 
in Brazil which means that these policies are seen as antagonistic, when they should 
be included in the same agenda if sustainable economic development is to be 
achieved (Lastres, 2007; Pacheco and Corder, 2009; Suzigan, 1978). Lastres 
demonstrates that this conflict emerges also at the regional level, and shows that it is 
a strong cultural aspect of local and regional innovation systems within the Brazilian 
national system of innovation. Until this conflict is resolved, economic growth and 
development may not achieve the levels necessary for economic catching-up.
97
  
Secondly, there has been very frequent creation of public organisations often with 
overlapping aims, which suggests difficulties for Brazilian organisations to adapt to 
and recreate themselves in the dynamic context of the evolution of innovation 
systems. This rigidity should be addressed by government, at various levels since it 
is evident in local, regional and national organisations (Pacheco and Corder, 2009). 
We can argue, therefore, that the system of innovation concept used to examine 
developed economies is not completely suited to an examination of S&T and 
innovation activities in Brazil. The concept assumes ex-ante the presence of systemic 
linkages in the interactions among the agents within the system of innovation, which 
seems still to be under construction in Brazil (Lastres, 2007). Systemic linkages 
remain to be developed in most ‘productive arrangements’ in Brazil, although 
regions performing under systemic arrangements are exceptions (Cassiolato and 
Lastres, 1999; Cassiolato et al., 2003; Cassiolato et al., 2008b; Lastres, 2007). 
This thesis investigates the emergence and evolution of the Brazilian software 
industry to address these and other issues (Section 3.3). It addresses the software 
industry following a sectoral system approach (Section 3.3.1), to provide a sectoral 
background to the investigation of the Brazilian software industry (Section 3.3.2). 
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 Suzigan (1978) points out that this was already a problem in Brazil in the late 1970s, demonstrating 
that it has been a long-term structural frailty in the Brazilian policy formulation process. 
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3.3 The software industry and Brazilian software industry 
experience 
This section discusses the emergence and development of the software industry in a 
developing country context, Brazil. Section 3.1 takes a sectoral systems approach, 
and investigates the main characteristics of the industry, highlighting the issues of 
technological and economic catch-up by developing countries in this industry. 
Section 3.3.2 discusses the Brazilian software industry, investigating its emergence 
(from the mid-1970s) and development until the late 2000s. 
3.3.1 Overview of the software sectoral system of innovation 
This section discusses the software industry following a sectoral systems of 
innovation approach, that is, it examines the particular and complex division of 
labour and knowledge specialisation, involving specific creation, use, diffusion and 
appropriation of knowledge, and learning processes (Malerba, 2002). According to 
Torrisi (1998: 39), software is: ‘the production of a structured set of instructions, 
procedures, programs, rules and documentation contained in any types of physical 
support (tapes, disks, electric circuits or film) with the aim of making possible the 
use of electronic data processing equipment’. And according to Steinmueller (2004: 
194), ‘the software SSI [sectoral system of innovation] can be best understood in 
terms of interactions between the specific purposes for which software is created, the 
capabilities for fulfilling these purposes, and the means for commercializing results’.  
Steinmueller claims also that a SSI approach emphasizes the role of systemic 
relationships involving knowledge exchange for innovation, particularly those that 
involve a close user-producer relationship, and improvement of public research 
organisations and networks within the industry.
98
 However, none of these 
mechanisms is reliable in the context of the software industry, which leads to the 
conclusion that the software system of innovation has a ‘deeper structure that, once 
delineated, can provide a meaningful interpretation of the division of labour in 
software creation’ (Steinmueller, 2004: 207).99 
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 Tigre et al. (2011)  investigate 6 software clusters in Brazil and Argentina, to explore some of these 
issues. 
99
 Steinmueller (2004) provides a comprehensive discussion on the applicability of the SSI approach 
to the software industry, which is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be pursued here.  
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Software is an intellectual and labour-intensive activity that deals with the 
codification of knowledge and information. Moreover, the production of software 
requires substantial tacit or experience-based knowledge in addition to codified 
knowledge (Brooks Jr., 1995; Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001). For this reason, the cost 
of software production is high due to large investment in skilled labour and, in a 
developing country context, the additional costs of adequate machinery to support 
software production.
100
 However, software replication and diffusion may involve low 
costs and, if successfully marketed as a purchased product, software producers can 
benefit from high returns once the high investment costs of the first copy are repaid. 
In effect, the potential for large profits in this industry will be realised if a large 
number of copies is sold because (constant) investment in the first copy is amortised 
over a larger number of copies and the marginal cost of making these copies is low.   
The software industry’s ability to appropriate the full value of its production is lower 
than industries that employ patents to protect their intellectual property. Although 
software often is protected by copyright, the enforcement of rights is less effective 
than with patents. One reason for this is ‘the intrinsic difficulty in disentangling 
innovative and protectable expressions of original ideas, such as a “user graphic 
interface”, from unprotectable ideas, such as an algorithm’ (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 
2001: 1428). This is an inherent limitation to the ‘scope’ of copyright which is 
limited to precise expression. In addition, because the costs of reproduction are low 
(even with various ‘copy protection’ schemes), a multitude of copyright infringing 
‘re-publishers’ emerge in almost every country and sell software at nearer to its costs 
of reproduction. However, the supposedly low appropriability in the software 
industry is compensated by other protection mechanisms, for instance, by the 
adoption of externalities associated with the use of highly diffused software (such as 
platforms and desktop applications); it is the nature of the product design rather than 
the means that is important from an appropriability perspective. The fact that designs 
can be protected through ‘versioning’ (with some level of enforcement), which 
reinforces the user’s need to connect to the producer (to update the product), reduces 
the product appropriability problem. In addition, the production of software is related 
more to development than to basic research, and software that is more basic research 
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 Steinmueller (2001) provides a discussion on the barriers to catching up by developing countries in 
the ICT industry, some of these issues are discussed later in this section. 
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intensive tends to rely more on copyrights than those related to development 
activities (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001). 
Software comprises both products and services, although the boundaries between the 
two are often blurred. The former relates to packaged software (generic solutions), 
customised software (produced out of necessity to improve productivity or find 
niches), and embedded software (software embodied in machines). The latter relates 
to such activities as consultancy, programming and training. Some software is 
developed internally by organisations, which usually involves the adaptation of 
packaged software to the needs of the organisation (Steinmueller, 2004). The 
production of software is commonly associated with the creative industries because it 
is intrinsic to software to involve novelty in every product or service provided; new 
software always aims to ‘produce new products or new ways of executing known 
tasks and functions’ (Torrisi, 1998: 41; Brooks Jr., 1995). Therefore, measuring 
product innovation in software is a challenging task, especially when software firms 
produce both products and services and cannot distinguish between them.
101
   
Software can be categorised into two market segments, software packages and 
customised software, which are comprised of operating system software, 
programming languages, application tools and application solutions.
102
 The level of 
technological complexity and R&D intensity differ among system software and 
application solutions (Torrisi, 1998). System software requires a much closer 
relationship between hardware and software manufacturers with the former often 
being the producer of the microprocessor. Hence, the roles of computer science and 
software engineering as fields of research are somewhat tangential to actual practice. 
For instance, the origin of the software industry in the US was strongly related to 
basic research developed in universities to support the US defence industry, 
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 This is a general problem in the creative industries – effectively every new design is an 
‘innovation’ in that it differs from existing designs and is meant to be produced in quantity. However, 
the process of design may, to some extent, be standardised and regularised as it is in the fashion 
industry, so that one is drawn to a level of differentiation in attempting to define innovation – e.g. the 
transformation of the athletics shoe to the trainer. A similar process occurs in attempting to 
understand software innovation and relies on the identification of new ‘application classes’ in 
packaged software and new ‘application domains’ in the case of software services and customised 
software. 
102
 Operating systems are ‘the software that controls the operations of the computer system, and 
provides the “platform” upon which other functionalities can be constructed’; the application solution 
is the software that employs these functionalities (Steinmueller, 2004: 203). 
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especially after World War II up to the late 1970s (Mowery and Langlois, 1996).
103
 
Software and hardware development were indistinguishable in the early stages of the 
software industry (Steinmueller, 1996) and US federal investments in R&D and 
procurement for the development of hardware to support the military industry 
indirectly supported the country’s software industry.104 Mowery and Langlois (1996) 
discuss the great importance of tie formation between the public and private sectors 
during that period, through the purchase by universities of computers.
105
 This 
contributed to the creation of computer science as a new academic discipline, and US 
universities played an important role in the diffusion of innovation in software: 
Ph.D. graduates of these [top US] universities found employment in senior 
positions in firms such as Silicon Graphics, Microsoft, and Sun 
Microsystems. The faculty at many of these institutions also entered into 
formal and informal consulting relationships with private firms, and others 
were directly involved in the foundation of such important hardware and 
software firms as the Carnegie Group, Ingress, and Thinking Machines. 
(Mowery and Langlois, 1996: 955) 
Although the US government strongly supported the emergence of the software 
industry, Steinmueller (1996) stated that there is no ‘natural’ industrial structure for 
software production and that the structure and evolution of a nation’s software 
industry depends upon particular historical and institutional events. Steinmueller 
claims also that because the specifics of history, institutions and participants are 
important, a study of the software industry’s evolution must begin at the national or 
regional level, rather than in the ‘global market’ (Steinmueller, 1996: 18). This 
suggests that investigation of the software industry should combine a sectoral and 
regional systems of innovation approach. 
Localised historical and institutional events are relevant to explain the development 
of the software industry within a country, which supports understanding of how, for 
example, the private and public sectors interact in this industry. In addition, Grimaldi 
and Torrisi (2001: 1428) state that the complexity of software products and their 
innovative activities require different types of S&T knowledge for software 
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 From the mid 1970s US government expenditure was directed more to applied research (Mowery 
and Langlois, 1996). 
104
 The US Department of Defense was the only federal government level department with substantial 
funding for basic and applied research for military purposes, that developed potential applications for 
many industrial sectors. The software industry benefited from this policy. 
105
 ‘Defense-related agencies funded more than 50% of academic computer science R&D from fiscal 
1977 through the mid-1980s, and defense-related support for applied computer science research grew 
rapidly after fiscal 1983’ (Yudken and Simons, 1988; quoted in Mowery and Langlois, 1996: 952). 
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development. This demands from firms different combinations of internal 
competencies, knowledge and experience, with external sources of knowledge, 
which happens through the creation of ties with supporting organisations such as 
universities, specialised suppliers, and users. The creation of such ties brings the fore 
the sectoral role in the formation of inter-organisational networks in the software 
industry. 
For instance, Grimaldi and Torrisi analysed five Italian software firms in the late 
1990s and found that most external collaborations from these firms were 
commercially based.
106
 However, some ties aimed at the exchange of technical as 
well as commercial knowledge. External ties differed according to firm size, product 
complexity, and the incentives for knowledge codification. Therefore, although one 
of the main characteristics of the software industry is the use of tacit and scientific 
knowledge, the codification of knowledge to improve internal development activities 
is a driver of the creation of external ties. The incentives for the creation of external 
ties also differed depending on firm size and type of product to be developed 
(Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001: 1436). 
The software sectoral characteristics discussed above introduce various issues to the 
discussion of the engagement of developing countries in the global software 
industry, highlighting the importance of leapfrogging and technological catch-up.
107
 
The main characteristics of the software industry, such as intensive skilled labour, 
low fixed investment compared to traditional sectors, and high possibility of 
imitation, suggest that developing countries might have a comparative advantage in 
catching up with the developed economies. This argument is based on classical 
economic theory and assumes that developing countries have an availability of cheap 
skilled labour compared to the developed economies, which could be a comparative 
advantage for the engagement of the former in the international ICT industry. Gaio 
(1992: 93) argues against that proposition claiming that:  
the science-base nature of IT, associated with an exceptional technological 
dynamism, a labour-saving bias and pervasive impacts on product and 
process innovations, would tend to generate negative externalities upon 
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 Grimaldi and Torrisi acknowledge the limitation imposed by small firm sample size, on 
generalisation. However, they suggest that their evidence illustrates some features of the industry that 
might shed light for future research on this industry. 
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 According to Steinmueller (2001: 94) leapfrogging is the ability of a country to bypass ‘some of 
the processes of accumulation of human capabilities and fixed investment in order to narrow the gaps 
in productivity and output that separate industrialised and developing countries’. 
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LDCs [Later Developing Countries], such as a loss of competitiveness in 
international markets, a deepening of dependency on foreign technology and 
the generation of unemployment with structural characteristics (…) 
Thereby, an analysis based on static comparative advantages does not 
appear to outline the appropriate strategy for promoting sustained growth. 
Along similar lines, Steinmueller (2001) argues that leapfrogging by developing 
countries in the ICT industry, including software firms, would face the following 
barriers. The requirement for: i) high levels of absorptive capacity by local firms, so 
that imitation would lead to innovation; ii) complementary technological capabilities, 
for example, in the efficient use of mechatronics; iii) solutions to common shortages 
in the number of skilled programmers; iv) the ability to create reliable and 
internationally reputed brands; and v) solutions to recurrent problems of unreliable 
electrical power supply and environmental conditions of high humidity and 
temperature. Tigre et al. (2011: 21) claim that it is not only technical knowledge that 
is required for a catching-up process: 
to participate in international networks, it is not enough to know 
programming and systems analysis; proficiency in English and other 
languages is also required. This includes not just linguistic abilities per se, 
but also the ability to understand specific cultural codes of relationship and 
communication. Workers have to adopt the quality standards of clients, meet 
deadlines and inspire confidence in their partners abroad. These cultural 
abilities are considered to be even rarer than technical abilities. 
Steinmueller (2001: 205) acknowledges that innovation in developing countries 
could be achieved through the recombination of existing knowledge in the ICT 
industry, which would lead to opportunities in software for local and vertical 
markets, since innovation in ICT applications requires understanding and use of 
localised knowledge. However, localised knowledge is ‘likely to reside in smaller, 
specialized companies that do not have global reach’ (Steinmueller, 2001: 205). 
Therefore, the challenge for developing country ICT firms to enter global markets is 
greater. This is comparatively less of a problem in very specialised and innovative 
software producers who enter the global market often through licensing of their 
product to established companies. However, global insertion is more problematic in 
the case of broader applications (such as ERP platforms), in which the problem of 
building brand is considerably larger. This is because such markets are vertically 
integrated, standardised and largely concentrated and, therefore, dominated by a few, 
well-established, large firms. Independent firms established in developing countries 
find it difficult to compete with these large firms, firstly because of the latter’s 
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dominance in the diffusion of applications, and their reputation. For instance, Britto 
et al. (2007: 10) claim that there has been an increase market concentration in the 
Brazilian software industry, following:  
the increase of international competition and the sophistication of consumer 
demands - elements that tend do reinforce the importance of availability of 
financial resources and distribution channels - contribute to this process, 
making harder the maintenance of market shares. To local firms the impacts 
of these tendencies might be disruptive: large users tend to adopt a risk 
averse purchasing attitude that favors the selection of established foreign 
suppliers, whereas small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are not 
willing to pay a premium for the domestic firms’ unique knowledge. 
Secondly, independent firms often follow the strategy of adopting well diffused 
technologies, so that they can benefit from the reputation already established by large 
application producers (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
Considering these issues, we can point to policies in developing countries that seek 
to overcome at least some of these barriers, so that catching-up with the leading 
countries can be achieved. For instance, Indian government investment in skilled IT 
labour training in universities and other educational organisations was aimed at 
solving the shortage of IT skilled labour force. Another common practice is the 
creation of science parks, such as in India and China, with the aim of foster 
university-firm interaction, following the argument that ICT scientific disciplines are 
extremely relevant for knowledge creation and development in the industry (Britto et 
al., 2007; Veloso et al., 2003). 
This section discussed the main characteristics of the software industry and 
highlighted important issues involved in how its development can be fostered. 
Developed countries’ experience in the software industry differ from that of 
developing countries, and the former leads the industry at global level (Veloso et al., 
2003). Section 3.3.2 investigates the Brazilian software industry. 
3.3.2 The Brazilian software industry: emergence and development 
We discuss the emergence and development of the Brazilian software industry across 
two periods. Firstly, the emergence up to the early 1990s when internal market 
protection ceased (Section 3.3.2.1); secondly, industry development up to the late 
2000s (Section 3.3.2.2) when local firms were more exposed to international 
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competitions, and government policies to support industry development was based 
on different strategies compared to the previous period.   
3.3.2.1 Emergence: the mid 1970s to early 1990s 
The emergence of the Brazilian software industry was motivated by the national 
government IT policy implemented in the early 1970s (Araújo, 2011), and formally 
consolidated in 1984 with the ‘Informatics Law’ (Law n° 7.232). This policy 
targeted the development of the local IT industry, economic growth and indigenous 
technological development in local firms and higher levels of industrialisation 
through import substitution arrangements in line with internal market protection for 
local IT firms. Approval of the ‘Informatics Law’ coincided with the beginning of 
Brazilian economic liberalisation, and guaranteed protection for the local IT market 
for the next eight years (Gaio, 1992: 106; Pacheco, 2007; Roselino, 2006).  
The informatics policy was aimed at development of the local hardware industry, 
especially telecommunications and minicomputers. Development of the local 
software industry was complementary to hardware, with investments directed mostly 
to the production and trade of packaged software.
108
 The most important policy 
mechanisms to support the local software industry were: i) government procurement; 
ii) strong regulation over imports of software solutions by Special Secretariat of 
Informatics (SEI);
109
 and iii) SEI approval for manufacturing projects related to 
micro computers using operating systems developed by local firms. The regulation 
required registration of all computer programs produced and traded in the country 
with SEI, which also controlled imports, allowing them only if no similar software 
was being produced locally (Gaio, 1992; Roselino, 2006). However, the import 
regulation was not completely effective because SEI had very little control over 
MNCs intra-firm operations, and by the mid-1980s MNC subsidiaries were 
responsible for most of Brazil’s trade in imported software, about 80.3% (Gaio, 
1992: 111). In addition, there was easy replication (piracy) of imported software in 
the local market, which was beyond government control (Roselino, 2006) and 
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 Gaio (1992) states that one of the reasons for the government focus on packaged software was the 
successful experience of the USA in this market niche, and replication of this strategy seemed useful.  
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 This was associated with the Software Law (no. 7646/87, approved in 1987), which required there 
to be no equivalent software produced nationally for the registration and commercialisation of foreign 
software for small and medium equipment (Roselino, 2006: 115). 
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provided even more effective competition for local products than a legitimate and 
higher cost source. 
Under the arrangements of the ‘Informatics Law’, in 1987 national government 
implemented a policy to explicitly protect the national software industry. It 
continued the import restrictions aimed at developing indigenous technologies by 
local firms, and allowed software imports only if no similar software was produced 
in the country. The software import restrictions were not backed by direct incentives 
for the development of the industry. However they did support the emergence of a 
Brazilian software industry (Roselino, 2006).    
The informatics policy was not quite as effective for supporting the local software 
industry as it was for supporting the production of microcomputers. The production 
of packaged software requires a close user-producer relationship, which did not 
occur because local users gave priority to purchasing imported packages, mainly 
based on their better reputation and settled technologies compared to those of local 
products.
110
 In addition, the production of packaged software is characterised by high 
cost and continuous investment in research for redesign, customisation and technical 
support, all economically infeasible for local small firms. Most local firms were 
small and considered these investments too risky.
111
 Hence, although they were 
aware that tackling market demands would lead to international competitiveness, 
they preferred a defensive and short-term strategy. They invested instead in software 
applications. However, this software market niche was not sufficiently dynamic to 
guarantee sustainable growth of the local software industry (Gaio, 1992). The local 
packaged software industry did not develop at a suitable pace based on demand from 
the local minicomputer industry, which in 1986 was largely met by imported 
software. As a result, ‘the informatics policy tended to focus on the promotion of the 
supply of local products, while not dealing with the diffusion process’ (Gaio, 1992: 
110). 
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 Steinmueller (2001) points out that the issue of developing an ‘own brand’ is one of the main 
challenges to countries that try to leapfrog.  
111
 Corder (2004: 121) discusses the Brazilian financial system and shows that the investments in 
innovation activities by private credit are historically problematic in Brazil, among other reasons 
because of the inherent uncertainty of innovation activities, Brazil’s economic instability, and low 
demand for private credit from local firms which often preferred public finance given the conditions 
imposed by private lenders.  
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In 1991, under economic liberalisation, national government approved the new 
Informatics Law (8.248/91), shifting from the previous internal IT market protection 
policy to fiscal incentives for R&D activities. The most important fiscal incentive 
defined by the law was the 15% exemption on industrialised goods taxation (IPI) and 
the 2% IPI exemption for components; firms were required an accompanying 
investment of 5% of their total revenue in R&D activities (performed in house, in a 
teaching and research organisation or in a S&T programme pre-defined by the 
Brazilian Ministry of S&T-MCT) (Garcia and Roselino, 2004).  
The change in the law fostered the creation of private, non-profit ICT research 
institutes, which in some cases were founded by MNCs already established in the 
country (Ritz, 2008). The research centres founded by MNCs performed R&D 
activities almost exclusively for their founders; it was a mechanism used by MNCs 
to benefit from the law using specialised knowledge that already conformed to 
MNCs’ demand (Garcia and Roselino, 2004; Stefanuto, 2004). According to MIT-
Softex (2002: 19), from 1993 to the end of 2001 the Informatics Law benefited 428 
firms, with R&D resources to a total of RS$2.9B in this period; 63% was performed 
by firms and 33% by firms in partnership with research institutes. The majority of 
R&D investment exploiting the provisions of the Informatics Law was directed to 
hardware development, and MNCs were the main beneficiaries.
112
 
In the early 1990s, the Brazilian software industry was failing in its technological 
catch-up attempts. One of the reasons was the strategy implemented by national 
government of investing in the packaged software market, which was already 
showing signs of maturity and was organised under an international oligopolistic 
market structure. However, the complementarities of software development in the 
telecommunication hardware industry proved very important for the development of 
the Brazilian software industry in the 1990s. Most internal software production was 
performed by large IT firms, including CPqD, the Telebrás (the telecommunication 
state-owned firm) research centre. As already mentioned (Section 3.2.3), with 
economic liberalisation the MNCs took over some former government owned 
monopolies. One of the consequences of Telebrás’ privatisation was that CPqD lost 
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 The case of the Scientific and Technological Park of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio 
Grande do Sul (TECNOPUC) demonstrates that MNCs benefiting from the Informatics Law 
implemented long-term projects through localised R&D laboratories, which involved close 
interactions with the University and extensive training of undergraduates and postgraduates (Araújo 
and Teixeira, 2008). 
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most of its guaranteed procurement and redirected its investments to software. This 
followed the centre’s assessment that CPqD had developed high technological 
capabilities for software development because of the software embedded in 
telecommunications hardware; and in 1991 80% of telecommunications hardware 
was composed of embedded software (Stefanuto, 2004).
113
 CPqD had a central role 
in the formulation of the Softex Programme, as discussed below. 
3.3.2.2 The Softex Programme and policies supporting the local software industry 
In 1993, in the new economic liberalisation context, government implemented the 
Softex Programme, a national programme to support Brazil’s software exports, with 
the aim of achieving 1% of the global software market by 2000. This programme 
was created under a comprehensive national project to support the Brazilian IT 
industry, the Informatics Strategic Development Project (DESI).  
DESI included two other programmes: i) the National Research Network (RNP) 
which aimed to link the country’s scientific community through the Internet; and ii) 
the Thematic Programme in Computing Science (PROTEN-CC), which aimed to 
foster cooperation between the private sector and computer research organisations 
(Roselino, 2006; Stefanuto, 2004).
114
 The formation of networks, therefore, played a 
crucial role in the project. DESI’s creation followed the assessment that the core 
organisations for local scientific and technological development needed to improve 
their cooperation (Stefanuto, 2004).
115
  
Although the implementation of the Softex Programme occurred under the DESI 
project, it was originally developed within CPqD by a group of its researchers. 
Because of the centre’s accumulated expertise with embedded software and strong 
relationship with the local research university (State University of Campinas), the 
idea of having institutional support for interaction between the private and public 
sectors, and a local research university involved in the creation of knowledge related 
to ICT, seemed a good idea to foster the country’s software industry.116 Hence, the 
Softex Programme proposal created by CPqD took account of CPqD experience, and 
was implemented by national government. This type of policy programme to support 
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 Pilot fieldwork interviews number 7 and 8. 
114
 Further discussion of these two programmes is beyond the scope of this thesis. For detailed 
discussion of them see Afonso et al. (1999). 
115
 Stefanuto (2004) conducted a study on the Softex Programme for 1992 to the early 2000s and most 
information about the programme’s formulation, aims and implementation are based on his findings. 
116
 Pilot fieldwork interviews numbers 4, 7, 8 and 9. Brazil fieldwork interview numbers 4 and 8. 
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and foster interaction between the private and the public sectors with the high 
involvement of research universities, had been implemented in developed and 
developing countries (e.g. in India, MIT-Softex, 2002). In India, the aim was to 
replicate successful industrial development experience in the developed economies. 
The Softex programme created regional networks and a Softex Nucleus was 
established and linked to local firms through affiliations. The programme’s rationale 
was that close geographical proximity among firms and universities would foster 
innovation in firms, and lead to higher market performance. According to 
interviewees, the programme’s formulation deliberately conformed to a system of 
innovation approach.
117
  
The Nucleus aimed to support exporting by local software affiliated firms through 
the provision of technical and managerial support, and international market 
information. By the end of 1993 Softex had 13 Nuclei, covering almost all regions 
within the country.
118
 The establishment of a Nucleus in a region required that: i) the 
region was host to a research university offering post-graduate degrees in computing 
science; ii) the region could demonstrate an orientation towards the development of 
software (e.g., through the presence of established firms); iii) the region had to host a 
technological park (or have a proposal in place for the creation of a park); and iv) the 
local government would contribute funding for the Softex Nucleus (Stefanuto, 2004). 
Once a Nucleus was established, the Softex programme committed R$1M through 
CNPq scholarships for firms developing projects related to exports, which included: 
i) software development; ii) human resources training; and iii) financial support for 
participation in international fairs. The Nucleus provided juridical and marketing 
consultancy, and updated hardware to support software development, which was 
shared by affiliated firms. In 1996, the Softex Programme created Genesis Centres, 
which were incubators for software start-ups. One of the aims of these incubators 
was to augment knowledge in entrepreneurship for start-up managers, who often 
were recent graduates from ICT related disciplines. Degrees in computing science in 
Brazil were generally science oriented, and did not include training in 
entrepreneurship (Stefanuto, 2004). This suggests a lack of interest of local research 
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 Pilot fieldwork interviews number 4, 7 and 8. 
118
 The most favoured region was the Southeast region with 6 Nuclei, followed by the South region 
with 4, the Northeast with 2 and the Central-West with 1 (this last in the capital, Brasília).  
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universities in engaging with the private sector IT firms. Local ICT research 
university departments focus only (or mostly) on academic knowledge with low 
involvement from the private sector.
119
 The Softex Nucleus and Genesis Centres 
merged into a single organisation in 2002, following an assessment that they were 
competing; the new organisation is known as the Softex Agent. 
The Softex programme failed in its original aim to have a 1% global share of the 
software industry by 2000, or an estimated US$2B. By 2000 Brazilian software 
exports had reached US$100M, significantly lower than the target (Britto et al., 
2007; Stefanuto, 2004). There are several reasons for this failure. Firstly, the local 
software firms concentrated on development for the internal market, which had not 
been exploited and so demand was good. Secondly, Brazilian firms had failed to 
develop packaged software and directed investment to vertical software markets. 
Those markets show intensive user-producer interaction, reinforcing the role of the 
local market which was more accessible. Thirdly, the local firms supported by the 
programme were often start-ups or micro firms, which did not have the necessary 
technological capabilities to develop software products or services that could 
compete with international firms with reliable and well established technologies. 
Fourthly, there was no ‘client-led drive’, as mentioned by Britto et al. (2007: 4):  
rather than to find first who are the clients that might be attended and then 
sorting out how and what products could be sold to them, the drive was put 
behind pushing what was available, without a focus in which segments and 
which markets could be properly exploited. 
Finally, the English language was a barrier to international market penetration 
(Roselino, 2006; Stefanuto, 2004). Thus, Brazilian firms did not manage to 
overcome some of the important barriers to leapfrogging in the ICT industry 
highlighted by Steinmueller (2001) and discussed above.  
However, the Softex programme played a central role in creating software networks 
in different regions within the country through the creation of new software firms. 
Also, it was very relevant for political and institutional interaction in the industry 
(Araújo and Meira, 2004; Roselino, 2006; Stefanuto, 2004).
120
 For instance, between 
1991 and 2001, the software industry increased its share in national GDP from 
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 This issue is addressed in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. Pilot fieldwork interview number 11. Campinas 
fieldwork interviews numbers 1, 2, 11, 12, 18, 25, 27, 44, and 46. Recife fieldwork interviews 
numbers 10, 12 and 25.   
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 In the early 2000s there were 22 Softex Agents distributed in 12 Brazilian states (Stefanuto, 2004). 
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0.27% to 0.71%, and became the most significant market in the IT industry (MIT-
Softex, 2002). This percentage translates into 879 software national firms active in 
the country in 2002 (see Table 3.1) (Roselino, 2006). Table 3.1 highlights that 
Brazilian firms performed in the lower added value niches of the industry, 
reinforcing the argument that development of technological capabilities in software 
development is a long term goal. And, although software is pervasive and a relatively 
easy product to imitate, the development of absorptive capacity by software firms is 
not a straightforward achievement, although essential for the reproduction of 
knowledge created externally to the firm.  
Table 3.1 Brazilian software producers, national and foreign firms - 
2002 
Type of activity/ type of firm Private 
national 
firms 
Public 
national 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Total 
Services in informatics 222 7 20 249 
Software services- low added value 368 13 36 417 
Software services- high added value 140 - 11 151 
Development and 
commercialisation of software 
product 
149 - 29 178 
Total  879 20 96 995 
Legend:  
Services in informatics= consultancy in hardware, maintenance, and commercialisation of 
equipment.  
Software services- low added value= internet services, creation and maintenance of database, 
outsourced data processing, and technical support. 
Software services- high added value= Customised software (analysis, project, programming, 
tests, implementation and documentation), project development, and database modelling. 
Development and commercialisation of software product= development and production of 
software ready to use (including software for customisation), commercialisation and 
licensing.  
Source: Adapted from Roselino (2006: 150-151). 
 
With regard to the Softex Programme creating software networks within the country, 
Britto and Stallivieri (2010) find that 30 Brazilian regions were producing software 
in 2006, 17 of which hosted a Softex Agent,
121
 and involved a total of 2,841 software 
firms. The outlier regions in terms of number of firms were mainly Brazilian state 
capitals, such as São Paulo with 652 firms, followed by Rio de Janeiro with 238 
firms and Belo Horizonte with 201 firms. These cities are all based in the Brazilian 
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 http://www.softex.br/_agentes/lista.asp, accessed 14 January 2011. 
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Southeast region, the wealthiest and most dynamic industrial region in the country,
122
 
corroborating the findings from other studies of the software industry in Brazil (such 
as, MIT-Softex, 2002; Roselino, 2006; Stefanuto, 2004).  
Other public incentives were implemented to support the development of the local 
software industry.
123
 For instance, in 1993 alongside the Softex Programme, the 
Brazilian Programme for Quality and Productivity (PBQP) was implemented and 
designed a special division for the software industry, PBQP-sw.
124
 The programme 
aimed to support the adoption of norms, methods, techniques and tools related to the 
quality of software engineering to promote improvement in software processes, 
products and services.
125
 The programme was formulated by a commission of 
volunteers from public and private organisations, including firms, universities and 
research institutes, as well as government authorities (such as SEPIN, the MCT 
Secretary for Policy in Informatics).  
The Brazilian software industry is also supported by Prosoft, a special programme 
set up in 1999 by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), to help the software 
industry.
126
 Prosoft benefits local software firms with BNDES loans under special 
conditions (no requirement for real guarantees), which are accessible to small and 
medium firms (but not start-ups); the establishment of corporate governance in firms 
applying to Prosoft is a requirement of the Bank.
127
  
Prosoft has three funding mechanisms. Prosoft Empresa (Prosoft Enterprise), which 
provides funding up to about US$640K,
128
 through funding or land value 
subscriptions for investment and business plans for software producing firms and 
firms offering IT related services. Prosoft Empresa has two supporting mechanisms, 
direct (where firms can hire consultancy services from Softex, which submits the 
application to BNDES without the charges for the BNDES Commission of Studies) 
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 http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/, accessed 14 January 2011. 
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 Araújo  (2011: Box B1 and Box B2) provides a detailed list of policies implemented by the 
Brazilian government that relate to the support of the local software industry. 
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 PBQP is Programa Brasileiro de Qualidade e Produtividade. 
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 http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/47694.html, accessed 07 July 2011. 
126
 All information on the Prosoft programme was collected from the programme’s website. The 
programme has an extensive and complex regulation which is not discussed in detail. For detailed 
information see: 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Areas_de_Atuacao/Inovacao/Prosoft/index.htm
l, accessed 07 July 2011. 
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 Fieldwork organisational interview. 
128
 Conversion rate of 1,558 available from the Brazilian Central Bank, available at: 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/Resultado.asp?idpai=convmoeda, accessed 07 July 2011. 
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and indirect (where firms submit applications directly to the bank, but have to pay 
the fees of the BNDES Commission of Studies). Prosoft Empresa supports a wide 
range of activities, including: i) investments in new machines and equipments; ii) 
investments in infrastructure; iii) expenses related to the improvement of managerial 
and technological capacities, training and certification; and iv) investment in 
development and research for new products, process and services.
129
 Since its 
creation (1999) until the year of data collection (2009), 66 software firms had 
contracts issued under the ‘Prosoft Empresa’ programme, 7 new firms were already 
approved for benefits and 30 proposals were being considered.
130
 
The second Prosoft funding mechanism is Prosoft Comercialização (Prosoft 
Commercialisation), which provides funding for acquisition, in the Brazilian market, 
of software and correlated services developed in the country, exclusively through 
financial institutions accredited by the Bank. Firms that operate in the country as 
well as public authorities can benefit from this programme. The lines of the 
programme comprise total or partial licensing of intellectual property rights, and 
total or partial acquisition of intellectual property rights, of national computing 
programmes developed by suppliers that are accredited by the Bank. 
The third Prosoft funding mechanism is Prosoft Exportação (Prosoft Exports), which 
has two funding means. Firstly, BNDES Exim Pré-embarque, which provides 
funding for the development of software and IT services aimed at exports (but pre-
export activity). Minimum funding is US$200M and only firms that have been 
established for at least 5 years can apply for this, and are required to have exported a 
minimum of US$200M in software or IT services in the 24 months previous to the 
Consultation stage with the Bank. Secondly, there is BNDES Exim Pós-Embarque, 
which supports firms that have already concluded the exports.  
The Informatics Law was revised in 2001 (Law 10.176/01) and again in 2004 (Law 
11.077/04). The most relevant change was the requirement that a percentage of 
firms’ R&D activities had to be performed in less economically favoured Brazilian 
regions (i.e., North, Northeast and Central-West). The new law aims to foster 
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 Software producing firms and firms offering IT related services include: firms that develop 
packaged software, embedded software, customised software products and components, in addition to 
services in IT, such as consultancy, development of customised software, training, support and 
maintenance, outsourcing and Business Process Outsourcing, including call centres and contact 
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 Fieldwork government interview. 
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regional development through the development and growth of the local IT industry 
in economically and socially disadvantaged regions. One of the arguments for this is 
that the pervasiveness of software could support the development of other industries 
in these regions. The non-profit private research centres located in those regions have 
benefited greatly from this change in the law. For example, the number of employees 
in the Recife Center for Advanced Studies and Systems-CESAR, which is based in 
Porto Digital (Pernambuco State) in the Northeast region, almost doubled in the 
period 2004-2007, and in 2006 69.9% of its total income was from resources 
available under the new Informatics Law (Ritz, 2008). 
In addition to fiscal incentives, the Brazilian national government employs direct 
policy instruments to foster firm innovations, in the IT and other industries. As 
mentioned in Section 3.2.3, the Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP) provides non-
reimbursable grants to support firms’ research through special calls. FINEP runs the 
Zero Interest Programme (since 2004), to support small and medium firms through 
low interest loans and has implemented the Prime Programme, to support start-up 
firms. 
FINEP manages the Sectoral Funds, and CTInfo is the Sectoral Fund devoted to the 
development of the local ICT industry, including software. The funding source 
comprises a (minimum) 0.5% of the total revenue of firms that develop or produce 
informatics and automation goods and services in Brazil and benefits from fiscal 
incentives under the Informatics Law.
131
 The funding allocation framework is 
through open calls that channel investments according to priority knowledge areas. 
Another initiative implemented by Softex in 2003 is the MPS.br Programme 
(Programme for the Brazilian Software Process Improvement), in which the 
following organisations were involved in the formulation of the programme in 
addition to Softex: the Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute – Graduate School and 
Research in Engineering at the Rio de Janeiro Federal University (COOPE/UFRJ); 
the Renato Archer Information Technology Centre (CTI/CenPRA); the Recife Center 
for Advanced Studies and Systems (CESAR); SoftexRecife; the Brazilian Technical 
Standards Association (ABNT); and the Informatics Company of the State of Paraná 
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 http://www.finep.gov.br/fundos_setoriais/ct_info/ct_info_ini.asp?codSessao=1&codFundo=8, 
accessed 07 July 2011. 
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(CELEPAR) (Britto et al., 2007).
132
 The programme is sponsored by the Brazilian 
Ministry of S&T (MCT), FINEP, and also the Inter-American Development Bank, to 
‘improve [the] software process in Brazilian organizations at reasonable costs’ 
(Weber et al., 2007: 111). MPS.br is strongly based on Capability Maturity Model 
Integration (CMMI) certification, and related to the increased relevance of CMMI in 
the country, meaning that firms awarded CMMI certification benefited from access 
to public calls, and greater credibility in the market. Because of the costs involved in 
CMMI implementation, the Brazilian government wanted to establish a similar 
certification process that would give credibility to local firms, and support their 
development activities. The programme aims to support Brazilian local firms to 
improve their software development processes and to support firms’ professional 
management. MPS.br has seven stages, from A to G, where G is the first and lowest 
level and A the seventh and highest level (CMMI has 5 stages, stage 1 is the first 
level and stage 5 is the highest level) (Weber et al., 2007). Taking into account that 
the majority of local software firms is composed by micro and small firms, MPS.br 
aims to adjust the well diffused CMMI certification process to the needs of local 
firms. The MPS.br programme assessed that it was necessary to create two new 
intermediate stages so that local firms could progress within seven rather than five 
stages, based in the argument that local firms were likely to struggle to advance 
along only five stages.
133
  
Softex manages the programme and firms associated with Softex can benefit from 
subsidies of 40% for the MPS.br certification process.
134
 A survey implemented by 
iMPS,
135
 showed that during the period September 2005 to November 2010, 250 
firms had been assessed by the MPS certification process, mostly micro or small 
firms (Travassos and Kalinowski, 2011). According to these authors, most firms that 
adopted MPS achieved higher customer satisfaction levels and higher productivity 
and capacity to develop more complex projects compared to before MPS adoption 
(they also showed better development than firms still in the implementation stage). 
                                                 
132
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2, the engagement of these organisations in the MPS.br 
project highlights the relevance of networks within the government aimed at increasing knowledge 
and expertise in specialised fields. 
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 Campinas fieldwork organisational interview. 
134
 Campinas fieldwork organisational interview. 
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 iMPS (Informações para Acompanhar e Evidenciar Variação de Desempenho nas Empresas que 
Adotaram o Modelo MPS’) is information collected for the assessment on firms awarded MPS 
certification. 
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These results suggest that MPS.br is fulfilling its aim to support local firms to 
implement best practice. 
In 2004 another initiative was introduced by national government to support the 
development of the local software industry, the Sectoral Integrated Project for 
Software Exports and Related Services (PSI-sw).
136
 The project was created in a 
partnership between the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX) 
and Softex, and under the new national policy implemented in 2004 (PITCE) when 
software became a government priority.
137
 The aim of the project is to promote and 
improve the internationalisation of Brazilian software firms and firms that develop 
IT related services. The project has been renewed several times since its creation, 
and is established until 2012. Firms wanting to benefit from PSI-sw funding do not 
receive it direct from APEX, the organization that manages the funding. Firms must 
submit proposals through associations, which become responsible for managing the 
finance. 
Since 2000, several national government initiatives have been implemented to 
support, directly or indirectly, the local software industry. Some of these initiatives 
support the interactions (through the creation of formal or informal ties) among 
components of the innovation system. In addition, national government has 
implemented regulations enforcing connections among some of the actors in the 
innovation system. For instance, only firms that are associated to Softex can benefit 
from the incentives for MPS accreditation and submit applications to BNDES 
Prosoft-Empresa free of charge.  
There is no single indicator that can be used to assess whether the government 
initiatives discussed above have translated into improvements in the performance of 
Brazilian software firms. However, according to the Brazilian Association of 
Software Producers (ABES), Brazil’s ranking in the global market increased from 
the 15
th
 in 2005 to 11
th
 position in 2010.
138
 This suggests that national efforts to 
support the Brazilian software industry are showing positive results.  
Also, according to Pintec (2010b: 73; Table 1.1.6) innovation by firms involved in 
the development and licensing of computing programmes and other IT services are 
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 PSI-sw is Projeto Setorial Integrado de Exportação de Software e Serviços Correlatos. 
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 http://golden.softex.br/portal/desenvolvimento/_psi-sw/psi2007-2009.asp, accessed 07 July 2011. 
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 http://www.abes.org.br/templ3.aspx?id=306&sub=650, accessed 07 July 2011. 
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well above the average for innovative firms (38.6%), at 58.2% and 46.1% 
respectively.
139
 This trend is confirmed if we compare their innovative performance 
with performance in other industries, such as the extractive industry (23.7%) and 
transformation industry (38.4%).  
3.4 Conclusions 
This section summarises the points discussed in this chapter. We provided an 
overview of the Brazilian industrialisation process highlighting the establishment of 
the main public organisations created (Section 3.2). We showed that the institutional 
framework created by the national government has not always received the same 
level of attention, especially in the early 1990s, and that the long term economic 
instability present until the mid 1990s prevented government from focusing on 
investments in S&T at the level required for economic development and 
technological catch-up.  
We also discussed the emergence and main characteristics of the software industry 
following a sectoral system of innovation approach, and the emergence and 
evolution of the Brazilian software industry. We found that there has been increasing 
effort through government initiatives to support the industry, either directly (e.g. 
Prosoft by BNDES) or indirectly (public funding organisations that provide funding 
to several industries).  
Chapter 4 addresses the emergence and development of two Brazilian regions active 
in the software industry, Campinas and Recife. 
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 The share of innovative firms in service related industries was above the average, i.e. 46.5%, 
showing that the innovative performance of other IT services firms have followed the overall trend. 
The results of Pintec 2008 are not comparable with Pintec 2005 with regards to software activities, 
because the industry classification changed during this period. 
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CHAPTER 4 – A TALE OF TWO SOFTWARE REGIONS: 
CAMPINAS AND RECIFE 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 introduces and provides historical evidence on the structure of the two 
networks investigated in this thesis. Based on the argument that there is a need for a 
deeper understanding of the emergence and evolution of networks through an 
examination of network governance (Chapter 2, Section 2.4), Chapter 4 examines the 
regional history of the emergence and development of the software industry in the 
Campinas and Recife networks. These networks are based in Campinas, a country 
city located in the São Paulo State (Brazilian Southeast) and Recife, the capital of 
Pernambuco State (Brazilian Northeast). These regions show great disparities in their 
socio-economic and scientific systems. 
The Southeast region share of Brazil’s population was 42.1% in 2010 (IBGE, 2010b) 
and its GDP in 2008 was 56.0% (IBGE, 2008). The São Paulo State share of Brazil’s 
population was 21.6% in 2010 (IBGE, 2010b) and its GDP in 2008 was 33.1% 
(IBGE, 2008). These indicators provide evidence of the economic potential of São 
Paulo.
140
 Per capita GDP for Campinas in 2008 was US$11.9K compared to the 
national average of US$6.8K.
141
 The population of the Campinas City was 2.6% of 
total São Paulo State population in 2010, and 0.6% of the total Brazilian population 
(IBGE, 2010c). 
The strong economic and industrial dynamics of São Paulo State and Campinas city 
are combined with a strong and well established regional scientific system. The São 
Paulo State Research Foundation (FAPESP) is one of the most important public 
research funding organisations in Brazil, with an estimated budget of US$402M in 
2009.
142
 Campinas is geographically close (100km distant) to São Paulo City, the 
capital of São Paulo State, and one of the most economically dynamic cities in 
Brazil. Campinas city is host to one of the best reputed public research universities in 
Brazil, the State University of Campinas (Unicamp), which conducts research in 
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 The country is comprised of 27 states (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics-IBGE). 
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 Exchange rate used the Brazilian Central Bank conversion rate of R$1 = US$2.337, for 31 
December 2008. Available at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp, last accessed in 
16 June 2011. 
142
 Campinas fieldwork organisational interview. 
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several disciplines.
143
 There are also several private teaching universities in 
Campinas. 
The Northeast region accounts for a much lower share of national GDP compared to 
the Southeast region, 13.1% in 2008 (IBGE, 2008); and its Northeast of Brazil’s 
population was 27.8% in 2010 (IBGE, 2010b). The Pernambuco State’s share in 
Brazil’s population was 4.6% in 2010 (IBGE, 2010b), and its share of the GDP was 
2.3% in 2008 (IBGE, 2008). These indicators show that this region is economically 
lagging behind the Southeast region and São Paulo State. Recife’s per capita GDP 
was US$6.2K in 2007 compared to the national average of US$6.8K,
144
 and is 
considerably lower (52%) than Campinas city. Recife city’s population accounted for 
17.4% of the population of Pernambuco State in 2010, and 0.8% of total Brazilian 
population (IBGE, 2010c). 
Pernambuco State, and the Recife region in particular, experienced an economic 
downturn in the 1980s, which was followed by recovery efforts aimed at boosting 
the region’s economic dynamics. The main reason for the downturn was its historical 
economic dependence on sugar cane production. The industry dynamics changed in 
the late 20
th
 century following a fall in international prices due to the entry of more 
sugar cane producers, which resulted in fiercer international competition (Oliveira, 
2008).  
Compared to Campinas, the scientific system in Recife is diminished both because 
the public research university does not perform at the same level in as many 
scientific fields as the research university in Campinas,
145
 and because the 
Pernambuco State Research Foundation (FACEPE) budget in 2009 was estimated in 
US$17.2M (i.e. more than 20 times lower than the FAPESP budget) (FACEPE, 
                                                 
143
 Unicamp is one of the two Brazilian universities in the Times Higher Education ranking in 2007, 
and was in 177
th
 position (São Paulo State University was ranked 175th). 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/hybrid.asp?typeCode=144, accessed 16 February 2011. 
144
 Exchange rate is based on the Brazilian Central Bank conversion rate of R$1 = US$2.337, for 31 
December 2008. Available at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp, accessed 16 June 
2011. 
145
 The scientific disparity between the two regions is shown by the Capes Foundation triennial 
assessment of postgraduate programmes offered by national universities, where the highest score of 7 
applies to postgraduate programmes offered by the top international universities. In the period 2006-
2009 Unicamp offered 66 postgraduate programmes assessed as follows: 15 programmes scored 7, 13 
programmes scored 6, 25 programmes scored 5, 10 programmes scored 4, and 3 programmes scored 
3. In the same period, the Federal University of Pernambuco-UFPE, the strongest research university 
in the state of Pernambuco, offered 62 postgraduate programmes assessed as: 2 programmes scored 6, 
23 programmes scored 5, 23 programmes scored 4, and 14 programmes scored 3 (CAPES, 2010). 
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2006).
146
 The percentage of students graduating in 2007 in the São Paulo State, 
29.6% (INEP, 2009), was more than proportionate to its share of the Brazilian 
population, that is, 21.6% while the percentage of students graduating in 2007 in 
Pernambuco State, 2.6% (INEP, 2009), was less than proportionate to its share of the 
Brazilian population, that is, 4.6%.
147
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 investigates the Campinas 
software network’s infancy and evolution, highlighting the institutional setting, 
government incentives and ICT industry that led to Campinas becoming Brazil’s 
leading software region. The section concludes with a profile of local software firms. 
Section 4.3 provides similar information for the Recife region. Section 4.4 concludes 
the chapter.  
4.2 The Campinas Software Network  
The Campinas region has a long history in ICT, going back to the mid 1960s and the 
foundation of the State University of Campinas (Unicamp). Unicamp is a research 
university that was founded to perform research linked to the needs of local industry 
and also to create the conditions for technological development in strategic sectors 
(e.g. energy and telecommunications), which at the time were controlled by large 
national state-owned firms (Dagnino and Velho, 1998). Unicamp was the first 
Brazilian university to offered degree courses in Computing Science beginning in 
1969.
148
 Campinas city was selected to host CPqD, the Telebrás (the Brazilian Public 
Telecommunications provider) research centre, in 1976 (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.2). The establishment of CPqD had a major impact on ICT industry development 
in the region (see Section 4.2.1). Section 4.2.2 investigates the emergence of the 
software industry in the region, and Section 4.2.3 discusses the most relevant 
initiatives implemented to support its evolution, including the main organisations 
established in the region. Section 4.2.4 presents the Campinas software firms 
established by the end of the first decade of 2000. 
                                                 
146
 Exchange rate based on the Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil) conversion rate 
available at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp, accessed 18 November 2010. 
147
 Most recent data on state populations are available only for 2010 (IBGE, 2010a).  
148
 http://www.ic.unicamp.br/informacoes-gerais/o-instituto/apresentacao?set_language=pt-br, 
accessed 6 January 2010. 
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4.2.1 The Campinas ICT network’s infancy  
The emergence of the Campinas ICT network was promoted by state and national 
level government science and technology policies. State level interventions include 
foundation of Unicamp by the São Paulo state government in 1966 to provide a 
research university that offered Computing Science and Engineering degrees among 
others. The creation of Unicamp is related to technology policies aimed at supporting 
the emergence of public organisations to develop scientific and technological 
knowledge (see Mowery, 1995 and Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 in this thesis). 
Unicamp’s Computing Institute (IC-Unicamp) offers training at undergraduate (since 
1969) and postgraduate (masters since 1977 and doctoral since 1994) levels. The 
School of Electrical Engineering and Computing (FEEC-Unicamp) began offering 
training in Computer Engineering in partnership with IC-Unicamp in 1990. These 
developments suggest that responsibility for the supply of knowledge for the ICT 
industry has assumed at the local level. However, whether local firms benefit from 
the knowledge produced through the employment of Unicamp graduates or formal 
collaborations with IC-Uunicamp and FEEC-Unicamp requires further investigation; 
this issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 where we investigate the Campinas 
software network of innovators in the period 2006-2009.  
Another important S&T policy implemented by the state government relates to 
mechanisms for funding R&D, which resulted in the creation of the São Paulo State 
Research Foundation (FAPESP) in 1962. FAPESP funds research conducted in 
Campinas and other regions in the state, on ICT related areas. Unicamp receives the 
second highest level of funding from FAPESP in São Paulo State.
149
  
FAPESP supports S&T activities in several areas, including ICT, and its expenditure 
on all ICT related knowledge areas in the period 2004-2008 accounted for 4.8% of 
FAPESP’s total budget of US1B for the period.150 However, the funding shares for 
Computing Science and Computer Engineering is lower compared to the amount 
awarded for all ICT related knowledge areas, accounting for 1.62% of the FAPESP 
budget for the 2009 fiscal year.  
                                                 
149
 The share of Unicamp in FAPESP’s budget for the fiscal year 2009 was 14.41%; São Paulo State 
University (USP), received a share of 45.71% (FAPESP, 2009). 
150
 This figure is based on FAPESP (2008) and an anonymous interviewee.  
Exchange rate based on the Brazilian Central Bank conversion rate of R$1 = US$2.337, for 31 
December 2008. Available at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp, accessed 16 June 
2011. 
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FAPESP funding channels include scholarships for undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, grants for academic researchers, special programmes and technology 
innovation grants.
151
 The last is an example of a technology policy related to the 
‘thematic funding’ discussed in Chapter 2, where thematic funding programmes are 
defined as ‘programs that involve the predefinition of themes under which eligible 
candidates are invited to propose specific programs of research’ (Steinmueller, 2010: 
1192). FAPESP supports two thematic funding programmes for the development of 
new technologies for practical applications; the main beneficiary is the private 
sector. These programmes are the Technological Innovation in Small Businesses 
Programme (PIPE) created in 1997, which requires applicants to be researchers 
formally associated to small firms,
152
 and the Partnership for Technological 
Innovation Programme (PITE),
153
 which requires the private sector to provide 
matching funding of up to 50% of the total project budget. The PIPE programme is 
part of a technology policy directed towards the formation of networks (see Chapter 
2), and applications must include actors from different organisations and sub-
networks (e.g. business and skills sub-networks; see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.1). 
The infant stage of the Campinas ICT network benefited from technology policies 
implemented at national government level that resulted in the creation of CPqD in 
1974, and the government Renato Archer Information Technology Centre 
(CTI/CenPRA) in 1982. CTI/CenPRA conducts R&D for the IT industry, and 
employed about 280 staff in 2009. It conducts research in microelectronics, software 
and IT applications.
154
 This complemented state government technology policy 
discussed above (such as the creation of Unicamp to provide high quality human 
resources training), through the funding of organisations to develop scientific and 
technological activity more generally.
155
  
                                                 
151
 http://www.FAPESP.br/en/materia/1/the-institution/FAPESP.htm; accessed 6 January 2010. 
152
 PIPE (Pesquisa Inovativa em Pequenas Empresas) was modeled after the Small Business 
Innovation Research Programme implemented by the US government.  
153
 PITE: Progama de Apoio em Parceria para a Inovavação Tecnológica. 
154
 Microelectronics includes Hardware Systems Design - Design House CTI, Microsystems and 
Electronic Packaging, Conformity and Quality Assessment, and Displays and Surface Interaction Lab. 
Software includes Development Technologies, Quality and Process Improvement, and Information 
Security. IT applications comprise: Robotics and Computer Vision, Decision Support Technologies, 
and 3D Technologies. 
 http://www.cti.gov.br/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1, accessed 
8 July 2011. 
155
 http://www.cpqd.com.br/2/115+historico-historico.html, accessed 13 January 2010. 
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CPqD historically has supported the creation of spin-off firms, which led to formal 
and trust-based ties with the research centre because: i) many entrepreneurs were 
previous employees of the centre and personal relationships were in place; and ii) 
CPqD was confident about the high quality of the knowledge and services produced 
by those firms. CPqD established ties with Unicamp through the employment of 
Unicamp graduates and through centre employees collaborating in teaching at 
Unicamp.
156
 The ties between CPqD, its spin-off firms, other local firms, and 
Unicamp were indirectly supported by guaranteed purchases of equipment by 
Telebrás, and also CPqD outsourcing some of its development activities to local 
firms. There was an endogenous process of technology development and diffusion in 
the region (Garcia, 2000: 9-10), involving interaction between CPqD and local firms, 
which created a telecommunication industry local system of innovation (Szapiro et 
al., 2002).    
The Campinas telecommunication innovation system virtuously evolved through the 
interactions described above and, also, benefited from the region’s good reputation 
for supplying high quality knowledge (Unicamp’s training and research), funding 
(e.g. from FAPESP) and the presence of the two public ICT related research centres, 
CPqD and CTI/CenPRA (Szapiro, 2003; Szapiro et al., 2002). This environment 
attracted ICT MNCs, which began to set up factories in the region in the late 1970s. 
They included IBM, Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Nokia, Siemens, NEC, 
Ericsson, Compaq and Texas Instruments (Garcia and Roselino, 2004: 181).  
The region’s infrastructure was important for attracting MNCs, especially the road 
linking the Campinas region to other country regions and the presence of an airport 
that allowed cargo to be transported (MNCs imported ICT components from their 
global suppliers).
157
 According to Garcia and Roselino (2004), the infrastructure was 
the most relevant regional characteristic, with the local scientific and technological 
system playing a secondary (although important) role in attracting MNCs. This 
questions the effectiveness of government investment in the region to support the 
development of local firms and their inclusion in global markets. The foundation of 
                                                 
156
 According to the pilot fieldwork interview number 7 CPqD historically interacted with ICT firms 
and other research centres and local academia. The creation of the CPqD community corresponds to 
the formation of a community of common knowledge in Pavitt’s (1987, Chapter 2 above) terms. 
157
 Imports of telecommunication components and final products increased from US$855M in 1994 to 
US$3.7B in 2001 suggesting the importance of importing for the Brazilian telecommunications 
industry (Szapiro, 2004). 
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private non-profit research institutes by the MNCs, created with the specific aim to 
perform customised R&D for them (and benefit from the Informatics Law tax 
exemption – see Chapter 3), suggests that local firms were not directly related to 
development activities performed by MNCs. According to Stefanuto (2004: 72), the 
level of cooperation between both local firms and the local research community, with 
private non-profit organisations was poor, resulting in low diffusion of the R&D 
activities performed by these last organisations. 
Despite the centrality of the transport infrastructure, Campinas shows evidence of 
Marshallian industrial districts in the meaning in Markusen (1996). Business units 
related to the telecommunication industry were attracted to the city (and 
surroundings) to benefit from its reputation, potential knowledge spill-overs, and a 
protected market. One of the most important advantages for the region’s ICT 
development was the institutional setting imposed by national government which 
meant that local telecommunication firms and research centres benefited from a 
protected internal market, which continued until the early 1990s with the opening-up 
and liberalisation of the Brazilian economy. Economic liberalisation influenced the 
evolution of the local telecommunications industry, with consequences for the 
development of the Brazilian software industry.
158
 Section 4.2.2 looks at some of the 
results of these changes in the Campinas ICT industry, and the emergence of the 
software industry in the region. 
4.2.2 Evolution of the Campinas ICT network: The emergence of the software 
network 
The Brazilian economy experienced a liberalisation process at the beginning of the 
1990s after more than two decades of internal market protection related to the 
industrialisation by import substitution model (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). The 
new macro-economic policy influenced the evolution of the Campinas 
telecommunication system of innovation, especially after the privatisation of 
Telebrás in 1998. The major change for the Campinas region was that CPqD became 
a non-profit private foundation, lost its guaranteed government procurement from 
                                                 
158
 The liberalisation of the Brazilian economy affected the development of other local industries (see 
Chapter 3). 
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Telebrás and had to compete in the national market with private ICT firms, which 
mostly were global players.
159
  
These changes had consequences also for local firms involved in CPqD development 
activities. Once the latter’s guaranteed procurement ended, its ties with local firms 
came under pressure.
160
 Local firms also had to compete with global players and, 
although some firms had developed strong technological capabilities in 
telecommunications by the 1990s, their size (small compared to global players) made 
it difficult for them to compete (Garcia and Roselino, 2004). The privatization of 
Telebrás contributed to the weakening of the Campinas telecommunication system of 
innovation (Szapiro, 2003). In many cases, the technological activities performed by 
local firms were severely downgraded (Garcia and Roselino, 2004; Ritz, 2008). Also, 
MNCs high technology research was mostly conducted elsewhere (e.g. in their home 
countries), to achieve better use of resources and economies of scale in research and 
economies of central coordination. The MNCs’ local market share in 
telecommunications equipment grew from 58.5% in 1997 to 91.3% in 2000, and 
CPqD’s role in the local telecommunication innovation system had changed 
(Szapiro, 2004). The new economic context discussed above led CPqD to revise its 
business strategy, as noted by an interviewee: 
All of a sudden CPqD was exposed to an open and extremely competitive 
internal market, we [CPqD] got ‘exposed’ to external competitors and had to 
learn very quickly how to be more competitive, and also how to sell our 
products. There was not enough time for us [CPqD] to adjust to the new 
reality; there was no time for a learning process. This was one of the reasons 
why CPqD decided to produce software and not only telecom software. The 
other reason was that we [CPqD] assessed that Brazil had lost the 
opportunity to compete internationally in the hardware industry, so we 
[CPqD] decided to concentrate our activities in software development (…) 
Also, we [CPqD] thought that the Brazilian software industry was lucky in a 
way, because when we [CPqD] decided to compete in software, the software 
industry had passed its early stage of the industry cycle, when the costs of 
production are known to be higher. (Pilot fieldwork interview)   
CPqD began to invest in software development, an activity that previously was 
marginal in the centre’s technological activities despite the centre’s accumulated 
expertise in the development of embedded software related to the production of 
telecommunications hardware. The decision to invest in software was based on three 
                                                 
159
 Campinas pilot fieldwork number 7. 
160
 This relates to the discussion in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 on the role of state intervention through 
incentives to create and maintain ties. 
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reasons: i) the centre was not capable (at least in the short term) to cope financially 
with the adjustments required to compete in the telecommunication hardware 
market; ii) the centre had accumulated knowledge and technological expertise in 
software whilst developing hardware for telecommunications; and iii) the Brazilian 
hardware industry had missed its chance to join the international hardware market, 
but the software industry was still relatively young making entry into the 
international software market more feasible.
161
 Since the late 1990s CPqD has been 
developing and commercialising software and has become a major player not only in 
the Campinas region, but also nationally.
162
  
The above discussion shows that CPqD became a central ICT player in the Campinas 
region when ties created with local firms and the local research university were 
protected by the market reserve policy. When the macro-economic environment 
changed and the research centre began to focus on software development, the ties 
between CPqD and local firms changed. This is investigated in Chapter 6. 
In addition to CPqD’s change of technological expertise to software development, in 
1993, a major institutional change was implemented in the country aimed at 
developing the Brazilian software industry, the Softex Programme (see Chapter 3). 
The Softex Programme chose Campinas to host a Softex Nucleus, which provided 
major support of the local software industry. The Campinas Softex Nucleus was set 
up to coordinate the local software network and support local software firms’ 
innovation and development. Initially, the Campinas Softex Nucleus was based on 
the Unicamp Campus, located next to the IC-Unicamp building. It was hoped that the 
geographical proximity between academics and entrepreneurs would foster 
interactions.
163
 For Unicamp, liberalisation of the Brazilian economy, which 
corresponded to the privatisation of state-owned firms in strategic sectors, changed 
the university’s institutional conditions with regard to the creation of new knowledge 
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 Campinas pilot fieldwork number 7. According to the interviewee, Brazil decided to enter in the 
software industry market when entry costs were lower than at later stages in the product life cycle. 
162
 Note that although the changes in the Campinas ICT industry were not the result of technology 
policies, the implementation of new macroeconomic policies by national government shifted national 
telecommunication industrial technological development. This is discussed in Mowery (1995) in 
relation to the practice of technology policy. Mowery (1995: 514) states that most government 
policies influence nation technological and industrial development, but that only those policies that 
are ‘intended’ to ‘influence the decisions of firms to develop, commercialize or adopt new 
technologies’ are technology policies. 
163
 It was claimed that geographical proximity would support the benefits of cognitive proximity in 
the understanding in Asheim and Gertler (2004, as discussed in Section 2.2.1, Chapter 2 above). 
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and its interaction with the private sector. There were few opportunities for long-
term research contracts with state-owned firms, and mostly short-term research 
contracts with the private sector aimed at solving practical problems (Dagnino and 
Velho, 1998).  
In 2009 (during the data collection period for this thesis) the Softex Campinas and 
Softex National Office were based in a separate building, located outside the 
Unicamp Campus. However, access was through Unicamp’s gates. According to 
interviewees, being geographically close to Unicamp was an intangible asset of the 
Nucleus.
164
 Between 2000 and 2010 the Campinas Softex Nucleus increased its 
efforts to support local firms in an effort to improve its reputation in the community 
as an organisation that was capable and had the expertise to support local firms. The 
interview extracts in the early years of 2000s demonstrate problems faced by Softex 
Campinas in this period: 
The Softex staff do not know what is going on in the local firms. They 
[Softex staff] do not how much is their [local firms] turn over, what they 
[local firms] do, which kind of activity they [local firms] are developing. 
(Campinas pilot fieldwork interview number 5) 
And, 
The big problem with Softex is that the organisation receives funding from 
the government, so they [Softex] consider the government their main client, 
and not the firms. They [Softex] are very interested in lobbying, because all 
of Softex products are directed to fulfil policy interests with the government, 
they [Softex] want to sell their projects to the government with the intention 
of getting more funding (…) the firms that succeeded did it on their own, 
through autonomous trajectories. (Campinas pilot fieldwork interview 
number 6)   
The issues highlighted by interviewees were overcome at least in part by Softex 
Campinas offering support to local firms, for example by extending its incubator 
programme, supporting and subsidising certification of local firms in software 
improvement (MPS.br, see Chapter 3) and facilitating the creation of a consortium of 
local firms. Section 4.2.3 examines some of these issues.  
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 Campinas interviews number 7, 20, 22, 25, 33, 35, 42 and 44. 
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4.2.3 Initiatives to support Campinas regional development and the local 
software industry 
In addition to the Softex Programme, the Campinas local council acknowledged the 
importance of innovation for the development of local firms. In 1991 the council 
created the Company for the Development of Campinas High-Technology Park 
(Ciatec), a division of the council that managed two High-Technology Parks (I and 
II) based in Campinas which hosted high-technology firms. These parks in practice 
function as a set of office condominiums for firms, and Ciatec is not active in 
coordinating dyadic interaction among the firms in the parks.
165
 In 1996 Ciatec 
created an incubator programme to support high-technology based firms, ‘mirroring 
the experiences of Europe and the USA’ (Campinas fieldwork organisational 
interview). The incubator is based at Ciatec’s central office (which is outside the 
technology parks) and supports software start-ups, although in most cases it refers 
these start-ups to the Softex Campinas incubator, one of two other local incubators 
(the second being Incamp). 
The Softex Incubator was inaugurated in Campinas in 1995, and supports only 
software start-ups. The incubator offers subsidised office facilities and infrastructure, 
which includes telephone, internet connection, reception services, cleaning, parking 
and security.
166
 Incubator firms also have access (at subsidised cost) to workshops 
organised by the Softex Campinas and can obtain consultancy services. The most 
common entrepreneur profile in the incubator is IC-Unicamp graduate students who 
often have little (if any) university training in entrepreneurship. Start-ups 
entrepreneurs normally struggle with business plans, and the business consultancy 
focuses on remedying this lack of knowledge.
167
 As noted by an interviewee: 
these guys [entrepreneurs] leave university thinking that they have a brilliant 
idea, and they may have a technological insight, but they have no idea on 
how to put their ideas into practice, they have no idea of what a business 
plan comprises of, they do not know who their consumers are. So the 
[Softex Incubator] makes the bridge between the ‘good idea’ and how to 
make it feasible. (Campinas fieldwork organisational interview)  
In the 2000s, innovation became an increasingly important institutional issue in 
Campinas. In 2001 Unicamp created its own incubator, Incamp, which is located on 
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 Campinas interview number 17. 
166
 Campinas interviews number 7 and 20. 
167
 Campinas interviews number 12, 20, 22,.35 and 44. 
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Unicamp’s campus and hosts high-technology start-ups, including those involved in 
software entrepreneurship (in most cases related to hardware development; an 
interviewee told us: ‘we are particularly interested if the start-up produces embedded 
software’, Campinas fieldwork organisational interview). However, as already noted, 
there are very few software start-ups in Incamp because most are referred to the 
Softex Campinas Incubator.
168
 Like the other two incubators in the region (Ciatec 
and Softex Campinas), Incamp offers start-ups subsidised office facilities and 
infrastructure as well as business related consultancy. Also, and perhaps more 
important, there are indications that Incamp incubator firms have a good reputation 
among customers in terms of reliability and easier access to Unicamp faculty 
members.
169
 IC-Unicamp historically was known for being conservative in its 
creation of formal ties with private industry; being based at Incamp is an asset for the 
incubated firms because Incamp acts as an informal broker between the firms and 
Unicamp’s faculty members.170 
In 2003, Unicamp founded the Unicamp Innovation Agency (Inova), which was an 
acknowledgement on the part of the university of the importance of innovation for 
the economy. Inova incorporated Incamp in 2009, based at the Agency’s facilities 
under its administration. Inova is responsible for several related activities; i) it serves 
as Unicamp’s intellectual property rights (IPR) and technology transfer office to 
handle the knowledge produced by Unicamp; ii) it provides training in strategy and 
management for the Technological Innovation Nucleus (NIT) established in other 
technological and scientific institutions (e.g. in other universities); and iii) it 
promotes and coordinates Unicamp’s external relationships.171 In relation to 
software, Inova manages two specific initiatives.  
In the early 2000s, Inova set up InovaSoft, a centre to support innovation in software 
through interactions among academia, and the private and public sectors. Private 
firms’ proposals to InovaSoft must include at least one faculty member from 
Unicamp and provide scholarships for Unicamp students. Although initially there 
were no facilities at Unicamp for these granted firms, Inova renovated an old 
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 Campinas fieldwork incubator interview. 
169
 Firms 6 and 18 mentioned that a Unicamp address on their business cards gave a good impression 
to prospective customers. 
170
 Campinas interviews number 3, 14, 21 and 24.  
171
 http://www.inova.unicamp.br/paginas/visualiza_conteudo.php?conteudo=2, accessed 19 November 
2010. 
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Unicamp building and in June 2009 this building housed four software firms (two 
MNCs and two local firms). At the time of the data collection this initiative was very 
recent; thus, consistent results with regard to the success or failure of the initiative 
could not be drawn.
172
  
Inova also supports ‘Unicamp Ventures’, an informal and virtual network created in 
2006. Eligible affiliates of Unicamp Ventures must have had a formal link with 
Unicamp, through employment, study or through Incamp. The network aims to 
promote virtual interaction among associated firms, to support learning-by-
interacting among its associates in relation to a range of issues including venture 
capital, public grant proposals and interactions with university.
173
 In June 2009 about 
70% of Unicamp Ventures firms were IT related, and entrepreneurs’ former linkages 
with Unicamp related mostly to IC-Unicamp.
174
 Unicamp Ventures is an informal 
network built on the common experience of network members (Powell and Grodal, 
2005), and, according to interviewees, has become an important intangible regional 
asset.
175
 According to interviewees, Campinas local entrepreneurs feel they can rely 
on one another and share business experiences and activities, which requires a level 
of trust supported by a common understanding and feeling of belonging to a 
community in which collective identity plays a crucial role.  
Another example of Unicamp’s indirect but strong influence on the community of 
local ICT firms is the ActMinds export consortium. The consortium was initially set 
up in 2004 by 10 ICT firms (9 from Campinas). The consortium is managed by 
Softex Campinas and co-financed by the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion 
Agency (APEX). An interesting feature of ActMinds is that most of its entrepreneurs 
previously studied at IC-Unicamp, which according to an interviewee is one of the 
main reasons for its success:  
the ‘embryo’ of ActMinds holds to friendship among the entrepreneurs. 
Many have studied at IC-Unicamp, they shared flats, or studied together. 
This became very important, because they feel that can trust each other, are 
part of the same community. (Campinas fieldwork organisational interview) 
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 Campinas fieldwork organisational interview.  
173
 http://www.inova.unicamp.br/paginas/visualiza_conteudo.php?conteudo=131, accessed 15 January 
2010. 
174
 Source: confidential list provided by Inova during data collection. 
175
 Campinas fieldwork interviews 11, 36 and 48. 
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This opinion is confirmed in Marinho and Simis (2007); their findings show that 
ActMinds entrepreneurs felt that were all part of the same community, which 
provided the required level of trust to initiate and implement the project. In relation 
to trust issues, the ActMinds executive-coordinator is a key person who facilitated 
the discussions pre-consortium formation and has contributed to its evolution. This 
executive-coordinator has a history of professional experience with the software 
industry; he has worked at the Softex National Office, was a local software 
entrepreneur and is a graduate of IC-Unicamp. However, all the firms involved in the 
consortium were positive and motivated (Marinho and Simis, 2007). Another benefit 
is the geographical proximity of firms, which confirms the claims that this leads to 
positive collective outcomes (as discussed by Cooke and de Laurentis, 2010). 
Although Unicamp has had a positive influence on the establishment of local 
software firms (e.g., through provision of training in Computing Science) and the 
interactions among local software entrepreneurs (through Unicamp Ventures and 
ActMinds), formal collaborations between Unicamp and local software firms has 
been less successful (see Chapter 6). This is because: i) the local industry has not 
engaged with scientific problems at the knowledge frontier (MIT-Softex, 2002; 
Roselino, 2006); ii) Unicamp historically benefited from public funding; for 
instance, Unicamp holds a significant share of FAPESP’s budget for research 
(FAPESP, 2009); and iii) Unicamp faculty members are assessed by CAPES based 
on numbers of publications in top indexed journals (which requires that academics 
perform high level research usually not related to the resolution of technological 
level practical problems). 
This discussion illustrates the implementation of initiatives to support the Campinas 
software industry at different levels (mainly state and federal) and the different 
organisations involved. Although these initiatives were not coordinated centrally but 
rather were a collection of individual initiatives, they fostered the creation of local 
software firms (see Section 4.2.4). 
4.2.4 The Campinas software firms and the main network actors  
According to National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE), which is 
coordinated by the National Classification Commission (CONCLA, IBGE), in 2009 
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there were 104 software firms based in Campinas. Table 4.1 summarises the number 
of firms and employees by industry category in CNAE.
176
 
Table 4.1 Campinas software firms by CNAE Classification (2009) 
Software related IT activities 
No. of 
firms 
(%) 
No. of 
employees 
(%) Average 
no. of 
employees  
Customised computer 
programme development  
47 45.2 478 32.4 10 
Development and licensing of 
customised computer  
8 7.7 108 7.3 14 
Development and licensing of 
non-customised computer  
30 28.8 589 39.9 20 
Consultancy in IT 19 18.3 301 20.4 16 
Total 104 100 1476 100 14.2 
Source: CNAE/ Comissão Nacional de Classificação, IBGE (2009). 
Table 4.1 shows that most Campinas software firms are involved in customised 
software and are micro or small firms; this is confirmed by the data collected during 
fieldwork (see Chapter 6). This is a common characteristic of the Brazilian software 
industry (see Duarte, 2003; Oliveira, 2008; Roselino, 2006; Britto and Stallivieri, 
2010; MIT-Softex, 2002; Veloso et al., 2003).  
Table 4.2 shows the large number of other network actors operating in the region 
related to the development of the Campinas local software industry. 
                                                 
176
 Box A1 (in the Appendix) provides a full description of the activities included in each CNAE 
category. 
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Table 4.2 Campinas network actors 
Actor 
Year of 
Foundation 
Main activities 
APEX-Brasil 1997 Promotion of Brazilian exports 
Campinas City 
Council 
n.a. Fiscal policies 
Ciatec 1991 
Manage the two Campinas High-Technology 
Parks 
Ciatec Incubator 1996 Incubation programme 
CNPq 1951 Brazilian Research Council 
CPqD 1976 R&D centre 
Criatec-Fund 2007 Venture capital fund/ BNDES and private sector 
CTI/CenPRA 1982 R&D centre  
FAPESP 1962 State level research foundation  
FINEP 1967 Brazilian Innovation Agency 
FITec-Campinas 2002 R&D centre (founded by MNC) 
Incamp 2001 Incubation programme 
Inova Soft 2003 Inova Centre for Information Technology 
Inova Unicamp 2003 Unicamp Innovation Agency 
Instituto Eldorado 1997 R&D centre (founded by MNC) 
Prosoft-BNDES 1999 BNDES programme for software 
PUC-CAMP n.a. Training in IT undergraduate. 
Sebrae-SP 1972 Support for micro and small entrepreneurships 
Secretary for 
Development/SP 
1965 
Promote sustainable economic growth and 
technological innovation in the São Paulo State. 
SIDI  R&D centre (founded by MNC) 
Softex Campinas 1993 Fostering and support local software industry. 
Softex Campinas 
Incubator 
1995 Incubator programme: software only 
Unicamp-FEEC 1967 
Training in IT undergraduate, Master’s, 
professional Master’s, Doctorate and Post-
Doctorate 
Unicamp-IC 
 
1969 
Training in IT undergraduate, Master’s, 
professional Master’s, Doctorate and Post-
Doctorate 
Venturus  1995 R&D centre (founded by MNC) 
Legend: 
n.a. = not available 
Source: own elaboration from organisations’ websites and literature review. 
4.2.5 Summary 
This section discussed the emergence and recent development of the Campinas 
software network. The region received considerable investment related to the IT 
industry from the private (e.g. establishment of private non-profit R&D centres) and 
public (e.g. the investment of FAPESP by the state government, and CPqD and 
CTI/CenPRA by the federal government) sectors. The Campinas software industry 
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has built an excellent reputation in the national market, which influenced its 
development by attracting well established firms and organisations. The region has 
benefited from its long ICT history, which has supported a virtuous growth cycle for 
local software firms.  
4.3 The Recife Software Network History 
The software industry is relatively recent in the Recife region. It began in the 1980s 
and benefited from the establishment of the Softex Agent in 1992, the creation of the 
private non-profit Recife Center for Advanced Studies and Systems (CESAR) in 
1996 and from the Pernambuco state government intervention that resulted in the 
creation of Porto Digital in 2000. This section discusses the infancy of the Recife 
software network, its evolution and the profiles of the software firms established in 
the region in 2009. Sections 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 examine the promotion of the IT 
industry and the emergence of the regional software network. Section 4.3.3 addresses 
recent initiatives to support the development of the Recife software network, 
including the organisations in the region; Section 4.3.4 introduces the firms in the 
region.   
4.3.1 The infancy of the Recife ICT network  
The Recife IT industry began in the 1960s when IBM established an IT centre in 
Recife that employed personnel skilled in computing and engaged mainly with the 
regional banking system, in particular the Banco Nacional do Norte (Banorte), a 
private bank that was the first banking organisation to introduce intranet to support 
banking operations in Brazil, using IBM equipment.
177
 Another organisation that 
played an important role in the development of IT activities in the region is Bom 
Preço, a large supermarket chain, initially owned by a north-eastern Brazilian 
business group, which also employed IT professionals.   
In Chapter 3 we show that until the early 1990s it was common for large 
organisations of develop IT related activities internally. Banorte and Bom Preço 
played a major role in IT industry development in Recife.
178
 Both organisations were 
involved in IT development in Recife and provided sophisticated IT services and 
                                                 
177 Recife interview number 21 and 
http://www.elogica.com/main/portal/clipping/jornalCommercio/2007-09-27jc.html, accessed 10 
January 2010. 
178
 Recife interviews number 18 and 21. 
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products. In 1987, Bom Preço was the first supermarket in Brazil to offer automated 
Points of Sale and use optical scanners.
179
 By the mid-1980s, Banorte and Bom 
Preço employed together about 600 highly skilled IT personnel and the region’s IT 
industry was prospering.
180
 In 1974 Pernambuco Federal University (UFPE) began to 
offer a degree in computing science from the Physics Institute; in 2009 training in 
computing science is offered by the Informatics Centre (Cin-UFPE).
181
 The offer of a 
Computing Science degree by a federal university demonstrates the Brazilian 
national government’s support in the form of funding the provision of well qualified 
IT human resources for the region. The role of Cin-UFPE has been crucial for the 
Recife software network.  
In 1986, Cin-UFPE decided to modify its undergraduate Computing Science degree 
syllabus because it realised that students needed some training in entrepreneurship in 
order to foster the creation of local IT firms (Oliveira, 2008).
182
 The new syllabus 
differed in two ways: i) it included issues related to market demand; and ii) it 
included academic training in entrepreneurship. It was believed that this would help 
to redress the imbalance between supply and demand of specialised knowledge, a 
common dysfunction in the Brazilian system of innovation (see Chapter 3). The 
decision to rewrite the syllabus coincided with an internal assessment that the 
department was lagging scientifically, behind national and international computing 
science centres: 
when [one of the faculty members] came back from [his] PhD in England 
[by the mid 1980s], [he] realised how far behind [the department] was in 
terms of equipment and technology. To give an example, the equipment we 
[the department] were using in the labs here [Cin-UFPE] had been replaced 
in the lab [he] worked for [his] PhD in England for more than ten years. So 
[he] thought that something had to be done about it, otherwise [the 
department] would be a peripheral university centre forever, it was an ‘all or 
nothing’ situation. So [the department] decided to change [its] 
undergraduate syllabus and send its [Cin-UFPE] faculty to be trained abroad 
for Masters and PhD degrees. We [Cin-UFPE] estimated that in 15 years the 
centre would be internationally recognised as an important research 
university department, which was achieved much earlier than that. (Recife 
fieldwork university interview)  
                                                 
179
 http://www.comunique-
se.com.br/produtos/saladeimprensa/walmart1/show.asp?_mat=21755&_ed=696&_tar=S&_sec=ii4, 
accessed 10 January 2010. 
180
 Recife interviews number 2, 12, 13 and 21. 
181
 The name of the centre has changed several times; here we refer to it as Cin-UFPE throughout. See 
Oliveira (2008) for a chronology of the changes. 
182
 Recife interviews number 10, 12 and 25. 
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Although Cin-UFPE is part of the federal university system, the above interview 
extract suggests that there was a bottom-up initiative promoted by the local research 
university to foster a change in the region’s peripheral scientific development in 
computing science (in the form specifically of policies to support the emergence or 
improvement of institutions developing any kind of scientific or technological 
activities – see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2).  
In addition to the changes in Cin-UFPE, in 1989 an important policy was 
implemented at state level to create the Pernambuco State Research Foundation 
(FACEPE). FACEPE’s main mission in 2009 was to foster scientific and 
technological development in Pernambuco State by providing support for science, 
technology and innovation.
183
 FACEPE offers scholarships for higher education 
training at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, and awards grants for research 
projects by university researchers as well as research performed in private-sector 
firms.
184
  
As a result of Cin-UFPE’s efforts, by the mid 1990's the majority of Cin-UFPE 
faculty members had been trained abroad to doctorate level, which improved the 
institution’s scientific reputation.185 Graduates began to enter the national labour 
market.
186
 Cin-UFPE graduates were attracted to other regions (especially the 
Southeast region) because of the lack of IT positions locally. In the 1990s Banorte 
went bankrupt and Bom Preço was sold to an international food chain.
187
 This 
greatly reduced the opportunities in Recife and most IT activities were transferred to 
the Southeast Brazilian region or went abroad (as in the case of Bom Preço), or 
ceased (as in the case of Banorte). Highly trained Cin-UFPE graduates had no 
                                                 
183
 http://www.facepe.br/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1, last accessed 19 March 
2011. 
184
 FACEPE played a very important role for the evolution of the Recife software network, as we will 
discuss in Section 4.3.3 below. 
185
 Recife interviews numbers 12 and 25. In addition, Cin-UFPE was assessed by CAPES 
postgraduate degree assessment exercise for the 3 years 2007-2009, and received grade 6 (this was 
matched by only two other computing sciences departments in Brazil, out of 53). Grade 6 is one 
below the highest level of grade 7 which is equivalent to international standards (only 2 other 
Brazilian computing sciences departments were assessed as 7) (CAPES, 2010).  
186
 According to this interviewee Cin-UFPE invested in the Java language from the start although 
other Brazilian university centres did not. As a result, when the private market needed skilled java 
trained human resources, Cin-UFPE’s graduates were well positioned in the labour market. Recife 
fieldwork university interview and Oliveira (2008: 146). 
187
 In 2009 the chain was owned by Wal-Mart. 
  
115 
opportunities locally to use and develop their skills, and looked for job opportunities 
outside Recife.
188
  
In addition, most large IT firms (including MNCs) were in the Southeast region. 
Recife IT trained human resources were attracted by the higher wages and good 
working conditions and more advanced technological activities than were available 
in Recife.
189
 The migration of Cin-UFPE graduates to other regions represented a 
brain drain for Recife and Pernambuco State: 
what happened was that the labour force trained by Cin-UFPE was 
extremely skilled in IT and the local demand for IT development was very 
simple. Then what could students who were graduating from Cin-UFPE do? 
The only option was to leave Recife, and so they did. In 1993, Microsoft 
created a temporary bureau at Cin-UFPE to hire recent graduate students; it 
represented a clear brain drain for the region. (Recife fieldwork interview 
number 21) 
Another local initiative to create a local software industry in Recife was the Softex 
Programme implemented by the Brazilian Federal government (see Chapter 3), and 
the establishment of the Recife Softex Nucleus (in 2009 Softex-Recife). The Softex 
programme aimed to support software exporting firms and was established at the 
time when Banorte and Bom Preço employees were made redundant. The Softex 
Recife programme supported the creation of some new firms set up by former 
Banorte and Bom Preço employees and the re-establishment of the Recife software 
industry. The importance of SoftexRecife is summarised by an interviewee as 
follows: 
Softex-Recife provided the minimal institutional infrastructure to firms that 
were founded by Banorte's former employees. When Softex-Recife was 
established there were 16 IT firms in Recife and among those 12 were 
founded by Banorte former employees. (Recife fieldwork organisational 
interview)  
The evolution of the Recife software network experienced a major shift in the mid 
1990s with the creation of the Recife Center for Advanced Studies and Systems 
(CESAR), a private non-profit innovation centre that performs IT research and 
development (see Section 4.3.2). 
                                                 
188
 Recife fieldwork interviews numbers 1, 10, 12, 13, 21 and 25. 
189
 Recife interviews numbers 9, 10, 12, 13, 21 and 32. 
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4.3.2 Evolution of the Recife ICT network: Emergence of the software network 
The migration of highly skilled IT human resources from Recife to other regions was 
seen as a setback in the efforts of Cin-UFPE to promote the local software network 
by increasing the supply of highly skilled IT personnel. Also, entrepreneurship 
among Cin-UFPE graduates was not as high as expected. These phenomena 
triggered the creation of CESAR in 1996 by a group of Cin-UFPE faculty members. 
In its first years, CESAR’s headquarters were located next to Cin-UFPE (on the 
university campus). 
CESAR was founded to offer high quality employment for Cin-UFPE graduates. A 
unique characteristic of CESAR was its foundation by a university group; other 
R&D organisations founded in Brazil (and in the region at a later date) were private 
sector initiatives (see Chapter 3). CESAR provided a strong link between Cin-UFPE 
and the private sector, as noted by an interviewee: 
the group within Cin-UFPE that believed in a closer relationship with the 
private sector was the leading group in the organisation at that time, and 
because of this leadership the group managed to break the university 
[UFPE] institutional ties, which were quite weak (…) The university had no 
idea what we [Cin-UFPE] were doing when we founded CESAR, and when 
the university administration realised that something was going on, we [Cin-
UFPE] were already concluding the construction of the building that hosted 
CESAR, and there was no way back by then. Moreover, there was nobody 
in UFPE that could assess what we [Cin-UFPE] were doing. Nobody in 
UFPE understood innovation at that time, so they just let us to continue with 
the initiative. Somehow they [UFPE central administration] trusted that we 
[Cin-UFPE] were doing the right thing. And that would never happen, for 
example, at Unicamp. For sure Unicamp would had had formed committee 
to discuss the relevance of an initiative like CESAR’s, and they [committee] 
would take a century to agree on a decision. Unicamp’s institutional 
framework is far more ‘rigid’ than in UFPE, and the experience we lived in 
creating CESAR is unthinkable in their [Unicamp] context. (Recife 
fieldwork university interview) 
CESAR has become a leading Brazilian IT R&D centre.
190
 The centre has grown 
considerably and in 2008 employed 672 staff, 69% of whom were engaged in IT 
development activities (Ritz, 2008: 126). CESAR’s portfolio of initiatives has 
increased to support consolidation of the Recife software industry.
191
 For instance, 
the centre offers an incubator programme and has an education division, 
                                                 
190
 In 2004 CESAR won the Finep Prize in the best Innovation Institution award category. 
http://www2.finep.gov.br/premio/index.php?pg=historico, accessed 19 March 2011. In 2010 CESAR 
won the Finep Prize in the best Science and Technology Institute award category. 
http://www.cesar.org.br/site/c-e-s-a-r-vence-premio-finep/, accessed 19 March 2011. 
191
 Recife fieldwork interview number 12. 
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CESAR.edu, which offers a professional Masters Degree in Software Engineering, 
and continuing education courses in IT related areas. CESAR.edu was set up initially 
to supply the local skilled labour force and was a kind of bottom-up arrangement to 
support organisations that were developing any kind of scientific or technological 
activities (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). CESAR has a division that supports local 
investment through partnerships, CESAR.par, mostly with former and current 
incubator firms. 
The establishment of the Softex-Recife office represented a major step towards the 
creation of a local software industry in Recife, and occurred almost simultaneously 
with the changes at Cin-UFPE and the creation of CESAR. However, the most 
important recent investment to consolidate the local industry was the creation of 
Porto Digital by the State Government of Pernambuco. 
The Porto Digital initiative was financed by the Pernambuco Secretary of Science 
and Technology and the Environment (SECTMA) in 2000 and implemented by the 
Porto Digital Management Unit (NGPD) in the same year. Porto Digital is a 
restricted geographic area on Recife Island, part of Recife city, which hosts software 
firms and other IT related organisations (see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Recife Island 
 
Note: Porto Digital occupies 60% of Recife Island, the remaining 40% of the Island area belongs to 
the Brazilian Marine Force. 
Source: http://recifeguide.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/recife-antigo-aerial-view.jpg, accessed 9 
March 2010.  
Porto Digital 
  
118 
The choice of the Recife Island to host Porto Digital was related in part to the 
economic decline in Pernambuco State, which for some 400 years had relied on 
sugar cane production to sustain its economic development (Oliveira, 2008: 69). At 
the end of the 1990s, SECTMA considered that Pernambuco State needed to 
formulate and implement a new technology policy that would support the economic 
development of different regions within the state in the following decades.  
The policy focused on the formation of regional clusters within the state, with the 
choice of industry to be supported by each cluster based on the advantages of each 
region (SECTMA, 2006: 82-83).
192
 By the late 1990s Recife Island Port had lost its 
economic vitality, which had been based on exporting locally produced sugar cane. It 
had been overtaken by the new Suape Port Complex.
193
 SECTMA did not see that 
the Recife Island port was viable. An IT cluster, a knowledge intensive industry, 
would not need the services of a port, and it was believed, would restore the Island’s 
economic dynamism (da Silva, 2008: 3).
194
 Porto Digital saw a concentrated 
geographic area as an asset and believed it would foster and support networking 
among software firms and with other IT organisations: 
delimiting the territory is one of the reasons that explain the success of the 
Porto Digital strategy (…) we [policy makers] followed a local system of 
innovation approach, we [policy makers] knew how important the 
interaction would be for the development of the local industry, we wanted 
people to be in contact with one another, sharing their experiences, getting 
to know one another, to build trust between firms. The location is extremely 
important for the governance of the network. Today [April 2009] firms’ 
entrepreneurs and employees bump into one another because the 
geographical area is very delimited, they meet by chance at lunch time, they 
all go to lunch at 12pm at the Paço Alfângeda [local shopping centre], and 
lots of experience are informally shared during these occasions. And if there 
is disagreement between these people, lots of it gets cleared during informal 
gatherings. (Recife fieldwork organisational interview). 
The technology policy implemented by SECTMA through the Porto Digital project 
had government level involvement and also input from Cin-UFPE, Softex-Recife, 
the Brazilian Association for Information Technology Firms Pernmabuco Office 
                                                 
192
 Recife interviews number 9. 
193
 Suape Port is also in Pernambuco State, but in a different region. Suape has been the main port in 
the Northeast region since the late 1990s.  
http://www.suape.pe.gov.br/institutional/historic.php, accessed 19 March 2011. 
194
 Recife 2000 HDI was 0.78, the 28
th
 in Brazil (the study measured 33 cities/regions, therefore 
Recife presented a score in the lower end of the sample) 
http://www.pnud.org.br/atlas/ranking/RM_Ranking.doc. According to Waiselfisz (2008) Recife was 
in 2006 the 3
rd
 Brazilian city in the total numbers of homicides, which ranks the city as one of the 
most violent capitals in Brazil.  
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(Assespro) and CESAR.
195
 According to interviewees, this added to the success of 
the project, because different sectors of society were cooperating in project 
implementation and development, allowing different demands to be 
accommodated.
196
 There have been four stages in the development of Porto Digital 
(da Silva, 2008; Marinho, 2008) (see Section 4.3.3). 
4.3.3 Initiatives to support Recife regional development and the local software 
industry 
The first stage in Porto Digital’s development was its formal creation and choice of 
governance model, described by da Silva (2008) as the ‘Existence Stage’.197 
SECTMA wanted political independence for the Porto Digital project and a new 
governance model organised by a new management unit, NGPD, a Social 
Organisation.
198
  NGPD was given responsibility for managing the public financial 
resources directed to Porto Digital development, formulating and implementing 
future policies for the local software industry, and supervising governance of the 
network.
199
 SECTMA delegated its responsibilities as policy formulator to NGPD, 
but still provided the majority of the financial resources for Porto Digital 
development through a management contract with NGPD.  
In 2000, SECTMA committed about US$18M to Porto Digital, to be managed by 
NGPD.
200
 This sum included a building on Recife Island whose space could be 
leased by software firms, which was suppose to provide NGPD with financial 
independence in the future. The management contract held by NGPD stated that 
SECTMA would continue to provide financial support to NGPD, however, no 
figures were agreed at the outset and this issue later became contentious.   
                                                 
195
 Recife interviews number 9, 10, 12, 13, 21, 25 and 32.  
196
 According to the interviewees, the successful engagement of the state government, academia (Cin-
UFPE) and industry (Softex-Recife and Assespro-PE) related to trust based, long term personal 
relationships between the representatives of those institutions. Recife interviews number 9 and 10. 
197
 Recife fieldwork organisational interview. 
198
 The new governance model was supposed to avoid the problems common in Brazilian government 
policy programmes of discontinuity due to political changes, as discussed by Velho and Saenz (2002). 
The problem of local policy programme discontinuity was mentioned by several interviewees. Recife 
interviews numbers 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 26, and 28. 
199
 NGPD Council has 17 seats to allow representation from different parts of society, including the 
private sector, local and state government, and the universities: ‘37% government representatives, 
21% from the productive sector, 11% from universities, 16% from non-governmental organisations, 
and 16% from other groups of society’, www.portodigital.org, accessed 2 December 2009.  
200
 Exchange rate uses the Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil) conversion rate available 
at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp, accessed 18 November 2010. 
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During this first stage, FACEPE played an important role by providing scholarships 
for human resources training and grants for training in IT related subjects (FACEPE, 
2006). The Human Capital Fund (FCH) co-financed the development of ICT 
professionals for companies based in Porto Digital (da Silva, 2008: 9-10).
201
 In 
addition, there were several government incentives to attract software firms to Recife 
Island. These included: i) assistance over land use conditions imposed by the Recife 
City Council administration with regard to historic buildings restoration; ii) 
reduction of up to 60% of Service Taxation imposed by Recife City Council (from 
the city council administration); iii) reduction from 17% to 1% in Taxation on Goods 
and Services to software firms (from the State of Pernambuco administration); and 
iv) a Loan Guarantee Fund: the Guarantee Fund for Software Companies in 
Pernambuco (FAESPE) which provided funds to guarantee loans to ICT companies 
from public banks (State Act No 11.634, 1999 and amended by Act 11.732, 1999) 
(da Silva, 2008). The range of incentives and the diversity of actors indicate there 
was coordination at different government levels to support the Porto Digital project. 
In 2002, that is, during Porto Digital’s first stage, CESAR moved from the UFPE 
Campus to Porto Digital, which represented a major positive shift for the network.
202
 
As already discussed, CESAR has become one of the leading IT research 
organisations in Brazil and became the anchor for the network. The Centre brings 
reputation to the region, and local firms benefit from being part of its network.  
The second stage of Porto Digital started in 2003; the aim was to promote the region 
and consolidate the ‘brand’ (Marinho, 2008).203 In this stage, NGPD appointed a new 
director-president (the second since its foundation) whose strong experience in the 
private sector made him extremely suitable to manage this new phase in Porto 
Digital.
204
 One of the objectives was to foster interaction and collaboration among 
firms and other institutions in Porto Digital (da Silva, 2008: 6).  
                                                 
201
 FACEPE’s investments are discussed in more detail below. 
202
 The original Porto Digital project aimed to bring Cin-UFPE to Recife Island, so that academic 
sector would be geographically close to software firms. However, there was lack of agreement among 
Cin-UFPE faculty members to Cin-UFPE’s being based elsewhere than on UFPE campus. CESAR 
decided to move to Porto Digital. Recife interviews numbers 9, 10 and 12. 
203
 Recife interviews numbers 9 and 13. 
204
 The new director-president had previously been CEO of the Brazilian subsidiary of a multinational 
mobile network firm. 
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FACEPE continued to play a significant role in supporting Porto Digital’s 
development, through scholarships and ‘other funding channels’.205 FACEPE 
increased its investment in science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) related subjects using Pernambuco State Treasury resources. For instance, 
‘other funding channels’ (than scholarships) increased fivefold in 2000 and 2002, 
making them six times higher than investments in Human and Social Sciences 
(FACEPE, 2006).
206
 As mentioned above, most of FACEPE’s investments were 
related to Human Capital Fund projects, set up by the State Government Executive 
Division to support the training of human resources in IT, especially in management, 
development, and product and process operations (FACEPE, 2006: 11). With regard 
to FACEPE’s investments through scholarships, there was a steady increase in the 
financing of STEM subjects, which resulted in a better balance with other knowledge 
areas  (FACEPE, 2006).  
During this stage, government procurement played an important role in the 
development of local firms. According to Almeida (2008: 49), from 2003, the state 
government started to procure from local software firms, which changed the pattern, 
of software provision based on firms in other regions.  
The third stage of Porto Digital started in 2006, and was aimed at strengthening 
Porto Digital software firms’ competitiveness (Marinho, 2008).207 The major change 
during this stage was the considerable decrease in SECTMA’s financial support for 
Porto Digital. This required a new strategic plan for Porto Digital development,
208
 
which was designed by a local consultancy firm (WIT, 2005).
209
 The plan comprised 
eight strategies and 86 goals. Table 4.3 presents the eight strategies, a summary of 
the actions and means to achieve the 86 goals. 
                                                 
205
 ‘Other funding channels’ refer to: i) participation in conferences and seminar in Brazil and abroad; 
ii) research proposals; iii) visiting scholars; iv) scientific meetings and training; v) researcher training; 
and vi) technical research training. Scholarships refer to: i) technical cooperation; ii) science and 
technology diffusion; iii) master’s and doctorate; iv) researcher and technician placements; v) 
academic incentives; vi) scientific projects for undergraduate students; vii) technological incentives; 
viii) visiting scholars; and ix) technical training (FACEPE, 2006).  
206
 FACEPE stopped releasing information on its investments in 2005; there are no figures available 
to compare investment in STEM subjects in 2009.  
207
 During this stage a third NGPD director-president was appointed. According to an interviewee, 
each director-president had different skills that suited the needs of each of Porto Digital’s 
development stage. Recife fieldwork organisational interviews. 
208
 Recife interviews numbers 13 and 21.  
209
 These strategies were devised in consultation with experts from different areas, including firms 
based in Porto Digital and outside, local organisations (such as Softex-Recife, ASSESPRO, CESAR, 
and Sebrae), government bodies, and local universities. Non-local organisations, such as ECLAC and 
Softex National, were also consulted (WIT, 2006); Recife fieldwork organisational interview. 
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Table 4.3 Strategies for Porto Digital development from 2006 to 2009 
Strategies Actions needed Necessary steps/means 
1. Increase the number of software firms 
at Porto Digital 
 Improve urban public services and infrastructure 
 More fiscal incentives for firms 
 Increase the offer of office spaces and other services (e.g. 
leisure, cultural events) 
 Marketing policies implementation 
 Creation and maintenance of knowledge basis 
 Conclusion of ITBC building 
 Articulation with government 
 Articulation with non software firms that are based 
at Porto Digital 
 Articulation among software firms based at Porto 
Digital 
2. Strengthening of local software firms   Mobilization of private and institutional funding resources 
 Mobilization of human capital 
 Technological innovation/product improvement 
 Improvement of entrepreneurial management skills 
 Certification of firms with well reputed certification processes 
(e.g. CMMI) 
 Certification of people with specific technologies and tools 
 Offer of entrepreneurial support services  
 Articulation with venture capital firms 
 Articulation with government 
 Articulation with major market players 
 Articulation with higher education and training 
centres 
 Articulation with human capital funding agencies  
 Articulation among software firms based at Porto 
Digital 
3. Support new entrepreneurial 
investments 
 Define new models of entrepreneurial investments 
 Implementation of new models of entrepreneurial investments 
 
 Articulation with higher education and training 
centres, and with funding organisations that 
support new entrepreneurship (e.g. Sebrae, 
CNPq, ANPROTEC, FINEP, and FACEPE) 
 Interaction and partnership with C.E.S.A.R 
 Articulation with INCUBANET 
4. Implementation of policies directed at 
socio-economic responsibility and social 
inclusion  
 Offer of social services to local community 
 Promotion of policies for social inclusion 
 Creation of job opportunities for local population 
 Promotion of historical sites restoration and preservation  
 Articulation with local residents association, Non-
governmental organisations, public institutions 
and firms based at Porto Digital 
 
Legend: n.a.= not applicable 
Note: the 86 goals were not displayed in this table. 
Source: own elaboration based on WIT (2006). 
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Table 4.3 Strategies for Porto Digital development from 2006 to 2009 (continuation) 
Strategies Actions needed Necessary steps/means 
5. Conquer credibility (local and no 
local/ Porto Digital ‘brand’ 
strengthening) 
 Policy implementation for strengthening the Porto Digital brand 
with local firms as well as other markets 
 Implementation of marketing strategy for Porto Digital focusing 
on critical results and factors 
 Promotion of Porto Digital with local social divisions so that 
Porto Digital becomes a local asset for the city 
 Articulation with local press and specialized 
publication (local, national and international) 
 Articulation with business associations, unions, and 
local community 
 Articulation with firms based at Porto Digital and 
outsider firms 
6. Accessing new markets  Provision of market information and studies on the ICT value-
chain (supply and demand) 
 Modelling strategies for competitiveness improvement in 
national and international markets 
 Implementation of marketing strategies for strengthening Porto 
Digital brand focusing on critical results and factors (e.g. 
human capital and cooperation) 
 Get institutional support from funding organisations that 
promote business (e.g. Itamaraty and SEBRAE).  
 Articulation with local press and specialized 
publications (local, national and international) 
 
7. Business models for local IT industry  Mobilization of investors to make capital available to Porto 
Digital firms 
 Elaboration/implementation of strategies for merger and 
acquisition at Porto Digital 
 Improvement of governance strategies among Porto Digital 
software firms 
n.a  
8. Foster cooperation among firms  Promotion of cooperation among local software firms aiming 
operational costs reduction 
 Formation of alliances and partnerships among firms (local and 
no local) so that  business with bigger customers can be 
achieved 
 Dissemination of tools aiming interaction among firms, 
collaborators and customers (e.g. website, local newsletter, 
service portfolio). 
 Articulation among local software firms 
 
Legend: n.a.= not applicable 
*= the 86 goals were not displayed in the table. 
Source: own elaboration based on WIT (2006). 
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Some of the strategies in Table 4.3 suggest that NGDP needed to interact with 
outside organisations to get additional funding. From 2007, NGPD started to work 
on these strategies and the results are described in Porto Digital’s fourth stage. 
Table 4.4 summarises the success rate for each strategy in the period 2006-2009. 
Table 4.4 Porto Digital Strategies and Goals for 2006-2009 
Strategy Number of goals* Concluded** 
Partially 
implemented** 
Not 
implemented**  
Strategy 1  21 goals (24.4%) 15 (71.4%) 5 (23.8%) 1 (4.8%) 
Strategy 2  21 goals (24.4%) 12 (57.1%) 5 (23.8%) 4 (19.1%) 
Strategy 3  3 goals (3.5%) 2 (67%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 
Strategy 4  16 goals (18.6%) 8 (50%) 7 (43.8%) 1 (6.2%) 
Strategy 5  6 goals (7%) 4 (66.6%) 1 (16.7) 1 (16.7) 
Strategy 6  5 goals (5.8%) 3 (60%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 
Strategy 7  8 goals (9.3%) 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 4 (50%) 
Strategy 8  6 goals (7%) 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 
Total number of 
goals 
86 50 (58.1%) 24 (27.9%) 12 (14%) 
Legend:  
*= Percentage refers to the total number of goals  
 **= Percentage refers to the total number of goals in each strategy 
Strategy 1= attract more software firms to Porto Digital;  
Strategy 2= strengthen local software firms;  
Strategy 3= support new entrepreneurial investments;  
Strategy 4= implement policies related to social inclusion;  
Strategy 5= increase the network external credibility;  
Strategy 6= access new markets;  
Strategy 7= provide new business models for local firms;  
Strategy 8= foster cooperation among firms 
Source: own elaboration based in NGPD (2009b). 
 
Although this strategic plan was designed seven years after Porto Digital had been 
created, Table 4.4 shows that the strategies to increase of numbers of firms in Porto 
Digital (strategy 1) and to strengthen them (strategy two), were prioritised by the 
regional software industry. This suggests that regional industrial development is a 
long-term and gradual process, as discussed in Chapter 2, Sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
Locating Porto Digital on Recife Island was aimed to encourage collaboration among 
local firms and between local firms and other IT related organisations. The strategy 
designed to foster collaborations (strategy eight), was not a priority in terms of the 
number of goals, but was as successful as the more elaborate Strategies 1 and 2.   
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Table 4.4 shows that the goals to create a new business model for software firms 
based at Porto Digital (strategy seven) were the least successful (50% incomplete). 
These goals (new business model) included attracting investors to Porto Digital, 
which was implemented, and fostering alliances among Porto Digital firms to gain 
scale in terms of firm size, not implemented due to lack of funding (NGPD, 2009b).  
During 2009 Porto Digital embarked on its fourth development stage.
210
 In order to 
support the implementation of the strategies mentioned in Table 4.3 above, NGPD 
launched 16 projects and partnerships, with combined funding of US$9.1M, to be 
implemented in 2009-2012.
211
 Table 4.5 summarises the 16 projects, which 
correspond to the new policy implemented by NGPD for Porto Digital development. 
Table 4.5 shows that NGPD funding changed. Originally, NGPD was funded mostly 
by SECTMA through the management contract agreement (see Section 4.3.2).
212
 
This funding was largely withdrawn between 2008 and 2009.
213
 For instance, in 
Porto Digital’s total funding for the period 2000 to 2010, we find that SECTMA’s 
funding represented 37.8% of NGDP’s budget between 2000 and 2006, but only 
1.4% in 2007 to 2010.
214
 Table 4.5 shows that of the US$9.1M funding raised by 
NGPD, only 11.52% was from SECTMA (NGPD, 2009a).
215
   
 
                                                 
210
 NGPD appointed its 4
th
 director-president in 2007; he is still in charge in 2011. He was heavily 
involved in formulating the new strategies. Recife interviews numbers 9, 10, 13 and 21. 
211
 Exchange rate uses the Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil) conversion rate available 
at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp, accessed 18 November 2010. 
212
 Recife fieldwork organisational interviews; and Porto Digital (2003). 
213
 Recife fieldwork organisational interviews. 
214
 Personal communication with NGPD July 2011. 
215
 Exchange rate uses the Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil) conversion rate available 
at http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/conversao/conversao.asp, accessed 18 November 2010. 
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Table 4.5 Projects and partnerships for innovation at Porto Digital 
for the period 2009-2012 
Project/ Strategy % total 
budget* 
 
Funding sources / Project 
Partners 
Aims 
1. Firms Certification / 
 Strategy 2 
3.2% FINEP / FINEP and 
SECTMA 
Certify local firms in 
methodologies and 
development processes 
2. IT Human Capital Training /  
 Strategy 2 
5.9% MCT and SECTMA / 
MCT and SECTMA 
Improve local labour force in 
IT skills 
3. Technological Vocational Centre 
in IT / Strategy 2 and Strategy 4 
1.1% MCT / MCT and Softex-
Recife 
i) Structure human capital 
qualification; and  ii) digital 
literacy 
4. Zero Interest Rate  Programme / 
Strategy 2 
27.2% FINEP / FINEP, AD 
Diper, C.E.S.A.R and 
Softex-Recife 
Foster the development of local 
innovative micro and small 
firms  
5. ‘Banda Franca’ /  
Strategy 4 
2.2% ATI / ATI and Especial 
Secretary for the Youth 
and Employment 
Free broadband access 
(minimum 256 kbps) in Porto 
Digital. Foster the development 
of local firms in IT. 
6. Centre of Competitive Intelligence 
for Technological Parks /  
Strategy 6 
8.1% FINEP / SECTMA, 
FACEPE, ITEP and 
ParqTel 
Foster local IT competitiveness 
through sharing strategic 
information in the IT industry 
7. ‘Porto Desembarca’ /  
Strategy 5 
2.4% MCT and Sebrae-PE / 
MCT, SECTMA and 
Sebrae-PE 
Foster the development of other 
regions in Pernambuco through 
sharing Porto Digital’s 
knowledge and experience with 
other clusters 
8. Porto Digital Incubator /  
Strategy 3 
5.9% Finep and Sebrae-PE  Foster entrepreneurship in 
software development  
9. Management Contract with 
SECTMA / Strategy 1 
5.3% Finep, Sebrae-PE and 
SECTMA 
Improve office spaces 
availability 
10. Porto Digital Quality and Brand 
Programme /  
Strategy 6 
1% MCT / CNPq Register Porto Digital Brand at 
INPI, creating a Porto Digital 
Label. Support local firms 
credibility in the market 
11 Olympic Digital Games in 
Education / Strategy 8 
27% Pernambuco State 
Education Secretary / 
idem 
Use of digital games in state 
schools to promote educational 
disciplines through games. 
12. Social entrepreneurial 
responsibility / Strategy 4 
0.7% MCT / idem Promote social responsibility in 
local firms 
13. ‘E-lixo’ (E-waste) / Strategy 4 
and Strategy 5 
1.7% MCT / idem Map use of electronic 
equipment and its waste at Porto 
Digital. Foster local firms’  
environmental responsibility 
14. Porto Digital Institutional 
Promotion / Strategy 5 and Strategy 
6 
3.6% FINEP / FINEP and 
SECTMA 
Improve Porto Digital’s image 
in other Brazilian regions  
15. Porto Digital Press Award / 
 Strategy 5 
0.4% SECTMA / SECTMA 
and Pernambuco State 
Press Secretary 
Foster specialization of local 
press in IT related areas 
16. Future Projects /  
Strategy 2 and Strategy 5 
 
4.8% Not specified i) improve micro, small and 
medium firms management 
skills, ii) Software quality 
laboratory, iii) institutional 
strengthening of Porto Digital 
Legend: *= Total budget US$9.1M. 
Source: own elaboration from NGPD (2009b). 
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According to NGPD (2009b: 5), which provides an assessment of all actions that 
were implemented for each of the strategies presented in Table 4.3 (p. 123), NGPD 
had to postpone implementation of the Strategy Plan for six months due, among 
other reasons, to the need to seek replacement funding.
216
  
The official statement from the state government regarding SECTMA’s reduced 
financial support for Porto Digital was that: i) SECTMA had invested most of its 
budget in the software industry over the previous five years (2000-2005) and had 
neglected other industries; this situation needed to be reassessed; ii) Porto Digital 
had achieved a stage of maturity where it could manage without SECTMA’s 
financial support.
217
 However, political issues seem also to have played a role, as da 
Silva (2008: 7) highlights:  
The year 2006 was also marked by elections for the state government that, 
after eight years, was won by a political party from the opposition to the 
previous Government. For the first time since its creation, Porto Digital 
would have to negotiate state political support and investment with a 
government from the opposition.  
Hence, the initial intention to insulate the Porto Digital programme against political 
changes did not survive the election of a new government, which argued that 
conditions had changed and so had funding priorities. The changes in financial 
circumstances suggested that NGPD was not able to ring-fence public revenue 
sources, that is, it was not able to achieve political support across party lines as part 
of state industrial policy. Public stakeholders began to question whether the software 
industry should be prioritised in state industrial policy. Some held the view that the 
electronics industry should also be favoured.
218
  
Although the state government in power in 2009 claimed that Porto Digital had 
achieved maturity and should be financially independent of SECTMA funding, the 
reduction in funding to support the development of Porto Digital suggests a partial 
                                                 
216
 The other reasons for the delayed implementation of the Strategy Plan were: i) elaboration of a 
Strategic Plan for 2010-2020; and ii) late access to financial resources for implementation. 
217
 Recife fieldwork organisational interview. However, several interviewees claimed that SECTMA’s 
reduced financial support for Porto Digital was politically related (11 interviewees made this 
comment, but asked to remain anonymous). Interviewees claimed that the real reason for the decrease 
in SECTMA’s financial support was the change in the state government’s political party in the state 
government elections in 2006. They claimed that the new governor was from the opposition party and 
deliberately withdrew support from Porto Digital, because this was an initiative formulated and 
implemented during the previous administration.  
218
 Although the shift in the policy programmes of different political parties is a common 
characteristic of Brazilian public policy programmes, we find similar phenomena elsewhere – see 
Rhodes (2007) for the UK. 
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discontinuity in the original policy programme implemented in 2000, which is a 
problem common to policy programmes in Brazil as discussed by Velho and Saenz 
(2002).
219
 
Under the new state government administration (beginning in 2007) SECTMA has 
directed funding to Parqtel, an electro-electronics Technological Park that was 
created in the mid 1990s, but had been virtually abandoned for almost eight years.
220
 
In March 2008 SECTMA set up a budget of US$5.3M for Parqtel’s redevelopment, 
which was in addition to US$2M from FINEP (SECTMA negotiated this financial 
support with the Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology-MCT) for facilities 
buildings.
221
 These amounts are considerably higher than the US$1M that SECTMA 
set aside for Porto Digital for 2009-2012. 
Although SECTMA’s financial support has been reduced, there is some evidence 
that the state government has implemented policies to support the local software 
industry through government procurement.
222
 NGPD and Softex-Recife played 
important roles as mediators between state government and local software producers 
(see Chapter 6).  
It is difficult to conclude to what extent differences in the visions of the local 
political parties on strategic priorities in state level industrial policies, shifted the 
initial policy (i.e. creation of Porto Digital). This issue is beyond the scope of this 
thesis and is not discussed further. However, we can provide a general overview of 
the reasons that perhaps influenced government policy. Firstly, there were clear 
differences in the political parties’ industrial policy priorities. These differences are 
reflected by the actions of public organisations at both city and state levels, for 
instance in the provision and maintenance of the local infrastructure in Porto Digital. 
In addition, local stakeholders (e.g. NGPD) were not capable of negotiating 
continued investment. As a result, NGPD faced funding difficulties with the change 
in the state government administration in 2007, and had to find alternative funding 
                                                 
219
 See also Chapter 3 above. 
220
 Recife interviews numbers 1, 12, 14, 21, 30.  
221
 http://computerworld.uol.com.br/negocios/2008/03/10/parque-tecnologico-de-pernambuco-recebe-
r-20-66-milhoes-do-mct/, accessed 21 March 2010. 
222
 Recife interviews numbers 1, 8, 20 and 21. 
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sources.
223
 This caused delays and some cancellations of some of the strategies 
related to the 86 goals (NGPD, 2009b).  
The above discussion shows that technology policies to support the Recife software 
industry were implemented mainly at state level. However, the engagement of local 
organisations and local government was extremely relevant for the region’s IT 
industry catch-up to the national level. Several initiatives fostered the creation of 
local software firms (see Section 4.3.4). 
4.3.4 The Recife software firms and the main actors in the network 
According to National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) coordinated by 
the National Classification Commission (CONCLA, IBGE), in 2009 there were 103 
software firms based in Recife. Table 4.6 presents the numbers of firms and 
employees by CNAE categories.
224
 
Table 4.6 Recife software firms by CNAE Classification (2009) 
Software related IT activities 
No. of 
firms 
(%) 
No. of 
employees 
(%) Average 
no. of 
employees  
Customised computer program 
development  
26 25.2 701 27.2 27.0 
Development and licensing of 
customised computer  
13 12.6 293 11.4 22.5 
Development and licensing of 
non-customised computer  
19 18.4 202 7.8 10.6 
Consultancy in IT 45 43.7 1383 53.6 30.7 
Total 103 100 2579 100 25.0 
Legend: n.a.= not applicable. 
Source: CNAE/ Comissão Nacional de Classificação, IBGE (2009). 
 
Table 4.6 indicates that most Recife software firms developed consultancy software 
activities (including market development and software adaptation to user needs), 
which employ the majority of the local IT labour force, followed by customised 
computer program development (including Web design). Table 4.6 suggests also that 
most Recife software firms are micro or small firms, confirmed by the fieldwork data 
(see Chapter 7). As discussed in Section 4.2.4, this is a common characteristic of the 
Brazilian software industry. In addition to these local software firms, other network 
                                                 
223
 Recife fieldwork organisational interview. 
224
 Box A1 in the Appendix provides a full description of the activities included in each CNAE 
category. 
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actors were established in the region related to the development of the Recife local 
software industry (see Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 Recife network actors 
Actor Year of 
Foundation 
Main activity 
APEX-Brasil 1997 Promotion of Brazilian exports  
Assespro-PE 1976 Industry association  
CESAR 1996 Local R&D centre 
CESAR 
Incubator 
 Incubator programme  
CESAR.edu 2006 Training in IT- Master’s and continued education  
Cin-UFPE 1974 Training in IT undergraduate, Master’s, 
professional Master’s, Doctorate and Post-
Doctorate  
CNPq 1951 National research council 
Criatec-Fund 2007 Venture capital fund/ BNDES and private sector 
DEINFO-
UFRPE 
2005 Training in IT undergraduate  
DSC-UPE 2004 Training in IT undergraduate  
FACEPE 1989 State level research foundation 
FIEPE 1939 Pernambuco Industrial Association 
FINEP 1967 Brazilian Innovation Agency 
FITec-Recife 2002 R&D centre (founded by MNC) 
IEL-PE 
 
1969 Support the improvement of firms’ management 
skills and their entrepreneurial capabilities. 
Incubanet 2005 Incubator Association  
Incubatep 1990 Incubator programme 
INdT-Recife 2006 R&D centre (founded by MNC) 
ITEP 1945 Pernambuco Technological Institute/ State level 
NGPD 2000 Porto Digital Management Unit 
Recife City 
Council 
n.a. Fiscal incentives to software firms based in Porto 
Digital 
Recife-BEAT 1997 Pre-incubation programme/ Cin-UFPE 
Sebrae-PE 1972 Support for micro and small entrepreneurships 
SECTMA 1993 Foster scientific, technological and innovation 
development of Pernambuco 
Softex-Recife 1993 Fostering and support local software industry. 
UNICAP n.a. Training in IT undergraduate  
Legend: n.a. = not available 
Source: own elaboration from organisations’ websites and literature review. 
4.3.5 Summary 
This section discussed the emergence and evolution of the Recife software network. 
State government implemented a technology policy to foster the creation of new 
software firms as well as policies to foster collaboration among established firms to 
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strengthen local firms and increase their competitiveness. The Recife software 
industry has a good reputation in the Northeast region and nationally. CESAR has 
strengthened its reputation in Brazil and hence supported strengthening of the 
region’s reputation.  
4.4 Summary 
This chapter responds to the question raised in Chapter 2, Section 2.4 about existing 
examinations of network governance, which do not fully address the emergence and 
evolution of networks, leaving a gap in the study of network governance. 
Specifically, this chapter introduced and provided historical evidence on the structure 
of the two networks investigated in this thesis, Campinas and Recife, and examined 
regional historical events related to the emergence and development of their software 
industries. The Campinas region historically has benefited from the creation of 
important public and private IT organisations that have been crucial for the 
emergence and development of a local software industry. The region also benefited 
from its geographical location; Campinas is in the most dynamic economic region of 
Brazil, geographically close to the most dynamic market in the country, it has access 
to an advanced scientific system and a well developed infrastructure. Hence, the 
Campinas software industry attracts innovative organisations (national and 
multinational), which has established a virtuous economic cycle, benefiting the 
software industry development. 
The Recife software industry does not have similar advantages, especially in terms of 
national government technology policies related to funding for the emergence or 
improvement of institutions developing scientific or technological activities (Cin-
UFPE is an exception because it is part of a federal university). Recife is in the 
Northeast of Brazil, in a region that is economically lagging on most measures, is 
distant from the most dynamic demand markets in the country, has a diminished 
scientific system and an under-developed infrastructure compared to other Brazilian 
regions. However, since the mid 1990s a series of local initiatives at different 
government levels and from local organisations (mainly private but also non-profit 
organisations) have promoted the development of the Recife software industry. 
These initiatives show high levels of coordination, and have played an important role 
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in the development of the Recife software industry and increased its reputation at 
national level. 
Although the historical patterns of these two regions IT industries differ, we found 
similarities that suggest comparison between them would be fruitful. Firstly, each 
region hosts one public research university that supports the provision of high skilled 
human resources in the field of computing science, and both universities show 
similar academic performance. Secondly, the two regions have been involved in the 
Softex Programme. Thirdly, the number of local software firms in each region is 
similar. However, further investigation of the innovation activities of the firms in the 
two networks is required, in order to find differences and similarities between their 
activities and their technological capabilities in software development. Chapter 5 
describes the methodology used for this research to support the investigations of the 
Campinas and Recife networks of innovators in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.
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CHAPTER 5 - RESEARCH METHOD  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the research method used for this thesis. Chapter 2 showed 
that there is a number of issues that are rather overlooked by the literature. First, 
there is much less empirical evidence on multi-organisational interaction than on 
single organisations interactions despite the apparently increasing importance of 
larger networks of interacting firms (Provan and Kenis, 2008), in developed and 
developing countries (Bell and Albu, 1999). Also, studies of multi-organisational 
networks tend not to investigate the controlling mechanisms within multi-
organisational networks. Second, the literature does not provide consistent evidence 
on which types of conditions, specifically with regard to network governance and 
structure, are necessary to foster the formation of network ties that might be expected 
to have a positive effect on firm performance (Giuliani, 2010).  
The methodology described in this chapter is complemented by the empirical 
chapters (6 and 7), which operationalise and apply the core concepts (i.e. the 
connection between objects and modes of analysis). 
This chapter is organised in six sections. Section 5.2 re-introduces the overarching 
research questions and discusses how they are addressed using the comparative case 
study approach that is the main approach used in this thesis. Section 5.3 discusses the 
core concepts and introduces the analytical framework. Section 5.4 discusses the 
research strategy, justifying the choice of a multiple case study methodology and the 
units of analysis used. Section 5.5 describes the data collection and data analysis 
methods and Section 5.6 summarises the chapter.  
5.2 Research questions and the broad approach 
First we reintroduce the research questions developed in Chapter 2 (Section 5.2.1) 
and describe the bounded focus of the thesis (Section 5.2.2). 
5.2.1 Research questions 
This doctoral research is aimed at providing empirical evidence in order to elucidate 
two issues. The first is related to the formation of multi-organisational ties and why 
and how local firms in a developing country context, engage in networks. The 
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second relates to which types of conditions are necessary to foster the formation of 
ties that support positive firm performance in a developing country context, for 
instance, technological capabilities accumulation and innovation in firms. These 
conditions may relate to government intervention through the implementation of 
technology policy to support network formation, or to firms’ spontaneous decisions 
to interact with network actors. To address these issues the research questions are 
grouped into two sets, A and B, with two questions in each group.  
Research Questions Group A: 
Question A1 
In considering government technology policy to promote firm innovation through 
networks in a developing country context, do regional level network governance and 
structure influence policy effectiveness? If they do, what features of governance and 
structure should be taken into account in policymaking?  
Question A2 
What, if any, is the responsiveness of network governance and structure to 
technology policy aimed at the promotion of networks in a developing country 
context? Does government policy promotion of networks and efforts to control 
network structure increase the effectiveness of technology policy aimed at improving 
innovative performance in a developing country context? 
Research Questions Group B: 
Question B1 
Do network governance and structure have a consistent influence upon the 
innovative performance of developing country firms set up in regions with different 
socio-economic development indicators?  
Question B2 
In assessing the effectiveness of technology policy in developing countries, are there 
differences in policy effects when comparing advanced and relatively backward 
regions within a country? 
That networks are built or emerge in situated contexts in which path-rigidity and 
‘history’ matter is significant (see Chapter 2); we find that the research questions set 
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out above can be answered best by considering the accumulated evidence derived 
from specific cases. The collection of evidence must be based on in-depth and well 
documented cases. The need for detailed cases means that a single-investigator study 
cannot develop a large number of cases (see Section 5.4.2) within a limited 
timeframe (such as a period of DPhil study). We need, therefore, to choose 
comparable cases that can provide answers to specific research questions (see 
Section 5.4.2) and provide insights for the setting of priorities for future 
investigations. This thesis aims to provide evidence on the basis of which we can 
make claims that contribute to answering the research questions but not that the 
results necessarily are generalisable to other contexts. Nevertheless, we hope to 
contribute to the existing knowledge by addressing some shortcomings in the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and in the introduction to this chapter. On this basis, 
we re-formulate the research questions, as follows: 
Research Questions Group A: 
Research Question A1 
In considering government technology policy to promote firm innovation through 
networks in the case of the two Brazilian regions selected for analysis, how does 
regional level network governance and structure influence the effectiveness of 
policies supporting network creation in Brazil? 
Research Question A2 
What, if any, is the responsiveness of network governance and structure to 
technology policy aimed at the promotion of networks in Brazil? Does government 
policy promotion of networks and efforts to control network structure increase the 
effectiveness of technology policy aimed at improving the innovative performance of 
Brazilian software firms? 
Research Questions Group B: 
Research Question B1 
Do network governance and structure have a consistent influence upon the 
innovative performance of Brazilian software firms set up in the two regions selected 
for analysis?  
Research Question B2 
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In assessing the effectiveness of technology policy in Brazil, are there relative 
differences in policy effects when comparing the two Brazilian regions analysed? 
5.2.2 The bounded focus of the empirical research  
The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that the innovation systems in which firms 
are embedded are relevant to support sectors’, regions’ or countries’ socio-economic 
development (Asheim and Gertler, 2004; Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992b; Malerba, 
2004; Nelson, 1993). This is because firms are at the core of the innovation system, 
and if we consider that networks are a sub-set of systems, then firms are also at the 
core of innovation networks. It has been acknowledged that developing countries 
often have dysfunctional innovation systems in which missing or weak links among 
system components are frequent (Bell and Albu, 1999; Bell and Pavitt, 1993; 
Cassiolato and Lastres, 1999; Cassiolato et al., 2003; Cassiolato et al., 2008a; 
Chaminade and Vang, 2008; Dantas and Bell, 2009; Freeman, 2002; Padilla-Pérez et 
al., 2009; Steinmueller, 2001; Viotti, 2000). Therefore, a comprehensive 
understanding of how innovation networks emerge and function in developing 
countries is important. While acknowledging that the system’s components are 
important, this thesis focuses on firms, and on their interactions to support 
innovation.  
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Figure 5.1 Focus of the Thesis 
 
 
 
Source: own-elaboration, based on the literature review (Chapter 2 in this thesis), and adapted from de 
Campos (2006).  
Figure 5.1 shows that intra-firm interactions can be relevant for firms’ innovative 
performances; however, we focus in particular on the ties among firms, and between 
firms and other organisations in the innovation system. We focus only on ties created 
to support firm innovation. This focus on firms’ inter-organisational ties is based on 
the argument in innovation studies that learning by interaction is relevant for firms’ 
technological capabilities building and, therefore, their innovation skills. 
5.3 Core concepts and analytical framework 
The research questions introduced in Section 5.2 encompass the following key 
concepts: (i) technology policy, (ii) network governance and structure, and (ii) firm-
level innovation. Each concept is discussed below. 
Organisations that 
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Network governance 
and structure 
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research 
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(ii) Firm-level: Motive 
for external tie creation 
to support innovation  
(iii) Firm-level 
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(v) Feature and motive for 
intra-organisational ties 
creation 
iv) Corporate governance  
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5.3.1 Technology policy and regional network creation  
The literature review (Chapter 2) discussed the relevance of government intervention 
in the economy through the implementation of technology policy, based on the 
argument that technology is a partial public good. The thesis adopts the technology 
policy definition that: ‘policies… are intended to influence the decisions of firms to 
develop, commercialize or adopt new technologies’ (Mowery, 1995: 514). Therefore, 
technology policy covers a wide array of policy actions. Here, we focus on 
technology policies to foster or support the creation of networks. Chapter 2 (Section 
2.2.2) identified the main channels of government intervention to foster or support 
the formation of networks: i) specification and funding of the emergence of or 
improvement to organisations that develop any kind of S&T activity; ii) imposition 
of new regulation in order to improve the relation among actors and agents involved 
in technological activities and innovation; iii) investment in basic research, higher 
education, public procurement, subsidies and tax reductions (i.e. direct technology 
policies); iv) basic education and training standards, competition policy, and public 
investments (i.e. indirect technology policies). As discussed in Mowery (1995), his 
definition of technology policy particularly emphasises the intentionality of policy 
intervention; this is because other government policies, for example, macro-
economic policy, may also influence private sector investment in technology. This 
thesis refers only to explicit technology policies implemented by government and 
especially those related to network formation. In other words, it focuses on item ii) 
and those organisations related to network development in item i), and takes as 
background or context, issues in iii) and iv) in the above list. 
5.3.2 Network governance 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), network governance and structure are 
defined by the three network features of: i) network infancy and evolution; ii) 
controlling mechanisms within the network, and iii) dyadic ties among firms, and 
between firms and other network actors. These three features are analysed separately, 
to enable conclusions to be drawn about how each feature may be contributing to the 
observed nature and performance of networks.  
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5.3.2.1 Network infancy and evolution, and the four sub-networks 
Network infancy is related to how networks are formed, that is, if they are purposive 
(following government strategic intervention) or emergent (following spontaneous 
ties among network actors). This thesis investigates purposive networks and 
examines two regional networks that were strategically created by the Brazilian 
government in the early 1990s (see Chapter 3). The two networks were created 
within the same government programme and, therefore, followed the same initial 
institutional framework. Chapter 3 shows that the government programme for the 
creation of software networks in different Brazilian regions was inspired by the 
systems of innovation approach, and assumes that networked firms will be better 
supported in their innovation activities by ties among themselves or with other 
components of the innovation system, such as universities, research centres, 
supporting organisations and funding agencies.  
The networks investigated in this thesis were identified by a priori identification of 
organisations that are part (or should be part) of the network. Network actors were 
identified through public reports, academic studies and specialised press on the 
technology policies implemented in Brazil (Chapter 3) and in the two investigated 
networks (Chapter 4).
225
  
The network approach employed in this thesis considers innovations networks 
include the following organisations: Brazilian owned firms, suppliers, customers, 
public agencies, associations, universities, technical institutes, research foundations, 
laboratories, technology centres, public and private banking systems, and 
government (local and regional). We categorised these organisations into four sub-
networks: business, skills, technological and financial.
226
 The rationale for grouping 
the actors into these sub-networks follows the argument that innovation networks are 
a sub-set of systems of innovation. Hence, network actors that belong to the same 
‘group’ of components within the innovation systems have overlapping aims and can 
be grouped accordingly. 
                                                 
225
 Some firms were identified as network members through interviews, which helped the 
identification of networks, see Section 5.5.1. 
226
 The possibility was considered to include IT MNCs in the interview sample of business network 
agents if local firms identified them as collaborators. However, none of the Brazilian-owned software 
firms interviewed mentioned multinationals as collaborators for innovation so MNCs are not included 
in the interview sample.  
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The technology sub-network is composed of organisations that perform basic or 
applied R&D in IT areas, either for their own commercialization or as outsourced 
providers of services to IT firms. 
The skills sub-network is composed of organisations devoted to IT training at 
different levels, such as undergraduate, Masters, Doctoral, Post-Doctoral and 
continuing education, the research foundations that provide funding for training at 
different educational levels and the programmes that support R&D in firms 
(including the IT area of knowledge). 
The business sub-network is composed of organisations that support software firms 
by: i) networking with customers and other software development firms, ii) 
providing support for applications to public funding institutions, iii) consortium 
formation, iv) access to information on national and international markets, v) 
provision of facilities for software development (e.g. software testing laboratories) 
and training in relevant areas (e.g., ‘agile methodologies’ for software development), 
and vi) specific support for micro and small firms (including designing business 
plans, training in organisational matters and market entry). 
The financial sub-network is composed of private and public funding organisations 
and agencies. The former include the private banking system and venture capitalists. 
The latter are organisations and agencies that support firms and other network actors 
financially, to perform basic and applied research and innovation in the IT industry 
(although they may finance other areas than just IT). Financial support can be 
provided through loans, reimbursable grants, non-reimbursable grants, tax incentives 
and special programmes (e.g., funding for technological park creation), etc. 
Government bodies are included in the financial network, because government 
authorities can provide financial assistance to firms through one of the means 
mentioned above. Therefore, local and state governments are included in the 
financial sub-network, as well as government authorities operating at national level. 
5.3.2.2 Controlling mechanisms  
The investigation of controlling mechanisms allows the identification of brokered 
networks, shared-governance networks, and mixed governance networks. Brokers 
concentrate power within the network; however their engagement in the network 
through the creation of dyadic ties is not necessarily a pre-requisite (i.e. they can be 
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either internal or external to the networks). In shared-governance networks we find 
that power is spread among network participants, hence, these participants are 
engaged in the network through dyadic ties. In mixed governance networks we find 
that some actors are responsible for coordinating certain issues, others being 
collectively coordinated. Mixed governance networks suggest a higher probability of 
hierarchical arrangements within the network than in shared governance networks.  
Investigation of how controlling mechanisms are exercised within a network 
supports an understanding of whether coordination within the network is 
concentrated in a few actors, which has implications for the evolution of the network. 
The possibility of these actors withdrawing from the network at any time 
compromises its evolution. Also, as discussed in Chapter 2, the identification of 
heterarchical (shared-governance) or hierarchical (brokered) control in networks may 
support the formulation and implementation of technology policy aimed at creating 
or supporting network formation.  
5.3.2.3 Dyadic ties  
The investigation of dyadic ties supports an examination of network governance by 
providing evidence on: i) number of collaborating actors for each firm; ii) type of 
actors tied to firms; iii) frequency of collaboration with each actor; iv) tightness of 
the ties among actors; v) consistency between sub-networks; vi) level of openness of 
the network; and vii) the structure of the network. We discuss each of the indicators 
constructed to examine network governance. 
The number of ties created by each firm together with the types of actors involved 
shows the extent to which firms rely on internal or external support for innovation, 
and the type of external support they search for, that is, technological, scientific, 
business or financial. We examine the frequency of ties for support in terms of 
whether they are used on a ‘one-off’ or regular basis.  
The tightness of ties relates to the motivation for firms to create external formal ties 
with network actors and the frequency of ties. The composition of this indicator was 
inspired by the work of Granovetter (1973), who defines strong ties as direct, trust 
based, and long-term, and weak ties as indirect, more opportunity based and short-
term. The thesis analyses only direct ties, to investigate whether the creation of direct 
ties involves (mainly) the characteristics associated with strong or weak ties as 
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discussed by Granovetter. We define direct ties as tightly-connected ties, that is, ties 
based on trust, affiliation, collective identity and knowledge availability and 
accessibility; tightly-connected ties are supposedly less vulnerable to breaking under 
pressure. Conversely, loosely-connected ties are also direct whether based on 
opportunity or cost, and are supposedly more vulnerable to breaking under pressure. 
We investigate also whether geographical proximity supports the creation of tightly-
connected or loosely-connected ties. Firms were asked about motivations for tie 
creation additional to those listed in the questionnaire (see above).  
The consistency of the sub-networks indicator relates to the overlap between the 
features of ties created by firms with other network actors, the general aims of the 
sub-network to which the actor belongs, and the self-defined, specific aim of the tied 
actor. Hence, consistency provides an evaluation of the performance of tied 
organisations. The composition of this indicator follows the Oslo Manual 
classification for the nature of external relationships among actors (OECD, 2005). 
The indicator is based on six features of the ties created by each firm with network 
actors: i) access to open information; ii) acquisition of knowledge; iii) acquisition of 
technology; iv) access to new sources of finance; v) access to commercial 
information; and vi) innovation co-operation. Table 5.1 summarises the consistency 
of each of the four sub-networks investigated in the thesis, that is, business, skills, 
technology and financial sub-networks. 
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Table 5.1 Indicators for consistency of sub-networks
227
  
Sub-
network 
Type of sub-network actor General aims by sub-network Features indicating consistency 
Business a) industrial associations  
b) competitors  
c) customers  
d) suppliers  
e) consultancy firms  
f) incubators  
g) private non-profit organisations 
acting on behalf of the public interests 
i) foster and support interactions among firms and between firms and 
customers  
ii) support for research funding applications  
iii) access to information on national and international markets  
iv) provision of facilities or knowledge for software development, 
training and workshops  
v) support the design of business plans and training on organisational 
matters  
vi) support software process improvement  
vii) incubation programmes 
1. Access to open information source 
2. Acquisition of knowledge 
3. Acquisition of technology 
4. Access to new sources of financing 
5. Access to commercial information 
6. Innovation co-operation 
 
Skills a) universities 
b) technical colleges 
c) continued education organisations 
d) research council 
e) research foundation 
i) IT training in different levels, such as undergraduate, Masters, 
Doctorate and Post-Doctorate and continued education;  
ii) support new knowledge creation through basic or applied research 
funding programmes;  
iii) support new knowledge creation through funding programmes for 
development activities. 
1. Access to open information source 
2. Acquisition of knowledge 
3. Acquisition of technology 
4. Innovation co-operation 
Technology a) research organisations  
b) development organisations 
i) perform basic or applied research for, among others, the 
commercialisation by the private sector  
ii) development activities for, among others, the commercialisation by 
the private sector. 
1. Acquisition of knowledge 
2. Acquisition of technology 
3. Innovation co-operation 
 
Financial a) private and public banking 
organisations 
b) public funding organisations 
c) venture capitalists 
d) government authorities 
i) grants or loans for firm-level basic or applied research and 
development activities 
ii) venture capital for start-ups 
iii) tax incentives for firm-level innovation activities 
iv) creation of technological parks or incubation programmes 
1. Acquisition of knowledge 
2. Acquisition of technology 
3. Access to new sources of financing 
 
                                                 
227
 Consistency here is understood as what von Tunzelmann (2003) calls alignment. 
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Firms were asked about any additional features not included in the questionnaire list. 
Validation of the questionnaire revealed that two of the elements discussed in the 
Oslo Manual had to be adapted. For instance, the Oslo Manual assumes acquisition 
of knowledge and technology require payment through a purchase process. 
According to the sampled software firms, they were able to acquire new knowledge 
and technology without payment.  
The openness level of the network relates to the geographical localisation of 
collaborating network actors. The two investigated networks are based in different 
regions; therefore, whenever we found that tied actors were mainly intra-region 
actors the regional network was classified as close. Correspondingly, if there was a 
presence of inter-regional tied actors (from another Brazilian region or from abroad), 
the regional network was classified as open. The openness level supports conclusions 
about the regional network’s vulnerability to lock-in, that is, the network has a high 
level of cooperation and cohesion, but may see outsiders as a threat to their 
adaptability and capabilities to innovate (Grabher, 1993; Grasenick et al., 2008; 
Semlinger, 2008).  
The structure of the network refers to how the network actors are connected in terms 
of being classified as fragmented or well-knit. Fragmented networks occur when the 
number of indirect ties is small, that is, network actors are frequently isolated. 
Conversely, well-knit networks occur when the number of indirect ties is high, and 
network actors are have frequent–direct or indirect- connections (intermediate stages 
between fragmented and well-knit are possible, and the visualisation of the network, 
see Section 5.2.2, supports our conclusions on the structure of the network).
228
 Table 
5.2 summarises the network governance indicators discussed above and suggests 
possible network outcomes related to each indicator. These indicators are 
characterisations of the predominant network outcomes expected and are derived 
from the literature (Chapter 2). The case studies investigated in Chapters 6 and 7 
qualify the dominant characterisations of network outcomes.   
                                                 
228
 Well-knit is used in this thesis to classify the structure of the network; it refers to how ties among 
the members of the network are connected. The higher the number of connected ties among 
themselves, the higher is the likelihood of a healthier/stronger network. This follows the system of 
innovation and network of innovator approaches, where connections are crucial for learning by 
interacting. Well-knit derives from medical terminology to describe the healing process of broken 
bones: those that join firmly are described as well-knit. 
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Table 5.2 Summary of network governance indicators 
Network 
governance 
indicators 
Network features Possible outcomes 
Tightness 
Tightly-connected ties 
i) Lower vulnerability to break 
when put under pressure 
ii) More reliability in the 
transmission of information within 
the network 
Loosely-connected ties 
i) Higher vulnerability to break 
when put under pressure 
ii) Less reliability in the 
transmission of information within 
the network 
Structure 
Well-knit network 
i) Lower probability of missing 
links among actors 
Fragmented network 
i) Higher probability of missing 
links among actors 
Consistency 
Consistent sub-network 
i) High occurrence of overlapping 
aims  
ii) Higher chance of policy effective 
results 
Inconsistent sub-network 
i) Low occurrence of overlapping 
aims  
ii) Lower chance of policy effective 
results 
Openness  
Intra-regional ties only 
i) Higher vulnerability to lock-in 
ii) Lower absorptive capacity 
Intra and inter-regional ties  
i) Lower vulnerability to lock-in 
ii) Higher absorptive capacity 
Source: own elaboration based on literature review (Chapter 2). 
 
5.3.4 Firms’ innovation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the definition of innovation in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 
2005) accommodates the innovative performance of developing country firms. 
Therefore, the definition is appropriate to investigate innovation in Brazilian 
software firms. According to the Olso Manual:  
an innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or 
external relations (OECD, 2005: 46). 
In addition, an innovation can be classified according to its degree of novelty, as 
follows: i) firm-level (i.e. new practices or outputs within the firm which are already 
present in other firms); ii) national market level (i.e. practices or outputs new to 
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firms in the country); and iii) international market level (i.e. new practices or outputs 
that are new to the world). Innovations are classified also as technology or business 
related.  
Another reason for employing the Oslo Manual definition for innovation is the wide 
adoption of this definition by innovation surveys in several countries (such as the 
European Union, Brazil and Australia).
229
 Hence, the use of this definition allows 
comparisons among firms within a network and among different regional levels 
(including the national and international), and different sectors (OECD, 2005: 139). 
The core concepts discussed above are summarised in Figure 5.2, which corresponds 
to the analytical framework for this thesis.  
                                                 
229
 http://www.seade.gov.br/produtos/paep/pdfs/metodo.pdf, accessed 10 March 2001. 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/8158.0Explanatory%20Notes12005?OpenDoc
ument, accessed 10 March 2001. 
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Figure 5.2 Analytical framework 
 
 Legend:    = mono-directional influencing factor 
  = bi-directional influencing factor 
  = bi-directional influencing and causation factor 
Cont= continuing 
Govt= government  
Pr= private 
Pu= public 
Res= research 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from von Tunzelmann (2010: 16). 
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Section 5.4 discusses the research strategy for collecting the empirical data, which 
included: i) choice of appropriate method for answering the thesis research 
questions; ii) justification for the type of information collected; and iii) explanation 
of the information sources used to collect the relevant data. 
5.4 Research strategy and case design  
5.4.1 The case study method 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and the empirical evidence on industrial 
development in Brazil (Chapter 3) show that there is a need to understand how 
network governance and structure influences the effectiveness of government 
technology policies aimed at promoting regional development in a developing 
country context. According to Yin (2003: 6-9), ‘how’ and ‘why’ type research 
questions are more explanatory (in the case here looking at how one phenomenon 
may influence another) and are better answered using a case study approach. 
We can also justify the choice of a case study approach based on the network 
governance concept adopted in this thesis. The network governance concept analyses 
three features of the network: i) infancy and evolution; ii) the dyadic ties between 
firms and other network agents; and iii) controlling mechanisms applied in the 
network. These three network features refer to both the contextual conditions and 
changes over time (especially the evolution of the network and controlling 
mechanisms). According to Yin (2003: 13), investigations that deal with contextual 
and temporal phenomena are better explained through a qualitative case study 
approach.  
Studies on governance, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by 
the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2010), relate governance to rules and traditions 
and employ quantitative methods aimed at creating indicators that allow comparison 
of governance across countries.
230
 Studies of governance in the context of networks 
are often related to cooperation and collaboration (e.g. Grasenick et al., 2008; Jones 
et al., 1997; Provan et al., 2009; Semlinger, 2008) and use quantitative methods 
(such as econometric models and Social Network Analysis) to investigate the 
structure of networks.  
                                                 
230
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp, accessed 17 May 2011. 
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In contrast to these types of approaches, this thesis understands governance as 
coordination (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1). In addition, it understands the relation 
between network structure, ties created by network actors over time, and governance 
as multivalent; and this type of relation is better addressed using a more qualitative 
approach. Moreover, a qualitative case study better addresses possible correlations 
between the positive outcomes of the indicators developed above, the effectiveness 
of the governance of the network and the innovation performance of firms (see 
Section 5.5.2). 
Although the thesis develops a qualitative case study approach, we complement the 
methodology by a quantitative approach using the Social Network Analysis software, 
Pajek, to visualise representation of the network of innovators (see discussion in 
Section 5.5.2). Although we found that the software network representation was 
adequate to demonstrate which agents were formally linked within the network, it 
did not allow discussion and analysis of the data. As explained in Chapter 2, Section 
2.4, and Section 5.3.2, the thesis employs a network governance concept that aims to 
investigate the infancy and evolution of the network, the features and motivation that 
drive firms to create formal ties with other actors, and controlling mechanisms that 
may be influencing the network structure. Following Grasenick et al’s (2008: 309-
310) argument that Social Network Analysis does not capture ‘historical tracks, legal 
restrictions, [and] institutional conditions’ that affect cooperation among network 
actors and, therefore, affect the network structure, we claim that this approach is not 
completely appropriate to discuss the data presented in this thesis  
The nature of the research questions introduced in Section 5.2 and the arguments 
above justify our choice of a multiple case study methodological approach (Yin, 
2003: 42). Moreover, a two case study approach was considered more appropriate to 
address the research questions. Technology policy directed at regional network 
creation may have different outcomes due to: i) policy implementation (involving 
questions such as: were all mechanisms fully implemented or implemented at all?; 
were all the necessary actors involved so that the policy would be effective?); and ii) 
the socio-economic and institutional settings where the policy is implemented may 
differ among regions and economic development stages; both may influence 
government policy effectiveness. Therefore, two case studies allow comparison 
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among two regions and controlling for the issues raised above. Section 5.4.2 
addresses this issue further.   
5.4.2 The two case studies and the unit of analysis 
The selection of the two case studies was an important step in the research design. 
Considering the research questions introduced in Section 5.2, we found that the 
selection of two case studies (two networks) should be based on the following 
criteria: i) being targeted by government technology policies aiming at regional 
network creation in a particular industry; ii) being within the same initial government 
programme, so that the networks would be in the same framework (i.e. receiving 
similar incentives and following similar regulations); iii) the networks ideally should 
be based in regions at different stages of industrial development to allow conclusions 
to be drawn on whether policy effectiveness is linked to different development 
stages; and iv) the networks ideally should be based in regions with different levels 
of socio-economic development, to allow conclusions about whether the factors 
influencing policy effectiveness were the result of the local socio-economic 
development or the policy implementation. The examination of a larger number of 
cases, that is, three or more regional networks, would have increased the scope of the 
thesis beyond what was practically feasible (in terms of time and resources) for a 
doctoral project. 
Following the criteria above, two Brazilian software industry regional networks were 
selected, Campinas and Recife (see Chapter 4). The two networks were formally 
created in the early 1990s within the SOFTEX Programme (discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.2), implemented by the Brazilian national government. This refers to 
selection criteria (i) and (ii) above. The third and fourth criteria were fulfilled by the 
choice to study two networks that were part of the Softex Programme, and also were 
located in regions with different levels of software industry and socio-economic 
development. Campinas is in the Southeast region of Brazil and is considered the 
country’s leader region in the software industry (Chapter 4, Section 4.2). Recife is in 
the Brazilian Northeast region and since the mid 1990s has been trying to catch up to 
Brazil’s leading software industry region (Chapter 4, Section 4.3). Chapters 6 and 7 
respectively, investigate the Campinas and Recife networks. 
  
151 
 
 
The thesis followed the strategy of holistic multiple case studies discussed by Yin 
(2003: 46-53). According to Yin, holistic case studies are justified when the cases 
have different contexts and the identification of sub-units is not possible; which 
corresponded to the case studies in this thesis.  
5.5 Data collection and analysis 
5.5.1 Data collection 
The data collection was conducted in two phases: (i) pilot fieldwork, implemented in 
the Campinas network only; and (i) main fieldwork, implemented in both Campinas 
and Recife networks. Interviews were also conducted in other locations, especially 
those with government organisations. 
(i) Pilot fieldwork 
Pilot fieldwork data collection was implemented this choice being based on the 
literature review on the Softex Programme which claimed that the programme based 
on the experience of Campinas in the IT industry. The Campinas network was also 
studied in the main fieldwork. The aims of the pilot fieldwork were to confirm 
whether the analytical framework and research questions were appropriately 
designed, and to find a possible network for comparison with the Campinas network. 
These two aims were fulfilled, as follows: (i) we redesigned and rephrased the 
analytical framework and research questions on the basis of the pilot fieldwork data 
analysis; and (ii) interviewees suggested the Recife network as a comparable case, 
which was justified by the reasons related to case study selection criteria in Section 
5.4.2. A total of 12 interviews was conducted during the pilot research with: research 
centres (2 interviews), research laboratories (1 interview), local research university 
(5 interviews), Brazilian Development Bank-BNDES (1 interview), Softex 
representative (1 interview), Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology (former 
employee, 1 interview), and supporting institutions (1 interview). The interviews 
were face-to-face with the exception of the BNDES, which was a telephone 
interview, and were based on an open-ended questionnaire.    
  
152 
 
 
(ii) The main fieldwork 
The main fieldwork date collection was implemented mostly in the two networks, 
Campinas and Recife.
231
 The main source of empirical information was face-to-face 
interviews using semi-structured (majority) and open-ended questionnaires. The 
questionnaires included different criteria for each type of organization. The firm 
questionnaire collected data on their innovation processes.
232
 Public and private 
organisations questionnaires collected additional evidence to and validated 
information from websites, reports and formal studies (data triangulation discussed 
by Yin (2003: 97)).
233
 A total of 91 interviews was conducted, 9 of which were 
telephone interviews.
234
 Table 5.3 presents the interviews by type of organisation. 
Table 5.3 Total number of interviews by type of organisation 
Type of organisation Number of 
interviews 
Campinas 
Number of 
interviews 
Recife 
Total 
number of 
interviews 
Consultants 2 1 3 
Firms 21 17 38 
Government representatives 2 2 13* 
Incubators 3 2 5 
Research centres 4 4 8 
Research foundations 1 2 3 
Supporting organisations 7 6 13 
University faculties 4 2 6 
Venture capital fund 2 0 2** 
Total 46 36 91 
Legend: *= total number of representative including national government. Number of government 
representatives interviewed in Campinas=2, Recife=2 and national government= 9. 
**= venture capital fund representatives were based in the Campinas city; however their 
actions covered the Brazilian national territory. 
Source: own elaboration from fieldwork data collection. 
Other sources of information include: i) administrative documents (e.g. reports); ii) 
formal studies of websites (e.g. Master’s and DPhil dissertations); iii) articles in the 
mass media; iv) presentations by interviewees and others involved in the networks; 
v) informal conversations with people knowledgeable about the networks; and vi) as 
                                                 
231
 Two interviews were conducted in another location.  
232
 Firm questionnaire collected data on marketing and organizational innovation (Section C); 
however, the significance of the observations did not merit analysis. Data on dynamics capabilities 
(questions B23 to B25) and on constraints on innovation (Section D) are out of scope of the thesis and 
were not analysed. 
233
 Appendix 2 provides the questionnaires. 
234
 Of these, 8 were conducted over the phone because of the location of the interviewee; in one case 
the interviewee would only agree to a telephone rather than a face-to-face interview. 
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participant observer at a local event involving firms and representatives of the main 
organisations supporting the network. These other sources of information were used  
i) first to corroborate evidence provided by the interviewees (Yin, 2003) and ii) 
acquire knowledge about the history of the organisations, the networks, and the 
formulation and implementation of policies. This last supported questionnaires 
design and minor modifications to the questionnaires during data collection 
(validating the questionnaire), mainly by the addition of topics that the researcher 
had not been aware of. 
Selection of interviewees started in the preparation stage for fieldwork data 
collection. An investigation of the main public and private organizations (including 
firms) involved in the two networks provided information about which were most 
relevant. Consultation of these organisations’ websites revealed key candidates. One 
month before the fieldwork, the first prospective interviewees were contacted and 
appointments arranged. This first group of interviewees recommended others and 
offered to mediate between the interviewer and other possible interviewees (snow 
ball technique). In only one case did someone decline to be interviewed, on the 
grounds of lack of time and interest in participating. Some interviewees had to be 
prompted in order to make a firm arrangement, especially company interviewees 
who had been involved in a lot of interviews and research projects conducted by 
university researchers and saw little or no return from this investment. After the 
interviews, each interviewee received a formal message of thanks for his or her 
contribution to the thesis. 
Interviews lasted approximately 75 minutes; however some lasted 4 hours and a few 
less than 45 minutes. Interviewees were asked at the beginning of the interview how 
much time was available in order to ensure key areas were covered. This was 
especially crucial for firm interviewees because a structured questionnaire was used.   
Interviews were recorded by detailed note taking. The decision not to use tape 
recording was to encourage greater candour on the part of respondents. It was 
believed that tape recording would interfere with information disclosure, particularly 
statements criticising other members of networks. The notes were transcribed 
immediately after each interview in order to avoid losing relevant information and to 
reproduce as closely as possible the exact words of interviewees to avoid bias from 
  
154 
 
 
the interviewer’s interpretations. The transcriptions were in Portuguese to ensure 
accuracy and allow validation by interviewees or others if necessary.  
(iii) Sample of firms 
The criteria for selecting firms included: size, age, and type of software activity, that 
is, product or service complexity. The discussion on the Brazilian software industry 
in Chapter 3 shows that most are micro or small firms (see Araújo, 2011: 244; and 
Roselino, 2006). The thesis applied the Brazilian Service of Support for Micro and 
Small Enterprises (Sebrae) criteria to classify firm size based on number of 
employees: i) micro firm = 1 to 9 employees; ii) small firms = 10 to 49 employees; 
iii) medium firms = 50 to 99 employees; and iv) large firms = more than 100 
employees.
235
  
The totals used included permanent and seasonal employees based on the argument 
that the majority of firms were micro or small firms (80% in Campinas and 70% in 
Recife) and could not afford to employ most staff on a permanent basis. The 
numbers of seasonal employees was often higher than the permanent employees.
 236
 
Were we to base the sample on permanent employee numbers, it would be distorted. 
The criterion of annual turnover was considered but not all firms were happy to 
disclose their annual turnover and a classification based on this criterion for the 
whole sample was not feasible. The total sample of firms included 21 firms in 
Campinas (19.6% of the total population of firms - Chapter 4 Table 4.1) and 17 in 
Recife (16.3% of the total population of firms - Chapter 4 Table 4.2).  
The firms were of different ages and sizes (Tables 5.4 and 5.5), and covered a wide 
range of production activities (see Appendix Table A2 and Table A3 for Campinas 
and Recife software firm activities).  
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 http://www.sebrae-sc.com.br/leis/default.asp?vcdtexto=4154&%5E%5E; accessed 09 May 2009. 
The choice of criteria is supported by NGPD criteria to determine Porto Digital firms’ size 
populations: i) micro firm = less than 5 employees; ii) small firms = 6 to 20 employees; iii) medium 
firms = 21 to 50 employees; and iv) large firms = above 51 employees. According to NGPD, Porto 
Digital firms are:  49% micro firms, 40% small firms, 11% medium and large firms (Recife fieldwork 
organisational interviews). 
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 This issue was reported in The Economist magazine 10 March 2011, in an article claiming that the 
financial penalty for firms making permanent employees redundant combined with very high 
employee turnover has led to a strong bias towards temporary employment contracts in the Brazilian 
market, http://www.economist.com/node/18332906, accessed 09 May 2011.  
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Table 5.4 Campinas software firms’ profile (age and size)  
Age/Size Micro Small Medium Large 
Younger than 5 years Firm 2 
Firm 6 
Firm 8 
Firm 10 
Firm 11 
Firm 16 
Firm 19 
Firm 12 
Firm 14 
0 0 
6 to 10 years Firm 7 
Firm 17 
Firm 3 
Firm 5 
Firm 9 
0 Firm 15 
Firm 18 
11 to 15 years 0 Firm 4 
Firm 13 
Firm 20 
0 Firm 1 
 
16 to 20 years 0 0 0 0 
Older than 21 years 0 0 0 Firm 21 
Source: fieldwork data collection, May and June 2009. 
 
As already mentioned, before data collection began we identified and pre-selected 
innovative firms for interviews in both regions, and these firms were included in the 
sample. The ‘snow ball’ technique used to support the identification and inclusion of 
innovative firms that were not immediately identified through consultation with 
public reports, academic studies and specialised press proved valuable. The in-depth 
interviews with firms using a semi-structured questionnaire allowed identification of 
patterns among firms in both regions (see Chapters 6 and 7).  
Table 5.5 Recife software firms profile (age and size)  
Age/Size Micro Small Medium Large 
Younger than 5 years Firm 3 Firm 5 
Firm 7 
Firm 8 
Firm 13 Firm 2 
6 to 10 years 0 Firm 10 
Firm 11 
Firm 12 
Firm 14 
0 0 
11 to 15 years 0 Firm 4 
Firm 6 
Firm 17 
Firm 16 0 
16 to 20 years 0 Firm 15 0 Firm 9 
Older than 21 years 0 0 0 Firm 1 
Source: fieldwork data collection, April 2009. 
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5.5.2 Data analysis 
Data analysis occurred in three stages. The first comprised transcription of interview 
notes to produce a comprehensive and accessible database that would allow further 
consultation as data analysis proceeded, and support the creation of comparable data 
among the units of analysis. The first step consisted of transcription in the original 
language (Portuguese) and then translation into English, both using Microsoft Word. 
In a second step, the initial data transcriptions were used as the basis for Excel 
worksheets, which aggregated comparable variables for each interview category 
(e.g., firms, supporting organisations, government representatives, academics). The 
worksheets supported the creation of a set of tables that classified the collected 
information, and supported the creation of a link between the core concepts applied 
in the thesis and the empirical information gathered during the data collection.  
The second stage involved the compilation of tables classifying the information 
collected to construct indicators of network governance (network tie tightness, 
structure, consistency and openness).  
Table 5.6 presents the indicators conceptually defined in Table 5.2 made operational 
for the purposes of measurement. In potential network features we find that ‘higher’ 
and ‘lower’ are relative terms that are meant to apply to the range of observed 
values; we identify characterisations of predominant network outcomes, and not 
optimal values.  
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Table 5.6 Network governance indicators and variables for analysis  
Network 
governance 
indicators 
Variable Potential network features 
Tightness 
Motivation for external tie 
creation by each firm and 
frequency of ties occurrence 
i) Higher number and frequency of 
strong ties= tightly-connected ties; 
ii) Lower number and frequency of 
strong ties= loosely-connected ties. 
Structure 
Number of external ties 
created by each firm 
i) Higher number of ties among 
local firms and network actors= 
well-knit network; 
ii) Lower number of ties among 
local firms and network actors= 
fragmented network. 
Consistency 
Feature of external tie 
created by each firm 
i) High overlap between feature of 
external tie created by each firm and 
aims of each network actor= 
consistent network; 
ii) Low overlap between feature of 
external tie created by each firm and 
aims of each network actor= 
inconsistent network. 
Openness 
Geographical location of 
each collaborator  
i) Higher number and frequency of 
intra-network collaboration= close-
like network; 
ii) Higher number and frequency of 
inter-network collaboration= open-
like network. 
Source: own elaboration based on literature review (Chapter 2). 
 
For reasons of confidentiality, the data in this thesis have been codified to ensure 
anonymity of interviewees. The interviews are split into three groups: Campinas, 
Recife and Brasil, the third group referring to interviews with central government 
controlled, public organisations. The list of representatives interviewed is provided 
in Appendix Table A4.
237
 
The third stage of data analysis comprised analysis of the variables in Table 5.6, 
using the network governance indicators to understand and explain possible 
relationships among them. The first step involved identification of patterns within 
the two networks for each of the three innovation stages analysed for each firm; that 
is, commercialised innovations during the period April 2006-June 2009, ongoing 
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 The full list of organisations and interviewees is available to examiners only. 
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innovations during the period April 2006-June 2009, and abandoned innovation 
attempts during April 2006-June 2009, which were related to the questions in Group 
A. The second step was to identify possible patterns and contradictions between the 
two networks, to respond to the research questions in Group B. 
In this third stage, quantitative research methods and Social Network Analysis 
software Pajek were used to support individual visual representation of the two 
networks for each innovation stage analysed. Visual representation supported the 
identification of patterns within the network, such as tightness of firms’ external ties, 
structure of the network and network level of openness. For tie tightness, we used 
Pajek to differentiate tightly-connected from loosely-conencted ties (the former 
represented by thick lines and the latter by thin lines in Chapter 6 - Figures 6.1, 6.2 
and 6.3, and Chapter 7 – Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3).  
Types of network actor were differentiated by symbols and colours which allowed 
the identification of patterns within the network with regard to the type of actors and 
their predominance. Visual representation of the networks also supported 
identification of network structure, that is, well-knit or fragmented. We were able to 
identify controlling mechanisms within the network, that is, whether the network was 
hierarchical, heterarchical or shared-governance. This supported conclusions on two 
issues: i) the role of actors exerting the most power within the network, and the 
possible effects on the network were they to leave it; and ii) the presence or absence 
of important actors who might be expected to join the network.  
Finally, examination of the networks of innovators employing the indicators 
developed above and the use of Pajek to visualise the network, allowed conclusions 
about the structure and transaction completeness of the networks. Whenever these 
network features showed more positive outcomes we concluded that the governance 
of the network was more effective; conversely, when they were less positive the 
governance of the network was less effective. Governance effectiveness then was 
related to the innovation performance of the sampled firms allowing propositions 
about whether more effective governance led to better firm innovation performance. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 continue this discussion in relation to the thesis research 
questions. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the methodology adopted in this thesis, which is 
complemented by explanation and development of the operationalisation of the core 
concepts applied in the thesis. This is developed further in the empirical chapters (6 
and 7).  
The research questions were re-introduced and re-specified according to the situated 
nature of the current study which is meant to deliver tentative conclusions on the 
over-arching questions and specific answers to the situated versions of the questions. 
This was followed by a detailed explanation of the bounded focus of the empirical 
research (Section 5.2), presentation and summary of the core concepts in an 
analytical framework (Section 5.3 and Figure 5.2). We presented the rationale for the 
research strategy, justifying a multiple case study method, selection of the two case 
studies and the units of analysis used (Section 5.4). Section 5.5 described the 
procedures used to collect and analyse the empirical data which form the basis for 
the discussion and concluding analysis in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 6 - EMPIRICAL RESULTS I: THE 
CAMPINAS SOFTWARE NETWORK 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the governance of the Campinas regional software network 
during the period 2006-2009, and how network governance and structure may have 
influenced Campinas software firms’ innovative performances in that period. 
Chapter 4 described the structure of the Campinas network and the region’s long 
history with ICT; it discussed government policies implemented since the early 
1990s to support the region’s software development. The region’s history and the 
implementation of government policies (although not centrally coordinated) have 
favoured the emergence and development of the Campinas software industry, and 
supported the region’s becoming the leading Brazilian software region.   
Chapter 6 exploits the indicators developed in Chapter 5 to investigate the features 
and motivations for the creation of formal dyadic ties by firms to support their 
innovation activities, and indicators to measure innovation at firm level. Chapter 5 
showed that the Campinas software network was defined prior to the empirical data 
collection and here we want to find whether there are relations between network 
members and how they interact. Section 6.2 addresses the structural embeddedness 
of the governance of the Campinas network of innovators based on the features of 
dyadic ties created by firms which are indicative of the consistency of the four sub-
networks examined (i.e. business, skills, technology, financial).  
Section 6.3 addresses issues related to the relational embeddedness of the 
governance of the Campinas network of innovators, based on the motivation for the 
dyadic ties created by firms and the tightness of ties – that is, tightly or loosely-
connected ties (where tightness is determined by motivation for and the frequency of 
ties). We provide a visual representation of the network of innovators and investigate 
those organisations that function (and are likely to function) as bridges within the 
network.   
Section 6.4 examines Campinas software innovations at firm level for each 
innovation stage examined – that is, commercialised, ongoing and abandoned, to 
identify which firms are innovating and whether they are connected or disconnected 
to the main cluster of network nodes. We identify the degree of novelty of their 
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innovations: i) firm innovation (i.e. new practices or outputs for the focal firm 
already existing in other firms); ii) national market innovation (i.e. practices or 
outputs new to firms in Brazil); iii) international market innovation (i.e. practices or 
outputs new to the world). Section 6.5 introduces a few observations on the catching-
up process of Campinas software firms. Section 6.6 concludes, summarising 
evidence that contributes to answering the research questions in Group A (see 
Chapter 5). 
6.2 The Campinas network of innovators: tie creation and 
consistency of the four sub-networks  
This section investigates the consistency of the business, skills, technology and 
financial sub-networks. Consistency is indicated by the level of overlap between the 
feature of the ties created by firms and the stated, self-defined aims of the tied 
organisations. We discuss the three innovation stages - commercialised, ongoing and 
abandoned – in relation to each sub-network. The empirical findings on the feature 
of innovation related ties created by firms provide evidence of the consistency of the 
sub-networks. Section 6.2.1 addresses the business sub-network, Section 6.2.2 the 
skills sub-network, Section 6.2.3 the technology and Section 6.2.4 the financial sub-
network. Section 6.2.5 summarises Section 6.2. 
6.2.1 Consistency of the business sub-network  
The business sub-network was the most accessed by Campinas local software firms, 
that is, firms had more ties with business sub-network actors than with the other 
three sub-networks, for all the innovation stages investigated. The results are as 
follows: i) 10 firms created 11 ties with 5 types of actors for commercialised 
innovations; ii) 6 firms created 10 ties with 4 types of actors for ongoing innovation; 
and iii) 2 firms created 2 ties with 2 types of actors in the case of later abandoned 
innovations. This result might be expected because there are more actors in the 
business sub-network than in the other three ones, however, the total number of ties 
created was not necessarily expected to be higher than in the other three sub-
networks. Table 6.1 below re-introduces the features that indicate the consistency of 
the business sub-network. 
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Table 6.1 Indicators for consistency of the business sub-network 
Business sub-network actors General aims by sub-network Features indicating 
consistency 
a) industrial associations  
b) competitors  
c) customers  
d) suppliers  
e) consultancy firms  
f) incubators  
g) private non-profit 
organisations acting on 
behalf of the public interests 
i) foster and support 
interactions among firms and 
between firms and customers  
ii) support for research 
funding applications  
iii) access to information on 
national and international 
markets  
iv) provision of facilities or 
knowledge for software 
development, training and 
workshops  
v) support the design of 
business plans and training 
on organisational matters  
vi) support software process 
improvement  
vii) incubation programmes 
1. Access to open 
information source 
2. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
3. Acquisition of 
technology 
4. Access to new 
sources of financing 
5. Access to 
commercial 
information 
6. Innovation co-
operation 
 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
The Campinas business sub-network was not only the most frequently accessed by 
Campinas software firms, but also the sub-network with the highest consistency; this 
means that there was a high level of overlap between the reasons for creating a tie 
(e.g. ‘innovation cooperation’) and the aims of the business organisations with which 
ties were formed. The three business actors with the highest number of ties are: 
incubators, customers and other software firms.  
The feature of the ties created with the three incubators reflected provision of 
financial support, that is, low infrastructure costs (e.g. office facilities, security, 
broadband access, fixed telephone line), a commercial address and the provision of 
business consultancy. In more than one case entrepreneurs of incubated firms said 
they could not had afforded the market price for the infrastructure offered by the 
incubator: 
when we [interviewed firm] set up our firm, we [interviewed firm] had 
recently graduated from IC [Unicamp undergraduate degree in computing 
science], and as new graduates we did not have the financial resources to 
pay for office space and other infrastructure. Without the incubator’s 
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support we would have had to set up the firm in a room in my or my 
partner’s house. It makes a big difference if prospective clients see a 
commercial address on your business card, it looks much more professional 
and reliable (Campinas fieldwork interview number 44). 
Another feature of local firms’ ties with incubators is business consultancy which is 
provided at subsidised cost. Consultancy focused mostly on start-up business plans 
and identification of market niches, that is, services related to commercial 
knowledge. According to some interviewees, Campinas local entrepreneurs who 
graduate in IT related degrees have no training in entrepreneurship,
238
 they are 
technically skilled to resolve complex problems, and may come up with new ideas 
for new products or services. However, these young professionals have almost no 
commercial knowledge to develop their ideas further, and this is where the 
incubator’s consultancy service plays a crucial role, as stated by an interviewee: 
the most common profile of [Campinas IT] incubated entrepreneurs is recent 
graduates. It is very common to finish university with good technical skills, 
and good ideas about how to exploit this scientific knowledge, but no idea 
about whether there is real demand for the innovation, or how to produce an 
executable business plan and implement it. This is why the consultancy 
offered by the incubator is so important, it provides the [incubated] start-up 
with a base of commercial knowledge to support its early years (Campinas 
fieldwork interview number 11).   
This view was expressed by other from firms that initially were incubated, as 
follows:  
when we [interviewed firm] entered the pre-incubation programme we had 
no clue about how to deal with administrative issues, or how to write a 
business plan. We did not know where to start from, for instance, with 
regards to potential demands for our services. The consultancy provided by 
the incubator was crucial for us in both administrative and business related 
aspects. And it was affordable, because it is subsidised (Campinas fieldwork 
interview number 22). 
and, 
the consultant asked questions that nobody else had asked us before, making 
us think about what we were doing, what had to be done if we wanted to 
succeed. We had been graduated for a few years, but the consultant still 
provided us with consultancy services (Campinas fieldwork interview 
number 44). 
The features associated with the creation of ties between firms and their customers 
differed among firms; the three firms identified different features as promoting tie 
creation. For instance, only Firm 1 identified ‘acquisition of knowledge and 
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 Campinas interviews number 3, 11, 15, 20, 22, 29, 35, and 44.  
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technology’ as relevant for tie creation, which was unexpected since all three firms’ 
ties with customers were related to developing customised software. Therefore, firms 
were expected to ‘acquire knowledge’ in the process because the development of 
customised software applications requires a close user-producer relationship and full 
understanding of customers’ business and technologies. The development of new 
applications often demands that the firm acquire new knowledge to understand how 
to develop applications. This process enhances the firm’s technical capabilities, and 
therefore its opportunities to develop new applications in the future.
239
 
However, the other features promoting ties with customers were consistent. For 
instance, we identified ‘innovation co-operation’ and ‘new sources of financing’. 
With regard to the former, most firms in the sample developed customised software 
for customers that requested it. Customers provide the information about their 
businesses and current software and the new software is an innovation for the 
creating firm.
240
 The customer financed the software innovation, the customised 
software, in the case of the firm interviewed.  
In addition to ties with incubators and customers, there are ties with other software 
firms, where we found the only inconsistency in the business sub-network. 
Inconsistency emerged only in the case of a tie between two software firms that 
developed complementary software. The tie was related to financial issues only, 
although it might have been expected to relate to ‘access to new knowledge’ and 
‘innovation co-operation’ (which would have indicated consistency). Tie creation 
was driven by a requirement of the funding agency financing the development of the 
new software. There was inconsistency in relation to the items in the questionnaire 
chosen to demonstrate consistency.  
We found one case of a tie among local software firms developing complementary 
software to obtain ‘access to commercial information’, showing consistency in the 
business sub-network. According to the interviewee, because the collaborating firm 
develops complementary knowledge, its marketing expertise is also complementary 
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 In the case of one firm ‘acquisition of knowledge’ was mentioned as a result of the tie created with 
the customer, however it did not motivate tie creation. According to the interviewee, the innovation 
resulted in the enhancement of the firm’s capability with regard to the development of applications for 
new market niches. Previous to the innovation, the firm had mostly developed software for a specific 
market niche, which had limited its penetration of other markets (Campinas fieldwork interview 
number 42). 
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 Campinas fieldwork interview number 42. 
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and its knowledge in this particular issue provided the interviewed firm access to 
new markets.
241
 
6.2.2 Consistency of the skills sub-network  
The skills sub-network was the second most frequently accessed sub-network by the 
Campinas local software firms, and applied to all investigated innovation stages, as 
follows: i) 4 firms created 11 ties with 4 types of actors for commercialised 
innovations; ii) 4 firms created 5 ties with 2 types of actors for ongoing innovation, 1 
firm created 2 ties; and iii) 1 firm created 3 ties with 1 type of actor for later 
abandoned innovations.
242
 In all innovation stages universities were the most 
frequently accessed type of actor. Table 6.2 re-introduces the features that indicate 
consistency for the skills sub-network.  
Table 6.2 Indicators for consistency of the skills sub-network 
Skill sub-network actors General aims by sub-network Features indicating 
consistency 
a) universities  
b) technical colleges 
c) continued education 
organisations  
d) research council  
e) research foundation 
i) IT training in different 
levels, such as: 
undergraduate, Masters, 
Doctorate and Post-
Doctorate and continued 
education  
ii) support new knowledge 
creation through basic or 
applied research funding 
programmes 
iii support new knowledge 
creation through funding 
programmes for 
development activities 
1. Access to open 
information source 
2. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
3. Acquisition of 
technology 
4. Innovation co-
operation 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
There are three important findings from the examination of the skills sub-network. 
Firstly, none of the ties created by firms for the commercialised innovation stage 
with organisations belonging to this sub-network related to ‘acquisition of 
knowledge’. This applies even to ties with eight university departments that were 
part of the ten skills organisations engaged in the network of innovators. The absence 
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 Campinas fieldwork interview number 35. 
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 Sub-network actors were identified a priori to the empirical data collection (Chapter 5). 
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of this feature was an unexpected result because educational organisations, and 
especially universities, produce new knowledge that potentially can be employed by 
the private sector. The features involved in tie creation included ‘access to open 
information sources’ and ‘innovation cooperation’ for this innovation stage.  
‘Acquisition of knowledge’ was relevant for the creation of ties in the other two 
innovation stages, that is, ongoing and abandoned innovations; however the number 
of actors engaged in the network of innovators and the frequency of collaborations 
were low. Acquisition of knowledge was mentioned by one firm in the ongoing 
innovation stage and by another firm in the abandoned innovation stage. In the latter 
case, the reason for abandonment was that none of the three university departments 
contacted by the firm were willing to collaborate formally with the private sector: 
I [the firm] tried to create collaborations with three public university 
departments, and realised that although some faculty members are quite 
keen to collaborate with us [private sector], the higher divisions within their 
[university] departments did not approve the projects. These departments 
receive a lot of public finding, which seems to reduce the pressure on 
faculty members to seek finance from other sources, for instance the private 
sector. I think they [faculty members from public universities] are mainly 
interested in doing their academic research, which often excludes the private 
sector (Campinas fieldwork firm interview).
243
  
The above extract suggests that the partial engagement of the Campinas local 
research university may be possibly related to over-funding from public sources of 
finance. This was partly corroborated by another firm that stated the following:  
the local university is not at all interested in collaborating with us [private 
firms], they are interested in following their own academic agenda. I will 
give you an example of how they are not interested in working with us 
[private firms]. About six months ago we [interviewed firm] needed training 
for our staff on a specific subject, and ideally it had to be offered by a 
university department. We had to go to ‘X’ [university department not 
disclosed for confidentiality reasons], which is not based locally because it 
was interested in providing this type of service. I guess that university is 
more open and more in need of extra funding [from the private sector] 
(Campinas fieldwork firm interview). 
Another explanation for the scarcity of ties created by local firms with the local 
research university could be related to the type of expertise developed by the 
university (IC-Unicamp). For instance, one firm that is specialised in mobile 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.2, interviewees are anonymous; for this reason in several 
interviews numbers are not disclosed but are replaced by the type of organisation from which data 
were collected. 
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technology stated that there are a few faculty members at the local research 
university who are experts in this knowledge area.
244
  
Similarly, ‘acquisition of technology’ was expected to be relevant for tie creation 
with skills sub-network actors. However, only one firm that created formal ties with 
a university included the feature ‘acquisition of technology’ as relevant. The tie was 
related to the type of knowledge required by them and its availability from research 
universities, as follows: 
today we [interviewed firm] develop technology that is at the international 
scientific and technological frontier, and few university departments in the 
country develop knowledge and technologies related to the type of software 
we create. Their [university departments] technology is complementary to 
what we do, and collaborating with them gives us access to the technology 
we need at a much cheaper price than offered by the private sector, this is 
one of the main reasons why we created ties with these two [not disclosed to 
avoid their identification] university departments (Campinas fieldwork firm 
interview).  
These findings suggest an absence of ties in the Campinas software network of 
innovators that would be important for the formation of local systems of innovations 
and its well functioning (see Bell and Pavitt, 1993 and Lastres and Cassiolato, 2001). 
It suggests also that the creation of ties between firms and skills sub-network actors 
is conditional on particular firm circumstances. As discussed in Chapter 2, inter-
organisational links between private and public actors (and among themselves) that 
are related to technological and innovation activities support the formation of a 
system of innovation (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992a). Each organisation has 
specific aims and the well functioning of the system depends not only on the 
individual performance of organisations but also on their interaction with others (e.g. 
through the creation of formal inter-organisational ties). Therefore, these empirical 
findings have implications for government policy; policy formulation should take 
account of these particularities to be more effective (see Ergas, 1987, on technology 
policy, and Chapter 2 in this thesis). As discussed in Chapter 2, there is not a ‘one 
model fits all’ for policy promoting the formation of networks and their functioning. 
The second notable finding in the ties created with the skills sub-network actors is 
that most of the universities engaged in the Campinas network of innovators are 
based outside the region (6 compared to 2 locally). There are two different 
interpretations: i) we might assume that Campinas firms are trying to create ties with 
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universities that are more open to collaborations with the private sector (as discussed 
in Chapter 4 there is some evidence that the local research university is driven more 
by the creation of academic knowledge); or ii) that Campinas firms target 
universities with the most appropriate expertise, and these are not based in the 
Campinas region.
245
 The empirical evidences shows that the ties created by one firm 
with three of the six university centres based outside the region were a requirement 
of the customer financing the innovation project. According to an interviewee: 
the main reason why we got involved with these universities is because they 
were included in the project by the client. We developed our part of the 
software using our internal knowledge and barely communicated with the 
other partners in the project, with the exception of the client, of course 
(Campinas fieldwork firm interview).  
This shows an inconsistency in the Campinas skills sub-network, because it could be 
expected that the engagement of firms with these types of actors (e.g. research 
universities) would include knowledge or technology related matters as well as 
‘innovation cooperation’ and ‘access to open information source’ (Table 6.2).   
The third notable finding in the ties created with the skills sub-network actors relates 
to the ties created by firms with research councils (i.e. CNPq) and research 
foundations (i.e. FAPESP). We found that the ties created by Campinas local firms 
involved only ‘access to new sources of financing’ and not ‘acquisition of 
knowledge’ or ‘acquisition of technology’. This is because these two organisations 
provide funding to firms to support the performance of basic and applied research, 
and development activities within the firm. These activities are directly related to the 
creation of new knowledge and technology by firms.
246
 The absence of these two 
features indicated that there is inconsistency in the skills sub-network, and also that 
Campinas firms may be replacing private finance with public funding for their R&D 
activities. The preference of firms for public rather than private finance has been a 
constraint on the evolution of the Brazilian system of innovating (Corder, 2004: 
121). This is not to say that public funding support is inadequate or should not be 
supporting the private sector. In fact, firms mentioned that public funding is very 
relevant for innovation projects if not already procured by the customer: 
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 This would provide evidence against general claims in the sectoral system of innovation approach 
with regard to the geographical localisation of knowledge, which is the overlap between the sectoral 
and regional system of innovation approaches. 
246
 http://www.cnpq.br/english/cnpq/index.htm, accessed 14 February 2011. 
http://www.FAPESP.br/en/materia/6028/the-institution/FAPESP.htm, accessed 14 February 2011. 
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I [the firm] am extremely grateful to ‘x’ [public funding organisation], if it 
was not for them we [the firm] would have had died by now [time of data 
collection], they provided non-refundable funding and believed in our 
project without expectations of marketable results. Their funding came at a 
crucial time, when the private market was down and we had only a few 
clients in our portfolio (Campinas fieldwork firm interview). 
However, on more than one occasion interviewees mentioned that public funding is 
difficult to access. According to them, funding agencies expect firms that apply for 
research-oriented grants to submit proposals that are highly academically oriented:
247
 
the problem is that ‘X’ [public funding organisation] is very academically 
biased in the evaluation of research grants applied by firms. It is managed 
by academics, their referees are mostly academics, and they want to see in a 
firm research grant application what is familiar to them, i.e. an academic 
format. For example, recently one of the local micro firms received a grant 
from ‘X’ [public funding organisation] and all of their staff hold PhD 
degrees and what they [firm] do is very theoretical (Campinas fieldwork 
organisational interview). 
According to firms, the academic bias in the assessment of grant applications has 
created a barrier to research funding from public organisations, because often firms 
do not have the required academic research skills. This deficiency can be overcome 
in the grant application process through the use of private consultancy services. The 
problem seems to be less for older or more research-oriented firms which have had 
time to develop capabilities to write grant applications that ‘fit’ the funding agencies’ 
requirements. Also, some firms submit applications that are strongly research 
oriented:  
there was a time when we [interviewed firm] needed to hire consultants to 
write research grant proposals for us, but now we have learnt by trial and 
error how to do it, and can do it ourselves (Campinas fieldwork interview 
number 21).  
And,  
we [interviewed firm] have some PhDs working in our firm innovation 
projects, I have done a few post-docs, and we [the firm] know exactly what 
we are doing, and better than anyone in the country. I can write research 
grant proposals very easily, I have done it before and can do it as a 
consultant for other firms (Campinas fieldwork firm interview). 
                                                 
247
 This issue is addressed by Pacheco (2007: 9), as follows: ‘It prevails, including in the private 
sector, a concept of technology policy that is similar to the support for academic research. The 
supporting mechanisms to the private initiatives are shaped from experiences with universities, such 
as the employment of individual support and scholarships as incentive mechanisms for the 
technological development of the private sector’. (my translation) 
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The empirical evidence suggests that some of the reason for the absence of ties 
between firms with skills sub-network actors may be related to the perceptions of 
funding organisations with regards to the research activities performed by the private 
sector, and not the absence of supporting organisations as found in regional systems 
of innovations studies (see e.g. Chaminade and Vang, 2008). According to the firms 
interviewed, in addition to research funders expecting academically oriented research 
grant proposals that require specific skills and capabilities which they often lack, the 
timing of research grants proposals assessment is not synchronised with the pace of 
innovation in the software industry. This suggests that public funding organisations 
that aim to support local firms are suffering from path rigidity, which is unlikely to 
be changed in the short-term, because changing paths is costly and is a gradual long-
term process. Also, historically, Brazilian public organisations suffer from 
institutional rigidity generally (see Pacheco and Corder, 2009,  and Chapter 3 in this 
thesis). 
If firms depend upon public research funding to innovate, they may either miss the 
opportunity to conclude innovation projects, or assume the costs of the innovation 
project which may in the future be financed by the public funding. This may 
jeopardise the success of the innovation project because firms sometimes lack the 
financial resources to perform all the stages required to complete the innovation 
project on time without external support. In addition, if firms decide to use internal 
financial resources for their innovation projects, and at some future stage are granted 
funding for activities already under development, they may be forced to ‘make up’ 
the figures and adjust the timing of the research project so that the final research 
grant report complies with the funding organisation’s requirements.248 New research 
funding is not released by the public funding organisations until previous research 
grant reports are revised and approved, hence approval of final research reports is 
considered crucial for future funding applications. 
6.2.3 Consistency of the technology sub-network  
The technology sub-network was the third sub-network most frequently accessed by 
the Campinas local software firms, for all innovation stages investigated.
249
 Three 
                                                 
248
 Campinas fieldwork firm interview. 
249
 The identification of networks actors partially derives from a priori identification of the 
organisations that are part (or are meant to be part) of the network (Chapter 5). 
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firms created three ties with three different technology sub-network actors, three 
different R&D organisations. Table 6.3 re-introduces the features that indicate 
consistency for the technology sub-network. 
Table 6.3 Indicators for consistency of the technology sub-network 
Technology sub-network 
actors 
General aims by sub-network Features indicating 
consistency 
a) research organisations 
b) development organisations 
i) perform basic or applied 
research for, among others, 
the commercialisation by the 
private sector 
ii) development activities 
for, among others, the 
commercialisation by the 
private sector 
1. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
2. Acquisition of 
technology 
3. Innovation co-
operation 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
There are three remarks about the ties created with technology sub-network actors. 
First, the features of ties created in the commercialised and ongoing innovation 
stages involved in ‘innovation cooperation’, which suggests that the sub-network is 
consistent. Second, the absence of ‘acquisition of knowledge’ and ‘acquisition of 
technology’ was an unexpected result. This is because according to the systems of 
innovation approach, in which network of innovators play a crucial role in 
supporting the creation of important links among organisations involved with 
innovation activities, it is expected that ties between innovative firms and R&D 
organisations are driven by the willingness of firms to acquire new knowledge and 
technology that complements internal knowledge (Lundvall, 1992b). 
In addition, in the abandoned-innovation stage, the features involved in tie creation, 
‘access to new sources of financing’ and ‘access to commercial information’, suggest 
inconsistency in this sub-network. According to the interviewee, the tie with the 
local R&D organisation was related to co-application for public funding: 
we had one abandoned innovation project during this period [2006-2009] 
which had collaboration from ‘x’ [local R&D centre], we tried to get public 
funding for the project but failed. So, as we did not get the funding, the 
innovation project was abandoned, and we have not been in contact with 
them [local R&D centre] since (Campinas fieldwork firm interview).  
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The extract above suggests that tie creation based on short-term opportunities and 
dependent on subsidies are more easily broken, which corroborates the evidence 
from studies on dyadic ties (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1). 
In the commercialised innovation stage, we found that one of the two R&D 
organisations that had ties with local firms is based in the Northeast region, that is, 
outside the Campinas region. Although the R&D organisation is well known and has 
an excellent reputation in the Brazilian IT industry, which justified the features 
‘access to open information’ and ‘innovation cooperation’ for the tie creation, two 
other things were important: 
they [R&D organisation] are very good in what they do and we benefited 
from the Informatics Law in collaborating with them, which was a very 
important aspect of the collaboration. And also we know someone who is 
trustworthy and has worked there [R&D organisation], which was a plus in 
the initial contact and success of the project (Campinas fieldwork firm 
interview).  
This empirical evidence suggests consistency of the technology sub-network. 
However, the absence of ‘acquisition of knowledge’ and ‘acquisition of technology’ 
for ties with the R&D organisation, which instead were influenced by personal and 
financial issues, suggests partial inconsistency of the technology sub-network. In 
addition, the above extract confirms findings from other studies that personal 
relationships play an important role in inter-organisational ties (Chapter 2). It 
suggests also that geographical proximity is not always crucial for ties.
250
  
6.2.4 Consistency of the financial sub-network 
The number and frequency of ties created by firms with the financial sub-network 
were the lowest among the four sub-networks investigated. Table 6.4 re-introduces 
the features that indicate consistency for the financial sub-network. 
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 E.g., see Boschma (2005) for a broad discussion on proximity. 
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Table 6.4 Indicators for consistency of the financial sub-network 
Financial sub-network 
actor 
General aims by sub-network Features indicating 
consistency 
a) private and public 
banking organisations 
b) public funding 
organisations 
c) venture capitalists 
d) government authorities 
i) grants or loans for firm-
level basic or applied 
research and development 
activities 
ii) venture capital for start-
ups 
iii) tax incentives for firm-
level innovation activities  
iv) creation of technological 
parks or incubation 
programmes 
1. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
2. Acquisition of 
technology 
3. Access to new 
sources of financing 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
A few Campinas firms created ties with only one public funding agency, the 
Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP), which suggests that this sub-network has 
virtually no connections with local firms. This is corroborated by two firms’ 
innovation projects for the ongoing and abandoned innovation stages that were put 
on hold until FINEP’s grant applications were awarded. Both firms stated that the 
projects depended upon FINEP financing, and in the case of non-award were 
abandoned.
251
  
The empirical evidence on the features of ties created with FINEP indicated that the 
financial sub-network is partly consistent. All five firms that created ties with FINEP 
(i.e. both established or ‘on hold’ ties) indicated that they were motivated by ‘access 
to new sources of financing’, which is consistent with expectations. However, 
FINEP’s mission is to support innovation in firms (among others) and only one firm 
in the sample said the tie was related to ‘innovation cooperation’, ‘acquisition of 
knowledge’ and ‘acquisition of technology’, all crucial for innovation. This is 
evidence of some level of inconsistency in the financial sub-network. 
6.2.5 Summary 
Investigation of the consistency of the four sub-networks provides evidence of for 
the following. Firstly, most Campinas software firms perform innovation without 
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 Campinas fieldwork firm interview. 
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external ties for knowledge and technology acquisition; knowledge for the 
development of innovation is mostly in-house. This is confirmed by the low 
engagement of the skills and technology sub-networks with ties in these sub-
networks rarely related to ‘acquisition of knowledge and technology’ and driven 
mostly by ‘financial issues’. 
Secondly, although the business sub-network demonstrates greater consistency 
between the features of ties identified and expected, the relevant actors in this sub-
network that might be expected to provide new knowledge to firms – customers and 
other software firms – did not figure prominently. Also, any ties with them were not 
often related to ‘acquisition of knowledge and technology’.  
Analysis of the consistency of the four sub-networks is complemented by an 
investigation of the motivation for tie creation among firms, and between firms and 
other network actors, in Section 6.3. 
6.3 Network Relations for Innovating and Non-Innovating Firms: 
Campinas   
This section investigates how many and which firms performed innovation, either 
alone or in collaboration with other network actors, the tightness (motivation and 
frequency) of the ties among Campinas software firms and between firms and other 
organisations, and which firms and network actors are functioning (or are more 
likely to function) as bridges within the network of innovators. We investigate each 
of these three issues for each innovation stage analysed in the thesis, that is, 
commercialised innovation (Section 6.3.1), ongoing innovation (Section 6.3.2) and 
abandoned innovation (Section 6.3.3). The representation of the network of 
innovators for each innovation stage supports the examination of the empirical 
evidence. 
6.3.1 Network of innovators for commercialized innovations in the period 2006-
2009 
The investigation in this section provides evidence on the three issues referred to 
above. Figure 6.1 supports the visualisation of the network of innovators for the 
commercialised innovation stage during the period April 2006-April 2009. It depicts 
the actors engaged in the network of innovators and the cluster of nodes to which 
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they belong, and also which actors are functioning as bridges within the network of 
innovators. It shows whether ties are tightly or loosely-connected.
252
 
Innovative firms and inter-organisational ties 
The examination of how many and which firms innovated during the period 2006-
2009 and whether they created external ties to support their innovation, shows that 
almost all Campinas firms innovated during that period.
253
 This finding was expected 
because it is intrinsic to the software industry that most software development 
involves innovation (Brooks Jr., 1995; Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001; Rousseva, 2008; 
Steinmueller, 1996; Torrisi, 1998). Forty percent of interviewed firms did not create 
an external tie to support their innovation activities, but innovated alone. Only four 
firms engaged in the main cluster of nodes, five firms created binary ties and three 
firms created triad ties.  
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 As discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.5.2, it is important to highlight that this representation is not 
intended to reproduce the structure of the network as analysed in other studies employing social 
network analysis methodology. Rather, it is a representation indicating patterns of ties among network 
actors within a particular institutional setting. 
253
 The exception is one firm that was incubated and had not commercialised the innovation at the 
time of data collection. 
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Figure 6.1 The Campinas software network of innovators: commercialized innovations during 2006-2009 
 
Legend: 
● Firms 
♦ Technology sub-network 
■ Skills sub-network 
▲Business sub-network 
● Financial sub-network 
Tight connections =   
Loose connections =  
□= Firms that did not create external ties to support their commercialised innovation. 
○= Autonomous private non-profit R&D organisations originally set up by multinationals that are disengaged from the network of innovators.  
Note: Firm 8 did not commercialise innovations during the period under analysis.  
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection.
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The ties outside from the main cluster were mostly with incubators. This may be 
important because once firms become more mature they tend not to refer to 
incubators as formal collaborators, even if an innovation was developed during the 
incubation period. For instance, three firms matured after 2006 but did not refer to 
incubators as formal collaborators for the commercialised innovation.
254
 However, 
this does not mean that firms did not acknowledge the importance of incubators. As 
already discussed, they found their support especially crucial for setting up their 
business, but dropped them as collaborators later. The above discussion leads to the 
conclusion that the Campinas network of innovators is fragmented rather than well-
knit. This network characteristic suggests that there is low level diffusion of 
information in the network of innovators, which might have implications for network 
effectiveness (as discussed by Burt, 1992). This issue is addressed later in this 
section. 
Tightness of inter-organisational ties 
Although the structure of the network is not well-knit, the majority of ties are tightly-
connected as opposed to loosely-connected (where tightness of ties is determined by 
their motivation and frequency). This finding indicates ties were created for reasons 
of trust, collective identity, personal relationships, and knowledge availability and 
accessibility. Also, in most cases geographical proximity supported the creation of 
tightly-connected ties.
255
 These were expected findings because direct ties are 
frequently associated with tight connections. In addition, as Asheim and Gertler 
(2004) show, local contexts support trust building among actors (i.e. corroborating 
Callon’s (1999) claim that economic actors rarely take decisions based on arm’s 
length relationships); and networks support the breeding of trustworthy relationships 
(Giuliani, 2010). Conversely, we found that there were direct loosely-connected ties, 
which were motivated by opportunities, financial issues or requirements for ties. 
Hence, the investigation of loosely-connected ties became relevant.  
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 Campinas fieldwork firm interviews. 
255
 However, we found one firm had a tightly-connected tie with a collaborator outside the region 
(university department) and one of the motivations for its creation was collective identity. The firm 
performs in a very specific market niche (is one of the few to develop the software application in the 
country), and there are only a few university departments that create knowledge related to the 
software developed by the firm. Therefore, community involved in innovations in that area is small; 
when professionals get to know one another they feel part of the community. Campinas fieldwork 
firm interview. 
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We find that loosely-connected ties occur more frequently among network actors in 
the skills and technology sub-networks and generally involved two of the firms in the 
main cluster of nodes, Firms 14 and 17. The existence of loosely-connected ties was 
an unexpected result, because ties created with organisations involved in the creation 
of new knowledge or technology (such as universities and R&D organisations), are 
supposedly motivated by trust, collective identity, knowledge availability and 
accessibility. These motivations were not the appropriate for some of the ties created 
by Firms 14 and 17, as explained below.  
The motivations that justified the loosely connection of Firm 14 were opportunity 
and cost. Cost related to ties created with funding organisations. Opportunity applied 
to ties with a university department and a R&D organisation, both outside the region. 
These motivations are related to the inconsistencies of the skills and technology sub-
networks (discussed in Section 6.2). Although the inter-regional ties were loosely-
connected, it is important to highlight that actors engaged in the Campinas network 
of innovators are able to and do access other network actors outside their region. 
This might be relevant for avoiding the network lock-in and sclerosis, discussed by 
Grabher (1993). 
Although we classify Firm 17 as having loosely-connected ties, we need to look at 
the motives for these ties with three university departments. They were based on a 
customer requirement and as part of the contract terms (as discussed in Section 6.2). 
Therefore, we can assume that they might not have been formed without such a 
requirement, which makes them rather ‘ephemeral’.  
For ties created with the technology sub-network, we find that although there are six 
private non-profit R&D organisations and one laboratory in the region, only Firm 4 
engaged with one of the R&D organisations, CTI/CenPRA. This was a tightly-
connected tie. However, the interviewee explained the motivations for its creation, as 
follows: 
I always engage with FEEC-Unicamp first. I am doing my Masters there and 
have a strong and trustworthy relationship with my supervisor, we [firm and 
supervisor] have collaborated before. Once we [firm and supervisor] have a 
common project, then we involve CTI/CenPRA. This is because my 
supervisor has a strong relationship with some of their [CTI/CenPRA] 
researchers, who are also students at FEEC-Unicamp. Some of them are my 
classmates. Thus, the engagement of CTI/CenPRA occurs as a consequence, 
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and it is always bridged by my supervisor (Campinas fieldwork firm 
interview).
256
 
Although only CTI/CenPRA has ties to a local firm, some interviewees mentioned 
cases where their firms had local R&D organisations as customers (although not 
during the period analysed in this thesis), for work outsourced as part of their 
innovation activities. This suggests a hierarchical relationship between Campinas 
software firms and local R&D organisations, meaning that these organisations are 
able to outsource development activities to firms, but local firms may only be able to 
access and employ knowledge created by the centres for their own innovation 
activities, when the R&D organisations are their customers.
257
 However, the 
innovation projects developed by the firms sampled in this research did not involve 
R&D organisation participation as a customer. Section 6.2 shows that ties created 
with customers rarely involve features related to the acquisition of knowledge and 
technology.
258
  
The loosely connections between local firms and FAPESP and CNPq corroborate the 
inconsistency of the skills sub-network related to public research funding 
organisations, discussed in Section 6.2.2. In addition, these organisations have a 
small number of ties with innovative firms engaged in the network of innovators. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, Campinas firms complained about frequent 
delays on the part of the funding organisation in the proposal assessment stage, 
which tended to hamper innovation activities whose performance depended on the 
funding organisation.
259
 This is important because most firms in the region are micro 
or small firms,
260
 with little capacity to finance new developments using only 
internal capital. Both local firms and funding organisations acknowledged that 
funding support to the IT industry generally (not just software firms) is not 
synchronised with the speed of innovation in this industry. Funding organisations 
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 This quote confirms Callon’s (1999) claims that network actors are not guided by arm’s length 
decision making. 
257
 Campinas interviews numbers 2, 5, and 39. 
258
 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, most of the other R&D organisations (not formally connected to 
a local firm) were set up by multinational firms to benefit from the Informatics Law. E.g.Ericsson 
founded Venturus, Samsung founded SIDI, Motorola founded Instituto Eldorado, and Lucent 
Technologies found Fitec (therefore CPqD and Wernher von Braun are exceptions). These R&D 
organisations were set up as autarchies mainly to support their founders’ development activities (Ritz, 
2008; Stefanuto, 2004) 
259
 Campinas interviews numbers 21, 27, 31, 35, 36, and 42.  
260
 This includes firms not part of the sample of interviewed firms; see Chapter 4 above for the profile 
of local firms. 
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tend to replicate funding mechanisms used to support traditional sectors, whose 
needs are different from those of high-technology and technology-based firms. As 
already mentioned, this finding points to institutional rigidity in the public funding 
organisations.  
Secondly, there seems to be a bias among funding organisations towards 
academically oriented research and research proposals for grants. As discussed 
above, this sometimes required firms to adopt an academic type format for their 
business research proposals, which was time consuming and because they often did 
not have the required expertise, incurred extra costs in the form of consultancy 
advice.  
Bridging organisations within the network of innovators 
The third issue is which organisations may become or are already functioning as 
bridges within the network of innovators. The importance of bridging organisations 
relates to the argument that the main advantages of participation in a network of 
innovators include the possibility of learning-by-interacting, and benefitting from 
network externalities (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Therefore, bridging organisations 
prospectively support the creation of ties among firms, and between firms and other 
network actors. The network of innovators depicted in Figure 6.1 (p. 176 above) 
suggests that there are some organisations with indirect ties to firms within the main 
cluster of nodes. The functioning of these organisations requires special 
consideration. 
The first consideration is that there are a few bridging organisations (as opposed to 
firms) in the main cluster of nodes (which reduces the diffusion of information), and 
they are part of the skills (FAPESP and IC-Unicamp) and financial (FINEP) sub-
networks. The second consideration is that close investigation of the aims of 
FAPESP and FINEP, together with empirical evidence from local firms,
261
  indicates 
a low likelihood of these two organisations fostering the creation of ties among firms 
indirectly connected to them. This is mainly because assessment of proposals for 
grants is done ‘blind’ and there is no personal contact between firms and grant 
application reviewers. This applies also to contacts between firms and administrative 
staff involved in project implementation. This seems to apply especially to FAPESP: 
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 Fieldwork interviews numbers 16, 23 and 46. 
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our [firm’s] relationship with FAPESP is very distant, we [firm] do not 
know who is dealing with our grant, we always talk to the ‘system’, there is 
a generic email that we communicate with. We believe that it is set up in 
such way to avoid favouritisms in future applications. With FINEP is 
different, there a technical assistant responsible for our grant, we know who 
this person is, and it seems to work better, there is less bureaucracy, we talk 
directly to the person who can help us solve problems (Campinas fieldwork 
firm interview).  
However, it is neither FINEP’s nor FAPESP’s job to connect firms that have already 
received grants from the organisation. Nevertheless, both organisations act as bridges 
by providing funds through special calls or programmes that require the creation of 
ties among firms or between firms and actors which may belong to the skills and 
technology sub-networks (this conforms to the ‘thematic funding’ technology policy 
channel discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). 
IC-Unicamp (the Computing Science Institute) also plays a bridging role. Figure 6.1 
(p. 176 above) shows that IC-Unicamp has formal ties with two firms. Empirical 
evidence shows that IC-Unicamp could and is likely to function as a bridge between 
these two firms, and other firms within the network of innovators. However, this role 
is not likely to be at the organisational level, and relates to faculty member’s 
individual initiatives and relationships. Thus, this bridging role may be limited by the 
low number of IC-Unicamp faculty members who are interested in creating ties with 
the private sector.
262
 Although, faculty members play an important role as some sort 
of ‘gatekeepers’ of the IC-Unicamp community (which includes former 
undergraduate and post-graduate students), faculty members are knowledgeable and 
able to share valuable information with local firms. In that sense, IC-Unicamp 
functions as a bridging organisation in the Campinas network of innovators.  
We found also that over its history IC-Unicamp has created a community of former 
students (alumni). These individuals are part of an informal network in which 
‘collective identity’ is relevant for the sharing of information on new markets 
opportunities and firm strategies (see Pavitt, 1987, on communities of common 
knowledge). The virtual network ‘Unicamp Ventures’ and the creation of the 
ActMinds export consortium (discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2) are two examples 
of IC-Unicamp acting as an informal bridging organisation in the region. According 
to Marinho and Simis (2007), and fieldwork interviews, there is a high level of trust 
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 Campinas interviews numbers 1, 2, 11, 23, 26, 35, 42 and 44.  
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among ActMinds firms, and the fact that many eventual entrepreneurs studied at IC-
Unicamp is important for trust building among firms, and for the success of the 
consortium.
263
  
A final comment on bridging organisations not depicted in Figure 6.1 (p. 176 above), 
relates to the role of local incubators. Although none of the three local incubators is 
tied to the main cluster of nodes, they function as bridges for tie creation between 
incubated and ‘graduate’ firms. This is because the managers of incubators are very 
knowledgeable about both groups of firms, and are likely to suggest contacts for 
collaboration (either formal or informal). This applied to ongoing innovation, which 
is analysed in Section 6.3.2. 
6.3.2 Network of innovators for ongoing innovations in the period 2006-2009 
This section investigates the Campinas software network of innovators in the 
ongoing innovation stage during 2006-2009. It examines: i) how many and which 
firms performed innovation activities, either alone or in collaboration with other 
network actors; ii) the tightness of the ties among Campinas software firms and 
between firms and other organisations; and iii) which firms and network actors are 
functioning (or are likely to function) as bridges within the network of innovators. 
Innovative firms and inter-organisational ties 
The empirical evidence on ongoing innovation by Campinas software firms shows 
that the network of innovators is different from that depicted in Figure 6.1 (p. 176 
above). There are fewer firms (18) involved in innovation in the ongoing stage 
compared to the commercialised stage analysed in the previous section (20 firms). 
Firms 1, 18 and 21 commercialised their innovation near to the time of data 
collection (May/June 2009) and were not involved in a new innovation at the time of 
the interviews; Firm 8 was not involved in commercialised innovation but was 
developing an ongoing innovative service. Figure 6.2 supports the visualisation of 
the network of innovators for the ongoing innovation stage during the period April 
2006-April 2009.   
 
                                                 
263
 Campinas fieldwork organisational interview. For detailed information on ActMinds creation see 
Marinho and Simis (2007). 
  
183 
  
  
 
Figure 6.2 The Campinas software network of innovators: ongoing innovations during 2006-2009 
 
Legend: 
● Firms 
♦ Technology sub-network  
■ Skills sub-network  
▲Business sub-network  
● Financial sub-network 
Tight connections =   
Loose connections =  
□= Firms that did not create external ties to support their ongoing innovation. 
○= Autonomous private non-profit R&D organisations originally set up by multinationals that are disengaged from the network of innovators. 
◊ = Firms that did not have ongoing innovations at the time of data collection. 
     = Actors in which firms broke ties from the commercialised innovation stage. 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
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The number of firms with external ties to support their ongoing innovation was 
almost the same as in the commercialised innovation stage (Section 6.3.1). However, 
for the ongoing innovation stage there is no core cluster of nodes, but instead several 
small clusters or isolated dyadic ties. This suggests that the level of diffusion of 
information within the network of innovators is low (i.e., similar to the finding for 
commercialised innovation - Figure 6.1). This low level of diffusion might have 
negative implications for the effectiveness of the network (Burt, 1992) and may 
suggest the absence of links within the network (discussed in Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 
Lastres and Cassiolato, 2001, Chaminade and Vang, 2008, Padilla-Pérez et al., 2009 
and Lundvall et al., 2009 with regards to the systems of innovation in developing 
countries). 
Tightness of inter-organisational ties  
The structure of the network of innovators shows that many of the ties created for the 
commercialised innovations stage do not exist in the ongoing innovation stage, and 
the network actors disappear from the network. Most of these were loosely-
connected ties with skills sub-network actors, such as the Paraiba Federal University, 
USP, Unimar, Unesp and CNPq, and also CESAR, which is part of the technology 
sub-network. All of these actors are outside the Campinas region. The breaking 
down of these ties in the ongoing of innovation stage indicates that geographical 
proximity may affect the strength of these ties and their maintenance over time. It 
may indicate also that when an innovation gets to market, the partners may re-assess 
what they are gaining from a link and abandon it if it is seen as no longer useful. It is 
consistent also with the expectation that loosely-connected ties are more vulnerable 
to breakage than tightly-connected ties.  
However, two actors outside the region were involved in tightly-connected ties in the 
commercialised stage and were dropped in the ongoing stage. In this case, 
geographical distance was not an impediment to the creation of tightly-connected 
ties. Despite geographical distance, both firms collaborated with these actors which 
were involved in research very close to the expertise of the firm, as stated by one of 
the interviewees: 
we [firm] have collaborations with ‘x’ [research university department] 
because they perform research very close to what we do, we [firm] feel that 
we [firm and research university department] belong to the same community 
especially because there are not many actors in the country that do what we 
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do. The reason why we are not collaborating with them at the moment is 
because there is no ongoing project that requires collaboration, but in the 
future we would not hesitate to create ties with them (Campinas fieldwork 
firm interview). 
Secondly, although the ties were tightly-connected, they were not maintained for the 
ongoing innovation stage, which suggests that the geographical distance could have 
become an obstacle for the maintenance of the ties (but not for tie creation). There 
were four firms (3, 5, 8 and 10) that had created ties during the ongoing innovation 
stage rather than the commercialised stage. The tightness of these ties varied, but the 
patterns were similar to the commercialised stage of loosely-connected ties with 
FINEP and FAPESP and tightly-connected ties with IC-Unicamp.  
A novelty in this stage was the appearance of suppliers as collaborators. However, 
their low frequency (ties by two firms) and the different tightness of the ties did not 
allow the identification of a pattern of ties with suppliers. There were not ties with 
customers in this stage, which is somewhat surprising because customers are 
assumed to be important for small and micro firms software developers for learning-
by-interacting. However, ties created during a period when revenues are accruing 
come under pressure because of different expectations about the benefits that should 
flow from the interaction. 
We find that most ties were tightly-connected, and some firms with tightly-
connected ties had maintained their ties over time. Again, this was expected for the 
reasons discussed in Section 6.3.1. In the case of loosely-connected ties these were 
mostly with FINEP and FAPESP and were motivated by cost and opportunity, that 
is, they replicated the patterns found for commercialised innovations (discussed in 
Section 6.3.1) and corroborate the inconsistency with expectations for the technology 
and financial sub-networks discussed in Section 6.2.3 and Section 6.2.4.  
Bridging organisations within the network of innovators 
Bridging organisations, showed the same pattern as discussed in Section 6.3.1. 
FAPESP, FINEP and IC-Unicamp functioned very similarly in the ongoing 
innovation stage compared to the commercialised innovation stage. However, there 
are two differences. Firstly, Incamp (Unicamp incubator) functions as a bridge 
between innovators, in this case geographical proximity was important for the 
creation of ties: 
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the incubator has put us [interviewed firm and collaborating firm] in contact, 
they [incubator] are aware of what each incubated firm does, and from this 
referral we [interviewed firm and collaborating firm] concluded that could 
use the complementary expertise developed by our firms to work on a new 
product. The fact that we are incubated supported the building of trust for 
the collaboration, and because we share the same facilities the 
communication is very easy (Campinas fieldwork firm interview).  
Incamp also functions indirectly as a bridge, as stated by the interviewee: 
the incubator supports us [incubated firms] with several issues, but maybe 
more importantly they [incubator] support us by facilitating access to 
Unicamp faculty members. I have contacted some faculty members to 
explore the possibility of collaborations and felt that because the firm is 
incubated at Incamp they [faculty members] are more open to talk to us 
[interviewed firm]. They [faculty members] may not be willing to 
collaborate, but at least they will agree to talk. I think they feel that we 
belong to the same community, because we are located on the campus. Now 
we [firm] are collaborating with a Unicamp faculty member (Campinas 
fieldwork firm interview). 
Figure 6.2 (p. 183 above) does not capture the indirect role played by Incamp in 
bridging between network actors. This shows that close examination is required for a 
full understanding of how networks of innovators are structured and how they 
function, as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1. 
This section shows that the number of firms that commercialised innovations during 
the period 2006-2009 did not change considerably in the ongoing innovation stage 
and neither did the patterns related to the tightness of ties. However, during the 
abandoned innovation stage, there were several changes (see Section 6.3.3). 
6.3.3 Network of innovators in abandoned innovation stage in the period 2006-
2009 
The empirical findings show that the majority of Campinas software firms did not 
abandon any innovation activities during the period 2006-2009 and also among firms 
that did most had no external ties to support their innovation. In this case, the over 
fragmented structure of the network compared to the other two investigated 
innovation stages (i.e. commercialised and ongoing innovation stages) suggests both 
an ineffective network and an absence of links to support firms’ innovation activities. 
Figure 6.3 represents the structure of the network of innovators in the abandoned 
innovation stage.  
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Figure 6.3 The Campinas software network of innovators: abandoned innovations during 2006-2009 
 
Legend: 
● Firms 
♦ Technology sub-network  
■ Skills sub-network 
▲Business sub-network 
● Financial sub-network 
Tight connections =   
Loose connections =  
□= Firms that did not create external ties to support their abandoned innovation. 
○= Autonomous private non-profit R&D organisations originally set up by multinationals that are disengaged from the network of innovators. 
     = Firms that did not abandon innovations for the analysed period. 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
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We find that Firm 15 created external ties to support their innovation for the first 
time, however, they were loosely-connected ties. The innovation performance of 
Firm 15 depended on successful application for public funding, which did not 
happen and explains why the innovation activity was abandoned and the ties broken.  
We see that the majority of direct ties were loosely-connected. This result is 
unexpected because in the two innovation stages analysed previously 
(commercialised and ongoing) most direct ties were tightly-connected. The higher 
frequency of loosely-connected ties in abandoned innovations indicates that such ties 
are more vulnerable to breaking, even in the cases of ties created with skills and 
technology sub-network actors (as discussed above, ties with skills and technology 
sub-network actors are expected to relate to tightly-connected ties).  
Figure 6.3 shows that there were few bridging organisations involved in the 
abandoned innovation stage and none was connected local firms: they were isolated 
ties. 
6.3.4 Summary 
This section investigated three characteristics of the Campinas software network of 
innovators: i) whether local software firms created external ties to support their 
innovation activities, in the three stages analysed, that is, commercialised, ongoing 
and abandoned innovations, in the period 2006-2009; ii) the tightness of dyadic ties 
created by firms to support their innovation activities; and iii) which organisations 
functioned as bridges in the network of innovators. Analysis of the three stages 
demonstrates that there is a pattern in the Campinas local software network of 
innovators regardless of the innovation stages: i) most local firms tend to create 
external ties for innovation; although the number of collaborating actors is small they 
are in the majority in the business sub-network; ii) the network is more likely to be 
composed of fragmented clusters of nodes rather than being well-knit; iii) most 
direct ties are tightly-connected ties (with the exception of the abandoned innovation 
stage); iv) although there are bridging organisations in the commercialised and 
ongoing innovation stages, only IC-Unicamp and incubators are more likely to foster 
the creation of ties among local firms.  
Analysis of the dyadic ties created by firms discussed in this section and of the 
consistency of sub-networks (Section 6.2) provides evidence on the governance of 
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the Campinas network of innovators. The structural and relational embeddedness of 
this network is related to the institutional context in which local firms innovated 
during the period under analysis, June 2006-June 2009. Section 6.4 investigates the 
innovation activities of Campinas local firms, and discusses how network 
governance influenced innovation performance in the region.  
6.4 Campinas software network: innovation at firm level  
This section investigates firm-level software innovation in the three stages analysed. 
The aim is to identify which firms are innovating, whether they are connected or 
disconnected to the main cluster of nodes, and how many and what is the degree of 
novelty (firm or market level) of their innovations. Section 6.4.1 investigates 
commercialised innovations in the period 2006-2009; Section 6.4.2 investigates the 
ongoing innovations at the time of data collection. Section 6.4.3 examines 
innovations abandoned during this period. 
6.4.1 Commercialized innovations  
This section investigates commercialised innovations by Campinas software firms in 
2006-2009. The empirical findings show that more commercialised innovations 
relate to software services (17 firms) than software products (6 firms). In software 
products, two firms (2 and 7) stand out for the number of their innovations. Table 6.5 
summarises the innovation performance of local firms that commercialised software 
products. 
Firm 2 commercialised innovations that were new to the firm, that is, there are 
similar software products in the market (both national and international). This firm 
had external ties with the Incamp incubator (see Section 6.3). Firm 7 commercialised 
more product innovations, all of which were new to the national market and three of 
which were new to the world (the international market). There were no competitors 
to Firm 7’s innovations on the national market. However, none of these innovations 
had been exported at the time of data collection. This firm has external ties with two 
skill sub-network actors (university departments) that supported two of their 
commercialised innovations. There are a few reasons for this firm’s outstanding 
performance compared to other local firms that commercialised software products. 
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Table 6.5 New software products commercialized by Campinas 
software firms during the period June 2006- June 2009 
 Total number 
of innovations 
Innovation new 
to firm 
Innovation new to 
national market 
Innovation new to 
international 
market 
Firm2 6 6 0 0 
Firm5 2 2 1 0 
Firm7 10+ 10+ 10+ 3 
Firm13  3 3 1 0 
Firm14 3 3 2 0 
Firm16 2 2 1 0 
Total 26 26 15 3 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
Firstly, this firm is an informal ‘spin-off’ from IC-Unicamp: 
we [firm’s entrepreneurs] were studying at IC and worked in a research 
project. The project was very successful and we realised that there was a 
market opportunity for a new product, the customer that financed the project 
with IC decided to develop this product with us [the firm]. There was no 
competitor in Brazil that could produce this new product, so we [firm and 
customer] decided to have a go and it has been a successful partnership 
(Campinas fieldwork firm interview).  
Second, Firm 7 maintained a strong ongoing relationship with the IC research group 
through formal training of its employees (Masters and Doctoral training), and a 
relationship based on trust. Relationship based on human resources training is not 
captured by the representation of the networks of innovators in Figure 6.1 (p. 176 
above). As discussed in Section 6.3.1, this endorses the need for very close 
examination to explain the functioning of networks of innovators and firms’ 
innovativeness. Firm 7 also had the highest number of new software services 
commercialised during the period 2006-2009, both new to the firm and also to the 
national and international markets. However, again, they had not exported them at 
the time of data collection. It seems this firm is investing in the national market only. 
We found that most firms introduced a maximum of four new services to the market 
during the period 2006-2009, mostly innovations new to the firm and the national 
market. Firms that had innovated at world level were in the minority. Table 6.6 
summarises the software services innovations commercialised during the period 
2006-2009. The empirical evidence presented in Table 6.6 shows that eight firms 
produced more than four software services innovations. 
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Table 6.6 New software services commercialized by Campinas 
software firms during the period June 2006- June 2009 
Firm 
number 
Total 
number of 
innovations 
New to 
firm 
New to 
national 
market 
New to 
international 
market 
External 
collaborator 
Firm1  7 7 1 1 Yes 
Firm2 3 3 0 0 Yes 
Firm3  99 99 9 1 No 
Firm4 1 1 1 0 Yes 
Firm6  3 3 0 0 Yes 
Firm7 3 3 3 3 Yes 
Firm9  4 4 4 0 Yes 
Firm10 1 1 0 0 No 
Firm11 1 1 0 0 Yes 
Firm12 35 35 0 0 Yes 
Firm14 4 2 2 0 Yes 
Firm15  30 10 15 5 No 
Firm17  3 3 0 0 Yes 
Firm18  1 1 1 0 No 
Firm19  6 6 6 0 No 
Firm20 3 3 2 1 No 
Firm21 3 3 2 1 Yes 
Total 207 185 46 12 Yes 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
First, Firms 14 and 15 re-employed software services developed in the firm before 
the period 2006-2009, to provide new services for the national market.  
Firms 3 and 15 stand out for the number of commercialised software services at both 
the firm and the national market. Both firms also innovated at the international level, 
and in the case of Firm 3 the new service had been exported.
264
 The empirical 
evidence from the in-depth interviews with these two firms showed that they had 
some common characteristics: i) the firms were between 6 and 10 years old; ii) they 
had not established external ties to support their innovation, iii) they had graduated 
from the same incubator; iv) they grew through mergers with other Brazilian 
software firms; and v) they developed complementary software related to mobility 
(i.e. they were not competitors).  
                                                 
264
 Section 6.5 below addresses the issue of internalisation of local firms. 
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Firm 12 showed outstanding innovation performance at the level of the firm, had 
been a member of the same incubator as Firms 3 and 15 (the incubator was the only 
external tie created by Firm 12), and had developed software services related to 
mobility. These findings may indicate that due to the relatively young age of the 
mobility software industry, which is related also to the development of customised 
software (e.g. mobile games), there might be more market opportunities for Brazilian 
software firms to perform and innovate in this industry than in more mature and 
consolidated software market niches (e.g., development of ERP platforms, 
historically an oligopolistic market - see Chapter 3).
265
 
Firms 1, 20 and 21 had commercialised radical, new to the world innovation. None 
of them had been incubated.
266
 Firm 1 is one of the most successful software firms in 
the region, has international CMMI certification level 5, exports outsourcing services 
and has external ties only with customers.  
Firm 20 is a case of an informal ‘spin-off’ from IBM Brasil. The firm’s founder is a 
former IBM Brasil employee who decided to leave IBM to set-up an independent 
firm to develop software services for IBM. The professional ties between the 
entrepreneur and IBM guaranteed procurement for the first years of operation and 
being a supplier to IBM provided immediate reputation.
267
  
Firm 21 is one of the oldest and largest local firms in the region and is involved in 
automated banking, an industry where Brazil has a good international reputation; 
local firms in automated banking industry have worked to develop sophisticated 
software products and services (although this industry mostly supplies the domestic 
market) (Softex, 2005). 
Among new software services commercialised during 2006-2009 by Campinas 
software firms, are the innovations produced by Firm 14. According to Table 6.6 this 
firm’s innovation level is not outstanding in terms of new to the world inventions, 
Figure 6.1 (p. 176 above) in Section 6.3 shows that this firm created the highest 
number of external ties to support its innovation activities. Two of its innovations 
were new to the national market, which means that they were no national 
                                                 
265
 Britto et al. (2007: 11) address this issue. 
266
 Campinas fieldwork firm interviews. 
267
 Campinas fieldwork firm interview. 
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competitors when their services were commercialised.
268
 This firm spun-off from 
one the most successful software firms in the region, was incubated for two years, 
and received some private venture capital investment. The venture capitalist was 
introduced to the firm by one of the incubator’s consultants, who thus functioned as a 
bridge. In turn, the venture capitalist bridged between the firm and a group of 
international students, who were involved in a month long firm visit. According to an 
interviewee, this experience with the international students was very productive: 
we got in contact with them [international university department] via the 
venture capitalist. They [international visitors] spent one month here [at the 
firm] and we [members of the firm] spent one month at ‘x’ [international 
university]. Our firm was used by them [international students] as a case 
study for a module in one of their programme. Because we [firm] were the 
case study, they had to get an in-depth understanding of how the firm 
functioned, and what we do. In explaining these issues to them, we also 
learnt a lot about our firm. In addition, their [international students] final 
report was extremely useful in pointing to ways that we could improve the 
firm’s performance in the short term (Campinas Firm 14 interview). 
This firm had received grants from FINEP and CNPq. It did not cite the incubator or 
the venture capitalist as external collaborators in its innovation activities. However, 
the in-depth interviews reinforced the relevance of these actors to the firm’s growth. 
The firm was in the youngest firm age group (less than 5 years) and had grown from 
a micro to a small firm during the five year period. The firm is part of the ActMinds 
export consortium (Chapter 4, Section 4.2) and has an office in the USA to prospect 
new markets in that country. This discussion suggests: i) that Firm 14 engaged in an 
effective network as discussed by Burt (1992), evidenced by its direct and tightly-
connected ties based on trust, and collaborated for access to reliable and relevant 
information; and ii) that firms with former links to successful organisations (e.g. 
Firms 7 and 14) and participate in the network of innovators,
269
 are capable of 
continuous successful performance. However, since Firms 7 and 14 are exceptions in 
the sample, we cannot reach a firm conclusion about this.  
6.4.2 Ongoing innovations  
This section investigates ongoing innovation by Campinas software firms in the 
period 2006-2009, summarised in Table 6.7.  
                                                 
268
 Only two other firms (16 and 9) in the same age group as Firm 14 managed to commercialise 
innovations that were new to the firm and the national market. 
269
 As already mentioned, Firm 7 is an informal spin-off from IC-Unicamp. 
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Table 6.7 Ongoing software innovations by Campinas software firms 
during the period June 2006- June 2009 
Firm number Number of ongoing 
innovations 
External collaborator 
Firm1 0 - 
Firm2 1 Yes 
Firm3 1 Yes 
Firm4 1 Yes 
Firm5 2 Yes 
Firm6 1 Yes 
Firm7 1 No 
Firm8 2 Yes 
Firm9 1 No 
Firm10 1 Yes 
Firm11 1 Yes 
Firm12 n.a. Yes 
Firm13 1 Yes 
Firm14 1 No 
Firm15 n.a. No 
Firm16 1 No 
Firm17 1 Yes 
Firm18 0 - 
Firm19 1 No 
Firm20 1 No 
Firm21 0 - 
Legend:  
n.a.= not available, firm did not disclose how many ongoing 
innovations. 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
 
The empirical evidence shows that most Campinas software firms were developing 
new software products or services in 2009, and almost half of them had created 
external ties to support this development. This was as expected because most firms 
develop customised software, the period of investigation was three years, and there 
was high likelihood of local software firms providing services or developing 
products for new customers within that period. Also, because most firms are micro or 
small firms they are likely to depend on customers to finance new innovations in 
order to survive in the market. However, close examination shows that only Firm 13 
was involved in ongoing innovation with demonstrated demand from a customer; the 
remaining firms were innovating for prospective demand. This result was unexpected 
and suggests that ongoing innovation performed locally does not require high fixed 
investment. However, the investment required for some of the innovations, was high, 
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and was provided by public funding through special programmes offering research 
grants (Firms 5, 10 and 17). 
The evidence presented in Table 6.7 indicates that although the number of innovative 
firms was high (18 out of 21 firms), the total number of innovations was 
considerably smaller than the number of commercialised innovations. This applies 
also to the number of actors engaged in the network of innovators, although the 
difference was not as much as for the number of innovations. 
The investigation of ongoing innovation does not analyse the degree of novelty of 
innovating firms inventions (i.e. new to the firm, the national or the international 
market). However, in-depth interviews with firms allowed examination of which 
firms created new ties to support their innovations, and which had a smaller number 
of external ties, e.g. Firm 14 and Firm 17. Among firms that created new ties, we 
found that four Campinas software firms (3, 5, 8 and 10) created external ties to 
support ongoing innovation, which differed from their strategy for the 
commercialised innovation stage discussed above, where it seems they innovated 
without the help of external knowledge (neither business, scientific nor 
technological). There are three relevant considerations related to these firms.  
Firstly, Firms 5 and 10 created external ties with public funding organisations, which 
indicated that local firms were able to access public funding over time. Secondly, 
Firm 8 was a ‘new’ innovator (it did not innovate during the commercialised 
innovation stage). It had ties with one of the three local incubators, and with another 
incubated firm; Firm 8 was one of the few firms that was working on two new 
innovations at the time of data collection.  
Thirdly, two of the firms (14 and 17) with the highest number of external ties in the 
commercialised stage had none or only a very few external ties in ongoing 
innovation stages. Most of Firm 17’s ties were created in the commercialised 
innovation stage and were with geographically distant actors; ties were mostly 
loosely-connected and were forged to meet the contractual requirements of 
customers. This suggests that Firm 17 prioritises the employment of internal 
knowledge only when developing new products and services.  
Firm 14 dispensed with all of its external ties created for the commercialised 
innovation stage. However, unlike Firm 17, it is a very young firm (less than 5 years 
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old at the time of data collection) and had a good innovation record for 
commercialised innovation (two innovations introduced at national market level). It 
was continuing to benefit from the results of these two commercialised innovations 
at the time of data collection, which together with its accelerated growth and access 
to public research funding was providing the firm with the capacity to invest in 
another new innovation project. The project was in its very early stages at the time of 
data collection, and the firm was performing it on its own. However, according to the 
interviewee, external ties could be renewed if it appeared they would help the 
innovation project’s development. 
6.4.3 Abandoned innovations  
Table 6.8 summarises the abandoned innovations for the sample firms in 2006-2009.  
The empirical evidences on abandoned innovations by Campinas software firms 
shows that just over half (12 out of 21) did not abandon innovation activities during 
the period May/June 2006-June 2009; and most firms that did had no external 
collaborators (only 3 out of 9 firms that abandoned innovations had external 
collaborators). The reasons for the innovation being abandoned varied, but close 
examination shows that they were strongly related to lack of demonstrated demand.  
Three firms (11, 15 and 20) abandoned their innovation projects for financial 
reasons: they had insufficient internal resources to invest in innovation. Chapter 5 
(Table 5.4) shows that these three firms were micro or small firms and were younger 
than 10 years, and their financial capacity to invest in innovations was limited 
compared to larger and older firms (as claimed by Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982).   
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Table 6.8 Abandoned software innovations by Campinas 
software firms during the period June 2006- June 2009 
Firm number Number of abandoned 
innovations 
External 
collaborator 
Firm1 0 - 
Firm2 0 - 
Firm3 2 No 
Firm4 1 No 
Firm5 0 - 
Firm6 0 - 
Firm7 1 No 
Firm8 0 - 
Firm9 0 - 
Firm10 5 Yes 
Firm11 1 Yes 
Firm12 0 - 
Firm13 0 - 
Firm14 0 - 
Firm15  1 Yes 
Firm16 0 - 
Firm17 0 - 
Firm18 1 No 
Firm19  0 - 
Firm20 1 No 
Firm21 1 No 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
Firm 3 was the only firm that cited lack of demand for the service as the explicit 
reason for its abandonment of the innovation project. Although Firm 21 is one of the 
oldest and largest local firms in the region, its reason for abandoning its innovation 
activity was also evidently related to lack of demand:  
we [firm] developed the project of a new product but realised that the 
investment for its development was too high and risky for the firm, so we 
[firm] abandoned the development before it began to cost too much for us 
[firm] (Campinas fieldwork Firm 21 interview).  
The findings on abandonment of innovation suggest that although Campinas 
software firms do not rely on demonstrated demand as a motivation for innovation 
(as discussed in Section 6.4.2), they are likely to abandon development activities if 
they see that the potential demand is unlikely to provide a good enough return from 
their investment.  
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6.4.4 Summary 
This section investigated and analysed the innovations of Campinas software firms in 
three innovation stages in the period 2006-2009, that is, commercialised, ongoing 
and abandoned innovations. Most commercialised innovations were new to the firm; 
only a small proportion of these innovations (6.5%) were new to the international 
market. However, most of the innovations new to the international market had not 
been commercialised abroad (Firm 3’s was the exception). These findings indicate 
that Brazilian software firms are making efforts to catch up with the more 
sophisticated products and services on the international market. However, they still 
aim mainly to supply the domestic market. This is a regular characteristic of the 
Brazilian software firms, as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.  
6.5 Internationalisation of Campinas software firms: Some 
observations 
The investigation of the innovations introduced by Campinas software firms and 
their market insertion allows some conclusions about their absorptive capacity and 
technological catching-up to the international technological frontier (Rousseva, 
2008). 
Table 6.9 summarises the findings in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 and suggests that there 
were outstanding innovative software firms in the Campinas software network of 
innovators. These firms introduced innovations to the national market (i.e. there were 
no national competitors at the time of the commercialisation of the innovation) and 
also to the international market (i.e. the commercialisation of the new software 
solution or service had no national or international competitors at the time of the 
innovation).  
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Table 6.9 Summary of Campinas software firms innovations, 2006-2009 
Firm 
number 
Market penetration 
Total number 
of innovations 
Commercialised Ongoing Abandoned 
Yes/ 
No 
External 
collaborator 
Yes/ 
No 
External 
collaborator 
Yes/ 
No 
External 
collaborator 
Firm1 Loc, Reg, Natl and Intl 7 Yes Yes No n.a. No n.a. 
Firm2 Regional 10 Yes Yes Yes Yes No n.a. 
Firm3 Natl and Intl 102 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Firm4 Reg and Intl 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Firm5 Natl and Intl 4 Yes No Yes Yes No n.a. 
Firm6 Local 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No n.a. 
Firm7 National 15 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Firm8 Regional 2 No n.a. Yes Yes No n.a. 
Firm9 National 5 Yes Yes Yes No No n.a. 
Firm10 Regional 7 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm11 National 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm12 Loc, Reg, Natl and Intl 35* Yes Yes Yes Yes No n.a. 
Firm13 National 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No n.a. 
Firm14 Natl and Intl 8 Yes Yes Yes No No n.a. 
Firm15 Natl and Intl 31* Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm16 Local 3 Yes No Yes No No n.a. 
Firm17 Regional 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No n.a. 
Firm18 National 2 Yes No No n.a. Yes No 
Firm19 Regional 7 Yes No Yes No No n.a. 
Firm20 Natl and Intl 5 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Firm21 Loc, Reg, Natl and Intl 4 Yes Yes No n.a. Yes No 
Legend: Loc= Local; Reg= Regional; Natl= National and Intl= International. 
 *= firm did not disclose the number of ongoing innovations, total number of innovation refer to commercialised and abandoned innovations. 
Source: Own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection.
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The relevance of this finding relates to the issue of catching-up by local firms. There 
seems to have been a shift in the strategy for catching up, with firms attempting 
some radical (mostly national level, and in some cases international level) 
innovation. 
The number of Campinas software firms that introduced innovations at either 
national or international level (the latter being more relevant) suggests that these 
firms are improving their absorptive capacity, crucial for technological catching up. 
A high level of absorptive capacity is one of the requirements for technological 
catch-up at firm-level (Rousseva, 2008). The absorptive capacity of software firms is 
directly related to their technological capability, and customers usually play a crucial 
role in building absorptive capacity, especially in customised software. This suggests 
that we should investigate the customers accessed by firms that innovated at the 
international level. 
These firms were involved in radical innovations, that is – Firm 1, Firm 3, Firm 7, 
Firm 15, Firm 20 and Firm 21 – and most of their customers were large firms (public 
or private), either Brazilian owned or MNC subsidiaries.
270
 These Brazilian software 
firms were able to improve their absorptive capacity and technological capability, 
which enabled them to compete with global software suppliers in the international 
market and to satisfy more sophisticated domestic demand.  
This applies to Firm 7. Although Firm 7 had not exported its innovation, it had 
managed to learn, replicate and improve a technology that previously was supplied to 
the Brazilian market by a global software supplier. According to the interviewee, the 
provision of this technology by a local supplier benefited the customer in two ways. 
It did not have to pay international licence fees for the use of the technology and also 
was able to obtain more customised software. The local firm did not charge a licence 
fee and was happy to tailor the technology to the customer’s requirements.271 This is 
an example of a major and crucial change in the Brazilian software market; until the 
late 1990s the Brazilian market for sophisticated software was satisfied by global 
suppliers. However, Brazilian software firms still face a major effort to become 
global players, including the need to develop complementary technological 
                                                 
270
 The evidence is based on public information available on firms’ websites. 
271
 Campinas fieldwork Firm 7 interview. 
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capabilities and the capacity to create reliable and internationally reputed brands 
(MIT-Softex, 2002; Steinmueller, 2001; Veloso et al., 2003). 
6.6 Conclusions 
The development of a national software industry depends upon particular historical 
and institutional events, and the specifics of these events, as well as the industry 
participants, which suggests a national or regional level of study is appropriate 
(Heeks et al., 2001; Steinmueller, 2001). An investigation of a national or regional 
software industry may support understanding of how, for example, the private and 
public sectors interact in this industry. Due to the complexity of software products, 
the development of new software requires the employment of different types of 
scientific and technological knowledge, which demands from firms different 
combinations of internal competencies, knowledge and experience with external 
sources of knowledge. These may happen through the creation of ties with 
supporting organisations such as universities, specialised suppliers, and users. The 
creation of such ties highlights the sectoral role in the formation of inter-
organisational networks of innovators in the software industry.  
This chapter investigated the Brazilian software industry in the region of Campinas. 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 analysed the governance of the Campinas software network of 
innovators examining respectively the structural and relational embeddedness of 
such network.
272
 Before we revisit the findings, a general comment on the incentives 
for development of the Brazilian software industry both nationally and regionally is 
appropriate.  
The Brazilian national government implemented policies to foster and support 
development of the local software industry from the late 1970s, and especially since 
the early 1990s. One of the main national government actions was the 
implementation of the Softex Programme, to foster interaction among regional actors 
supposed to be involved in software development (e.g. research universities and 
R&D organisations). The programme followed the systems of innovation approach 
that learning-by-interacting is crucial for firms and especially for the development of 
high-technology industries, which includes the software industry (see Chapter 3). 
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 As explained in Chapter 5, part of the Campinas network of actors was identified outside of this 
research, i.e. previous to the empirical data collection; this research involves analysing the extent to 
which these formally identified actors are interacting and how.  
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Over the 1990s and 2000s several national policies were implemented to support 
local software industry development, both through changes to the regulatory regime 
(e.g. amendments to the Informatics Law) and special programmes to provide 
financial support to local firms (e.g. the Prosoft programme by BNDES and special 
calls by FINEP). Within this institutional national context, Campinas has become the 
main Brazilian region for the development of software products and services.  
Campinas is embedded in a region that benefits from economic and scientific 
prosperity. The city is in São Paulo state, the most economically and industrially 
dynamic Brazilian state (Chapter 4, Section 4.2). One of the country’s leading 
research universities – Unicamp - is based in Campinas. Unicamp runs an incubation 
programme (Incamp) for technology-based firms and in the early 2000s, set up an 
Innovation Agency (Inova). The Campinas region also hosts several MNC 
subsidiaries, R&D organisations and Softex Campinas, the local agent that is still 
attached to the central administration of Softex National. In terms of regional 
policies directed to the development of the Campinas software industry, FAPESP 
(the São Paulo State Research Foundation) is the most important public funding 
organisation and provides financial support for local firms’ research activities 
through a special programme (PIPE, see Chapter 3). At city level, the Campinas City 
Council manages two high-technology parks and offers an incubation programme to 
technology-based firms, both managed by Ciatec (the Company for the Development 
of Campinas High-Technology Park). 
At the national, regional and local institutional and organisation level in relation to 
infrastructure to foster and support the Campinas local software industry, we 
examined the governance of the Campinas software network of innovators in terms 
of its structural embeddedness. The main findings reveal that the most frequently 
accessed and consistent sub-network is the business sub-network (Section 6.2.1). The 
skills sub-network shows unexpected inconsistency with what would be expected 
and the technology sub-network is mostly not involved with the network of 
innovators (Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3). In the financial sub-network, the only actor in 
the network of innovators is FINEP, a public funding agency. Thus, there are no 
private funding mechanisms supporting innovation activity. However, 4 of the 21 
firms interviewed had received venture capital funding, indicating that there was 
external private investment activity (although at low levels) in local firms during the 
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2000s. The level of inconsistency in the sub-networks is a sign that even if the 
relevant ties exist, they may not be functioning positively.   
The examination of relational embeddedness of the Campinas software network of 
innovators demonstrates that most direct ties created by local firms are tightly-
connected ties, and that in most cases geographical proximity supports the creation 
of such ties. There are a few exceptions, mostly in the case of Firms 10, 14 and 17. 
There are a few loosely-connected ties with skills sub-network actors, which in some 
cases were related to the inconsistency found for this sub-network. Overall, it seems 
that most firms create external ties for innovation aimed at resolving financial 
deficiencies and supplying commercial knowledge. Most firms’ software 
developments were based on internal technological and scientific knowledge.  
The creation of external ties was almost insignificant in the abandoned innovation 
stage, suggesting that innovation is abandoned before the stage of creating external 
ties. The visual representation of the Campinas network of innovators displayed in 
Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 suggest that the structure of the network of innovators is 
mostly fragmented as opposed to well-knit. This finding suggests that there are 
missing links in the Campinas network of innovators, and that formal interactions 
among firms, and between firms and other actors are not well diffused. 
Our examination of the governance of the Campinas software network of innovators 
for the three investigated innovation stages, that is, commercialised, ongoing and 
abandoned innovations, shows that the absolute number of innovations by Campinas 
firms is high, 265 innovations in the period June 2006-June 2009. However, most are 
novel only to the firm and are imitative rather than radical innovation. This 
demonstrates that Brazilian software firms are recombining existing knowledge often 
applied in local (as opposed to global) and vertical markets. It is common for 
innovations in software applications to require the understanding and use of localised 
knowledge. This result was expected, since it is a common feature of local software 
firms in developing countries. In addition, the low level of diffusion of interactions 
within the network of innovators was also expected, and relates to the imitative 
strategies of local firms. Imitative software firms often rely on experience-based 
learning and numbers of external ties are therefore low. This is the case for the 
Campinas software firms.  
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The discussion above provides information to respond to the research questions in 
Group A, reintroduced below.  
Research Question A1 
In considering government technology policy to promote firm innovation through 
networks in the case of the two Brazilian regions selected for analysis, how does 
regional level network governance and structure influence the effectiveness of 
policies supporting network creation in Brazil?      
The empirical findings show that the network governance and structure of the 
Campinas software network of innovators has a mixed influence on the effectiveness 
of government technology policies to encourage firm innovation. This is indicated by 
the different results for the structural embeddedness of the network of innovators 
compared to the results for relational embeddedness. The former show 
inconsistencies in a crucial sub-network, the skills sub-network, and very small 
involvement of technology sub-network actors. These two findings suggest a 
negative influence of Campinas software network governance and structure on the 
effectiveness of technology policies directed to firm-level innovation through the 
promotion of networks.  
The results for relational embeddedness indicate that most direct ties are tightly-
connected, a crucial feature in interactions aimed at knowledge exchange among 
actors. This finding suggests a positive influence of the Campinas software network 
governance and structure on the effectiveness of technology policies for firm-level 
innovation through the promotion of networks. However, the diffusion of formal ties 
is low, suggesting that Campinas software firms have not been as responsive, as 
might have been expected, to government policies aimed at promoting network 
formation. This may be an indication that there are low levels of interaction between 
technology policy and network governance and structure in a developing country 
context.  
Research Question A2 
What, if any, is the responsiveness of network governance and structure to 
technology policy aimed at the promotion of networks in Brazil? Does government 
policy promotion of networks and efforts to control network structure increase the 
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effectiveness of technology policy aimed at improving the innovative performance of 
Brazilian software firms? 
This chapter shows that the Campinas network of innovators has a fragmented rather 
than a well-knit structure, which suggests that there are important missing ties within 
the network of innovators and that the level of diffusion of formal interactions 
among this network actors is low. 
As already discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, the Campinas ICT industry, 
including software, has been the target of national, regional and local government 
technology policies since the early 1990s (the implementation of national policies 
goes even earlier). These policies include, among other things, support for network 
formation based on the argument that networks support learning-by-interaction, 
crucial for the acquisition of new knowledge and its improvement. These policies 
relate to the training of skilled human resources (higher education), the performance 
of IT research by the local public research university and R&D organisations, 
provision of public funding for private research performed by firms, and special 
programmes to foster the creation of formal ties between the private sectors and 
knowledge creators.  
Based on the findings in this chapter, we see that the responsiveness of the Campinas 
software firms to government policies aimed to promote network formation is low 
compared to the potential for interactions among firms and between firms and other 
organisations. The results for the Campinas case show there was limited interaction 
between technology policy and network governance and structure. Taking into 
account that Campinas software firms show high innovative performance, and that a 
large share of innovative firms relied on internal sources for developing their 
innovation activities (especially the development and employment of new knowledge 
and technology), we can conclude that Campinas software firms prioritised learning-
by-experience over learning-by-interacting. This questions the framework of network 
formation as a government policy instrument to support firms’ innovation and 
regional industrial development.  
The Recife software network case study is examined in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7 - EMPIRICAL RESULTS II: THE RECIFE 
SOFTWARE NETWORK 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 investigates governance of the Recife regional software network of 
innovators during the period 2006-2009, and how network governance and structure 
may have influenced Recife software firms’ innovative performances in that period. 
Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) provided evidence on the structure of the Recife network and 
showed that, until the mid-1980s, IT related activities in the region were performed 
mainly by two private organisations. There was little activity after that in Recife until 
national government policies were implemented the early 1990s to support the 
region’s software development (through the Softex Programme), which, together 
with state policies implemented by the early 2000s, have supported the emergence 
and development of the Recife software industry. Recife has become the leading 
software region in the Brazilian Northeast.   
The chapter exploits the indicators developed in Chapter 5 to investigate the features 
and motivations for firms’ creation of formal dyadic ties to support their innovation 
activities. It draws also upon the indicators of firm-level innovation. Chapter 5 
demonstrated that the Recife software network was defined ex-ante to the empirical 
data collection and here we explore whether there are relations between network 
members, and how they interact. Section 7.2 addresses issues related to the structural 
embeddedness of the governance of the Recife network of innovators, investigating 
the evidence provided by the features of dyadic tie creation which are indicative of 
the consistency of each of the four sub-networks under examination (i.e. the 
business, skills, technology, and financial sub-networks).  
Section 7.3 addresses issues related to the relational embeddedness of the 
governance of the Recife network of innovators and the motivation for and tightness 
of firms’ ties (tightness being determined by the motivation for and frequency of 
ties). In this section, we introduce a visual representation of the network of 
innovators and investigate which organisations function or are likely to function as 
bridges within the network of innovators.   
Section 7.4 examines Recife firm level software innovations in three innovation 
stages– commercialised, ongoing and abandoned. The aim is to identify which firms 
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are innovating, whether they are connected or disconnected to the main cluster of 
network nodes, and the degree of novelty of their innovations: i) firm level (i.e. new 
practices or outputs for the firm not new to all other firms); ii) national market level 
(i.e. practices or outputs new to firms in Brazil); or iii) international market level (i.e. 
practices or outputs new to the world). Section 7.5 introduces a few observations on 
the catching-up process of Recife software firms and Section 7.6 concludes with a 
summary of the evidence to answer the research questions in ‘Group A’ (introduced 
in Chapter 5). 
7.2 The Recife network of innovators: tie creation and consistency of 
the four sub-networks  
This section investigates the consistency of each of the business, skills, technology 
and financial sub-networks. We discuss three innovation stages - commercialised, 
ongoing and abandoned innovations – related to the examination of these sub-
networks. The empirical findings on the features of the innovation related ties 
created by firms demonstrate the consistency of the sub-networks. Consistency is 
indicated by the level of overlap between the nature of ties created by firms and the 
organisations’ stated, self-defined aims. Section 7.2.1 addresses the business sub-
network, Section 7.2.2 the skills sub-network, Sections 7.2.3 the technology and 
7.2.4 the financial sub-network. Section 7.2.5 summarises Section 7.2. 
7.2.1 Consistency of the business sub-network 
The business sub-network was the most frequently accessed by Recife local software 
firms, that is, there were more firm ties with business sub-network actors than with 
actors in the other three sub-networks, in all the innovation stages investigated. The 
results are as follows: i) 9 firms created 16 ties with 7 types of actors for 
commercialised innovations; ii) 7 firms created 9 ties with 6 types of actors for 
ongoing innovation; and iii) 3 firms created 4 ties with 2 types of actors for 
abandoned innovation. As discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.1), this was partly 
expected because there are more actors in the business sub-network than in the other 
three sub-networks; however, the number of ties created was not necessarily 
expected to be higher than in the other three sub-networks. Table 7.1 re-introduces 
the features that indicate the consistency of the business sub-network. 
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Table 7.1 Indicators for consistency of the business sub-network 
Business sub-network actors General aims by sub-network Features indicating 
consistency 
a) industrial associations  
b) competitors  
c) customers  
d) suppliers  
e) consultancy firms  
f) incubators  
g) private non-profit 
organisations acting on 
behalf of the public interests 
i) foster and support 
interactions among firms and 
between firms and customers  
ii) support for research 
funding applications  
iii) access to information on 
national and international 
markets  
iv) provision of facilities or 
knowledge for software 
development, training and 
workshops  
v) support the design of 
business plans and training 
on organisational matters  
vi) support software process 
improvement  
vii) incubation programmes 
1. Access to open 
information source 
2. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
3. Acquisition of 
technology 
4. Access to new 
sources of financing 
5. Access to 
commercial 
information 
6. Innovation co-
operation 
 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
The features of the ties within the business sub-network were fully consistent with it 
being the sub-network most frequently accessed by Recife software firms. There is a 
high overlap between the features of each tie created by a local firm (e.g. ‘innovation 
cooperation’) and the self-defined aims of the business organisations with which ties 
were formed. Of the business sub-network actors with ties to Recife software firms, 
customers, other software firms, incubators, and private non-profit organisations are 
considered further. 
The ties created by firms with customers are the most frequent within the business 
sub-network, and show most of the features in Table 7.1 (with the exception of 
‘access to commercial information’). Only Firm 5 gave ‘acquisition of knowledge’ 
as the reason for tie creation. This was unexpected because the five firms with ties to 
customers are customised software developers and ‘acquisition of knowledge’ is 
assumed to be important in that process. However, Firm 5 was perhaps the exception 
for the following reason.   
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As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1, the development of customised applications 
requires firms to learn about and fully understand the customer’s business and 
technologies. It requires the addition of new knowledge to pre-existing 
understanding of how to develop applications. According to the interviewee, once 
the new knowledge is acquired by the firm, it enhances its expertise and 
technological capabilities; as a result, the firm increases its internal stock of 
knowledge, which may be employed in the development of new applications and 
innovations. Firm 5 was also the only firm to include ‘acquisition of technology’ as a 
relevant feature for the tie creation with their customers.
273
 It should be noted that 
‘acquisition of technology’ does not seem to imply paid for purchase of a technology 
(see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.3). In the case of Firm 5 ‘acquisition of technology’ 
occurred in the course of providing services to its customers, which provided the 
opportunity to access and incorporate new technologies developed by the customer, 
crucial for the firm’s development of customised services. For instance, one of the 
firm’s customers is the most important local IT R&D organisation, acknowledged to 
be eminent also in Brazil.
274
 Both acquisition of knowledge and acquisition of new 
technologies enhance firm capabilities that may be employed in future innovation 
projects.  
As expected, because all five firms develop customised software the features ‘access 
to new sources of financing’ and ‘innovation cooperation’ were frequently identified 
as reasons for ties with customers. Although ‘access to new sources of financing’ 
was explicitly mentioned by only two of the five firms with ties for financing, our in-
depth interviews show that their size (all are micro or small firms) is a constraint to 
investment in innovations projects without demonstrated demand. These firms stated 
that customers financed their innovation, which allowed them to survive. As stated 
by the interviewee:  
here we [the firm] only produce what is demanded, the customer dictates 
what has to be researched for the delivery of what has been demanded 
(Recife fieldwork firm interview).
275
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 Recife fieldwork firm interview. 
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 E.g., the R&D organisation won FINEP Innovation Prize 2010 for the best Brazilian Science and 
Technology Organisation category. http://www.cesar.org.br/site/c-e-s-a-r-vence-premio-FINEP/, 
accessed 19 February 2011. 
275
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.2 and Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2, we respect the anonymity 
of interviewees; for this reason interview numbers are not attached to all quotations. They are 
replaced by the type of organisation from which the data were collected (firm, organisation, etc.). 
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This applied also to medium sized and larger and longer established firms: 
we [firm] cannot afford to invest in research or development for its own 
sake, our budget is very tight and taking the risk is not worth it, because if 
we develop a product that has no demand we go bankrupt. We tried to invest 
in development for its own sake about 20 years ago, when we invested in 
technology and research that were completely new in Brazil. It was so new 
that the Brazilian market was not ready to use the technology at that time. 
The good thing about it was that the effort somehow paid off later, because 
when the Brazilian market demanded the technology we had the expertise to 
offer it. But we would not do this again, it is far too risky. So our customers 
not only guide our innovation but also finance it (Recife fieldwork firm 
interview). 
For ‘innovation cooperation’, most firms stated that development of customised 
software always involves an innovation new to the firm. This was the case of the two 
interviewed firms, confirming that software development most frequently involves 
something new for those engaged in the application development (as discussed by 
Brooks Jr., 1995).
276
 
Three firms had created ties with locally based software firms that develop 
complementary software. These ties showed the highest frequency of consistent 
features and included ‘acquisition of technology’, ‘access to commercial 
information’ and ‘innovation cooperation’. All of these features were expected. 
Acquisition of technology and innovation cooperation followed similar patterns to 
those described above. The development of complementary software provided access 
and acquisition to technologies (again the acquisition did not involve a purchase) that 
were new to the interviewed firms before the creation of the external tie. According 
to the interviewees, the feature ‘innovation cooperation’ was relevant for both firms 
in the tie: the aim was cooperation to obtain complementary knowledge to support 
the development of new software, which benefited both firms and resulted in 
innovation for both.
277
 According to the interviewee,  
the other software firm was interested in collaborating with us [interviewed 
firm], because we can learn from each other, we are here to innovate and 
succeed, and some of the local firms believe in that as we [interviewed firm] 
do. So, the collaboration results in innovation to the both sides, it is a win-
win situation (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
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 Recife fieldwork firms interviews. 
277
 Recife fieldwork interviews number 15,16 and 29. It is important to note that the collaborating 
firms were not part of the sample, therefore we relied only on the primary source of information to 
make this statement. 
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The creation of ties between Recife firms and local incubators was related mostly to 
‘access to new sources of finances’. There are two incubators in the region that host 
software firms and provide infrastructure (e.g. office facilities, security, broadband 
access) and business support at subsidised cost. For prospective customers, an 
incubator provides the incubated firm with reputation from association with an 
established organisation. As stated by the interviewee:  
the customers associate your firm with the incubator, thinking that if you 
have already been accepted by the incubator, your firm must be developing 
reliable services and is worth of trust (Recife fieldwork firm interview).  
Finally, ties between Recife software firms and private non-profit organisations 
involved NGPD and Softex Recife, which are based in the region and aim to support 
the development of the local software industry (Chapter 4, Section 4.3). The ties 
created by local firms with both NGPD and Softex Recife are related to these 
organisations’ introduction of two local firms to large and sophisticated local 
customers. In both cases the customers were divisions of the Pernambuco State 
government, so the referral involved government procurement.  
NGPD and Softex Recife have excellent reputations in the region and, according to 
the interviewees, state government relies on their knowledge for choosing local firms 
to interact with.
278
 From the firms’ perspective the referrals were crucial because 
they gave access to large customers that previously had used providers in other 
Brazilian regions (often in the Southeast). As stated by the interviewee:  
the state government feels that they can trust NGPD and Softex knowledge 
to refer them to a reliable local firm, they [state government] know that if a 
firm is referred by these organisations the likelihood of the firm 
disappointing them is minimal, because we know that if anything goes 
wrong our image with the customer and within the local community [Porto 
Digital] gets damaged, so we make sure that the project is successful. What 
is very important about these referrals is that now we [local firms] have 
finally got access to the most important local customers such as the State 
government (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
Another outcome of ties created through NGPD, which facilitated referral of local 
firms to potential customers and referrals among firms for collaboration was the 
creation of a consortium of local competing firms in Recife, mediated by NGPD.
279
 
As explained by the interviewee, 
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 Recife fieldwork organisational interviews. 
279
 Recife fieldwork interviews numbers 13, 20, 21 and 32. 
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the [Pernambuco] State Secretary of Education contacted NGPD with an 
idea for a project to be applied in the state schools. NGPD approached us to 
investigate if we could deliver the project and we said that we could not 
develop it alone, we did not have all the necessary expertise and personnel 
to deliver the project. But we said that if other local firms got involved we 
could do it. So, we all got in contact, we [local competitors] know each 
other, we are neighbours here [in Porto Digital]. But NGPD mediated the 
meetings, they are a neutral organisation, it was easier to negotiate with our 
competitors if a neutral organisation was involved. We sat together, and 
agreed that we could found a new firm based on a consortium type of 
arrangement. It has been a great success. We are now at the trial stage and 
with ideas to offer the product and services to other state governments and 
maybe private schools as well. The project opened very good business 
opportunities for us [firms involved in the project] (Recife fieldwork firm 
interview). 
The empirical evidence discussed above demonstrates the relevance of local 
organisations, such as SoftexRecife and NGPD, for supporting the growth of Recife 
software firms. The level of consistency suggests that the ties created with the 
business sub-network were positive, although this is not typical of systems of 
innovations in developing countries (Cassiolato et al., 2003; Chaminade and Vang, 
2008; Lastres, 2007; Lundvall et al., 2009a). 
7.2.2 Consistency of the skills sub-network 
The skills sub-network was the second most frequently accessed sub-network by 
Recife local software firms in the innovation stages considered: i) five firms created 
six ties with four types of actors for the commercialised innovations stage; ii) six 
firms created nine ties with four types of actors for ongoing innovation; iii) there 
were no ties created with the skills sub-network actors for the abandoned innovation 
stage.
280
 The skills sub-network was partly consistent, with universities and research 
foundations being the most frequently accessed types of actors. Table 7.2 re-
introduces the features that indicate consistency for the skills sub-network.  
                                                 
280
 Identification of part of the network actors was done previous to questionnaires and interviews 
(Chapter 5). 
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Table 7.2 Indicators for consistency of the skills sub-network 
Skill sub-network actors General aims by sub-network Features 
indicating 
consistency 
a) universities  
b) technical colleges 
c) continued education 
organisations  
d) research council  
e) research foundation 
i) IT training in different 
levels, such as: 
undergraduate, Masters, 
Doctorate and Post-
Doctorate and continued 
education  
ii) support new knowledge 
creation through basic or 
applied research funding 
programmes 
iii support new knowledge 
creation through funding 
programmes for 
development activities 
1. Access to open 
information source 
2. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
3. Acquisition of 
technology 
4. Innovation co-
operation 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
Two findings stand out in the examination of ties created with the skills sub-network. 
Firstly, the highest frequency of ties created by firms were with the national research 
council (CNPq) and the local research foundation (FACEPE), ties that were 
associated with the inconsistency found in the sub-network. All the firms that created 
ties with CNPq (4 and 14) and FACEPE (2, 4, 7, and 16) were for ‘access to new 
sources of financing’. This was expected as both CNPq and FACEPE provide 
funding to support firm research related activities. However, no mention of 
‘acquisition of knowledge’ and ‘acquisition of technology’ was unexpected because 
the stated aims of both CNPq and FACEPE include provision of funding for the 
promotion of the scientific and technological development of firms through the 
performance of in firm research activity.
281
 Hence, local firms did not associate ties 
with CNPq and FACEPE for funding research with improvements to their own 
scientific or technological development, which demonstrates inconsistency in the 
skills sub-network. 
Secondly, the empirical findings show that the four firms that had created ties with 
local research university departments (Cin-UFPE and Design) mentioned all the 
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 http://www.FACEPE.br/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1, and 
http://www.cnpq.br/english/cnpq/index.htm, accessed 19 February 2011. 
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features that denote consistency in the skills sub-network, that is, ‘access to open 
information source’, ‘acquisition of knowledge’, ‘acquisition of technology’, and 
‘innovation cooperation’.282 This result was expected, although ‘innovation 
cooperation’ requires further comment. Local firms stated that the local research 
university departments involved in ties develop high quality (although rather 
academically related) scientific knowledge, and also are open to collaborations with 
the private sector through the development and employment of applied research (this 
issue was discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3). Also some UFPE faculty members 
are happy to collaborate with local firms, so the knowledge produced by the 
university would be translated into practical applications.
283
 As stated by the 
interviewee:  
we [the firm] spotted an opportunity to develop a project with UFPE design 
department because they have expertise in one area where the firm lacked 
capability. We contacted one of the faculty members using a personal 
relationship and they [design department] were happy to collaborate, they 
feel that they are contributing to the economic development of the region 
when their knowledge is put into practical and real things (Recife fieldwork 
firm interview). 
The ties with Cin-UFPE and the empirical evidence show the efforts made by Cin-
UFPE to engage with the private sector, a goal that has been pursued by the 
department since the early 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3).
284
  
The discussion and interview extracts above could be interpreted as local research 
universities devoting their scientific efforts towards applied knowledge (or to 
knowledge with a purpose) related to the needs of the local private sector. This 
would confound those that criticise the roles played by research universities in 
developing countries, which often are seen as being too concerned with the 
international knowledge frontier at the expense of the needs of their local embedded 
regions. The role of universities is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, if public 
policy making were aimed exclusively at the private sector, a shift in the role of local 
research universities towards the production of practical knowledge might ultimately 
impede the catching-up process for laggard regions.  
                                                 
282
 As mentioned above, acquisition does not refer to the purchase of new technologies. 
283
 Recife fieldwork interviews numbers 10, 12 and 29. 
284
 Recife fieldwork organisational interview. 
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This could be relevant for an investigation of innovative firms engaged in innovator 
networks, and might provide insights for public policy formulation and effectiveness 
in a network framework.  
7.2.3 Consistency of the technology sub-network 
The technology sub-network was the third most frequently accessed sub-network as 
follows: i) five firms created five ties with two different technology sub-network 
actors (two different R&D organisations) for commercialised innovations; ii) four 
firms created four ties with two different technology sub-network actors (the same 
two R&D organisations as in the commercialised innovation stage);  and iii) one firm 
created one tie with one technology sub-network actor – an R&D organisation for the 
abandoned innovation stage. Table 7.3 re-introduces the features that indicate 
consistency for the technology sub-network. 
Table 7.3 Indicators for consistency of the technology sub-network 
Technology sub-network 
actors 
General aims by sub-network Features indicating 
consistency 
a) research organisations 
b) development organisations 
i) perform basic or applied 
research, for, among others, 
the commercialisation by the 
private sector 
ii) development activities 
for, among others, the 
commercialisation by the 
private sector. 
1. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
2. Acquisition of 
technology 
3. Innovation co-
operation 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
The technology sub-network shows a high level of consistency when the ties created 
by local software firms with local R&D organisations involve ‘acquisition of 
knowledge’, ‘acquisition of technology’ and ‘innovation cooperation’. However, we 
also found some features related to inconsistency of the technology sub-network. 
Investigation of the consistency and inconsistency of this sub-network requires a 
discussion of ties created with each of the three R&D organisations. 
CESAR was the local R&D organisation most frequently accessed by Recife 
software firms. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, CESAR has become the 
anchor of the Recife software network of innovators, both because it employs the 
highest number of personnel devoted to IT development activities locally (about 400 
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employees in 2009)
285
 and because of its excellent reputation in the national IT 
market. Four firms created ties with CESAR, two of them are affiliated to CESAR 
and two are not.  
The ties created by firms not affiliated to CESAR are consistent, that is, they were 
forged for reasons of ‘acquisition of knowledge’, ‘acquisition of technology’ and 
‘innovation cooperation’. This result was expected, and ‘innovation cooperation’ 
reflects CESAR’s investment in and reputation for being a R&D organisation 
devoted to the development of IT innovation. 
Investigation of ties created with CESAR show that the two firms were affiliated to 
the organisation at the time of the data collection.
286
 In one case, all innovation 
activities developed by the firm (number not disclosed for reasons of confidentiality) 
were performed in partnership with CESAR.
287
 The other firm was incubated in 
CESAR’s incubation programme and was part of CESAR.par.288 Also, CESAR is a 
minor shareholder in the firm. This firm’s ties were created for ‘acquisition of 
knowledge’ and ‘acquisition of technology’, demonstrating consistency in ties 
created with the technology sub-network actors.  
The firm with no ties with CESAR’s software developers requires further 
consideration. In this one case, the firm had been incubated at CESAR, and was part 
of CESAR.par and CESAR was a minority shareholder in the firm. As an incubated 
firm, it benefited from the subsidised infrastructure offered by the incubator, legal 
assistance over labour regulations and taxes (provided by CESAR’s administrative 
department), and advice on business plans (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
However, the tie was created only with the incubator programme and not with 
CESAR’s software developers, which related to inconsistency of the technology sub-
network, as follows:  
we [firm] do not employ external knowledge in the development of our 
[firm] services. We were incubated at CESAR, but our relationship with 
them did not go beyond the incubation facilities and subsidies (Recife 
fieldwork firm interview).  
                                                 
285
 Recife fieldwork organisational interview. See Ritz (2008) for extensive discussion on private non-
profit Brazilian IT research centres. 
286
 One firm is CESAR’s spin-off firm, however still part of CESAR.par, which means that CESAR is 
the firm’s main shareholder. The other firm was incubated at CESAR, and is also part of CESAR.par, 
however in this case CESAR is a minority shareholder. 
287
 Recife fieldwork firm interview. 
288
 As informed in Section 4.3 (Chapter 4 above), CESAR.par is the division of CESAR responsible 
for financial investments in other business partners. 
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The fact that this firm has not created ties with CESAR developing division partly 
indicates inconsistency in the technology sub-network. It could be expected that 
being part of the organisation would lead to ties between the firm and CESAR other 
than exploitation of the latter’s incubation facilities and services. One might expect 
ties for the ‘acquisition of knowledge’ or ‘acquisition of technology’, based on 
CESAR’s mission to ‘transfer information technology knowledge between the 
industry and the academia in a self-sustainable way’.289 Although the incubation 
programme does not explicitly advertise that technological knowledge developed in 
CESAR’s main activities is accessible to incubated firms, the advertisement for the 
incubation programme declared CESAR’s strong involvement with the incubated 
businesses, and provision of services that would support start-ups and add value, 
build firm competencies and access networks that would generate positive results for 
start-ups.
290
 These services, competencies and networking could be understood as 
being technologically related. The empirical evidence from our close examination 
suggests that the lack of ties created with CESAR explicitly for ‘acquisition of 
knowledge’ and ‘acquisition of technology’ confirms the partial inconsistency of the 
technology sub-network.  
Another firm had no ties for ‘acquisition of knowledge’ and ‘acquisition of 
technology’ with a local R&D organisation despite having been part of its incubation 
programme. This again suggests possible inconsistency in the technology sub-
network, and also dysfunctional ties between local firms and supporting 
organisations, which the interview tends, a priori, to confirm:  
what we get from the organisation [local R&D organisation] is infrastructure 
at low cost, that is all. They [incubator] say that they offer consultancy, but 
in reality it does not happen, we [interviewed firm] are on our own, but we 
are doing well. The low infrastructure cost has been a good benefit for us 
(Recife fieldwork interview number 11). 
However, the self-defined, stated mission of the R&D organisation, and closer 
examination of its expertise, shows that the consultancy offered by the organisation 
is business related rather than technological (i.e., the partial inconsistency would be 
in the business sub-network instead of in the technology sub-network). In addition, 
this particular R&D organisation does not hold specific competence in ICT, 
providing no foundations for expectations of direct tie creation with the main unit. 
                                                 
289
 www.cesar.org.br, accessed 08 November 2008. 
290
 Idem. 
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This confirms again the need for close examination to fully explain the functioning 
and structure of network of innovators (see also Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1).  
In addition to ties created with the two R&D organisations discussed above, another 
local firm had a formal tie with a third local R&D organisation,  for the abandoned 
innovation stage. As expected, tie creation involved the ‘acquisition of knowledge’ 
and the ‘acquisition of technology’ and therefore indicated consistency of the 
technology sub-network.  
7.2.4 Consistency of the financial sub-network 
The fewest ties were those created by firms with the financial sub-network. Table 7.4 
re-introduces the features that indicate consistency for the financial sub-network.
291
 
Table 7.4 Indicators for consistency of the financial sub-network 
Financial sub-network actor General aims by sub-network Features indicating 
consistency 
a) private and public banking 
organisations 
b) public funding 
organisations 
c) venture capitalists 
d) government authorities 
i) grants or loans for firm-
level basic or applied 
research and development 
activities 
ii) venture capital for start-
ups 
iii) tax incentives for firm-
level innovation activities 
iv) creation of technological 
parks or incubation 
programmes 
1. Acquisition of 
knowledge 
2. Acquisition of 
technology 
3. Access to new 
sources of financing 
Source: own elaboration, adapted from Table 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
Recife firms were involved in ties only with one national public funding agency -
FINEP, which indicates that this sub-network is infrequently connected to local 
firms. None of the 17 firms interviewed had ties with FINEP for the commercialised 
innovation stage and one of the four firms that had created ties with FINEP for the 
ongoing innovation stage was still awaiting a response to a grant application.  
In addition, the two firms with ties to FINEP for the abandoned innovation stage did 
not receive funding from the agency, which explains the abandonment of their 
                                                 
291
 As explained above, some of the Recife network’s actors were identified previous to empirical data 
collection. 
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innovation development. The empirical evidence on the features of ties created with 
FINEP indicates that the financial sub-network is partly consistent, explained by the 
following. All seven firms that involved FINEP in their innovation projects (through 
existing or prospective ties) indicated ‘access to new sources of financing’ as the 
reason, which is consistent with the expected nature of this sub-network. However, it 
is FINEP’s mission to support innovation in firms (among others) and only one firm 
in the sample identified FINEP with ‘innovation cooperation’. Hence, we conclude 
that there is inconsistency in the tie creation. 
7.2.5 Summary 
Our investigation of the consistency of the four sub-networks provides the following 
evidence. Firstly, most Recife software firms perform their innovation activities in 
collaboration with organisations with which they have formal ties. Secondly, the 
business sub-network displays the highest level of consistency among all 
investigated sub-networks, that is, there was a high overlap between the features of 
ties identified and those indicated in Table 7.1. In addition, the ties created with 
supporting private, non-profit, local organisations are relevant for firms accessing 
new customers. Thirdly, there is low engagement of actors in the skills and 
technology sub-networks, where lack of ties for ‘acquisition of knowledge’ and 
‘acquisition of technology’ demonstrates partial inconsistency of these sub-networks. 
Fourthly, there is no engagement of the private funding sector with Recife private 
firms innovation activities, which rely on funding from public organisations for their 
innovation activities, thus, the ties created by firms are not fully consistent with other 
missions of FINEP.  
Investigation of the consistency of the four sub-networks is complemented by an 
investigation of the motivations for ties among firms, and between firms and other 
network actors, which is the object of Section 7.3. 
7. 3 Network Relations for Innovating and Non-Innovating Firms: 
Recife   
This section investigates the relational embeddedness of the Recife software 
network of innovators related to three issues. Firstly, how many and which firms 
perform innovation activities, either alone or in collaboration with other network 
actors to support their innovation. Secondly, we examine the tightness of the ties 
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among Recife software firms and between firms and other organisations (tightness 
being based on motivation for and the frequency of ties). Thirdly, we examine which 
firms and network actors function (and are more likely to function) as bridges within 
the network of innovators. We examine these three issues for each innovation stage 
analysed in the thesis, that is, commercialised innovations (Section 7.3.1), ongoing 
innovation (Section 7.3.2) and abandoned innovation (Section 7.3.3). The 
representation of the network of innovators for each innovation stage supports the 
empirical evidence. 
7.3.1 Network of innovators for commercialised innovations in the period 2006-
2009 
This section investigates the Recife software network of innovators for the 
commercialised innovation stage during the period under analysis (May 2006 to May 
2009) providing evidence for the three issues mentioned above. 
Innovative firms and inter-organisational ties 
How many and which firms innovated during the period 2006-2009 and whether 
they created external ties, shows that almost all Recife firms innovated during that 
period.
292
 This is as expected because, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, most 
developed software involves some degree of innovation. We found that 70% of the 
sample of interviewed firms had external ties to support their innovation activities. In 
addition, five firms were engaged in the main cluster of nodes (which accounted for 
17 actors), 4 firms were engaged in the secondary cluster of nodes (which accounted 
for 8 actors), and there were isolated clusters which accounted for two triad ties (by 
Firms 5 Firm 8) and one binary tie (by Firm 12). This allows us to conclude that the 
Recife network of innovators is fragmented as opposed to having a well-knit 
structure. This characteristic suggests diffusion of information within the network 
and effectiveness to access new and valuable information by network actors, will be 
low (Burt, 1992). 
Tightness of inter-organisational ties 
                                                 
292
 Firms 6 and 10 are exceptions. Both had innovated previous to 2006 and since then had developed 
new versions of the innovation, i.e. had been involved in incremental innovation. In addition, in the 
two cases the customers who financed their innovations are large customers and account for a 
significant part of the firms’ revenues. These customers helped to keep Firms 6 and 10 in business 
during the period analysed in this thesis. Recife fieldwork firms interviews. 
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Although the structure is not well-knit, the majority of the ties are tightly-connected 
as opposed to loosely-connected ties, which relates to the second issue discussed in 
this section. This finding indicates that the creation of ties is motivated mainly by 
issues such as trust, collective identity, personal relationships, and knowledge 
availability and accessibility. In most cases geographical proximity supports the 
creation of tight ties, which corroborates claims that local contexts support trust 
building and cognitive proximity (as discussed by Asheim and Gertler, 2004).
293
 
These findings are as expected because direct ties are frequently associated with tight 
connections (as discussed by Giuliani networks breed trustworthy relationships). 
Figure 7.1 is a visualisation of the Recife software network of innovators for the 
commercialised innovation stage during the period April 2006-April 2009. It 
differentiates tightly-connected and loosely-connected ties, which actors are engaged 
in which clusters of nodes, and supports understanding of which actors are acting as 
bridges within the network of innovators. Direct loosely-connected ties, motivated 
by opportunities and financial issues, were an unexpected finding. 
                                                 
293
 Although geographic proximity does not always explain tightly-connected ties, for instance, 
because of labour mobility, as mentioned by Boschma (2005). 
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 Figure 7.1 The Recife software network of innovators: commercialized innovations during 2006-2009 
 
Legend: 
● Firms 
♦ Technology sub-network  
■ Skills sub-network 
▲Business sub-network  
● Financial sub-network 
Tight connections =   
Loose connections =  
□= Firms that did not create external ties to support their commercialised innovation during 2006-2009. 
○= Autonomous private non-profit R&D organisations originally set up by multinationals that were disengaged from the network of innovators.  
◊ = Firms that did not commercialise new software products of services during the period 2006-2009. 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
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There are six cases of loosely-connected ties in the Recife software network of 
innovators, related to Firms 3, 5 and 7 for the business network, and Firms 4, 7 and 
16 for the skills sub-network. Among the loosely-connected ties with business sub-
network actors, two were with local incubators. Firm 5 had a tie with Incubatep, 
motivated by ‘costs’ and ‘opportunity’. Firm 5 chose the incubation programme 
offered by ITEP (rather than the others available) based on geographic proximity to 
Cin-UFPE, where the entrepreneurs were studying: 
the fact that Incubatep is just across the road [from Cin-UFPE] was a major 
issue for us, because we are still doing our masters at Cin-UFPE, so we can 
go between venues in a few minutes. And also, the trainees that work here 
[in the firm] on fixed-term contracts are often still studying there [Cin-
UFPE], so it is easy for them to work for us between lectures or lab sessions. 
It is easier for everyone (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
Firm 3 had a loose tie to CESAR and referred to the motivation of ‘cost’. It had 
chosen to be incubated at CESAR because of the low infrastructure costs and the 
legal and financial administrative assistance provided (incubation at CESAR 
provides automatic membership of CESAR.par, and the benefits of CESAR’s 
centralised administration), and support in preparing business plans.
294
  
Only one firm had a tie with local suppliers, and this was a loosely-connected tie and 
was based on the motivation ‘opportunity’. The interviewee also mentioned 
geographical proximity as an important motivation for creating this tie. This 
indicates that closeness may be associated with loosely-connected ties, although this 
tends to be the exception. 
The loosely-connected ties with the skills sub-network actors, FACEPE 
(Pernambuco State Research Foundation) and CNPq (national research council), 
were motivated by ‘cost’ and ‘opportunity’. These loosely-connected ties between 
local firms and FACEPE and CNPq confirm the inconsistency of the skills sub-
network discussed in Section 7.2. However, one firm (Firm 14) had a tightly-
connected tie with CNPq, which was based also on ‘trust’ and ‘knowledge 
availability and accessibility’. 
From the firms’ perspective grants offered by FACEPE were biased towards 
‘academic’ type research proposals. According to one firm, the requirements in 
FACEPE’s research grant calls for proposals are difficult and demanding to fulfil: 
                                                 
294
 Recife fieldwork firm interview. 
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we [the firm] are applying for a good grant by a new call from FACEPE, 
when we could hire a researcher to work for the firm in the next two coming 
years. But look, FACEPE requires the applicant to be not employed at the 
time of the application, to hold at least a Master’s degree and have at least 
five years of experience. Where are we going to find someone exactly like 
that? A well qualified and experienced researcher is unlikely to be 
unemployed; if they are good they are employed. Usually we [the firm] have 
to find people and persuade them to come to work for us (Recife fieldwork 
firm interview). 
The statement above demonstrates the paradox in the funding organisation’s 
requirements. This perhaps is related to concerns that funding might be used to 
poach talent from rival firms, creating unintended consequences. However, it makes 
it difficult for applicants to meet the requirements for receiving funding. It suggests 
the presence of a similar phenomenon as in Campinas with regard to the strong bias 
of public funding organisations towards academic type applications and research and 
poor timing of calls for public funding in relation to commercial needs. It shows that 
there are important actors in the region (this laggard problem having been overcome) 
but an absence of potentially important ties due to institutional rigidity inherent in 
Brazilian public organisations (see Pacheco and Corder (2009), and Chapters 3 and 6 
in this thesis). 
The empirical evidence on the dyadic ties created by Recife software firms shows 
that most direct ties are tightly-connected ties, which may be of relevance for the role 
of organisations functioning as bridges in the network of innovators, the third issue 
investigated in this section.  
Bridging organisations within the network of innovators 
The relevance of bridging organisations is based on the argument that one of the 
advantages from participation in a network is the possibility of learning-by-
interacting. Therefore, bridging organisations prospectively support the creation of 
ties among firms, and between firms and other network actors. Burt (1992) addresses 
this issue in his discussion of the efficiency and effectiveness of networks (see also 
Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1). The representation of the network of innovators in Figure 
7.1 (p. 222 above) suggests that there are some organisations that indirectly bridge 
between firms in the main cluster of nodes, and secondary cluster. We examine the 
functioning of these organisations further. 
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Figure 7.1 shows that four organisations could function as bridges in the Recife 
network of innovators; two are part of the skills sub-network –CNPq and FACEPE, 
and two are part of the business sub-network -NGPD and SoftexRecife. However, 
CNPq and FACEPE are unlikely to do so because it is not part of their remit. Their 
funding programmes are arranged through open calls, and blind assessment of firms’ 
applications. However, some of FACEPE’s funding programmes require the 
participation of academic researchers in firms’ project applications, which would 
mean that FACEPE would be functioning indirectly as a bridge. Which researchers 
and which organisations are invited to participate in the firm’s application project is 
down to the firm and not FACEPE. The same could apply to CNPq, however the 
research council more often supports research in firms by funding secondment of 
university students through bursaries and scholarships rather than research grants.  
With regard to the main cluster of nodes, NGPD and SoftexRecife may function as 
bridges because of their position within the network of innovators, which can be seen 
in Figure 7.1 and the close examination showing that firms are tied to customers, 
other local software firms and local organisations through NGPD and SoftexRecife 
(e.g., the case of Firm 13). This emphasizes the relevance of close examination to 
support a full understanding of how networks of innovators function and are 
structured. However, Figure 7.1 shows that the firms connected to NGPD overlap 
with the firms that are connected to SoftexRecife, which raises the issue of whether 
only a limited number of firms has been able to access or receive support from these 
two organisations. The empirical findings from the interviews with firms show that 
the number of firms benefiting from these organisations’ support is not limited to 
those represented in Figure 7.1. For instance, Firm 1 has used SoftexRecife facilities 
(testing laboratory), and Firm 10 had support from NGPD for writing a grant 
application to FINEP.
295
  
Most Recife software firms are associated to SoftexRecife, therefore the organisation 
is knowledgeable about the firms based in the region and their expertise. Although 
SoftexRecife has closer relationships with some firms than others through the 
creation of formal ties, the interviews do not indicate that SoftexRecife would be 
                                                 
295
 Recife fieldwork Firm 1 and Firm 10 interviews. 
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likely to favour certain of the associated firms.
296
 Finally, 9 of the 17 firms 
interviewed believe that NGPD represents one of the strongest assets of the Recife 
network.
297
 This suggests that NGPD has come to represent the Recife community of 
firms: ‘NGPD has good access to firms. They are the link between the sub-groups of 
firms based in the Recife’ (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
Investigation of the secondary cluster of nodes in Figure 7.1 (p. 222 above) shows 
that CESAR is the main bridging organisation, and ties local firms indirectly. Three 
firms, 2, 11 and 15, have direct ties to CESAR. Although Firm 3 did not include 
CESAR as an actor directly related to their innovations, this firm is part of 
CESAR.par and we can conclude, therefore, that CESAR can bridge between Firm 3 
and other network actors in the cluster of nodes.  
All the ties between firms and CESAR are tightly-connected ties, suggesting that 
firms are likely to regard referrals from CESAR as reliable, possibly increasing the 
chances of CESAR’s bridging activities being successful. This finding was expected 
since CESAR has become the anchor of Recife software network during the 2000s. 
However, Figure 7.1 shows CESAR’s disengagement from the main cluster of nodes 
within the network, and also shows that CESAR has its own cluster of nodes. This 
was an unexpected finding: it was expected that CESAR would be tied to the main 
cluster of nodes mainly because it is the main IT R&D organisations in the region 
(and among the most important in the country) and CESAR was identified by nine 
firms as being an important asset in the region.
298
 For instance: 
CESAR promotes new ideas and the engagement of new actors in the 
region. For example, CESAR was chosen by FINEP to manage the PRIME 
[FINEP Programme] programme in Pernambuco. Even the actions of NGPD 
end up linked with CESAR (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
and, 
The main strength of the region is CESAR’s reputation. Silvio Meira 
[CESAR’s chief scientist] is a very important communicator in and for the 
region. CESAR has implemented several important initiatives, such as the 
partnership with Motorola to bring its testing centre to Recife. They also 
attracted Microsoft for the region (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
                                                 
296
 The close relationship of SoftexRecife with a group of firms was identified through SoftexRecife’s 
referral of local innovative firms, which were included in the sample of interviewed firms of this 
thesis. 
297
 Recife fieldwork interviews numbers 6, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, and 29. 
298
 Recife fieldwork interviews numbers 4, 6, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19. 
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However, the representation of the network of innovators in Figure 7.1 does not do 
full justice to the role played by CESAR within the Recife network of innovators. 
For instance, based on this representation it might be assumed that the 
disengagement of CESAR from the network would not cause much disruption to the 
evolution of the network. The close examination of empirical evidence, however, 
provides a much better understanding of the role played of the organisation in the 
local network of innovators. It shows that in the course of its existence, CESAR has 
become the network’s anchor and its reputation has had spill-over effects for the 
organisations in the network. Its withdrawal from the network (should, perhaps, its 
headquarters be relocated) would cause huge disruption to the evolution of the 
network. CESAR has also built an important community in the region, based mainly 
in its relationships with Cin-UFPE faculty members and their former and current 
undergraduate and post-graduate students.
299
 This community also includes other 
organisations established in the region during the 2000s. This community is based on 
relationships among actors with common professional backgrounds, who may 
engage in communities of scientific and technological development through the 
creation of ties based on common understandings of particular problems (see Salter 
and Martin, 2001 and Pavitt, 1987; see also Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). The evidence 
from the interviews shows that CESAR has the potential to bridge between local 
actors based on its trustworthy reputation in the region. These findings are 
corroborated by the engagement of CESAR in the main cluster of nodes in the 
ongoing innovation stage, which is analysed in Section 7.3.2.  
7.3.2 Network of innovators for ongoing innovations in the period 2006-2009 
This section investigates the Recife software network of innovators for the ongoing 
innovation stage, during the period 2006-2009 and addresses the following issues: i) 
how many and which firms perform innovation activities, either alone or in 
collaboration with other network actors; ii) the tightness of the ties created among 
Recife software firms, and between firms and other organisations; and iii) which 
firms and network actors function (and are more likely to function) as bridges within 
the network of innovators. 
Innovative firms and inter-organisational ties 
                                                 
299
 As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, CESAR is a spin-off from Cin-UFPE. 
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The empirical evidence on ongoing innovation performed by Recife software firms 
shows that there were some changes to the network of innovators represented in 
Figure 7.2 below. The first change is that the number of non-innovative firms during 
the ongoing innovation stage increased compared to the commercialised innovation 
stage analysed in Section 7.3.1, from 2 firms to 4. Only Firm 6 was non-innovative 
during the ongoing innovation stage as well as in the commercialised innovation 
stage. Firm 13 (consortium of firms) was set up in 2008 to deliver a customised 
software product/service, which was commercialised in early 2009 on a trial basis, 
because of which there is no ongoing innovation recorded at the time of data 
collection.
300
 Firms 8 and 15 had commercialised new products and services close to 
the time of data collection and were still benefiting from these innovations, which 
required constant updates which these firms did not consider to be innovations. 
                                                 
300
 Recife fieldwork firm interview. 
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Figure 7.2 The Recife software network of innovators: ongoing innovations during 2006-2009 
 
Legend: 
● Firms 
♦ Technology sub-network 
■ Skills sub-network 
▲Business sub-network  
● Financial sub-network 
Tight connections =   
Loose connections =  
□= Non-innovating firms, April 2009. 
○= Autonomous private non-profit R&D organisations originally set up by multinationals disengaged from the network of innovators.  
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
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The second and significant change in the ongoing innovation stage is that all Recife 
software firms involved in ongoing innovations had created external ties to support 
their innovation activity. As expected, most of the direct ties created by Recife firms 
are tightly-connected ties. In addition, although the representation of the network of 
innovators in Figure 7.2 shows that the network of innovators is fragmented (as 
opposed to well-knit), in this innovation stage there was only one main cluster of 
nodes (rather than 2 as in the commercialised innovation stage), involving 10 
innovative firms and the other 14 network actors. Three firms had created isolated 
ties, Firm 9 created a triad, and Firms 10 and 12 had created binary ties. 
Examination of the structure of the network of innovators shows that some of the ties 
in the commercialised innovation stage had broken down, especially those with 
business and skills sub-network actors. These were not always loosely-connected 
ties, as might have been expected. The completion of innovation projects financed by 
FACEPE explains the break down of ties with that organisation; Firms 7 and 16 were 
no longer being financed by FACEPE in the ongoing innovation stage. In the case of 
SoftexRecife and NGPD the discontinued ties had been tightly-connected ties. In the 
case of Firm 13 there was no involvement in ongoing innovations at the time of data 
collection. 
More important than the discontinued ties, were the new ties created by firms in the 
ongoing innovation stage. Firstly, Recife software firms accessed funding from 
FINEP, which engaged in the main network of innovators through the creation of ties 
by five firms.
301
 The majority of the ties created with FINEP were loosely-
connected, that is, they were more frequently related to the motivations of 
‘opportunity’ (there was a call where the firm fitted the requirements) and ‘costs’ 
(FINEP provides non-reimbursable grants). This confirms the partial inconsistency 
of the financial sub-network discussed above. Secondly, the ties with business 
organisations that were new compared to the commercialised innovation stage, such 
as the Euvaldo Lodi Institute (IEL) and the Brazilian Trade and Investment 
Promotion Agency (APEX), were tightly-conencted ties. In the case of the tightly-
connected tie between Firm 14 and Apex, this was based on ‘trust’ and ‘knowledge 
availability and accessibility’: 
                                                 
301
 Firm 1 was the only firm in the sample that was awaiting a response to its research funding 
application. 
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we [the firm] feel confident that they [APEX] will release the funding on the 
scheduled date. You know, not all government funding organisations follow 
that rule; delays in release of funding are common. And also we trust that 
they have the adequate knowledge to support us with the exports (Recife 
fieldwork firm interview). 
Thirdly, firms disengaged from the main cluster of nodes in the commercialised 
stage were engaged in the ongoing innovation stage. For instance, Firm 5, which was 
isolated in its own cluster of nodes in the commercialised stage; and Firm 11, which 
was engaged only with CESAR’s cluster of nodes. In the ongoing innovation stage 
CESAR’s cluster of nodes was tied to the main cluster, which represents an 
improvement in the network (although this finding should be balanced against close 
examination - see above). However, this engagement was supported by a tie created 
with FINEP, which demands some clarifications regarding the role of FINEP as a 
bridging organisation. The investigation of which firms and network actors function 
(or are likely to function) as bridges within the network of innovators is the third 
issue investigated in this section.  
Bridging organisations within the network of innovators 
The representation of the Recife software network of innovators in Figure 7.2 
indicates that the following organisations could play bridging roles: FACEPE, 
CNPq, FINEP and Cin-UFPE. As discussed above, bridging organisations can be 
crucial to the development of networks, because they foster the creation of direct ties 
among firms, and between firms and other organisations. 
The potential bridging role of FACEPE, CNPq and FINEP is undermined by their 
aims and the looseness of firms’ ties with them. These organisations do not have 
‘bridging’ as one of the objectives. FINEP, FACEPE and CNPq offers funding 
through open calls and special programmes, which are blind reviewed by internal 
evaluators. Several firms identified FINEP as an important source of finance (FINEP 
offers non-refundable research funding) which suggests that post-application efforts 
by FINEP to bridge between firms would be rather ineffective.  
Figure 7.2 shows that Cin-UFPE acts as a bridge in the network in the ongoing 
innovation stage, and is potentially very likely to foster the creation of direct ties 
among local firms. This is because most local software entrepreneurs are graduates 
of Cin-UFPE, from undergraduate or postgraduate courses and often have good 
trusting relationships with former tutors. The ties created by Firms 5 and 16 with 
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Cin-UFPE were motivated by personal relationships with their Masters’ Degree 
supervisors. Also, Cin-UFPE has an excellent reputation among the local community 
and in Brazil, which, in addition to tightly-connected ties with firms, increases the 
chances of firms following up prospective referrals from Cin-UFPE.
302
 A Cin-UFPE 
faculty member mentioned his mediation of a partnership between two local firms: 
there is this local entrepreneur that I have a close relationship with. Some 
time ago he came to me and said that he was looking for a foreigner partner 
to co-develop a new service with his [local entrepreneur] firm. I asked why 
he was looking abroad if a local firm could do the same job. He said that he 
worried about his business plans being ‘stolen’ by a neighbouring firm that 
is owned by someone he knows, they have lunch together, they have coffee 
together every week. So I intervened: I proposed a non-disclosure contract 
that would guarantee no ‘stealing’ by either party. And it worked! They 
became partners, are co-developing the innovation and together are more 
likely to succeed (Recife fieldwork organisational interview). 
Finally, Cin-UFPE has been making efforts since the early 1990s to be more pro-
active in its relationships with the private market. The establishing of the pre-
incubation programme, Recife BEAT, and the creation of CESAR, were two 
significant organisational changes resulting from this effort. Therefore, it can 
probably be assumed that Cin-UFPE faculty members would be willing to put firms 
in touch with one another and to make recommendations were they to see an 
opportunity for local firms to work together in a way that would benefit them and the 
region.  
7.3.3 Network of innovators for abandoned innovations in the period 2006-2009 
The empirical findings for the Recife software network of innovators for the 
abandoned innovation activity stage show that the majority of software firms were 
not forced to abandon these activities during the period 2006-2009, and that most 
that did had created an external tie. This empirical evidence corroborated previous 
findings regarding the innovation stages examined in Section 7.3.1 and Section 7.3.2, 
when most firms created external ties to support their innovations.  
With regard to the tightness of the ties created by firms, most direct ties were 
loosely-connected. This was an unexpected result; in the two innovation stages 
analysed above (commercialised and ongoing) most direct ties were tightly-
connected.  
                                                 
302
 Firms and other organisations stated that Cin-UFPE is one of the strongest assets of the Recife 
software network. Recife fieldwork interviews numbers: 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 21, 25, and 32. 
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Figure 7.3 The Recife software network of innovators: abandoned innovations during 2006-2009 
 
Legend: 
● Firms 
♦ Technology sub-network 
■ Skills sub-network 
▲Business sub-network  
● Financial sub-network 
Tight connections =   
Loose connections =  
□= Firms that did not abandon innovation projects during the period 2006-2009. 
○= Autonomous private non-profit R&D organisations originally set up by multinationals disengaged from the network of innovators.  
◊ = Firms that did not create ties for the abandoned innovations during the period 2006-2009. 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
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The higher proportion of loosely-connected ties in Figure 7.3 combined with the 
empirical evidence, indicates that loosely-connected ties are more vulnerable to 
breaking down under pressure, even when they involve technology sub-network 
actors. For instance, Firm 9 was depending on approval of a FINEP grant to develop 
its innovation; when it was not approved, the tie was broken. In the absence of public 
incentives or subsidies, ties among actors are not likely to be maintained. Figure 7.3 
highlights also that only FINEP was in a position to act as a bridging organisation in 
the abandoned innovation stage. However, FINEP was unlikely to foster the creation 
of direct ties between Firms 9 and 10 for the reasons discussed in Section 7.3.2. 
7.3.4 Summary 
This section investigated three characteristics of the Recife software network of 
innovators: i) whether local software firms created external ties to support their 
innovation activities in the innovation stages of commercialised, ongoing and 
abandoned in the period 2006-2009; ii) the tightness of dyadic ties created by firms 
to support their innovation activities; and iii) the organisations that functioned as 
bridges in the network of innovators.  
The analysis of the three innovation stages reveals a pattern: i) most local firms 
create external ties to support innovation, and the majority are with business sub-
network actors; ii) the network of innovators is more likely to have fragmented 
clusters of nodes as opposed to a well-knit structure, although the ongoing 
innovation stage showed less fragmentation; iii) most direct ties are tightly-
connected ties, except in the abandoned innovation stage; iv) although bridging 
features in the commercialised and ongoing innovation stages are related to the 
business sub-network generally, empirical evidence shows that Cin-UFPE (skills 
sub-network) and CESAR (technology sub-network) are the most prominent actors 
that could play bridging roles. 
Analysis of the dyadic ties created by firms in this section, and the examination of 
the consistency of the sub-networks in Section 7.2 provides evidence on the 
governance of the Recife network of innovators. The structural and relational 
embeddedness of this network is indicative of the institutional context in which local 
firms innovated in the period April 2006-April 2009. Section 7.4 investigates the 
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innovation performed by Recife local firms, and discusses how network governance 
influenced innovation in the region.  
7.4 The Recife software network: innovation at the firm-level  
This section investigates Recife software firms’ innovations in the commercialised, 
ongoing and abandoned innovation stages. We show which firms are innovating, 
whether they are connected or disconnected to the main cluster of nodes, and how 
many innovations and what degree of novelty do they produce. Section 7.4.1 
investigates innovations commercialised in the period 2006-2009; Section 7.4.2 
investigates the innovations that were being developed at the time of data collection 
(ongoing innovations). Section 7.4.3 investigates the innovations abandoned during 
the same period. Section 7.4.4 summarises section 7.4. 
7.4.1 Commercialized innovations: 2006-2009 
The empirical findings revealed that most commercialised innovations are software 
services: 113 new services and 11 new products. The former involved 10 firms and 
the latter 7 firms).  
Table 7.5 New software products commercialised by Recife software 
firms during the period April 2006-2009 
Firm # 
Total number of 
innovations 
Innovation new 
to the firm 
Innovation new to 
national market 
Innovation new to 
international 
market 
Firm  1 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 5 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 7 2 2 1 0 
Firm 9 1 1 1 0 
Firm 13 1 1 1 0 
Firm 14 3 3 3 2 
Firm 15 1 1 1 0 
Firm 16 2 2 2 0 
Firm 17 1 1 1 0 
Total 11 11 10 2 
Legend: n.a.= not applicable 
Source: own elaboration from fieldwork, April 2009. 
 
Table 7.5 shows that most firms commercialised one new product in the period 
2006-2009. The most notable finding showed in Table 7.5 is that all Recife firms that 
commercialised new software products introduced an innovation to the national 
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market, that is, these firms produced software that had not been present in any other 
Brazilian software firm at the time of the commercialisation. This suggests that firms 
had improved their absorptive capacity and indicates that the formerly lagging Recife 
region is showing positive results in relation to IT technological catch up (Section 
7.5 discusses this further). Firms 14 and 16 produced more than one innovation, and 
Firm 14 introduced two new-to-the-world innovations.  
The innovations achieved by Firm 16 required external ties with actors in the 
business and skills sub-networks. For one of its innovations Firm 16 created a tie 
with a local firm that develops complementary software. For the other innovation, it 
forged ties with Cin-UFPE (the only example of a firm tie with this organisation) and 
FACEPE, the public funding agency that part financed the innovation. An 
interviewee told us that the involvement of Cin-UFPE was crucial because it 
supported the firm’s access to new knowledge which positioned it at the national 
technological frontier. The tie with Cin-UFPE was supported by the enrolment of 
one of the firm’s creators on a Professional Masters Degree course offered by Cin-
UFPE. This course is more market orientated than Cin-UFPE’s regular Masters 
Degree in Computing Science. The tie with the university group was motivated by a 
relationship with a Cin-UFPE professor who supervised the interviewee’s Masters 
Dissertation. This suggests that personal relationships played an important role in the 
creation of ties with the local research university and underlines that actors in the 
same communities have shared knowledge and understandings about specific 
problems, which increases the likelihood of ties between them. This corroborates the 
findings in Section 7.3. 
Firm 14 stands out because it is the only firm that introduced an innovation at the 
international level, and had been exporting. This firm is one of the most successful 
software firms in the Recife region and competes in the international market: 
the international market always comes first for us [interviewed firm], we 
actually develop our products in the English language, and then later assess 
which products would be interesting to the national market, when chosen 
products are translated into Portuguese (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
There are two interesting findings related to Firm 14. First, the firm was incubated as 
part of the Cin-UFPE incubation programme ‘Recife BEAT’, and its first product 
was the result of a Master’s level research by one of the firm’s founder. Although the 
firm did not name Cin-UFPE as a formal collaborator during the period under 
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analysis (the firm is in the age group 6-10 years - Chapter 5, Table 5.5), the 
interviewee stressed the firm’s good relationships with the organisation: 
there are always students from Cin-UFPE here in the firm, they [Cin-
UFPE students] come as trainees to develop part of their dissertations, 
we are happy to give our codes to them because we know that they 
use for scientific purposes (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
Second, Firm 14 creates ties with CNPq for international level innovations, and is the 
only firm in the sample with tightly-connected ties to this organisation. According to 
the interviewee, CNPq’s funding allows them to hire highly-qualified staff, which 
provides the firm with technological frontier knowledge. 
The investigation of new commercialised software services shows that most Recife 
firms innovated in services rather than products. However, this preponderance is due 
mostly to the very high number of service innovations commercialised by three 
firms, which account for 90% of total firm level innovation. Table 7.6 summarises 
the innovation performance of local firms that commercialised new software services 
during the period 2006 to 2009. 
Table 7.6 shows that there were much smaller numbers of national level innovations 
(compared to new software products) and especially international (new to the world) 
innovations, and shows that four firms stand out for innovative performance.  
Firm 5 had the highest number of innovations, 44, but these were all firm level 
innovations (i.e. innovations already present in other firms in the market). Firm 5 
created external ties with customers and a local incubator to support their innovation. 
According to the interviewee, the number of innovations is because the firm works 
on the basis of one-off projects, as follows: 
we [firm] only work for projects with proven demand, we are a start-up and 
cannot afford to have a different business model. And every project 
demands a novelty that has to be learnt by us, so the way I see it is that 
every project is an innovation, it may not involve only new things to us, of 
course we [firm] re-employ previous knowledge, but there is always 
something new to be learnt, and in that sense it is an innovation (…) but we 
are aware that the new knowledge employed by us has already been used by 
others (Recife fieldwork firm interview). 
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 Table 7.6 New software services commercialised by Recife software 
firms during the period April 2006-2009 
Firm # 
Total 
number of 
innovations 
Innovation 
new to the 
firm 
Innovation new 
to national 
market 
Innovation new to 
international 
market 
Firm 1 3 3 2 1 
Firm 2 1 1 0 0 
Firm 3 1 1 1 0 
Firm 4 2 1  1 0 
Firm 5 44 44  0 0 
Firm 6 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 7 2 2 1 0 
Firm 8 1 1 0 0 
Firm 9 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 10 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 11* 18  18 18 15 
Firm 12* 40 40 Not answered  Not answered 
Firm 13 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 14 1 1 0 0 
Firm 15 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 16 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Firm 17 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total 113 113 23 16 
Legend:  
n.a.= not applicable 
* = Firm produces both services and products and was unable to state whether the innovation 
referred to a service or product. 
Source: own elaboration from fieldwork, April 2009. 
 
Firm 1 had produced fewer innovations compared to Firms 5, 11 and 12, for 
instance. However, most of Firm 1 innovations were new to the national market, and 
one was new to the world although at the time of data collection had not entered the 
export market. The firm is directing its investments mostly to the domestic market. 
Firm 1 is among the group of a few firms with no external ties to support their 
innovation: 
we [firm] use only internal knowledge to develop our products and services, 
but in technical terms there is one firm that does all the R&D for us, we 
[firm’s entrepreneurs] created a spin-off firm to develop our R&D. We 
created this new [spin-off] firm because it reduced our tax liability; in 
reality, the firms are part of the same firm. Sometimes we outsource part of 
our activities, because there are local firms that can do things quicker and 
more cheaply than we can ourselves. But all the required knowledge is 
developed here (Recife fieldwork firm interview).   
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Firm 11 had involvement in all the types of innovations in Table 7.6, with most new 
to the international market. According to the interviewee most of these innovations 
involved new technologies, and some involved the application of a new business 
model not previously used for the type of software developed. Firm 11 was 
incubated at CESAR and, as discussed above, benefited from the incubator 
infrastructure and from CESAR’s reputation (with regard to prospective customers) 
and expertise in software development.
303
 The firm was connected to CESAR’s 
independent cluster of nodes (Figure 7.1, p. 222 above) and therefore disengaged 
from the main cluster within the network of innovators; the firm has external ties 
with customers in addition to CESAR. As mentioned above, CESAR is one of the 
most important IT R&D organisations in Brazil, and the innovative results of Firm 
11 suggest that firms with access to successful organisations may be able not only to 
benefit from their successful experience, but also to reproduce success in their own 
contexts. However, we cannot generalise this because the history and performance of 
Firm 11 is an exception in the sample. 
7.4.2 Ongoing innovations  
Table 7.7 summarises the ongoing innovation stage for Recife software firms during 
2006-2009. The empirical evidence for this stage shows that most (13) Recife 
software firms were involved in developing new software products or services at the 
time of the data collection.  
All the firms involved in ongoing innovation stage had created external ties to 
support their innovation activities. This was as expected because most firms had 
developed customised software during the period of investigation, and one would 
expect local firms to have responded to new customer demands. Also, most firms in 
the sample are micro or small firms, and it is reasonable to assume they depend on 
customers to finance financing their innovation. However, close examination shows 
that not all Recife innovative firms invested in new innovation projects in response 
                                                 
303
 According to the interviewee, the firm has had ad hoc collaborations with independent developers 
that are part of a virtual community. These collaborations occur whenever the firm reaches its 
technical or creativity capacity in the development stage. The firm uses email to contact independent 
developers who may be located anywhere in Brazil. The developers produce part of the firm’s 
products, but there is no legal contract regulating the relationship: ‘these collaborations are very 
informal, and there is a lot of trust involved. We email the developer, who confirms whether he/she 
can deliver the product, and once we make a deal we trust that they [developers] will deliver what we 
[firm] need. We pay them direct’. Recife fieldwork firm interview.  
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to market demands; this includes Firms 1, 2, 7, 14, 16 and 17. Four firms (1, 2, 7 and 
14) had created external ties and relied on public funding to invest in software 
products or services to respond to potential demand.
304
 Other firms involved in 
ongoing innovation stated that their new products or services had been financed by 
their customers (e.g. Firms 3, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 12).
305
 
Table 7.7 Ongoing software innovations by Recife 
software firms during the period June 2006- June 2009 
Firm number Number of ongoing 
innovations 
External 
collaborator 
Firm1 1 Yes 
Firm2 4 Yes 
Firm3 1 Yes 
Firm4 n.a. Yes 
Firm5 3 Yes 
Firm6 0 - 
Firm7 1 Yes 
Firm8 0 - 
Firm9 1 Yes 
Firm10 1 Yes 
Firm11 1 Yes 
Firm12 1 Yes 
Firm13 0 - 
Firm14 n.a. Yes 
Firm15 0 - 
Firm16 1 Yes 
Firm17 1 Yes 
Total* 16 n.a. 
Legend:  
n.a.= Firm did not disclose how many ongoing innovations. 
*= Total is incomplete because Firm 4 and Firm 14 did not disclose how many 
ongoing innovations. 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
 
There were fewer innovations in the ongoing than in the commercialised stage (16 
and 113 respectively), but the number of external ties created by innovative firms 
had increased. Most ties were with actors in the business sub-network, followed by 
the skills, finance and technology sub-networks. Some firms, such as Firms 4 and 7, 
had relinquished ties created in the commercialised innovation stage; however, both 
these firms had created other ties, indicating that ties may be abandoned and 
                                                 
304
 Firm 1 was still awaiting the results of a grant application to FINEP, at the time of the data 
collection. 
305
 Firm 4 did not disclose this information. 
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reformed or replaced as to respond to the requirements of different innovation 
projects. Firms 4 and 7 had abandoned their ties with SoftexRecife, ties that in the 
commercialised innovation stage had provided referrals to new customers. Neither 
firm was using SoftexRecife for their ongoing innovation. 
Another finding with regard to the creation of external ties for innovation is the 
increasing number with funding organisations from both the skills and financial sub-
networks. Three firms had set up ties with FACEPE and five firms had ties with 
FINEP. This suggests that Recife software firms are increasingly more able to access 
public funding offered by local organisations (e.g. FACEPE) or national funders (e.g. 
FINEP).  
Table 7.7 shows also the prominence of Firm 2 for total number of ongoing 
innovations - four compared to one for the majority of firms. Firm 2’s number of 
ongoing innovations was higher than its number of commercialised innovations (1) 
and it had retained all existing ties as well as creating new ones for the ongoing 
innovation stage. These were with two public funding organisations. Its ongoing 
innovation was not related to demonstrated demand. Firm 5 also stands out. It 
created a new tie with Cin-UFPE to support its ongoing innovation, and to connect it 
to the main cluster of nodes (the firm formerly was in an isolated node). It also is 
involved mostly in one-off projects, which probably explains its higher number of 
innovations compared to other firms. 
7.4.3 Abandoned innovation  
This section investigates innovations abandoned by Recife software firms in the 
period 2006-2009 (Table 7.8).  
The empirical evidence reveals that most firms did not abandon any of their 
innovation activities during the period 2006 until 2009. Activities that were 
abandoned were mostly for reasons related to lack of financial resources within the 
firm (Firms 3 and 15), or from customers (Firm 3), or failure to access external 
funding from public funding organisations (Firms 9 and 10). Firm 4, though, had a 
different reason: loss of trust in a partner collaborating over software development. 
The partner was located in another region of Brazil, and it is possible that 
geographical distance had a negative effect on this tie. These findings suggest that 
although Recife software firms do not rely completely on demonstrated demand 
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when initiating innovation activity (as discussed in Section 7.4.2), they are likely to 
cease development if they are left with only internal means of financing the activity.  
Table 7.8 Abandoned software innovations by Recife 
software firms during the period June 2006- June 2009 
Firm number Number of abandoned 
innovations 
External 
collaborator 
Firm1 0 n.a. 
Firm2 0 n.a. 
Firm3 1 Yes 
Firm4 1 Yes 
Firm5 0 n.a. 
Firm6 0 n.a. 
Firm7 0 n.a. 
Firm8 0 n.a. 
Firm9 2 Yes 
Firm10 1 Yes 
Firm11 1 Yes 
Firm12 0 n.a. 
Firm13 0 n.a. 
Firm14 0 n.a. 
Firm15  1 No 
Firm16 0 n.a. 
Firm17 0 n.a. 
Total 7 n.a 
Legend:  
n.a.= Firm did not disclose how many ongoing innovations. 
Source: own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
7.4.4 Summary 
This section investigated and analysed innovation in Recife software firms in three 
innovation stages, during the period 2006-2009. All the commercialised product 
innovations were new to the firm and most (90%) were new to the national market. 
A very small number (18%) of product software innovations was new to the 
international market. For commercialised software services innovations, all were 
new to the firm, 20% were new to the national market and 14% were new to the 
international market. These results show that Recife software firms’ innovation in 
products is more fundamental than their innovation in software services. The 
considerably higher number of software service innovations compared to software 
products shows that Recife software firms are more competitive in software services. 
Also Recife software firms success at commercialising a substantial number of 
innovations suggests that local firms are making an effort to catch up with other 
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regions in the country, and penetrate regional and national markets historically 
supplied by leading national competitors or international suppliers.  
The investigation of the three innovation stages and the representations of networks 
show that only in the abandoned innovation stage was there participation from an 
inter-regional network actor. The tie with this actor was loosely-connected, and 
eventually was abandoned. This finding suggests that the Recife network of 
innovators should beware of network sclerosis (Grabher, 1993, and Grasenick et al, 
2008) especially when there is a predominance of tightly-connected ties in the 
network. At the same time, some ties were with customers located in regions other 
than Recife, which may reduce the risks of sclerosis. Section 7.5 addresses the 
importance of customers for Recife software firms, focusing on their contribution to 
catch-up.  
7.5 Internationalisation of Recife software firms: some observations 
Investigation of the innovations introduced by Recife software firms and their market 
penetration leads to some conclusions related to their absorptive capacity and 
technological catch-up to the national and international technological frontiers. Both 
are important issues because the region is considered a laggard in software 
production compared to other Brazilian regions. 
Table 7.9 summarises the findings in Sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 and suggests that 
some Recife software firms stand out as very active software innovators. The 
findings in Table 7.9 reveal that some firms access customers based outside the 
Recife region, which is relevant for catching-up. The firms that innovated in the 
national market seem to have developed beyond innovation based on imitation and 
(at least to a degree) caught up with national firms in other Brazilian regions. The 
close examination of national and international level innovation shows that although 
only Firm 14 was exporting its innovation at the time of the data collection, other 
local firms had successfully penetrated the national market and were competitive in 
Brazil, and some had been involved in export (vide Table 7.9).  
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Table 7.9 Summary of Recife software firms innovations, 2006-2009 
Firm 
number 
Market penetration 
Total number 
of innovations 
Commercialised Ongoing Abandoned 
Yes/ No External 
collaborator 
Yes/ No External 
collaborator 
Yes/ No External 
collaborator 
Firm1 National 4 Yes No Yes Yes No - 
Firm2 National 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
Firm3 Regional 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm4 National 3* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm5 Regional 47 Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
Firm6 Reg; Natl and Intl 0 No - No - No - 
Firm7 Regional 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
Firm8 Regional 1 Yes Yes No - No - 
Firm9 Local, Reg; Natl and Intl 4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm10 Natl and Intl 2 No - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm11 Natl and Intl 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm12 Natl and Intl 41 Yes No Yes Yes No - 
Firm13 Local 1 Yes Yes No - No - 
Firm14 Natl and Intl 4* Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
Firm15 Natl and Intl 2 Yes Yes No - Yes No 
Firm16 National 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
Firm17 Natl and Intl 2 Yes No Yes Yes No - 
Legend: Loc= Local; Reg= Regional; Natl= National and Intl= International. 
 *= firm did not disclose the number of ongoing innovations, total number of innovation refer to commercialised and abandoned innovations. 
Source: Own elaboration based on fieldwork data collection. 
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Since penetration of more sophisticated markets indicates better developed 
absorptive capacity, and absorptive capacity is crucial for technological catching-up 
(Rousseva, 2008), we can conclude that in the first decade of 2000 there was an 
important shift in the Recife software industry. Up to the late 1990s, the region was 
lagging some way behind other Brazilian software producing regions, but is showing 
(relative success) in catching up.  
Although Recife software firms, for the most part, are following an imitative 
strategy, the fact that some are innovating at national and international level and 
accessing sophisticated customers (in their own or other Brazilian regions, or 
abroad), suggest a major change in the Recife software market. Until the 2000s most 
of the region’s sophisticated software demand was satisfied by software suppliers in 
other national or international regions. Nevertheless, the catch-up that has been 
achieved is limited to a small number of firms. Recife must find ways to enable firms 
to improve the degree of novelty of their innovations which will allow them to 
access new markets. 
7.6 Conclusions 
The development of a national software industry depends on historical and 
institutional events and their specifics, as well as the industry participants. This 
requires study at the national or regional level of the industry (Heeks et al., 2001; 
Steinmueller, 2001). An investigation of the software industry in a country or region 
may provide greater understanding about how, for example, the private and public 
sectors interact. The complexity of software products and their innovative activities 
require scientific and technological knowledge at different levels. Software firms 
may need to combine internal competencies, knowledge and experience with 
external sources of knowledge, which is enabled by the creation of external ties with 
supporting organisations such as universities, specialised suppliers, and users. 
Creation of such ties highlights the role of inter-organisational networks of 
innovators in the software industry.  
This chapter investigated the Brazilian software industry in the region of Recife, 
reputed to be a laggard in this industry at national and international market levels. 
Sections 7.2 and 7.3 analysed governance of the Recife software network of 
innovators by examining the structural and relational embeddedness of the network. 
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It is important to highlight that most of network actors were identified before 
empirical data collection, and the examination of structural and relational 
embeddedness allows us to identify which network actors were interacting and how 
(Chapter 5). Examination of the structural embeddedness of the Recife software 
network of innovators showed that there is a high level of consistency in most of the 
sub-networks analysed, and in the case of the business sub-network complete 
consistency. The participation of two supporting business organisations, 
SoftexRecife and NGPD, was crucial for supporting local firms access to 
sophisticated customers, which demanded an up grading in the firms’ technological 
capabilities. 
Examination of the relational embeddedness of the Recife software network of 
innovators demonstrated that most direct ties created by local firms were tightly-
connected ties and that, in most cases, geographical proximity supported the creation 
of such ties. We found also that most firms created external ties to support their 
innovation activity. This applied especially in the ongoing innovation stage when all 
the firms studied had ties to one or more external organisations and also most firms 
were connected to the main cluster of nodes, suggesting an improvement in the 
structure of the network of innovators compared to the commercialised innovation 
stage. The Recife network software of innovators showed a change from a 
fragmented structure to a well-knit one. This suggests that there were fewer ‘missing 
links’ in the network of innovators and that formal interactions among firms and 
between firms and other actors were better diffused. With regard to the abandoned 
innovation stage, we found that most firms that abandoned innovations during the 
period 2006-2009 had external ties for innovation. 
We found that the absolute number of innovations by Recife firms was quite large 
for a laggard region, with a relatively new industry. The total number of innovations 
in the period April 2006 to April 2009 was 147. Most of these innovations were new 
to the firm, which demonstrates that Recife software firms are following an imitation 
rather than a more fundamental innovation strategy. An alternative interpretation 
would be that because many of these innovative firms are small firms, their 
innovation strategies are largely dictated by customers, whose requirements are not 
related to more radical innovations. Recife software firms are recombining existing 
knowledge, often directed to local (as opposed to global) and vertical markets. This 
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was an expected result, since it is a common feature of local software firms in 
laggard regions to adopt such a strategy as a first step towards penetrating local and 
national markets.  
However, we found also that most Recife software firms had external ties to support 
their innovation, and there was a medium level of diffusion of interactions within the 
network of innovators (especially in the ongoing innovation stage). This was 
unexpected, because the knowledge base of imitative software firms often relies on 
experience-based learning and the number of external ties in this case is expected to 
be lower. The discussion above contributes to answering the research questions 
which are reintroduced below.  
Research Question A1 
In considering government technology policy to promote firm innovation through 
networks in the case of the two Brazilian regions selected for analysis, how does 
regional level network governance and structure influence the effectiveness of 
policies supporting network creation in Brazil? 
The empirical findings discussed above identified that the governance and structure 
of the Recife software network of innovators had a varied influence on the 
effectiveness of government technology policies to promote firm innovation. This 
was demonstrated by the conflicting results for structural and relational 
embeddedness of the network of innovators. The former indicates some level of 
inconsistency in the skills sub-network (although this was related primarily to 
funding), in addition to the low engagement in the network of innovators by crucial 
actors such as university departments. For the technology sub-network we found that 
only one R&D organisation was tied to local firms, and was related more to its own 
cluster of nodes. These two findings suggest the network governance and structure of 
the Recife software may have partly jeopardized the effectiveness of technology 
policies directed at firm-level innovations through the promotion of networks.  
The results on the relational embeddedness indicated that most direct ties were 
tightly-connected ties, a crucial feature in interactions aimed at knowledge exchange 
among actors. In addition, the efforts of key network actors to support the 
development and growth of Recife local firms, seem to have been successful 
although to a limited degree. These findings suggest that the network governance and 
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structure of the Recife software network have positively influenced the effectiveness 
of technology policies directed at firm-level innovations through the promotion of 
networks. In addition, the diffusion of formal interactions shows improvements when 
different innovation stages were compared, which is partly due to the response to 
local policies implemented in the region aimed at fostering collaborations.  
Research Question A2 
What, if any, is the responsiveness of network governance and structure to 
technology policy aimed at the promotion of networks in Brazil? Does government 
policy promotion of networks and efforts to control network structure increase the 
effectiveness of technology policy aimed at improving the innovative performance of 
Brazilian software firms? 
The empirical findings discussed in this chapter show there was a moderate level of 
diffusion of formal interactions in the Recife network of software innovators. 
Although the network of innovators was generally fragmented, there were signs of a 
trend towards a well-knit structure. Also, interactions among key local actors in the 
network of innovators were having some effect on the development and growth of 
Recife local software. Hence, the results for the Recife case show that there was 
interaction between technology policy and network governance and structure in 
Recife, that this interaction was positive, and that a large share of innovative firms 
participated in the network of innovators to develop their innovation activities. Based 
on the existence of state level policy to promote the emergence of a local network of 
innovators, and positive innovation performance among local firms, we can conclude 
that the promotion of local networks has increased the effectiveness of policy 
directed at improving local innovative performance. 
The positive response of Recife local software firms to public policies aimed at 
promoting the formation of a network of innovators may be explained also by local 
firms need for complementary support (related to business or technical knowledge) 
to compensate for their backwardness in relation to competition in regional and 
national markets. This discussion reveals that the interactions between technology 
policy and network governance and structure in a developing country context may 
require specific consideration of the stage of development of both region and firms in 
order to achieve a more appropriate (consistent) and well-knit structure of 
interactions in which different ties are formed at different stages in the life cycle of 
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innovation development. This issue is addressed in the discussion in Chapter 8 
related to the Group B research questions introduced in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 8 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
8.1 Introduction  
The thesis investigated two regional software networks in Brazil, and especially their 
structure and governance (Chapters 4, 6 and 7), to provide evidence to answer the 
research questions introduced in Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
The research questions are in two groups: A and B. Chapters 6 and 7 respectively 
address the questions in Group A for the Campinas and Recife networks; the findings 
are summarised in this chapter which also addresses the questions in Group B 
through a comparison of the networks (Section 8.2). Section 8.3 identifies the main 
contributions of this thesis. Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of this research and 
Section 8.5 presents the implications for policy. Section 8.6 concludes with some 
suggestions for future research. 
8.2 The Research Questions  
This section highlights the findings in Chapters 6 and 7 (Section 8.2.1) and addresses 
the research questions in Group B (Section 8.2.2). 
8.2.1 Revisiting the Group A research questions 
Research Question A1 
In considering government technology policy to promote firm innovation through 
networks in the case of the two Brazilian regions selected for analysis, how does 
regional level network governance and structure influence the effectiveness of 
policies supporting network creation in Brazil?   
Chapter 2 outlined the relevance of government technology policy in the economy to 
assure higher levels social welfare, based on the definition of technology as a partial 
public good (Ergas, 1987; Mowery, 1995; Pavitt, 1987; Steinmueller, 2010). Chapter 
2 also highlights the promotion of networks through different technology policy 
channels, including networks that enable firms to increase their possibility of 
learning-by-interaction, and acquiring new knowledge crucial for innovation 
(Lundvall, 1992a). Evidence on developed countries regional networks provides 
some confirmation of the relevance of networks for regional industrial growth and 
development and has encouraged developing countries to implement technology 
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policies aimed at promoting network formation. Chapter 3 shows that Brazil was no 
exception, and introduced policies in the early 1990s, to foster the formation of 
regional software networks in different regions of the country (Stefanuto, 2004).  
Chapter 4 discussed the cases of two of such networks, Campinas and Recife, and 
showed that they had different histories in the ICT industry, with implications for 
how the software industries developed in each of these networks following the 
implementation of the national policy programme.  
Campinas is in the most economically developed Brazilian region and has benefited 
from national and state level policies to support regional industry development, 
mainly through the establishment of organisations that are directly related to research 
and scientific activities. Campinas has become the leading software region in Brazil. 
Government policy has played a role in this leadership position.  
Recife, in contrast, is in an economically lagging Brazilian region, which is 
geographically distant from the most economically dynamic region, and has received 
less support from national policies directed to the development of the software 
industry. The lower level of national support has triggered the implementation by the 
government of Pernambuco state, where Recife is located, of state level technology 
policies directed towards the development of the local software industry and aimed 
at supporting economic catch-up by Recife and Pernambuco state (SECTMA, 2006). 
The empirical findings discussed in Chapter 6 reveal that the network governance 
and structure of the Campinas software network of innovators has had a mixed 
influence on the effectiveness of government technology policies directed at firm 
innovation. This was indicated by the different results with regard to the structural 
embeddedness of the network compared to the results for relational embeddedness. 
The results for structural embeddedness indicate inconsistencies in a crucial sub-
network, the skills sub-network, low engagement of technology sub-network actors, 
and low levels of interaction among local firms for innovation related activities. The 
results for relational embeddedness of the Campinas network reveal that most direct 
ties were tightly-connected ties, crucial for interactions aimed at knowledge 
exchange and learning among actors. These findings indicated that the relational 
embeddedness of the Campinas network governance and structure had a more 
positive influence than structural embeddedness, on technology policy effectiveness 
in relation to the promotion of firm-level innovation through network formation.  
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The empirical findings in Chapter 7 show that the influence of network governance 
and structure of the Recife software network of innovators was also mixed in terms 
of its effect on government technology policies for firm innovation. Again, the 
results for structural embeddedness of the network and relational embeddedness 
differ. The results for the structural embeddedness indicate some level of 
inconsistency in the skills sub-network (although this primarily is related to funding). 
They also show low level of engagement in the network of crucial actors such as 
university departments. The examination of ties with local technology sub-network 
actors showed that local firms had ties with only one local R&D organisation, 
although it is strongly related to its cluster of nodes. The level of interaction among 
local firms in Recife is shown also to be low. The results for relational 
embeddedness of network governance and structure are similar to the Campinas case 
for the tightness of ties, since most direct ties are tightly-connected, and as discussed 
above, a crucial feature of interactions aimed at knowledge exchange and learning 
among actors is tightly-connected ties. These findings indicate that the relational 
embeddedness of the Recife network’s governance and structure had a more 
constructive influence than its structural embeddedness, in terms of the effectiveness 
of technology policy directed at firm-level innovation through the promotion of 
networks.  
Although the historical and industrial trajectories of the Campinas and Recife 
software networks are different, these findings suggest some similarity between the 
regions with regard to network governance and structure. However, is the 
effectiveness of government policy in Brazil limited in relation to promoting the 
formation of networks? In both cases we found that structural embeddedness limited 
the effectiveness of government policy, especially in relation to the inconsistencies 
in the sub-networks. One of the main problems is the institutional path rigidity that is 
a feature of both networks, and indicates, as argued by Asheim and Gertler (2004), 
that the national context should be taken account of in an analysis of regions. The 
findings from this doctoral research suggest that reducing institutional rigidity must 
be a first step towards improving the effectiveness of government policy to promote 
network formation in Brazil. 
Research Question A2 
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What, if any, is the responsiveness of network governance and structure to 
technology policy aimed at the promotion of networks in Brazil? Does government 
policy promotion of networks and efforts to control network structure increase the 
effectiveness of technology policy aimed at improving the innovative performance of 
Brazilian software firms? 
The results in Chapter 6 show that the structure of the Campinas software network of 
innovators is fragmented, which suggests a low level of diffusion of formal 
interactions within the network. This finding suggests that the rate of response of 
Campinas software firms to government policies to promote network formation is 
low compared to the potential for interactions among firms, and between firms and 
other organisations. The results for the Campinas case show that there are limited 
interactions between technology policy and network governance and structure in 
Campinas, where firms show high levels of innovative performance and where a 
large share of innovative firms relies on internal sources for developing their 
innovation activities. Firms prefer to learn through experience rather than learning by 
interacting. 
The results in Chapter 7 show that the level of diffusion of formal interactions is 
slightly higher in the Recife software network of innovators. Although the structure 
of the network is fragmented, we found signs of a trend towards a well-knit structure. 
In addition, key local actors keen to support the development and growth of Recife 
local software firms are active in the network, although not to a huge extent. The 
results for the Recife case show broader interaction between technology policy and 
network governance and structure in Recife (compared to Campinas), and a large 
share of innovative firms engaged in the network to develop their innovation 
activities. Based on the implementation of state policy to promote networks and the 
findings from this doctoral research, we can conclude that the promotion of local 
networks has increased the effectiveness of policy directed at improving local 
innovative performance. 
8.2.2 Answering the Group B research questions 
Research Question B1 
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Do network governance and structure have a consistent influence upon the 
innovative performance of Brazilian software firms set up in the two regions selected 
for analysis? 
The innovative performance of the software firms embedded in the two networks 
investigated differs in absolute terms and in their nearness to the technological 
frontier. Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4, provides a discussion of the degree of novelty of 
commercialised innovations, in terms of newness to the firm, the national market or 
the international market.  
The findings for firm-level innovation by firms embedded in the Campinas software 
network show that the level of innovation is comparatively higher in absolute terms 
and closer to the technology frontier. This is as expected because Campinas is the 
leading software region in Brazil. However, studies of systems of innovation claim 
that engagement in networks and network alignment are required for better 
innovative performance. The finding in this thesis show that innovative performance 
among the firms in both networks was better when firms were least engaged in the 
network, when network governance and structure were comparatively less aligned 
and their influence on technology policies directed at network formation to support 
innovation was more limited. In other words, the different levels of innovative 
performance of firms located in regions with different levels of socio-economic 
development, in a developing country context, such as the cases of Campinas and 
Recife, show different or inconsistent influence of network governance and structure 
on the effectiveness of government technology policy. 
In addition, although network governance and structure in Recife was comparatively 
better aligned, innovation was mostly firm level (innovations new to the international 
markets were rare), which indicates that the region’s backwardness had an effect on 
the type of innovation being performed. This regional backwardness was a barrier to 
the conduct and diffusion of innovation, there was the predominance of one-off 
innovation projects and less re-use of previous innovative efforts/knowledge, with 
the result that firms embedded in Recife are continually re-inventing, which is 
constraining their possibilities for growth and economic returns.   
Research Question B2 
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In assessing the effectiveness of technology policy in Brazil, are there relative 
differences in policy effects when comparing the two Brazilian regions analysed? 
The findings provided evidence that in a context of backwardness, policies aimed at 
network formation are consistent with some positive effects, suggesting that 
backwardness is not a complete barrier. However, the Campinas network case does 
not provide clear evidence that network policies are causally responsible for the 
innovative performance of the firms in the network. The initial assumptions that 
network promotion policies would be positive in both cases (augmenting strengths 
and compensating for weaknesses) are not supported. There seems to be little 
evidence that the strengths among Campinas firms were augmented by policy as 
opposed to the organic growth of the relational embeddedness of the network. On the 
other hand, there is some evidence that network promotion policies play a role by 
compensating for weaknesses. Relational embeddedness is more remote from 
government policy because of the issues involved in the creation of ties. Structural 
embeddedness is closer to government policy in the sense that government has wider 
possibilities for action and rather more control over the results of policies 
implemented. The Recife case highlights the more positive interaction between 
structural and relational embeddedness compared to the Campinas case, suggesting 
that backwardness does not decrease the effectiveness of the policy – if anything it 
increases its importance. 
The findings from the two case studies, and especially the results for the Campinas 
network, show that network promotion policies do not have such a positive effect on 
firm-level innovation performance as might be expected. Innovation performance 
tends not to depend on network governance and structure. Therefore, these findings 
challenge those who claim that networks and innovation are directly connected, that 
is, that better (more closely) connected firms will be more innovative. These claims, 
of course, are based largely on experience in developed countries. Nevertheless, 
these results were not as expected and suggest that network policies are unlikely to 
be effective substitutes for other elements of industrial policy (such as, procurement 
demand, support for research institutions, and direct support for the innovative 
efforts of firms). This leads to the conclusion that the relatively cheaper fostering of 
innovativeness through network promotion policies will not be as effective as the 
theory and experience in developed countries would suggest. Instead, it reinforces 
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the argument that development and catching up are costly and long-term processes 
that require industrial policies complemented by and aligned to technology policies.  
8.3 Contributions of the Thesis  
This thesis was motivated by an interest in and concern for whether network 
promotion policies could be relied upon to contribute to the innovation effectiveness 
of firms involved in networks stimulated by those policies. From a careful review of 
the literature, we derived a series of general research questions that focus on the 
possible omissions or gaps in the consideration of factors that, in principle, might 
make a difference to the effectiveness of such policies. These general questions were 
operationalised for a situated study of two networks in Brazil, both of which were 
influenced by network promotion policies, and also had a number of contrasting 
features including differences in the levels of regional development in their situated 
contexts. This situated study has demonstrated that the issues identified in the 
general research questions are relevant to the situated cases examined and, therefore, 
should be taken account of in future policy related works on the effects of network 
promotion policies on innovation effectiveness. The following paragraphs provide a 
more complete explanation of the contributions of this thesis to the existing literature 
and to methods of policy analysis relevant for examining network promotion 
policies.   
The first contribution relates to the need to include the structural and relational 
embeddedness of networks, within the same analytical framework. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, most studies on organisational networks concentrate on examining dyadic 
ties (relational embeddedness) (Provan and Kenis, 2008) and tend to ignore the 
institutional setting (structural embeddedness) (Grasenick et al., 2008), which 
however is strongly related to controlling mechanisms within networks. This lack of 
attention to the institutional setting provided the basis for the first of the general 
research questions (question A1 and A2 in Chapter 1) and their specific operational 
implementation (in Chapter 5 and subsequent chapters). 
This thesis captures the features of dyadic ties within the network, and the 
institutional settings that rule the ties among firms and between firms and other 
network organisations. Hence, it provides indicators that reflect the quality of 
relationships. This is a relevant area of investigation in the context of innovation 
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systems in developing countries (Lundvall et al., 2009). Furthermore, it examines the 
structural features that go beyond the regional setting, for instance, by studying the 
consistency of the sub-networks in which national level organisations participate. 
The analytical framework contributes by bringing empirical evidence that relates to 
and supports Asheim and Gertler’s (2004) claim that, although regions may differ 
(especially in large countries where regional disparities and path-rigidity are 
common) (Martin and Sunley, 2010), the national system of innovation in which 
they are embedded presents specific features that influence regional development 
and performance.  
In addition, the thesis provides evidence that is specific to firms located in regional 
systems and groups such systems into ‘families’ based on commonalities, and 
provides a systematic comparison among regions, issues highlighted as in need of 
investigation by Lundvall et al. (2009b) and Padilla-Pérez et al. (2009). The thesis 
shows that although ties among network actors may be tightly-connected, there may 
be inconsistencies in sub-networks, and poor engagement of sub-networks (such as 
the technology and financial sub-networks) to support local technological 
development and innovation. The inconsistency in the role of sub-network support 
has been addressed conceptually by Bell and Pavitt, (1993), Cassiolato et al. (2003) 
and Lastres and Cassiolato (2001) as dysfunctional links within developing country 
innovation systems. The poor engagement of sub-networks is often described in the 
systems of innovation literature on developing countries as ‘missing links’ (Bell and 
Albu, 1999; Chaminade and Vang, 2008; Cimoli, 2002). The thesis advances the 
existing knowledge by clarifying these issues in a situated case, and demonstrating 
the utility of specific indicators for capturing these effects. 
The second contribution of the thesis is methodological and also stems from the 
answers to the first set of general research questions (A1 and A2 in Chapter 1) as 
operationalised in Chapter 5 and subsequent chapters. By combining qualitative data 
and Social Network Analysis methods to study regional networks in Brazil, this 
research shows that conclusions may be drawn about how the engagement of actors 
in or their withdrawal from networks can influence their evolution. This is 
accomplished by analysing a visual representation of the network based on close 
examined data. This method serves also to highlight the actors that play bridging 
roles in the network.  
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Work on regional innovation in Brazil largely employs the Local Productive 
Arrangement (LPA) approach developed by Cassiolato and Lastres (1999). The LPA 
approach investigates three main issues: i) which markets are targeted by the 
‘arrangement’; ii) which governance mode is present in the ‘arrangement’ – that is, 
whether the decision power follows a hierarchical or network type structure; and iii) 
the relevance of the territory with regard to the presence of local capabilities. The 
main aim of LPA studies is to understand local industry performance and how 
territories can improve their competitiveness in a globalised economy (Lastres, 
2007). This thesis has investigated governance and structure within networks and, 
based on visual representation, identified the following network features: i) tightness 
of ties; ii) how many and which firms are connected to organisations for innovation 
activities; iii) the structure of the network – that is, whether it is fragmented or well-
knit; iv) the openness of the network; and v) which organisations (including firms) 
function as bridges in the network. Thus, this thesis research extends and elaborates 
the LPA framework, bringing greater specificity and rigour to this approach and 
opening possibilities for factors that might easily be omitted through adherence to an 
LPA framework approach to policy analysis. 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of how economic and social forces 
influence network governance and structure, which is relevant for policy making 
(Pavitt, 1987). This understanding follows from the second set of general research 
questions (B1 and B2 as stated in Chapter 1 and made operational in Chapter 5 and 
subsequent chapters). As mentioned in Chapter 2, network governance and structure 
encompass issues such as whether the network is emergent or purposive, whether 
there are government efforts to promote networks (which may influence the type of 
network that is likely to emerge in a particular industry), level of openness of the 
network which influences its evolution, and the existence of network brokers that 
involve controlling mechanisms. Since different types of policy have proved 
important mechanisms to support public-private sector collaboration (Faulkner and 
Senker, 1995) and the establishment of ongoing networks of participants, the study 
of network infancy and evolution combined with studies on governance (understood 
as coordination) support the identification of elements that may contribute to the 
formulation of technology policies that address economic and industrial catching-up 
through the development and articulation of networks. 
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In addition, the analytical framework developed in this thesis to respond to the 
second  general research questions (B1 and B2 as stated in Chapter 1 and made 
operational in Chapter 5 and subsequent chapters) allowed investigation of the 
interaction among different networks (identified here as sub-networks) with different 
purposes and membership based on different principles. This highlights the 
possibility that a given network may perform according to its stated principles or 
those principles related to recruiting members (here related to the consistency of 
networks) or, alternatively, that it may depart from these performance and/or 
membership principles (represented here as the inconsistency of networks). Hence, 
this level of analysis separates sub-networks according to purpose, providing 
empirical evidence that questions whether a mapping of the predominant purpose of 
networks or other conventional mapping techniques for networks is adequate to 
reveal their influence on innovation effectiveness. This thesis concludes that 
networks are more than a collection of dyadic relations between actors, a mapping 
that we find in empirical studies such as Cantner and Graf (2010) and Cantner et al. 
(2010), as well as in the system of innovation literature discussed in Chaminade and 
Vang (2008) and Lundvall et al. (2009b). The thesis advances knowledge on 
network alignment (von Tunzelmann, 2003) by making this concept operational.
306
  
The third contribution of the thesis, also a response to the second general research 
questions (B 1 and 2 as stated in Chapter 1 and made operational in Chapter 5 and 
subsequent chapters) relates to the role played by networks with regard to firm-level 
innovativeness in a particular type of sector, that is, the high-technology sector, and a 
developing country context, that is, countries at an intermediate level of economic 
and social development, in which regional disparities can be substantial (Fagerberg 
and Srholec, 2008).
307
 As discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.4, the existing literature is 
undecided about when and how network structure and governance effects influence 
the effectiveness of policies aimed at promoting network formation and 
development. However, there are many studies of systems of innovation, including 
networks as a proxy for an investigation of the systemic links within systems, that 
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 Von Tunzelmann (2003: 46) defines network alignment as multiple networks that pull ‘in similar 
directions to one another, even when their purposes differ’ and ‘orient their effectiveness towards 
attaining certain goals for the relevant systems’ (von Tunzelmann, 2010: 4). 
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 Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) show that developing countries differ considerably in their science, 
research and innovation capabilities, openness to trade, production quality and standards, ICT 
infrastructure, education skills, quality of governance, social values and political systems. 
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argue that the engagement of firms in networks is relevant to improve firm-level 
innovation performance and economic catch-up, because networking increases the 
likelihood of firms’ learning by interacting (Ahuja, 2000; Bresnahan et al., 2001; 
Cantner and Graf, 2010; Castilla et al., 2000; Cooke and de Laurentis, 2010; 
Dodgson et al., 2008; Fuchs, 2010; Grasenick et al., 2008; Herrigel, 1993; Kenney, 
2000; Kim and Von Tunzelmann, 1998; Lazerson, 1993; Nohria, 1992; Okimoto, 
1989; Saxenian, 1994; Uzzi, 1997).  
The findings in this thesis show that high-technology (software) firms, in a country 
at an intermediate level of development (Brazil), which has large regional disparities 
(Lastres, 2007; Teixeira, 2008), engage differently in networks and show different 
innovative performance. When compared to the performance of networked firms in 
developed and other intermediate-level catching-up countries (such as in the studies 
mentioned above), Brazilian software firms embedded in regions with different 
structures (i.e. socio-economic and industrial development), show different 
engagement in networks and contradictory innovative performance. That is, we 
found that those firms less engaged in networking, the Campinas software firms, 
showed higher levels of innovative performance in absolute terms, and produce 
innovations that are closer to the technology frontier compared to regions where 
firms are more engaged in networking, that is, Recife software firms. However, 
although Recife showed comparatively lower innovation performance, networking in 
this region seems to have supported regional catching up. Therefore, a general 
technology policy prescription for the formation of networks as a mechanism to 
improve firm-level innovation and regional catching-up should not be adopted 
without very careful consideration of its intended effects; firm engagement in 
networks may not be a necessary condition for firm-level innovation improvements. 
Regional path-rigidity and contextual as well as network specific influences at 
infancy and during evolution of networks are also crucial elements in technology 
policy formulation. 
8.4 Limitations of this Research 
The thesis followed a multiple case study approach focusing on the investigation of 
network governance and structure and its interaction with government technology 
policy in a developing country context. The thesis examined two regional software 
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networks in Brazil, and the findings highlight problem areas that have received little 
attention from other studies on innovation in developing countries. The findings on 
regional network governance and structure can be generalized, but there are some 
limitations related to other findings. 
Firstly, the choice of a multiple case study limits the extent of the generalisability of 
the findings on network governance and structure to other regions and countries. The 
history of the two regions was a crucial element in analysis of how the networks 
emerged, evolved and their innovative performance. Within the time and other 
resources available to conduct a DPhil research project, two regions was practical in 
relation to data gathering for the thesis. Since it is impossible to know in advance 
what the structure and embeddedness of a network in a particular region will be, 
there is some risk of equivocal results if regions fail to exhibit all the expected 
relationships which then do not allow comparison of the magnitude of effects. This 
risk was realised in this research – the impact of network promotion policies was 
somewhat ambiguous between the two regions, which limits the strength of the 
conclusions. If a similar investigation of network governance and structure were to 
be implemented in other Brazilian regions or regions embedded in other developing 
counties, the findings might be less ambiguous. 
Secondly, the choice of the software industry limits generalisation of the findings on 
network governance and structure. The technological activities performed by 
software firms may require the creation of external formal ties with specific types of 
actors and the nature of those ties might involve less mutual dependence (and 
loosely-connected ties) than might be the case where the economic performance of 
collaborators is more closely linked. The investigation of network governance and 
structure in industries that require the creation of different types of external formal 
ties than those applying to software development might produce different results 
from the ones in this study. 
8.5 Implications for Policy  
The findings from this thesis research have implications for policy. Firstly, they 
suggest that there is no one-size-fits-all network governance and structure, which is 
consistent with the findings from other studies on networks (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; 
Grasenick et al., 2008). The institutional, cultural and economic settings may differ 
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among regions, and policies aimed at promoting network formation to improve firms 
innovative performance should take into account that reproducing the network 
governance and structure of regions that have been successful may not be 
appropriate to other regions. As discussed, the findings from this thesis highlighted 
that network promotion policies on their own may not be an efficient mechanism for 
improved innovation performance and economic catch-up.  
Secondly, the findings of inconsistency of sub-networks and poor engagement of 
organisations expected to play a primary role in fostering development and catch-up, 
or to be relevant throughout the life of the innovation development process, suggests 
that adjustments to the missions of these organisations are required, and policies 
aimed at the formation of networks should take those issues into account. 
8.6 Questions for Future Research 
This thesis has identified areas not covered here which could be tackled by future 
research on network governance and structure. 
Firstly, the thesis was limited to the investigation of formal ties among innovative 
firms, and does not include informal ties or affiliations between firms and supporting 
organisations. Future research on network governance and structure could look at the 
relevance of informal ties and affiliations. This would enable a more comprehensive 
understanding of how a network might be supporting firm-level innovation activities 
in a developing country context. It would be a significantly larger research 
undertaking since the unit of analysis would shift from the network (where formal 
ties can be identified) to individuals or groups of individuals within the firm (where 
informal ties are likely to exist). Thus, it would be necessary to interview or survey a 
substantial proportion of actors engaged in a particular industry. This would ideally 
require and be most effective with state or industry association sponsorship. 
Secondly, future research could gain from investigating other software regions in 
Brazil, or other industries within the same regions. It would be useful to bring 
additional evidence on the roles played by regional and industrial effects on the 
network governance and structure in which firms are embedded. This would 
illuminate issues regarding the co-evolution of network governance and structure and 
technological development in developing country regions. In terms of the ex ante 
choice made with respect to regions, the present study made the most reasonable 
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choice given the time and resource limits. However, there are other regions in Brazil 
that could be included in a more extensive investigation, for instance Britto and 
Stallivieri  (2010) highlight the existence of about 30 software Local Productive 
Arrangements in Brazil.   
Thirdly, future research could examine network governance and structure in the 
regions investigated in this thesis, at some future time. This thesis examines the 
results well after initiation of central government promotion policies and rather soon 
after the implementation of state level policies. Examining these regions again after 
the accumulation of more experience with central and state level policies including 
the effects of backing away from or abandoning policies, would be informative.  It 
would throw light on changes in network governance and structure and how such 
changes are influenced by government technology policies that aim at network 
formation as a mechanism to support firm-level innovation.  
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APPENDIX 1  
Table A1 Main public institutions created to support the Brazilian 
system of innovation – from 1951 to 2004 
Created in  Institution Aim 
1951 CNPq  Coordinate and foster the Brazilian scientific development. 
1951 CAPES Assure availability of skilled personnel needed for private 
and public entrepreneurship related to the country’s 
development 
1952 BNDES  Support entrepreneurship, mainly related to the industrial 
and infra-structural investments. 
1960 FAPESP Support the São Paulo state scientific development. 
1967 FINEP Manage the Financial Fund for Projects and Programmes 
Studies created in 1965. Later, took over from BNDES the 
management of the Techno-Scientific Development Fund 
(FUNTEC), which aimed to financially support post-
graduate degrees in Brazilian universities. 
1969 FNDCT Financially support the improvement of the Brazilian 
scientific and technological systems. 
1985 MCT Formulate and implement the national S&T policy.  
1999 Sectoral Funds 
for Science and 
Technology 
Financial mechanism to support research, development and 
innovation projects performed in the country. There are 14 
vertical sectoral funds and two horizontal ones (university 
industry links and the second aims to support the country’s 
research infra-structure). Mostly funds are managed by 
FNDCT. 
2001 CGEE  Provide studies, foresight activities and evaluation of 
strategies in science and technology.  
2004 ABDI Promote the Brazilian industrial and technological 
development through the improvement of local 
competitiveness and innovation.  
Source: Pacheco and Corder (2009: Table 13, p.52). 
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Table A2 Campinas software firms: main activities 
(Firm number was included for examination purposes only) 
Firm Service/ Product Business area 
Firm A Services Energy sector assets control; database qualification; 
recycle waste management  
Firm B Services  
Firm C Services /Products Data and communication security 
Firm D Services Software test 
Firm E Services /Products Digital recognition 
Firm F Services /Products Customized Software Factory, Software Test, 
Industrial Maintenance Management 
Firm G Services Console Games, Outsourcing in game development, 
technology for game development (middleware) 
Firm H Services /Products Banking software, ERP for banking  
Firm I Services /Products Outsourcing, consultancy, Supply management  
Firm J Services /Products Customized software; embedded software for 
electronic turnstile 
Firm K Services Consultancy and development of embedded 
software 
Firm L Services Application Performance Management (technology 
that supports management of applications 
performance) 
Firm M Services Genomic applications for agribusiness and human 
health; applications for logistic and management. 
Firm N Services /Products Geographic Information Systems for Electric 
Energy Distributers 
Firm O Services Mobility services 
Firm P Services /Products Software reusing 
Firm Q Products ERP 
Firm R Services development for mobility; outsourcing for mobility, 
consultancy 
Firm S Services internet social network 
Firm T Services /Products Simulation for engineering  
Firm U Services Agile development applications, BPM consultancy, 
Digital marketing, Testing factory, SAP 
consultancy, Business Intelligence, IT governance 
Source: own elaboration, fieldwork data collection. 
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Table A3 Recife software firms: main activities  
(Firm number was included for examination purposes only) 
Firm Service/ Product Business area 
Firm A Services /Products Hospital management 
Electronic Hospital Records 
WBI Business Intelligence 
Firm B Service Business Process Management (BPM) 
Firm C Services /Products Smart card 
Mobile TV 
Database performance consultancy 
Firm D Service Software factory 
Management and organisational consultancy 
Firm E Services /Products Outsourcing 
Customised systems 
Consultancy 
Firm F Service Corporate integrated solutions (intranets, extranets  
virtual communities, websites, and communication 
control)  
Firm G Service Transport management system developed in web  
Firm H Service Software factory 
IT management and governance 
Information security 
Software quality and performance 
Web and mobile development 
Test processes  
Systems integration 
Performance optimizations 
Firm I Services /Products Interactive voice response unit 
Computer telephony integration 
Firm J Services /Products Information management  
Information recovery 
Firm K Services /Products Operations and maintenance integrated management 
Customised development 
Equipment related middleware development 
Firm L Services /Products Musical technology and computing 
Musical games (mobile and web) 
Firm M Services /Products Educational games for schools 
Firm N Services /Products Game development  
Firm O Services /Products Mobile solutions  
Game development 
Firm P Service Security analysis and monitoring  
Digital certification 
Firm Q Services /Products Systems management for public authorities 
Systems management using GIS  
Source: own elaboration, fieldwork data collection. 
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Table A4 List of interviewed organizations and their representatives 
Organisation Position 
Associations President, senior advisors 
Consultancy firms Owner/managers 
Export Consortiums Directors 
Government Authorities Coordinator, senior advisor, and directors 
Higher education organisations Superintendent  
Incubators Managers 
Private non-profit research 
institutes 
CEO, chief scientist, R&D managers and operations 
manager 
Public research institutes Managers and coordinators  
Research Foundations Scientific director  and scientific director advisors  
Social organisations Directors, coordinators 
Supporting organisations Executive coordinator, coordinators, managers, and 
directors 
Universities Head of departments, professors and assistant 
professors 
Venture Capital Director and managers 
Source: own elaboration, fieldwork data collection. 
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Box A1 CNAE Classification for IT software activities 
62015: Customised computer programme development  
- Systems development to supply customised demand including activities related to 
module definition, internal functional specifications, tests for performance 
assessment; 
-  Programming development using programme tools and languages;  
- Supply of documentation of customised informatics programmes;  
- Web design; 
- Development of customised projects and database. 
62023: Development and licensing of customised computer  
- Computer systems or computer programme development (software) that allows 
customisation (further adaptation to customers needs) 
- Licensing or authorization for the use of customised informatics programme; 
licensing is provided by the developer. 
62031: Development and licensing of non-customised computer  
- Computer systems or computer programme development (software) that do not 
allow customization, such as: operational systems, applications for companies, 
computer games for all platforms; licensing or authorization for the use of non-
customised informatics programme; distributors of authorized non customized 
programmes. 
62040: Consultancy in IT  
- Analysis to determine customers needs or potential market, and systems technical 
specification related to its functionalities and application areas; 
- Consultancy services to provide user support in the definition of systems related to 
the equipment types and configuration (hardware), as well as informatics 
programmes (software), its applications, networks and communication; 
- Follow-up, management and controlling of informatics projects, i.e. the 
coordination of activities involving the definition, implementation and 
operationalisation of informatics projects; 
- Consultancy for systems and solution integration (i.e. structuring activities and 
operationalisation of functional final solution, from the merging of different systems, 
keeping the essential characteristics); 
- Web sites updating; 
- Customising services for informatics programmes (software), i.e. activities related 
to the adaption of software to customer needs to screens, terminologies, tables and 
other systems characteristics.  
Source: CNAE
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APPENDIX 2 – QUESTIONNAIRES 
2A Questionnaire - Firms 
 
SECTION A - GENERAL INFORMATION - FIRM AND EMPLOYEE 
 
FIRM 
Name of firm: to be filled in by myself previous to the interview 
Address of firm: to be filled in by myself previous to the interview  
Year of foundation: to be filled in by myself previous to the interview  
Number of employees: …………………………………... 
Market: (   ) Local, (   ) Regional, (   ) National, (   ) International, (   ) All  
Size of firm: Micro (   ), Small (   ), Medium (   ), Large (   )  
Firm Activities: Service (    ), Product (    ), Both (    ) 
Was your firm awarded with the:  
CMMI (Capability Maturity Model Integration) 
(     ) Yes, which level?..........; (     ) No 
If No, is your firm considering an application? (     ) Yes, when?..........; 
(     ) No 
MPS.br (Melhoria de Processos do Software Brasileiro) 
(     ) Yes, which level?..........; (     ) No 
If No, is your firm considering an application? (     ) Yes, 
when?..........,; (     ) No 
Is your firm associated to SOFTEX Recife? Yes(    )  No (    ) 
RESPONDENT 
Name of employee: …………………………………………….…………… 
Employee contact details:  
Telephone (     ) ………………………………………...……………  
Email: ………………………………………………….…………… 
Position held at the firm: …………………………………………………… 
Years of employment: ……………………………………………………… 
Professional background:  
 College/diploma: …………………………………………………… 
Undergraduate degree/ year of graduation: ………………………… 
Postgraduate degree:  
Master/ year of graduation: ……………….……………… 
DPhil/ year of graduation: ……………….……..………… 
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SECTION B - PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATION 
 
B1. Does your firm perform which software applications (e.g. banking, business)? 
 
1. 4. 
2. 5. 
3. 6. 
 
B2. Did your firm introduce a new product or a new service to the market in the 
past 3 years? (Please, state below whether this product/service was new to your 
firm or new to the market) 
 
 No  Yes: 
how many 
New to 
the Firm 
New to the 
market 
National 
market 
International 
market 
Product        
Service       
       
If the answer is No, please go to SECTION C. 
 
If the answer for the question above is Yes, could you please describe what novelty 
your product/service brought to the market? 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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B3. Please, could you specify which of the following actors assisted your firm to 
design, develop or launch this new product or new service? (Observation: a 
separate sheet will be given to the respondent with the relevant list) 
 
B4. Is there any other actor rather than the ones mentioned above that gave 
great assistance to your firm with regard to design, development and 
launching? Which ones?  
 
B5. Considering the actor ‘X’, please could you tell in which stage this actor 
assisted your firm: design, development or launching? 
 
B6. Could you tell if any of the following reasons were relevant for this actor 
assisting your firm? (obs: a separate sheet will be given to the respondent with 
the relevant list) 
Ask about level of importance of the relevant actor: 
0=not important; 1= moderately important; 2= very important and 3= extremely important. 
 
(     ) Open Information Source 
(     ) Acquisition of Knowledge 
(     ) Acquisition of technology 
(     ) Access to new sources of financing 
(     ) Access to commercial information 
(     ) Innovation co-operation 
 
B7. Is there any other reason rather than the ones mentioned above that was 
relevant for this actor giving assistance to your firm? Which ones?  
 
B8. Please, could you tell if any of the listed motives were important for your 
firm to be linked to this actor, rating the motives as following (obs: a separate 
sheet will be given to the respondent with the relevant list): 
0=not important; 1= moderately important; 2= very important and 3= extremely important. 
 
(     ) Trust  
(     ) Opportunity  
(     ) Cost  
(     ) Collective identity  
(     ) Knowledge: availability and accessibility   
(     ) Geographical proximity 
 
B9. Is there any other motive that was relevant for your firm interacting with 
this actor that was not listed? Which one? 
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Observation: the respondent will receive a copy of this page for answering the 
following questions: 
 
B10. Is your firm at the stage of designing, developing or launching a new 
product or a new service? 
 
Yes  
No  
 
If the answer is No, please go to question B13. 
 
If the answer is YES: 
 
B11. Please, could you list which actors are assisting your firm at this stage? 
Obs.: The list with the network actors will be again provided in a separate sheet. 
 
1 __________________ 
2 __________________ 
3 __________________ 
4 __________________ 
5 __________________ 
 
B12. Is there any other actor rather than the ones mentioned on the list that is 
giving assistance to your firm? Which ones? 
 
B13. Please, could you tick (√) what are the reasons for these actors assisting 
you? 
 
(     ) Open Information Source  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Acquisition of Knowledge  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Acquisition of technology  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Access to new sources of financing  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Access to commercial information  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Innovation co-operation  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Other, please specify  Please name actors:_________________________ 
 
B14. Is there any other reason rather than the ones mentioned above that is 
relevant for this actor giving assistance to your firm? Which ones? 
 
B15. Please, could you tell if any of the listed motives are important for your 
firm to be linked to these actors, rating them accordingly to their importance? 
(List will be provided on a separate sheet) 
0=not important; 1= moderately important; 2= very important and 3= extremely important. 
 
(     ) Trust  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Opportunity  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Cost  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Collective identity  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Knowledge: availability and accessibility  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Geographical proximity  Please name actors:____________________________ 
B16. Is there any other motive that was relevant for your firm interacting with 
this actor that was not listed above? Which one? 
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Observation: the respondent will receive a copy of this page for answering the 
following questions: 
 
B17. Has your firm abandoned the design, development or launching of a new 
product or new service in the past 3 years? 
 
Yes  
No  
 
If the answer is No, please go to SECTION C. 
 
If the answer is YES: 
 
B18. Please, could you list which actors were assisting your firm before 
abandonment? 
Obs.: The list with the network actors will be again provided in a separate 
sheet. 
1 __________________ 
2 __________________ 
3 __________________ 
4 __________________ 
5 __________________ 
 
B19. Is there any other actor rather than the ones mentioned on the list that was 
giving assistance to your firm? Which ones? 
 
Please, could you tick (√) what were the reasons for these actors assisting you? 
 
(     ) Open Information Source  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Acquisition of Knowledge  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Acquisition of technology  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Access to new sources of financing  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Access to commercial information  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Innovation co-operation  Please name actors:_________________________ 
(     ) Other, please specify  Please name actors:_________________________ 
 
B20. Is there any other reason rather than the ones mentioned above that was 
relevant for this actor giving assistance to your firm? Which ones? 
 
B21. Please, could you tell if any of the listed motives were important for your 
firm to be linked to these actors, rating them accordingly to their importance? 
(List will be provided on a separate sheet) 
0=not important; 1= moderately important; 2= very important and 3= extremely important. 
 
(     ) Trust  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Opportunity  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Cost  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Collective identity  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Knowledge: availability and accessibility  Please name actors:____________________________ 
(     ) Geographical proximity  Please name actors:____________________________ 
B22. Is there any other motive that was relevant for your firm interacting with 
this actor that was not listed? Which one? 
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Observation: the respondent will receive a copy of this page for answering the 
following questions:  
 
B23. Considering that there is market demand for a new product or new 
service, how quick is your firm capable of responding to this new demand?  
0=Very slow; 1= Moderately Slow; 2= Quick; 3= Very quick  
 
B24. How is the speed rate of responsiveness for each of the stages below?  
0=Very slow; 1= Moderately Slow; 2= Quick; 3= Very quick  
 
 Design Development Launching 
Design of a new product    
Design of a new service    
Development of a new product    
Development of a new service    
Commercialisation of a new product    
Commercialisation of a new service    
 
B25. Considering that there is market demand for a new product or new 
service, how quick does your firm interact with another network actor in order 
to get assistance for designing, developing, launching this new product or 
service?  
0=Very slow; 1= Moderately Slow; 2= Quick; 3= Very quick  
 
Observation: The respondent may say that the rate of responsiveness varies 
accordingly to different actors. In this case the list below will then be given to 
the respondent, asking him/her to apply the following scale: 
0=Very slow; 1= Moderately Slow; 2= Quick; 3= Very quick  
 
Actor/speed Design Development Launching 
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Observation: the respondent will receive a copy of this page for answering the 
following questions:  
SECTION C - MARKETING AND ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATION 
 
C1. Did your firm implement a new marketing or new organisational method in 
the past 3 years? If the answer is NO, please go to Section D. 
If the answer for the question above is Yes, could you please describe which 
procedures were those? 
Please, for answering this section, consider the following definitions: 
A marketing innovation is “the implementation of a new marketing method 
involving significant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, 
product promotion or pricing” (OECD, 2005:49). 
An organisational innovation is “the implementation of a new organisational 
method in the firm’s business practices, workplace organisation or external” (OECD, 
2005:51). 
 
 Novelty 
Marketing innovation  
 
 
Organisational innovation  
 
 
 
C2. Please, could you tick (√) which actors assisted your firm to introduce a new 
marketing or a new organisational method? Please, state which reasons 
motivated your firm to be linked to each actor from the provided list rating as 
follows). 
0=not important; 1= moderately important; 2= very important and 3= extremely important. 
 
Actors Marketing Organisational 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
   
   
     
C3. Is there any other motive that was relevant for your firm interacting with 
this actor that was not listed? Which one? 
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Observation: the respondent will receive a copy of this page for answering the following questions (template for Recife): 
 
SECTION D - CONSTRAINTS ON INNOVATION 
 
D1. Considering the following factors as constraints on innovation to your firm, please could you tick (√) which of the actors below you 
looked for assistance in order to alleviate this/these constraint(s)?  Please, relate each actor to the motive as following: 
0=not important; 1= moderately important; 2= very important and 3= extremely important. 
 
Actors /Constraints 
Cost of 
finance 
Availability 
of finance 
Uncertain 
demand for 
innovative goods   
Need to meet 
government 
regulations 
Lack of 
qualified 
personnel 
Lack of 
information 
on technology 
Lack of 
information 
on markets 
Need to meet 
international 
regulations 
Porto Digital Management Unit                 
C.A.I.S. do Porto                 
SoftexRecife                 
C.E.S.A.R                 
Cin – UFPE                 
UNICAP                 
CEFET-PE                 
ITEP                 
SECTMA                 
FACEPE                 
AD-Diper                 
SEBRAE Pernambuco                 
ASSESPRO Pernambuco                 
FINEP                 
BNDES                 
Customers                 
Supplier                 
Other, please specify:                  
None of the above                 
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SECTION E – GOVERNMENT POLICY ASPECTS 
 
E1. Was your firm engaged in any process of government programme/policy 
formulation directed to the software industry in the past 5 years? 
Yes, which programme was this? Why? 
No, why? 
 
E2. Did you get in contact with the government body for engaging in this process or 
were contacted by them? 
 
E3. Why did you contact them? OR Why do you think that your firm was contacted? 
 
E4. In your opinion, do you think this programme formulation considered your 
demands and comments? 
Yes, how? 
No, why? 
 
E5. In your opinion, did the programme results meet your demands? 
 
E6. In your opinion, how do think that the programme affected the network as a 
whole?  
 
E7. In your opinion, how do you think that the programme is going to interfere in 
your relation with other actors of the network? 
 
E8. In your opinion, what do you think that are the strengths of the network? 
 
E9. In your opinion, what do you think that are the weaknesses of the network? 
 
E10. In your opinion, how do you think that a new government programme could 
improve the network as a whole? 
 
E11. In your opinion, how do you think that the programme could be improved? 
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2B Questionnaire – Supporting organisations 
 
SECTION A 
GENERAL INFORMATION –ORGANISATION AND EMPLOYEE 
 
INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION (to be filled previous to interview) 
Name of organisation: ……………………………………………. 
Address of organisation: …………………………………………. 
Number of firms associated: ………. 
Number of employees: ………. 
 
 
 
RESPONDENT 
Name of employee: …………………………………………….…………… 
Employee contact details:  
Telephone (     ) ………………………………………...……………  
Mobile phone: ………………………………………….…………… 
Email: ………………………………………………….…………… 
Position held at the organisation: …………………………………………… 
Years of employment: ……………………………………………………… 
Professional background:  
 College/diploma: …………………………………………………… 
Undergraduate degree/ year of graduation:…………………………… 
Postgraduate degree/ year of graduation:  
Master/ year: ……………….……………… 
DPhil/ year: ……………….………………. 
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SECTION B  
 
B1. How did you get involved with the software industry? (Background information 
about the interviewee) 
B2. Did your organisation participate in the formulation/implementation of any 
programme/policy directed to the software industry?  
B3. If yes, was your organisation contacted by any government body to engage in the 
formulation/implementation process? (if no, go to B6) 
B4. If yes: in your opinion, which reasons made the government seek for an 
interaction with your organisation for the formulation/implementation of this 
programme?  
B5. How did your involvement happen? (Formal basis or informal basis?) 
B6. OR Did your organisation contact the government body so that you could get 
involved in the formulation/implementation process? If yes, why did you want to get 
involved in the formulation/implementation process? 
B7. In your opinion, were your comments and demands incorporated by the 
programme? Why? 
B8. In your opinion, which reasons make software firms interact with your 
organisation? 
B9. How does this interaction happen? Is it on a formal basis, or on an informal 
basis? 
B10. Is your organisation contacted by other actors of the network? (e.g.: 
universities, SOFTEX, research centres?) 
B11. In your opinion, which reasons drive this interaction? 
B12. How does this interaction happen? (Formal basis or informal basis) 
B13. Does your organisation conduct activities to promote innovation in the software 
industry? If no, why does not it? 
B14. If yes, which ones? (e.g.: training, technology dissemination, technological 
upgrading, normalisation and standardisation?) 
B15. In your opinion, what are the strengths of the network? 
B16. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of the network? 
B17. In your opinion, which and how the strengths/weaknesses mentioned above 
could be improved? 
B18. In your opinion, who are the key actors of the network? Why? 
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2C Questionnaire – policy makers 
 
SECTION A 
GENERAL INFORMATION – GOVERNMENT BODY AND EMPLOYEE 
 
GOVERNMENT BODY  
Name of government body: ……………………………………………. 
Address of government body: …………………………………………. 
Number of employees: …………………………………... 
 
RESPONDENT 
Name of employee: …………………………………………….…………… 
Employee contact details:  
Telephone (     ) ………………………………………...……………  
Mobile phone: ………………………………………….…………… 
Email: ………………………………………………….…………… 
Position held at the government: …………………………………………… 
Years of employment: ……………………………………………………… 
Professional background:  
 College/diploma: …………………………………………………… 
Undergraduate degree/ year of graduation:…………………………… 
Postgraduate degree/ year of graduation:  
Master/ year: ……………….……………… 
DPhil/ year: ……………….………………. 
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SECTION B 
B1. How did you get involved with the ICT industry? (Background information 
about the interviewee) 
B2. Did you participate in the formulation of any programme/policy directed to the 
software industry? 
B3. Did firms participate in the formulation process of this programme? If yes, 
which ones (local, multinational, which size)? 
B4. Did firms contact your government body to engage in the formulation process? 
If yes: which ones (local, multinational, which size)?  
B5. In your opinion why did these firms want to be involved in the formulation 
process?  
B6. Were firms contacted by your government body to be engaged in the 
formulation process? If yes, which ones and why were they? 
B7. Did other actors (e.g. Universities, Industrial Associations, SEBRAE) of the 
network participate in the formulation process of this programme? If yes, which 
ones? 
B8: Were they contacted by your government body to be engaged in the formulation 
process or they contacted the government? Why were they contacted? OR why they 
contacted you? 
B9. How do firms and other actors’ involvement happen? Is it on a formal basis, or 
on an informal basis? 
B10. In your opinion, which reasons made the government seek for an interaction 
with firms and other actors? (get a separate reason for each of the mentioned actors 
by the interviewee). 
B11. In your opinion, what motivates the interaction with each actor? (come with 
elements about trust, opportunity, etc.) 
B12. Were firms and other actors comments incorporated in the programme/policy? 
Why? 
B13. How does the implementation stage happen, do network actors engage in the 
implementation of the programme/policy? (If yes: how do they engage in?; If no: 
why do not they? 
B14. In your opinion, in general terms why firms contact your government body and 
how do they do so? (e.g. use the Industrial Federation, Industrial Association, etc). 
B15. In your opinion, what are the strengths of the network? 
B16. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of the network? 
B17. In your opinion, which and how the strengths/weaknesses mentioned above 
could be improved? 
B18. In your opinion, who are the key actors of the network? Why? 
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2D Questionnaire – University, technical education school, research 
centre 
 
SECTION A 
GENERAL INFORMATION – ORGANISATION AND EMPLOYEE 
 
Organisation (to be filled previous to interview) 
Name of organisation: ……………………………………………. 
Address of organisation: …………………………………………. 
Year of foundation: ……………………………………… 
Number of employees: …………………………………... 
Activity: (     ) Undergraduate (     ) Postgraduate 
       (     ) Technical School (     ) Research Centre 
 
RESPONDENT 
Name of employee: …………………………………………….…………… 
Employee contact details:  
Telephone (     ) ………………………………………...……………  
Mobile phone: ………………………………………….…………… 
Email: ………………………………………………….…………… 
Position held at the organisation: …………………………………………… 
Years of employment: ……………………………………………………… 
Professional background:  
 College/diploma: …………………………………………………… 
Undergraduate degree/ year of graduation:…………………………… 
Postgraduate degree/ year of graduation:  
Master/ year: ……………….……………… 
DPhil/ year: ……………….………………. 
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SECTION B - RESEARCH RELATED QUESTIONS 
B1. Which are your research topics in software and how are they related to the 
software industry? 
B2. Do firms collaborate in any of these research areas? 
If yes, which firms are those? (local, multinational, micro, small, medium, large) 
B3. In your opinion, what are the reasons for those collaborations? (what do each of 
you seek in the partnership?) 
B4. How do these collaborations normally happen? Do you approach firms? OR Do 
firms approach you?  
B5. Which kind of collaborations are they? 
(     ) Formal (     ) Informal  
B6. In your opinion, what are the motives for those interactions? (check from list of 
motives below)  
B7. Is there a broker to mediate the collaboration? 
If yes: which one is it? In your opinion, why do think that a broker is needed? 
B8. Do other organisations collaborate in these research areas? 
B9. In your opinion, what are the reasons for those collaborations? (what do each of 
you seek in the partnership?) 
B10. How do these collaborations normally happen? Do you approach them? OR Do 
they approach you? 
B11. Which kind of collaborations are they? 
(     ) Formal 
(     ) Informal  
B12. In your opinion, what are the motives for those interactions? (check from list of 
motives below)  
B13. Is there a broker to mediate the collaboration? 
If yes: which one is it? In your opinion, why do think that a broker is needed? 
B14. In your opinion, what are the motives for those interactions, with the broker 
presence? (check from list of motives below) 
List of motives: 
A. Trust 
B. Opportunity 
C. Cost 
D. Collective identity 
E. Knowledge: availability and accessibility 
F. Geographical proximity 
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SECTION C – EDUCATION RELATED QUESTIONS 
C1. Which are the taught programmes that are related to the software industry? 
C2. How are the syllabuses of these programmes created? Are they discussed only 
internally? Do other actors participate in their formulation process? Or in any 
changing process?) 
C3. What are the aims of these programmes (e.g., strength academia in this area, 
provide human resources for the private sector?) 
C4. Is there any taught programme related to the software industry that you offer to 
the private sector? 
C5. How are the syllabuses of these programmes created? Are they discussed only 
internally? Do other actors participate in their formulation process? Or in any 
changing process?) 
C6. Why was this programme created? (e.g., to meet a demand from the private 
sector?)  
C7. Which audience is this programmes targeting? (firms, which firms?; 
technological institutes, previous graduates?)    
C8. How many students do you have enrolled per year in each programme?  
C9. What is the profile of your students?  
C10. How do you advertise this programme? (e.g., SOFTEX, industrial 
associations?) 
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SECTION D – POLICY AND NETWORK RELATED QUESTIONS 
D1. Did the government seek for your expertise when formulating any programme 
for the software industry in the past 10 years? 
D2. If yes, how did that happen? (formal or informal basis) 
D3. In case of informal basis: is the government representative a graduate/ex-
employee/ faculty who is on temporary leave to work for the government? 
D4. In your opinion, what were the reasons that made your organisation consulted 
OR not consulted? (e.g., scientific reasons, provision of human resources?) 
D5.  In your opinion, were your comments incorporated in the programme? Why? 
D6.  In your opinion, were your demands incorporated in the programme? Why? 
D7. In your opinion, what are the strengths of the government policy? 
D8. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of the government policy? 
D9. In your opinion, what are the strengths of the network? 
D10. In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of the network? 
D11. In your opinion, which and how the strengths/weaknesses mentioned above 
could be improved? 
D12. In your opinion, who are the key actors of the network? Why? 
 
